he possessed from eternity; and the second was the Logos first spoken into hypostatic or individual personal being, when God said, Let there be light. The Nicene Council and their advocates appealed to the Scripture, to confirm the derived nature of the Son and Spirit. The leading modern Trinitarians appeal to the Scripture in order to prove derived personality; although, on this particular point, I have rarely found them venturing such an appeal, choosing rather, as it would seem, to submit the matter to the arbitrament of metaphysics. The Arians appealed with great confidence to the Scriptures, in behalf of their views; and so have Unitarians of all ages. It is not the appeal itself, then, which is to move us. It is our duty to examine whether the appeal is well grounded in the laws and principles of exegesis.

It is impossible for me, consistently with the limits prescribed to this essay, to go at length into the examination of this subject. A few hints are all that can now be submitted to the reader.

I regard it as a point exegetically certain, that all the representations in Scripture of the Father's commanding the Son, covenanting with the Son [where is this?], sending the Son into the world, anointing him to be King, begetting him, giving him to have life in himself, and all and singular of the like declarations, either refer to the Messiah, the ɛávоwлos, the Logos incarnate, in the way of prediction and anticipation, or else in the way of history and as a statement of simple facts. I am fully of the opinion that this can be made out in an unanswerable manner, if the laws of language, and not the assertions of theological Symbols, are to be followed. I appeal to one simple consideration, which must go far in the mind of the sober and thinking reader, and ask: Why has not the Scripture represented God the Father as addressing the Spirit or Holy Ghost, as well as the Son; inasmuch as he sends the Spirit, and the Spirit is said by the Creeds to proceed from him in a metaphysical or physiological manner? Is the third person in the Trinity less important-less conspicuous even in the great work of redemption than the second? Is he less distinct as a person, so far as the divine nature is concerned? Why then is not the Father represented as conferring with him, and covenanting with him, and consulting with him, and doing other things of the like nature, which we are told he does in respect to the Son? Only one answer that will satisfy the mind, it seems to me, can be given to this question; which is, that all those transactions

just referred to, concern the theanthropic person of the Son, and do not relate to him as Logos only. John, the only writer of the New Testament that gives us a view of the Logos or antecedent divine nature of the Son, does not even aver that he was sent; but simply states that "he became flesh and dwelt among us ;" and then it was, that he 'beheld his glory, the glory of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.'

And when the Son himself prays the Father that he may return to him and have that "glory which he had with him before the world was," although I think this and such passages fatal to the views of Dr. Schleiermacher, still I do not feel any embarrassment in my views as to the point before us. The composite theanthropic person of the Saviour could speak of itself, in respect to either nature. If one says that Abraham is dead, we understand him of course to mean, that his mortal part is dead. Again, if one says that Abraham is alive, we understand him to mean that his immortal part still lives. So when Jesus is said to have 'increased in wisdom, and stature, and in favour with God and man,' we understand this to be predicated of the human part of his person; but when he says that he will 'have all the churches to know that he searches the hearts and tries the reins of the children of men,' and thus vindicates to himself the peculiar prerogatives of Godhead, we predicate this of his divine nature. And it is in the like way, that all those texts which speak of his state before the incarnation are to be construed. To assert that he was with God in the beginning, and that he had glory with the Father before the world was, is indeed to assert something which implies a distinction in the Godhead before the world began. So far as I am able to see, this stands full and direct against a part of the theory of Dr. S. and of Sabellius. But how such expressions can be construed as giving any liberty to speak of society, and covenanting transactions, and deliberative counsel, and the like, in the Godhead itself, which has one will, understanding, essence, etc., I am unable to see. Especially does this last idea of deliberation and discussion in the Godhead itself, seem to imply such a defect as to omniscience and infinite wisdom, as to be particularly repulsive.

Nor does the appeal to the plural forms of expression in the Old Testament justify the modes of representation in question; such as, "Let us make man; Let us go down and see; The man is become like one of us; Who will go for us?" and the

like. All these modes of expression seem naturally to spring from the almost continual use of the plural form as the name of God. But he who has well studied the genius of the Hebrew language, must know that this often makes an intensitive signification of words by employing the plural number; and particularly that this is the fact in regard to words designating dominion, lordship, etc. Such is the case not only with

,and many others ,תְּרָפִים, אֲדֹנִים, בַּעֲלִים but also with , אֱלֹהִים

even when they designate single objects. Elohim is for the most part as much as to say, supreme God. But if any still insist on the argument to be drawn from this, as evincing of itself a plurality in the Godhead, what shall be said of its use in Ps. 45: 6, 7, where first the Son and then the Father is each respectively called Elohim? Is there then a plurality of persons in the Son and in the Father too?

