Or from Leibnitz, "I should rather say that there is a kind. of resemblance (between ideas and objects) not entire, and, so to speak, in terminis, but expressive, or a sort of relation of order." Or from Berkeley, that "the various sensations, or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together, cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them." Or from Reid, that "as to the nature of this Something, I am afraid we can give little account of it, but that it has the qualities which our senses discover." Or from Hamilton, that "the total or absolute cognition in perception is only matter in a certain relation to mind, and mind in a certain relation to matter." Or from Kant, the repeated assertion, that "the understanding cannot make of its à priori principles, or even of its conceptions, other than an empirical use." But what need of further quotation? Mr. Fiske can find a few statements to his purpose in those philosophers who are more or less tinged with Realism; but even in those exceptional cases it takes more imagination than a historian of Philosophy ought to possess, to insert into them such a principle as this, which Mr. Fiske quietly spreads over the whole school. The truth is simply this. If, for example, the statement of Plato, that "the same thing cannot at the same time, with the same part, act in contrary ways about the same," be a limitation of the possibilities of things, by the possibilities of thought—we admit the charge, and might quote whole chapters from Mr. Fiske's own work, to show that he himself is as exposed to the same accusation as any "metaphysician. But this is very different from the assertion that because Michelet's fanciful explanation of the cry of a new-born babe is "involved in the idea," it is therefore "also conformable to fact." When Mr. Fiske wishes to establish for his own use the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, he takes great pleasure in quoting from Mansel, and Hamilton, and Kant. But when he wishes to overthrow their subjective Method, he suddenly forgets that doctrine of Relativity, for which he had before praised them, and accuses them of having utterly ignored it. But this wretched misrepresentation is not worthy of further consideration; neither is the other accusation brought against the subjective method, namely, that it "ignores verification, and forgets to test it's premises as much as the inferences,"* an accusation as puerile as the rejection of Metaphysics, because it is "incapable of making discoveries."+ Let us turn from this flimsy attack and see what substitute for the subjective method is offered by "philosophic maturity." The "objective" method, it is called. It is the "method of science." It starts by verifying its premise, and not content with any apparent congruity in its syllogistic processes, it does not definitely accept the conclusion, until that also has been confronted with the phenomena." "A scientific explanation is a hypothesis which admits of verification-it can be either proved or disproved; while a metaphysical explanation is a hypothesis which does not admit of verification—it can neither be proved nor disproved."§ This method seems to centre upon the one word, Verification. "Verification is the comparison by means of observation, experiment, and deduction of the order of conceptions with the order of phenomena."T Very well. Let us turn this test about, for a moment, and apply it to Cosmism. A Something infinite, absolute, indestructible, exists. Will Mr. Fiske please verify, by comparing conceptions with phenomena? And, if successful, will he then please reconcile it with the fact that "we are incapable of transcending our experience?" This Absolute Something is a "Power." If it be true that experience gives to us, not Efficient Power in Causation, but only invariable sequence, the existence of this absolute Power is a pleasant task for verification, by an appeal to experience. Again, "a uniform state of consciousness is in no respect different from complete unconsciousness."** A very dogmatic assertion. How would Mr. Fiske verify it? By an appeal to experience, we presume, which furnishes uniformly the activity of change in consciousness. Very true-up to the limits of experience. But to go beyond experience, and to assert, absolutely, that a thing must or must not be as Mr. Fiske in this and innumerable other cases does assert-is not this Metaphysics the Unscientific? Can it be verified by comparing the conclusion with facts? * Vol. i, p. 99. † p. 128. I p. 108. + p. 98. § p. 127. Let us sum up this whole question of Method. A system of Philosophy is or is not consistent with itself, and true to facts, as facts are known by the human mind. If it is not, it is not Philosophy, but nonsense. If it is self-consistent and true, it is judged to be so by the producing and by the recipient mind. If a system is judged by mind to be self-consistent and true, that mind judges it by its own laws. That system of Philosophy which is judged to be self-consistent and true, is logical; that which is logical is logical just in so far as it is congruous with the laws of Thinking, and it is logical because of that congruity with mental law. The ultimate test, then, of the selfconsistent and the true in Philosophy, is found in the Laws of Thought, in the minds of the Producer and the Recipient. These Laws of Thought must be "ultimate