an offer to the Colonies, in case they contributed equitably to the Imperial defence by money or troops and made "an ostensible contribution to the general supply," that the King would recommend to Parliament a relaxation of the restrictions on their trade, and would allow them "to spread into the continent of America."

Hartley's idea, like Burke's, seems to have been to accomplish exactly the same purpose as Lord Chatham had aimed at in his Bill, but to avoid an express definition of the power of Great Britain or of Parliament or of the King, leaving it open for definition by events as they should arise in the future. His prime object was to secure the recognition by the Colonies of some power to be exercised by Parliament, leaving it free to Great Britain to claim that its power was more than that exercised, in case it should be found necessary in the future to exercise greater power.

In explaining his resolutions, Hartley said:

My motion originates in the House of Commons, to desire the King, as the Executive Magistrate, to put their plan into effect. If the power of making requisitions to the Colonies is not in the King, my motion is to give the authority and sanction of Parliament to this measure. It is so far from being my proposition, to enable the Crown to raise what supply it can in America, independent of Parliament, that my motion is the very first which has ever had in contemplation to lay a Parliamentary control upon that power, and to require that all answers from America shall be laid before this House for the very purpose of controlling that power in the Crown. I have so doubly guarded that point that my motion is not even for the Crown to demand a supply from America, but for services to be performed in America, for the defence, security and protection of the Colonies themselves.

Hartley's resolutions met the same fate as Lord Chatham's and Burke's. Neither House of Parliament would

admit, directly or indirectly, that the power of Parliament over the Colonies was anything less than a power to bind them "in all cases whatsoever.'

Dickinson, Lord Chatham, and Burke all concurred in the conclusion that the Imperial State in the Federal Empire must, from the necessity of the case, adjudicate the rights of the Member-States, and incidentally, also, the limits of its own jurisdiction. Dickinson said, in his New Essay, that Parliament was "the supreme Legislature and full representative of the parent State, and the only judge between her and her children in commercial interests, which the nature of the case, in the progress of their growth, admitted." Lord Chatham, in his Bill, called the power of Parliament, sitting as the Parliament of the Empire, a "supreme legislative authority and superintending power"; and Burke, after having described the power of the Imperial Parliament as a power of "provident and beneficent superintendence" in his speech on American Taxation, said in his speech on Conciliation: "We are, indeed, in all disputes with the Colonies, by the necessity of the case, the judge."

Hartley, too, was enthusiastically in favor of Lord Chatham's plan of settlement, if it could have been brought about, and brought forward his resolutions in the hope of accomplishing the same result at which Lord Chatham was aiming.

It may, therefore, be said that every British plan of settlement, proposed in 1775, aimed at the restoration or the declaration of the Federal Empire.

L

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FINAL ISSUE, 1775-1776

ORD CHATHAM'S Bill, by describing the power of the State of Great Britain in the Empire as a power of "superintendence," inevitably precipitated a second debate, in the second session of Congress, which began on May 10, 1775, concerning the character and extent of the power of the Imperial State in the Empire. Lord North's Proposals, by providing for a Parliamentary determination, having in some respects the form of an adjudication, of the amounts of the contributions of the respective Colonies to the Imperial defence (and hence providing, by necessary implication, for Parliamentary adjudication of all the rights of the Colonies), inevitably precipitated a second debate concerning the respective functions of the King and the Parliament in the Empire. These were the two fundamental questions, if the British Empire was a political organism.

Before reaching the consideration of these questions, however, there had to be a second discussion and settlement of the preliminary question-whether the British Empire was a political organism, or State, from which withdrawal of any of the Member-States was impossible except upon dissolution by mutual consent, or whether it was a mere Alliance of States, from which one or more might secede at any time.

It has already been noticed that, at the first session of the Congress, this question had been strenuously debated, and that, as the result, the majority had been in favor of the Federal-Imperialist view, in which it was necessarily

implied that the British Empire was a State. In the recess between the first and the second sessions of Congress, however, the anti-Imperialist or Secessionist minority had shown themselves quite unreconciled to the view of the majority. The most pronounced anti-Imperialist utterance of John Adams was made during this recess, shortly before the news of Lord Chatham's Bill could have reached America. When that news arrived, it evidently cut the ground from under the feet of this minority. Lord Chatham's Bill was virtually an adjudication of the whole dispute between the Colonies and Great Britain, by the one man in whom the Colonies possessed absolute confidence, and who was recognized as the greatest statesman of his day.

Jefferson has borne witness to the profound effect which the Bill had upon the thought of America. 1775, he wrote to Dr. Wm. Small:

On May 7,

When I saw Lord Chatham's Bill, I entertained high hope that a reconciliation could have been brought about. The difference between his terms and those offered by Congress might have been accommodated, if entered on by both parties. with a disposition to accommodate.

In the Address to Governor Dunmore from the House of Burgesses of Virginia, of June 12, 1775,-in answer to Lord North's Proposals,-which Jefferson, in his Autobi ography, says that he drafted, it was said:

There was, indeed, a plan of accommodation offered in Parliament which, though not entirely equal to the terms we had a right to ask, yet differed but in a few points from what the General Congress had held out. Had Parliament been disposed sincerely, as we are, to bring about a reconciliation, reasonable men had hoped that by meeting us on this ground, something might have been done. Lord Chatham's Bill on the one part, and the terms of Congress on the other, would have

formed a basis for negotiations which a spirit of accommodation on both sides might, perhaps, have reconciled. It came recommended, too, from one whose successful experience in the art of government should have insured it some attention from those to whom it was intended. He had shown to the world that Great Britain, with her Colonies united under a just and honest government, formed a power which might bid defiance to the most potent enemies.

Upon the reassembling of Congress for the second session, there were two elements of the situation which made for unanimity,—the appreciation of the fact that the Colonies could not hope to succeed if they were divided among themselves, and the influence of Lord Chatham's opinion in favor of the Federal-Imperialist majority. The result was a partial yielding on both sides, which brought the anti-Imperialists into substantial accord with the Federal-Imperialists, and which led the latter to take an enlarged and more correct conception of the character of the Federal Empire. The circumstances of the yielding of the anti-Imperialist party to the general views of the Federal-Imperialists are narrated by Jefferson and were as follows:

On June 23, 1775, Congress appointed a committee to prepare a Declaration on Taking up Arms. The first draft, prepared by John Rutledge, was unsatisfactory to Congress, and the report was recommitted and Jefferson and Dickinson added to the committee. Jefferson prepared a draft, but it was not satisfactory to the commit. tee, and finally, by their request, Dickinson wrote a draft incorporating some parts of Jefferson's, which was accepted by the committee and by Congress. Jefferson in his Autobiography says of his draft:

It was too strong for Mr. Dickinson. He still retained the hope of reconciliation with the Mother Country, and was unwilling it should be lessened by offensive statements. He was