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21. At the Presidential level the emphasis should be on the establishment of program priorities and not on the consideration of program details.
22. Humphrey, "The Need for a Department of Science," 327 Annals 27 (1960). Also see Stover, The Government of Science 41-44 (1962). The idea for such a department is not new, for as early as 1884 a committee of the National Academy of Sciences made a similar recommendation. Dupree, Science in the Federal Government Ch. XI (1957).
23. In 1962 an Interagency Committee on Oceanography developed a ten-year plan for research in this field and efforts are being made to adhere to its provisions. Hearings, supra note 14, pt. 1 at 225.
24. See note 17 supra.
26. Federal Funds for Research, Development and Other Scientific Activities Table C-17 (NSF 64-11, 1964).
27. "The National Science Foundation ... excludes political science completely from its fellowship program and virtually excludes it from its research grants and other support. Such exclusion . is without rational justification, has worked and is working an undue, unfair, and discriminatory hardship on political science as a discipline and a profession.” From a statement of Dr. Evron M. Kirkpatrick, executive director of the American Political Science Association, hearings, supra note 14, pt. 2 at 1027.
28. 26 U.S.C. § 174 (1959). This section, added to the law in 1954 [68A Stat. 66], permits a taxpayer to “expense” (charge off in full in the year when paid or incurred) research or experimental expenditures, even when they involve what normally would be regarded as capital outlays.
29. A report from Washington in November, 1964 indicated that the Treasury was considering a proposal that would permit firms to take as a credit against their tax liability an amount equal to 75 percent of their research budget. Admittedly this has a serious weakness in that it applies to any taxpayer, even to one which does not increase its research effort. To correct this deficiency some thought was also being given to a proposal that would allow a credit but only in terms of research expenditures that were in excess of those incurred in a selected base year (this particular approach is now in use in Canada). Wall Street Journal, Nov. 9, 1964, p. 1.
30. It would thus bear the same organizational relationship to the Secretary of Defense as does the Defense Supply Agency. The latter was created by Secretary McNamara on August 31, 1961 to assume responsibility for the supply of commercial items to all the services. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (7962). In 1963 the Pentagon was reportedly contemplating "eliminating all procurement organizations in the individual services and centralizing all contracting and procurement in either the Defense Supply Agency or in an expanded version of it, which might develop into a single Service of Supply for all the armed forces.” N.Y. Times, June 29, 1963, p. 9. Regrettably, however, this report failed to materialize. In 1964 all that was done was to assign the Defense Department's Contract Administration Services to the Defense Supply Agency. The Services provide a variety of administrative support but they do not perform the procurement function, and it is this which is critical to a wider dissemination of defense contracts. For background on the Contract Administration Services, see Joint Economic Committee, Background Material on Economic Impact of Federal Procurement 1965, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. Pp. 38–41 (1965).
31. After their study of government contracting in the Defense Department, Peck, Cherington, and Scherer concluded that concern for too much participation by the civilian secretaries and their deputies was misplaced. “(I)t is perhaps more amazing that so much authority is delegated to generals and assistant secretaries. Even in the largest l'.S. corporations, projects involving more than roughly $100,000 are critically evaluated by at least a vice-president, and often by the company's president and board of directors. Yet, in contrast, Air Force weapon system project officers (usually lieutenant colonels) have authority to approve program changes involving up to $350,000, and the Air Research and Development Command can begin new programs costing up to $1 million and authorize program changes worth up to $5 million on its own initiative.” Peck, Cherington, and Scherer, “Organization and Research and Development Decision Making within a Government Department,” in National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, pp. 395, 400 (1962).
32. Some idea of what might be done was revealed in President Kennedy's appointment of a committee to aid in achieving a 10 percent rise in government
procurement contracts awarded to small business. V.Y. Times, May 3, 1961, p. 48. The Defense Department has had moderate success in fulfilling the 10 percent target. See Hearings on Military Supply and Service Activities in Economy before the Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the Joint Economic Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 52 (1963). Office Secretary of Defense, Defense Procurement from Small and Other Business Firms July 1964-May 1963, table II (July 8, 1965) (small business share of prime contracts up from 18 to 20 percent in fiscal 1965 compared with fiscal 1964). Through the deliberate manipulation of such goals and their rigorous enforcement much could be done to broaden the procurement base, for R&D as well as goods. What is required is the will to act.
