sheltered from the Confederate shells. The batteries above them are in a blaze. The stone wall at the base of the hill is aflame. Barksdale sees the threatening aspect. "I am hard pressed," is his message to Wilcox. "Send me reinforcements." But Gibbon is moving on Wilcox, and the latter cannot respond.

Cool and steady the advance. road is a sheet of flame. But onward into the storm, with a cheer, heard above the roar of battle upon the distant Falmouth hills, the soldiers rush into the sunken road and capture those defending it. They climb the hill; reach the breastworks; leap over them and seize the cannon.

The hills rain canister. The sunken

Barksdale puts spurs to his horse and rides to the rear, leaving half of his brigade and eight guns in the hands of the victors.

Early fled down the Telegraph road. Hayes also ran. Wilcox, who was not aware of the disaster, remained in position on Taylor's Hill, wondering what had happend. Had Sedgwick known his position, the whole of Wilcox's brigade might have been captured; but it required time to reform the lines, and Wilcox made his escape.

Long and loud and joyous were the shouts of the victors. The stronghold had been wrested from the rebels at last.

It was Sunday noon. Hooker had just fallen back from Chancellorsville, and the Confederates were rejoicing over their success, when a messenger reached Lee with the tidings of disaster. Fredericksburg was lost, after all. It must be recovered, or the victory at Chancellorsville would be only a disastrous defeat.

Sedgwick telegraphed his success to Hooker.

"Move and attack Lee in rear," was Hooker's order.

Lee sent McLaws to hold Sedgwick in check. The time had come when Hooker should have assumed the offensive. It was an auspicious moment,—a golden opportunity, such as does not often come to military commanders. But having formed his plan of fighting a defensive battle, he did not depart from it, and lost the victory which lay within his grasp.

Sedgwick having carried the heights of Fredericksburg, instead of following Early down the Telegraph road, made preparations to move towards Chancellorsville, and join Hooker.

Wilcox, meanwhile, brought two of Huger's rifle-guns into position near Dr. Taylor's house, and opened fire. He also threw out his skirmishers, made a display of his force, and looked round to see what

could be done to escape his perilous position. Sedgwick brought up a battery, and moved forward his lines. Wilcox fled, and succeeded, by rapid marching under the shelter of a pine thicket, in gaining the plank road, near Salem Church, where he was joined by General McLaws, and where also Barksdale rallied his troops.

Sedgwick brought up his artillery and commenced a fire upon the church, and the woods beyond it. Wilcox had formed his line across the plank road. His sharpshooters were in the church. He had four pieces of artillery in the road and on each side of it. He also threw a company of sharpshooters into a schoolhouse near the church. Kershaw's and Russell's and Bartlett's brigades moved forward to rout the enemy from the woods, Sedgwick supposing there was but a small force. to oppose him. The advance was over ground slightly ascending, through an open field, towards the woods, where the rebel skirmishers. were lying. It is a narrow belt of woods. Behind it were the church and schoolhouse, and beyond the church the woods where the main body of the rebels were lying. They drove the skirmishers from the belt of woods, halted a moment to reform their lines, gave three cheers, charged through the grove, routing the rebels there concealed. They surrounded the schoolhouse, captured the entire company of the Ninth Alabama stationed in it, put to flight a regiment lying behind the house. But the remainder of the Ninth Alabama, with other regiments, came to the rescue, succeeded in recapturing a portion of their comrades, and forced Russell and Bartlett to retire.

It was now nearly six o'clock in the afternoon, and till night set in there was heavy fighting along the whole line. Wilcox and Semmes several times advanced upon Sedgwick, but were repulsed. So far as numbers were concerned the contest was about equal. But the rebels were on commanding ground, and protected by the woods, while Sedgwick was in the open field. In this contest Wilcox lost four hundred and ninety-five men. He had six officers killed and twenty-three wounded. Semmes lost six hundred and eighty-three killed and wounded, Wafford five hundred and sixty-two. The whole loss of the rebels in the fight at Salem Church was nearly two thousand. Sedgwick, instead of advancing again, waited for the rebels to attack him, but they did not choose to come out from their strong position in the woods and try it a second time in the field. Thus the day closed.

