Dynamic Statutory InterpretationHarvard University Press, 1994 - 438 pages Contrary to traditional theories of statutory interpretation, which ground statutes in the original legislative text or intent, legal scholar William Eskridge argues that statutory interpretation changes in response to new political alignments, new interpreters, and new ideologies. It does so, first of all, because it involves richer authoritative texts than does either common law or constitutional interpretation: statutes are often complex and have a detailed legislative history. Second, Congress can, and often does, rewrite statutes when it disagrees with their interpretations; and agencies and courts attend to current as well as historical congressional preferences when they interpret statutes. Third, since statutory interpretation is as much agency-centered as judgecentered and since agency executives see their creativity as more legitimate than judges see theirs, statutory interpretation in the modern regulatory state is particularly dynamic. Eskridge also considers how different normative theories of jurisprudence--liberal, legal process, and antiliberal--inform debates about statutory interpretation. He explores what theory of statutory interpretation--if any--is required by the rule of law or by democratic theory. Finally, he provides an analytical and jurisprudential history of important debates on statutory interpretation. |
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... question ? For example , Rehnquist's dissent in Weber made its case by asking Dirksen or other members of the enacting coalition in 1964 this question : " Do you want to allow voluntary quotas in hiring ? ” Rehnquist answered : “ No , I ...
... question . Which of these questions is truer to the intentionalist approach ? Which is the more accurate reconstruction ? I do not know . Neither does Rehnquist . Even if Dirksen had answered no to both questions , he might have ...
... questions . The Rehnquist Court's rupture in civil rights law is defensible if it can be justified by a robust critical appraisal of law's practice . The question then becomes : Is the Court's substantive theory justified ? Here , I am ...
Contents
The Practice of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation | 9 |
Jurisprudential Theories for Reading Statutes Dynamically | 107 |
Doctrinal Implications of Dynamic Statutory Jurisprudence | 205 |
Copyright | |
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