33. The success of large-scale projects like the atomic submarine program, Mercury, and Apollo is felt to turn on the presence of knowledgeable project engineers who can press industrial contractors to insure that they deliver on time products that meet specifications. Complete confidence cannot be placed in the contractors; they must be closely supervised by managers who can coordinate the work of many engineers into a complete system. Yet NASA and the Defense Department are finding it very difficult to find and hire engineers with this kind of skill. One reason is the comparatively low pay that can be offered by government. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1963, p. 71. And the projects suffer as a result. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1963, p 1 (reports of gross inefficiency and bungled management by contractors and NASA during Project Mercury).
34. There is uncontradictable evidence that private firms, including those engaged in systems management, have grown with the aid of scientific personnel stolen from the government (indeed from the very agencies with which they work under contract). About 20 percent of the scientists, engineers, and administrators hired by Space Technology Laboratories (see Chapter V) between 1954 and 1959, while it was under contract to the Air Force, came directly from government agencies, mostly from the Defense Department. They were attracted by salary increments ranging from $1,000 a year to more than $8,000. General Accounting Office, Initial Report on Review of Administrative Management of the Ballistic Missile Program of the Department of Air Force 87-88, 102–04.
33. Presentiy the Secretary of Defense is authorized to establish additional civilian positions for specially qualified scientists or professional personnel to carry out R. & D. These positions can be created without reference to usual Civil Service limits on appointments to the higher pay levels. However, such individuals may not be paid at a rate higher than that prevailing for grades GS-18, currently set at $24,500 a year in accordance with the 1964 pay increase act (PL 88-426, 78 Stat. 400). This ceiling is still too low, even though it represents an increase from the pre-1964 level of $20,000. The NASA Administrator is given authority to appoint 425 scientific and relates personnel at the grade 18 level. 42 U.S.C. $ 2473(b) (2).
Persons of this calibre, especially if they combine both technical and managerial skills, can earn substantially more in private industry. Ultimately it must be recognized that certain kinds of personnel simply have to be paid more than others. A skilled technical manager is worth more in the market than a general administrator and government salary schedules will have to reflect this if the requisite kinds of personnel are to be obtained.
36. 4 Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Journal of Research and Education 295, 377–79 (1960). Over the 17 year period 1944–61 defense contractors took title to 13,000 patented inventions arising out of research done for the government. During this same time the government itself acquired title to 11,674 patents, of which 4,431 were attributable to its own employees, the rest coming from outsiders, mostly contractors who had elected not to patent inventions they had made. Of the 11,674 patents secured by the government, 7.228 were traceable to the Defense Department and 2,690 to the work of the AEC. Holman, “The Utilization of Government-Owned Patented Inventions,” 7 Patent, Trademark & Copyright Journal of Research and Education 109, 113, 125–26 (1963).
37. Id, at 378.
38. Id. at 380. Estimates as to commercial use of patents generally appear in Rossman and Sanders, “The Patent Utilization Study," I Patent Journal of Research and Education 74 (1957).
39. 4 P.T.C.J. of R. & E., su pra note 36, at 377. Compare Holman, supra note 36, at 136 (“Actual commercial use, either by the contractor or by firms licensed by the contractor, was less than 7 per cent of all patented inventions resulting from military contracts").
40. The most frequently cited reasons for not making more extensive use of government-owned inventions mentioned by inventors are that the product or process is only of government use and that there is insufficient market demand
for the product (the two reasons obviously are interrelated). Holman, supra note 36, at 156–60 (especially table 14). The preceding study shows that commercialization of a patent, regardless of ownership, is likely to occur only if it is capable of prompt exploitation and does not call for extensive preliminary development. This is one major reason why it seems essential (as is recommended infra) that a government agency take on the job of accomplishing this preparatory work-of readying an invention for commercial exploitation.
41. The Office of Technical Services publishes twice monthly U.S. Government Research Reports. The AEC also disseminates information in its Nuclear Science Abstracts. Private abstracting services are numerous; see, e.g., Excerpto Medico, published by the International Medical Abstracting Service.
42. In cooperation with a small number of universities and research institutes NASA has established centers which have as their function the distribution to industry of information generated by the agency and its contractors. For a good description of one center, see Weimer and Timms, “The [Indiana] Aerospace Applications Center," Business Horizons, Summer 1964, p. 93. Also see note 29, Chapter VI. More generally, Webb, “The Economic Impact of the Space Program,” Business Horizons, Spring 1963, p. 5.