facts in consciousness which underlie and precede all demonstration." Not verified? They are their own verification. Verification itself is preceded by and conditioned upon them-impossible without them. Now these Laws of Thought, with which a system starts out, either are or are not necessary-in the strictest of all strict senses of the word, necessary. If they are necessary, those conclusions which they imperatively and unconditionally deInand are TRUE, if there is in the world such a thing as truth. The premises find their "verification" in the fact that they are the primary postulates of that consciousness which is involved. in verification. The conclusion is verified by the absolutely "inexpugnable" certainty of its premises, and the absolutely indissoluble bond which unites it to them. This is what lies at the basis of, and conditions, and legalizes every thought-process, and this is called Logic; and the method which starts from this and works outward, is called the Subjective Method; and it is the only conceivable method by which the mind can ever dream of attaining the self-consistent and the true. Diminish by one jot or tittle the imperative necessity of this underlying and formulating Logic, and you cut off forever from the vocabulary of human thought the words "is" and "must." If there is truth, if there is certainty, if there is knowledge, if there is a ringing yes or no, possible to the human mind, it is because and only because of the absolute validity of the Subjective Method. Over against it stands skeptical Skepticism, a dubious suggestion of doubt, a question which does not dare to face its own interrogation-point, a hopeless impotence of mind, which has not the nerve to assert that it is impotent. Between these two there is no middle ground. There is no such thing as an "objective" method-outside of the "few disciplined minds" who possess the doctrine of Evolution. There is no such thing as a valid thought-process, unless it be valid because of it's obedience to the laws governing the thought-process. But a process of reasoning, even about Cosmism, is a thought-process, and if such reasoning goes out into the world of matter, or goes back to the nebulous mist, and then, through the tremendous circle of the ages, returns upon itself with conclusions which banish from it's method the one word "must"-then Logic, and Method, and Certainty, and Truth become the dreams of diseased fancy; and we are left to stagger beneath the doubt which consistently doubts itself-which questions even the process by which it became doubt. Objective" method? A method which by thinking draws in from the object, laws to govern the thinking subject in its very search after law? Yes, there is a process called Method; and the word objective is prefixed to the word Method. It is the process by which the Cosmism of Mr. Fiske is built up. Does it not judge itself? Could anything be more overwhelming than its self-condemnation ? "Cosmism" is a very elegant dress for so old a skeleton. to wear; but it has masqueraded so often, in so many different disguises, and has so often been stripped and sent back into the darkness, that it's reappearance, now, causes more amusement than terror; and the imperturbable common-sense of mankind smiles at its follies,-and lets it go it's way to a new self-destruction. ARTICLE IX.-THE NEW TRANSLATIONS OF LAOCOON. Laocoon. Translated from the Text of Lessing. With Preface and Notes by the Rt. Hon. Sir ROBERT PHILLIMORE, D.C.L. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874. 8vo, pp. 360. Laocoon. An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry. With Remarks Illustrative of Various Points in the History of Ancient Art. By GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING. Translated by ELLEN FROTHINGHAM. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1874. 12mo, pp. 245. FOR several reasons Lessing's Laocoon is and is destined to be permanently a classic. The most important piece of the noblest figure in German literature, it embodies his best qualities of style and exhibits the nature and working of his mind in transparent clearness. He who would (as it is commonly put), if having the choice between truth and its pursuit, choose the latter, discloses by his fine analysis in these pages how admirably fitted he was to pursue truth, and justifies the choice. To one who could thus trace to their source the causes of human feeling, define the fields of the various arts, and support his theory of limitations by a wealth of learning, so finely controlled by insight as to make the suggestion of pedantry impossible, the pursuit of truth might well promise more delight than a vast body of axiomatic truth. The possession of the latter, given to man without effort or appreciation on his part, might well seem to Lessing a dead and deadening thing, but the pursuit of truth difficult of attainment, with the prospect even of slight success, would involve the fulness and activity of life. Often as Lessing has been reproached by Vilmar, Goedeke, and others, with a relative indifference for the truth itself, his famous saying does not bear that construction: "If God held all truth shut in his right hand, and in his left nothing but the ever restless instinct for truth, though with the condition of forever and ever erring, and should say to me, 'choose,' I should bow humbly to his left hand and say, |