ARTICLE VII.—THE GENESIS OF RIGHTS IN NATURAL LAW.

IN his treatise on International Law, Dr. Woolsey assumes, as the basis or starting point of the science, "certain conceptions which we call rights." He says, "In order to protect the individual members of society from one another, and to make just society possible, the Creator of man has implanted" these conceptions in his nature. "These," he adds, "are the foundations of the System of Justice, and the ultimate standard with which laws are compared, to ascertain whether they are just or unjust."

The question may very properly be asked, what is the origin, philosophically considered, of these "implanted" conceptions, which constitute the "ultimate standard ?" Must they be sought for simply in the individual consciousness as original principles, and are they to be found defined in consciousness, or are they developed from certain logical antecedents, and in order to define them must we appeal to something beside the simple intuitions of consciousness?

It will generally be conceded that there must be an objective beauty as well as a subjective sensibility that enables us to apprehend it; that there must be an objective right as well as a moral sense, however variously the latter term may be defined or explained. Our conceptions of right, in like manner, demand for their explanation more than subjective sensibility, or what is evolved from consciousness. Indeed, the theory of implanted conceptions approximates very closely to that of "innate ideas," and while obnoxious to the same criticism, offers no satisfactory account of "conceptions which we call rights." The attempt to define rights shows that ideas of personality, personal relations, and obligations are involved in it. These must be apprehended before any correct conception of rights is possible. In other words, we must first attend to what is implied in natural law, or we lack what is absolutely essential to the basis as well as definition of rights. Hobbes' theory of

rights harmonized logically enough with his theory concerning natural law, but was radically false because it rested on a false foundation. He gave to every man a right to all things-a right to which might only could give valid effect. So that in reality, before the conflicting claims of individuals were settled by the "Leviathan," right was practically synonymous with might, and based upon it. It would be difficult to prove him in error, if we concede to him, what he assumes, that natural law does not come in or find place till the conflict of individual rights is adjusted by authority.

Very properly, we reject a theory of rights which initiates a moral and political chaos, from which a "Leviathan" is needed to evolve order. Natural law does not come in subsequent to "rights." It logically precedes them. Whatever exists, comes into being under law-the law of its nature and relations, by which it is conditioned. The restrictions it imposes apply to rights, and assist us to define them.

As to the term law, it is used in various senses, and oftentimes without any discrimination between them. If, with Dr. Hopkins, we define law to be force working by rule, it may be applied exclusively to the force, as when we speak of what a law, in the sense of power, effects; or to the mode in which it works, and here we apply it to chemical combinations; or to the phraseology in which the letter of the law finds expression; or it may be employed in a variety of other senses that must by no means be confounded. The attempt to define it so that it shall apply alike in the physical and moral sphere, may give evidence of adroit generalization or marshalling of words, but it is only confusing when it ignores or leaves out of sight the radical distinction between physical and moral law. Yet, bearing this in mind, we may accept for the present that generic idea of law which involves conditions and restrictions to which the subject of law must conform, leaving to an after stage of discussion the specifying of what is peculiar to the moral sphere.

To law of some kind then, all which exists must be subject, for the simple reason that nothing created can exist without conditions and relations. If we could suppose only a single particle of matter to exist in the universe, it would sustain re

lations to time and space. Unless it is absolutely simple, indivisible, and without parts, it would possess a constitution, the elements of which would sustain mutual relations, so that in this way, also, it would be limited and conditioned. If another particle of inatter is called into being,, new reiations, and consequently new limitations would supervene, and with every addition made to the sum of being, new limitations would be imposed, which as the conditions of existence or operation, would be in their nature equivalent to law.

In such a case as this, therefore, law would be simply-as expressed the definition of the mutual relations of things as constituted by their maker (or of these relations with their necessary results), while the establishing or constituting of these relations-a synonym for creation-would be legislation in its most sovereign and absolute sense. But in this case, no moral element would be involved. The characteristic of physical law is simply that it requires invariable sequence, and that obedience to or compliance with it is a matter of necessity with which conscious volition has nothing to do.