43. In 1963 President Kennedy proposed the organization of a Business Extension Service, analogous to the Department of Agriculture's Extension Service. U.S. Code, Congress and Administration News, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 28, at 41 (1963). As a step towards the better dissemination of technical information it was a commendable proposal. However, the plan engendered opposition from some business interests and the House turned hostile, cutting an initial budget request of $7.4 million to $1 million and making clear that even this might not be renewed. 140 Science 1380 (June 20, 1963). At that point the Service-conceived of as part of a broader Civilian Industrial Technology program-was all but dropped. The 1965 budget spoke only of an enlarged Office of Technical Services (see note 41 supra). In the 1966 budget an even more conservative approach was evident. Additional funds were sought for the National Standard Reference Data System and for a clearinghouse to distribute technical documents resulting from government R&D. Neither proposal was new, and both were to be administered by the long-established National Bureau of Standards. 1966 Budget at 101. Passage in 1965 of the State Technical Services Act, in an effort to encourage the states to develop programs for the diffusion of science and technology, was an encouraging step. Its impact cannot yet be assessed but the Act reflects the unwillingness of the federal government to become actively involved in the dissemination of technical information to industry.
44. Development of Inventions Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, C. 60 (1948). The Corporation was formed on June 29, 1949 was a government grant of £5 million. In the words of the Economist its purpose was "to smooth the frequently difficult transition from laboratory to commercial development for inventions which happen to be made outside industry and can gain no support from private business.” 193 Economist 1186 (1959). Unlike the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, which also engages in development work, the Development Corporation has no laboratories of its own.
45. For a review of the products in whose development the Corporation has played a role see 186 Economist 875 (1968), 193 Id. 1186 (1959), and 201 Id. 1231 (1961). Cf. Duckworth, “Government and Industry Research : General Principles, Organization and Terms of Reference,” 178 Statist 887 (1962).
46. When it was set up in 1949 the Corporation was thought likely to generate enough revenue through royalties to cover its outlays. No doubt this was an unduly optimistic assessment. In the year 1959–60 it spent an estimated £500,000 and received royalties of £259,000. 201 Economist 1231 (1961). It is thougt, paving part of its way and the government is gaining some return on its outlays. More important than any notion of "profit," however, is the fact that inventions which otherwise would be collecting dust are being put to the good of the society.
47. Perhaps in most cases, it would be preferable to allow an invention to be used by all interested parties without the payment of royalty. This would tend to maximize exploitation and also avoid the passing along of the royalty to others in the form of higher prices. In a given case, however, the imposition of a rovalty might be appropriate. It is contemplated, as an example, that the Super-Sonic Transport (SST) will be developed at a cost well in excess of $1 billion. Of this the Federal Government will contribute at least $750 million, the rest coming from aircraft and engine manufacturers. According to the original plan the government's contribution would be repaid by the airlines through the assessment of a royalty of about 1.5 percent of the revenue from the plane over a 12 year period. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1963, p. 34.
SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT
REMARKS BY WILLIAM D. CAREY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
TO THE SOCIETY FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN SCIENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. SEPTEMBER 7, 1968
It's a pleasure to speak to you briefly and informally about some aspects of the relations of science and Government.
These are days of discontent and social criticism, of rising noise levels and shaken certainties. Any man's opinions ought to be offered with humility and questioned cheerfully. As omniscient as we would have you believe the Bureau of the Budget is, it is possible that we may have made one or two mistakes in the past 47 years.
The business before us is science and where it stands. It is no news that the current battle of the budget has rung alarm bells in the science halls of the Nation. After years of feast, now comes the harbinger of famine, the way I hear it. I suggest that we see the situation in perspective.
One, the budget for science is tight, and by past standards it will not change much in the short run.
Two, the Government is not resigning from the support of research, and Federal funds for science will continue to support the market in about the same proportions as in the recent past.
Three, the current pain in the research community might best be described as a cramp or charley horse in the financial muscle, and the prognosis for recovery is favorable.
Four, when we voice anguish about constraints on science budgets it may be worth noting that the aggregate Federal expenditures for R&D in the decade of the Fifties amounted to about $3.5 billion, while the total in the Sixties is in the range of $150 billion. This puts austerity in a slightly better light.
Five, the present strain translates into two or three years in a row of failure to provide financing for increments of inflation in the costs of performing research and for increments in the supply of graduate scientists coming on line. The effect is to force dollars for science to stretch farther and to defer the pursuit of some research opportunities.