Half of Lee's army was arrayed against Sedgwick, who held his ground through the 4th till night. Early, during the day, retraced his steps up

the Telegraph road, and, finding that Sedgwick had moved out to Salem Church, and that the fortifications were unoccupied, took possession, and thus cut Sedgwick's communications with Falmouth. When Anderson arrived he had no alternative but to retreat by Banks's Ford, where he crossed the river, without loss, during the night. Hooker also recrossed, took up his bridges, and the army returned again to its camp. In reviewing this battle, it is apparent that Hooker's movement to

Chancellorsville was a surprise to Lee. It was excellently planned and efficiently executed, each corps reaching its assigned position at the time appointed by the commander-in-chief. It is plain that Hooker's departure from his original intention-to await an attack from Leewas the cause of the disaster at the beginning of the engagement. Sickles's corps and Barlow's brigade being absent, the balance of the Eleventh Corps had no supports.

Had Sickles's corps and Barlow's brigade been in the line, there would have been not only no disaster, but Jackson would have been defeated at the outset; for, upon the return of those troops from Scott's Run, he was driven with great loss.

Jackson was driven by Sickles when the Third Corps returned to the line; and had Sickles and Barlow been in their proper positions when the attack was made, they could have repulsed him with greater ease. Though Jackson's attack was successful, it is not therefore conclusively evident that Lee's plan was wise. His army was divided into three parts, Early at Fredericksburg, Lee east of Chancellorsville, and Jackson northwest of it. Being thoroughly acquainted with the country, he was able to take his position unobserved.

noon.

There were several opportunities during the battle when Hooker could have broken Lee's lines. The battle virtually was lost to Lee on Sunday Hooker had fallen back from Chancellorsville, but Sedgwick had taken Fredericksburg. Had Hooker, when he ordered Sedgwick to attack Lee in the rear, on Sunday afternoon, himself advanced, Lee would have been forced to abandon the contest; but having resolved at the outset to stand on the defensive, the Union commander adhered to the idea, and thus Lee was able to retrieve the disaster at Fredericksburg.

The strategy of Hooker in the movement of the army to Chancellorsville must be regarded as exceedingly brilliant, but the tactics pursued after gaining his position were very faulty. It is said that in the bombardment he was stunned by the explosion of a shell at the Chancellorsville invasion, and that he did not fully recover his intellectual powers for several hours. But aside from this, it must be said that there was an error of judgment when he concluded before the battle began that Lee was retreating towards Gordonsville. True, Jackson was moving in that direction, but it was hardly probable that the Confederate commander would retire in that direction, exposing Richmond, or that he would retire at all, without first fighting a battle.

THE

CHAPTER XV.

GETTYSBURG.

HF success of Lee at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville led to an aggressive movement on the part of the Confederates. The Southern people demanded that the North should be invaded. The army of Northern Virginia had compelled McClellan to retire from the Peninsula. It had won the battles of the second Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. It had been only once defeated at Antietam. The Confederate soldiers composing it believed that under Lee they were invincible. The Confederate Government believed, and with reason, that if a great victory could be won on Northern soil it would secure recognition of independence on the part of Great Britain and France, and the breaking of the blockade by those powers. With so much to be gained it was resolved to invade Pennsylvania.

General Hooker, at Fredericksburg, the first week in June, received positive information that Lee was breaking up his camp, and that some of his divisions were moving towards Culpeper. The dust clouds which rose above the tree tops indicated that the Confederate army was in motion. The Army of the Potomac immediately broke up its camp and moved to Catlett's Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, where intelligence was received that Stuart had massed his cavalry at Brandy Station for a raid in Pennsylvania.

General Pleasanton, commanding the cavalry, was sent with his entire force to look into the matter. He fell upon Stuart on the 9th of June, on the broad, open plains along the Rappahannock. A desperate battle ensued, probably it was the greatest cavalry battle of the war, — in which Stuart was driven back upon the infantry, which was being nurried up from Culpeper to his support. The object of the attack was accomplished, Stuart's raid was postponed and Lee's movement unmasked. On the same day, Lee's advanced divisions reached Winchester, attacked General Milroy, captured the town, the cannon in the fortifications, and moved on to the Potomac.