It is then on the ground of this plurality as to form in the name of God, that we may most naturally account for such modes of expression as "Let us make man, etc." At all events, the subject of such plurality of names is encompassed with so many difficulties, when viewed in any other light, that nothing positive can safely be built upon it, in respect to plurality in the Godhead; an expression, by the way, against which the graver and more cautious writers on the subject of the Trinity are often warning us, because of its polytheistic aspect.

When moreover we are asked, with a kind of assurance which seems to be well persuaded that no satisfactory answer can be given, 'How could God make the worlds by his Son, if he had no Son until the incarnation?' We may answer in the first place, by asking, How could he "create all things by Jesus Christ," if Jesus Christ did not exist before the incarnation? In both cases the same answer is to be made, viz., that the divine nature that dwelt in Jesus did exist before all worlds, and created the worlds. Son, in such cases, is used as a proper name, descriptive of the whole person. In the second place we might say, that the question urged on us assumes, that we do not believe what we expressly profess to believe, viz., that there was a distinction in the Godhead, which laid the foundation for the development of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which distinction was prior to all time and absolutely eternal.

I have one more suggestion to make. This is, that the names themselves, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are names given not so much to characterize the original distinctions in the Godhead,

as those by which the Godhead is disclosed to us in the scheme of redemption. These appellations may be said to spring from, and to be peculiarly characteristic of, redemption. If any one demands an illustration of the nature of this, let him ask whether God was actually creator and governor of the world before the world was made? The answer must be in the negative. To complete this relation, and to warrant the full and proper application of these names to the divine Being, the creation and government of the world must have first become matter of real fact. Why is not the same thing true now, in regard to the names Father, Son, and Spirit? Distinctions in his nature God always possessed. But these were not developed before the scheme of redemption began. The names could then, in their full and proper significancy, be applied only in anticipation of the accomplishment of this scheme, or else after its actual accomplishment. That the glorious Trinity in the Godhead has a special and peculiar relation to this greatest and best of all the works of God, the humble believer, 1 trust, will not be tempted to call in question.

If it be said that God's becoming creator and governor of the world depended merely on the voluntary exercise of the powers which he possessed of creatorship and lordship, and that therefore this case cannot be compared with the development of the distinctions in the Godhead; my answer is, that no essential or important distinction between the two cases, in respect to the principle concerned in them, can well be made out. God's original powers or attributes of creatorship and lordship were just as certain to lead to the development of them in the creation and government of the world, as the original distinctions in the Godhead were certain to lead to the development of them as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. In both cases, the causa primaria was the nature of the Godhead itself which possessed such attributes and distinctions. The attribute of creatorship was not an effect of voluntary arbitrament; it was original and uncreated; and being such, it was certain to occasion the development of creative power. And so in the other case; the distinction in the Godhead was original and uncreated; and being such, it was certain to occasion the developments of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. So far as merely the developments themselves are concerned, both are equally voluntary, and both depend on or arise from original nature.

But to proceed with the train of thought before introduced;

it is, I apprehend, principally because the Old Testament was a revelation merely preparatory to the gospel in its full perfection, that it does but obscurely (if at all) reveal the doctrine of a Trinity. I am aware, that this question has been often and zealously disputed. But the proper subject of debate is not, whether by a comparison of the declarations of the New Testament with certain things asserted respecting Jehovah or Elohim in the Old, and by the light which these declarations cast on the whole subject, we can now find evidence in the Old Testament of the doctrine of a Trinity. The appropriate question is, Whether the Old Testament in and by itself alone, reveals the doctrine of a Trinity? If it does so, and does it clearly, then how could the Saviour say, in reference to all that had been revealed by Moses and the prophets, "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath revealed him?" Surely all the natural and moral attributes of the Godhead, in the usual sense of these terms, were clearly disclosed by the Old Testament writings. What was there then for the Saviour to reveal, which neither Moses nor any of the prophets saw or could see? I am not able to answer this question in any satisfactory way, except by the supposition that Jesus means to declare, that God, as, exhibited in the economy of the gospel, was never fully and plainly revealed until this economy was perfected by the incarnation.

If I should be asked: 'How could the New Testament writers appeal to the Old Testament in order to prove the divine nature of Christ, provided it be true that the Old Testament did not clearly reveal that divine nature?' the answer is easy. In the first place, I would say, that I know of no place in the New Testament where an appeal is made for such a purpose. Even in Heb. 1. the texts cited are designed by the writer to prove the superiority of Christ over the angels, and not to prove his divinity; as John Owen himself explicitly confesses, in his commentary on this chapter. That the texts cited do establish more than this, (for that they do I fully concede), results from the nature of the case, and not from the particular design of the writer. The sacred writer intimates, that Psalm XLV. and Psalm 102: 25 seq. relate to Christ; but if he had not told us this as to the latter case, we should never have known and could not have conjectured that Psalm 102: 25 seq. did refer to the Saviour. It is only on his own authority, that we ground this reference. And as to the quotation of Ps. XLV., it seems to me to VOL. VI. No. 19.

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