Having made these points, let me not be misunderstood. I am not placid about the condition of science, particularly academic science. In a civilized society concerned with the best uses of its intellectual and material wealth, the pursuit of knowledge ought to rank high and it should compete on even terms with other public goals and preferences. But this is the heart of the problem : science is not seen as an integrated enterprise, and public investment in R&D is both highly discretionary and dependent on external goals, the chief of which is national security. I am not aware that our society attaches a conscious objective value to science as public enterprise, apart from accepting its utilities to defense, space, nuclear weapons and technology, and medical advances. In short, despite the prodigious scale of our outlays, we have not yet developed a strategy for the uses of science to society. We are basically opportunistic, and when luck turns against us we behave much like a bewildered child whose ball as been taken away.
It is also necessary to remember that when the pursuit of science and technology rests largely in the hands of Government, outcomes are inevitably a function of the process of political action. All Government is. And it is neither a stable nor predictable process because it traffics in the volatile preferences and pressures of a pluralistic society. Rationality in our behavior may be gaining, but it still has far to go, and those who pin their hopes for science on Government must be prepared for cold winters as well as warm summers.
It is one thing to argue against cuts in research funding but quite another to think through and formuate strategies and policies that might give science a rational and more secure base in our public values. How can science serve the ends of a free and decent society? What should be its directions, and to what investment alternatives should we address ourselves? So far as I know, there exists no such policy framework around which to crystallize purposeful public goals for science. That is our real trouble.
Looking to the post-Vietnam period and to the highest and best uses of the peace dividend, the question is whether conventional wisdom will govern our actions or whether we will have sufficient spine to think through our social responsibilities and priorities. It is already becoming clear that the peace and growth dividend is accruing callable mortgages from the defense sector, price rises, and workload increases. Time is running, and while we quarrel and demonstrate the crucial questions go begging. A great country with a record of ethical motivations in its public conduct that is almost unbelievable ought to stop shaking its fists and begin using its mind to find a right order of priorities.
And in the area of science, what should the post-Vietnam profile look like? Where can science and technology respond best to the conscience of man? High on my own list would come food and agriculture and aquaculture because a decade or so from now humanity faces the terrible tragedy of famine. My private list of priorities would give high rank to population control research, to R&D in the organization and delivery of health services, to the design and creation of new towns and communities, and to the pursuit of institutional change that can melt divisions in society and foster complementarity of organizational goals.
But your list might be very different. I have suggested in another forum that problems of choice for public investment in science and technology ought to start from a framework of social values, and that alternatives ought to be tested in that framework to determine their social contribution relative to costs. Despite some rude noises which greeted this rashness, I still stand on this ground. It will not accomplish much to deliver impassioned polemics against moon expeditions or other pet dislikes that pass under the rubric of science because they too have constituencies and policy antecedents, and they will not give ground to rhetoric. But if rational analysis can be applied to opportunities for R&D in a value-oriented framework we may at least influence future choices. And if reason should not finally prevail, we can say that it had its moment.
Perhaps we should also ask whether new institutional arrangements are needed to promote what some call the science of science and what you term "social responsibility in science.” If we are to come to look upon science as more than a derivative relation of national defense and oold war strategies— if we are to sense that it is a function of culture and humanism and the political economy—then perhaps institutional changes are needed to focus analysis, criticism, forecasting, evaluation, and planning, together with responsible advocacy, in a style not now observable.
I can think of a variety of directions to take for institutional change, if that is what is needed. One option is to create, in the rilight area between Government and the Universities, an Institute for Science Policy Studies, to be concerned with studies, analyses and demonstrations relating to problems of policy planning, goal selection, criteria for resolving problems of scientific choice, and the relevance of science and technology to the human condition. A second alternative would be to realign administrative machinery by creating a strong Cabinet Department of Science, Technology, and Higher Education, reflecting both the major and pervassive role that science exercises in the Nation's business and the organic linkage between science and graduate education. A third and somewhat appealing step might be to create a Council of Science Advisers modeled on the Council of Economic Advisers, to be concerned with the interactions of science and education, social development, foreign relations, technological change, growth, and human needs.
Such a Council might also be charged with producing an annual report on science and public policy goals with assessments of the balance, relevancy and progress of science, and with evaluations of emerging opportunities for social investment in science and technology. In all these alternatives we would be reaching not for more administrative statuary but for devices to apply thought and purpose to science as a social responsibility. So much for institutions.