But when we pass into the moral sphere a new element is introduced. Here mutual relations also exist, conditioning and limiting whatsoever they reach, but out of these relations spring mutual obligations, and it is to the obligations rather than the relations that we apply the term law. The relations, however, are not to be lost sight of. They are absolutely essential to an intelligent and just definition of the obligations which arise out of them, and must be exactly conformed to them. The relation of parent and child, of teacher and pupil, of employer and employed, must be kept in view if we attempt to designate the duties or obligations that spring out of their several relations. When these relations are clearly stated and apprehended, law, as expressed, will simply define what is to be inferred from them, while law, as the original or creative force, simply constitutes the relations themselves. But as law implies superior power or authority, exercised over what is subject to it, we must, to complete our conception of law, introduce into it this idea. Physical law, therefore, is the authoritative establishing (or defining) of the mutual relations of things, by which they are limited or conditioned; while moral law is the authoritative establishing (or defining) of the obligations springing from the mutual relations of beings and things.

To moral law, man, as a moral agent, is born subject. Whatever rights he may have or claim, must be held or claimed under that law, or in harmony with it. Antecedent to all civil relations, this law is binding, and thus, as obligatory in a state of nature-a non-civil state-is designated properly natural law. Existing under it, man can be said at first to know no other right than what is implied in such existence. Natural law, without lingering over any question of rights, proceeds at once to define obligations, and in doing so, for the first time evolves the conception of rights. It classifies man's relations, in order to distribute and define his duties. It shows how he stands related to his own being, and deduces the duties he owes to himself; how he stands related to his fellow beings, and deduces the duties he owes to them; how he stands related to his Maker, and deduces the duties which he owes to one who is at once his Creator, Ruler, Father, and Judge.

Here, then, is the basis for the three great divisions of natural law, made familiar to us in the pages of the old writers and authorities, who, like Puffenderf, have elaborately discussed the subject. Let us take up the first of these, the duty which man owes to himself, and see what it involves. Such duty exists. The very command to love our neighbor as ourselves, sometimes quoted to show that virtue consists in loving our neighbor, implies as the basis and measure of duty, love to ourselves. Natural law recognizes it under the head of the great law of self-preservation, most comprehensive in its scope. Each thing or being that exists originates from a force out of itself, and comes into being with the necessity of self-assertion imposed upon it. It must assert itself for what it is. This law is universal in its application. It applies to the clod, the crystal, the brute, the man, the angel. The extension and impenetrability of the stone are but forms of its unconscious self-assertion. The germination of the seed, the growth of the tree, the expansion of the flower, are but the self-assertion of vital organisms. Animal life, also, conforms to the law of self-preservation, when it expands its powers, or resists what would interfere with its integrity or normal development. In like manner, man, with his complex nature, physical, intellectual, emotional, moral, must conform to the same law, modified only by its objects.

He is to love himself, or in other words, to comply with the natural law of self-preservation.

But to do this, he must not only see that his physical wants are supplied, that food and clothing and shelter are provided for his body, but he must meet, as far as the resources at his command will allow, the demands of his conscious and rational being. Just as he should secure for his lungs the healthful air, and for his stomach the healthful food which they demand, so also it is his duty to provide for his intellectual development, for his moral perfection, in a word, for his attainment of that standard of acquisition, expansion, and perfection of all the powers of his being which is possible in the nature and conditions of that being. Just as he is, by the law of self-preservation, bound to resist the injury that violence might inflict upon his person, so he is bound to ward off all intellectual or moral wrong. All this is required by a simple regard to the law of self-preservation.

Up to this point, it is evident, we have been dealing formally with questions of obligation. Natural law has simply defined. a man's duty to himself. It has said negatively, man has no right to destroy himself, to mutilate his person, to pervert the design of his own being; and so far it is a denial of rights. But it has also said positively that man is bound to seek the development and perfection of his own being, and has thus made it imperative upon him to use the means at his command in order to attain this end. These means are essential in order to the discharge of duty. They are of the nature of talents put into one's hand, which he is to employ. Whatever is requisite to compliance with the law of self-preservation, taken in its broad but just sense, belongs to him. It is his right. If, to attain the end in view, he must have a free use of his faculties, that freedom is his right. If he must have the free use of the light and the air, that free use is his right. If he needs the soil to cultivate, the forest to furnish him timber, the mine to furnish him metals, and these are essential to the great end of his being, then these are his right. If the experience and accumulated wisdom of the past are necessary, he has a right to demand them of those who have them to bestow.

Here, therefore, in this department of natural law we have a basis for rights, and at the same time the means of at least