BANKRUPTCY-JUDGMENT ENFORCING LIEN-JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT.-METCALF BROS. V. BARKER, TRUSTEE, 23 SUP. CT. REP. 67.-Action was commenced against a creditor nearly two years before the filing of his petition in bankruptcy. Final judgment was entered within four months before the date of filing. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provides that judgments obtained within such time are invalid and, consequently, an injunction was granted forbidding further proceedings on the judgment. Held, that judgment creditors, by commencing action more than four months before the date of filing, acquired an equitable lien on debtor's property which could not be invalidated by the provisions of the act.

The court in this case has followed the general rule that the filing of a judgment creditor's bill creates an equitable lien. Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sandf. Ch. 494; Miller v. Sherry, 2 Wall. 237. It was contended that such lien, being contingent upon the recovery of a judgment, must depend also upon the judgment's validity. But a judgment creditor's lien is considered equivalent to an equitable levy. Freedmen's Sav. & T. Co. v. Earle, 110 U. S. 710. The court further held that the District Court of the United States was without jurisdiction to issue an injunction in this case under the rule recently reiterated in Louisville Trust Co. v. Cominger, 184 U. S. 18, that Federal Courts may not interfere to affect the validity of the judgments of State tribunals.

BANKRUPTCY-LIABILITY ON LEASE.-IN RE HAYS, FOSTER & WARD Co., 117 FED. 879.-Held, where a tenant is adjudged a bankrupt, such adjudication terminates the existing relation of landlord and tenant, and the landlord is not entitled to prove, as against the bankrupt's estate a claim for rent accruing after the adjudication.

The most recent decisions are not in accord as to the rights of a landlord against his tenant in bankruptcy. In re Mitchell, 116 Fed. 87, holds that a landlord has a lien for rent growing due, basing the decision on a priority law of the State. A State statute may grant to a landlord such a lien in case of attachment, but it does not apply to a tenant in bankruptcy. In re Jefferson, 93 Fed. 948. The adjudication terminates all contractual relations. In re Webb, 29 Fed. Cas. 494. A claim for future rent is not a fixed liability. Bankrupt Act, 1898, Sec. 63. Only rent in arrear can be made the subject of distress. Bray v. Cobb, 100 Fed. 272.

CARRIERS-STREET RAILWAY TRANSFERS-MISTAKE OF AGENT.-LAWSHE V. TACOMA RY. Co., 70 PAC. 118 (Wash.).—A passenger received a transfer to a line other than the one he requested. On refusal of the conductor to accept it, he declined to pay further fare, and was ejected. Held, the company was liable.

The authorities are in conflict, many of them holding that the ticket is the sole criterion of the passenger's right of passage, and if he is ejected because of a defective ticket, his only remedy is an action for negligent mistake, or for breach of contract and not for expulsion. Bradshaw v. Boston Ry. Co., 135 Mass. 407; Western Ry. Co. v. Stocksdale, 83 Md. 245; · Yorton v. Milwaukee Ry. Co., 54 Wis. 234; Poulin v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 6 U. S. App. 298. Other courts have held that the passenger so ejected may maintain an action for his ejection. Muckle v. Rochester Ry. Co., 79 Hun 32; O'Rourke v. Railway Co., 103 Tenn. 124. In Krueger v. R. R. Co.,

68 Minn. 445, it was held that if the circumstances show a probability of a mistake on the part of the company, the conductor will not be justified in ejecting him without further inquiry.

CHECK-LIABILITY OF DRAWER-Presentation.-EDMISTEN V. HERPOLSHEIMER ET AL., 92 N. W. 138 (NEB.).—In the absence of special circumstances, in order to hold the drawer liable on his check, held, that it must be presented not later than the day following its receipt, provided the payee receives it in the same place in which the bank is located upon which it is drawn. Sedgwick, J., dissenting.

The present tendency of the courts, as indicated by the Negotiable Instruments Law, New York Laws 1897, Chap. 612, is to require presentation within a reasonable time, determined by the facts in each case. Grafton Nat. Bank v. Buckhannon Nat. Bank, 80 Md. 475; Robinson v. Ames, 20 Johns. 146. Although supported by some authority the decision in the case in hand would seem arbitrary and not according to the best decisions. Smith v. Jones, 20 Wend. 192; Gowan v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 176.

CONSIDERATION-PAYMENT OF DEBT OF THIRD PARTY-PROMISE To Repay. -THOMSON ET AL. V. THOMSON, 78 N. Y. SUPP. 389.-Plaintiffs being under no obligation to pay defendant's debt, did so without request but were afterwards promised reimbursement by defendant. Held, plaintiff could not recover on subsequent promise as it was without consideration.

The English cases relied on decide instances where the promise is based on a mere moral obligation and do not refer to cases where one does what another was legally bound to do. Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Adolph. &. E. 438. The text writers support the proposition that where one pays a debt for another who subsequently promises reimbursement the law will imply a previous request. I Parsons, Cont. 495. All cases directly applicable hold contrary to the finding in this instance. Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 378; Gleason v. Dyke, 22 Pick. 390; Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LIMITING HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN.STATE V. BUCHANAN, 70 PAC. 52 (WASH.).-Held, a statute providing that no female shall be employed in certain business establishments more than 10 hours in a day, is constitutional.

In Com. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383, it was held that a statute limiting the hours of labor of women in factories was a valid health regulation. But an almost identical statute was held unconstitutional as restricting liberty of contract in Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98. So a statute of Utah limiting hours of labor in mines was upheld in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, where it is laid down that a reasonable limitation, necessary for the preservation of health of employes, is within police powers. But In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, holds that mere fact of probable injury to health of employes is not a valid support for such a statute, where there is no injury to general public. In New York, on ground of protection to public, hours of labor on railroads may be limited; People v. Phyfe, 136 N. Y. 554; also in bakeries. People v. Lochner, 73 N. Y. App. Div. 120. While impossible to reconcile the decisions, the weight of authority seems to sustain at least such statutes as the one passed upon here. Tied., Fed. Con. of Pers. and Prop., par. 102.

CONSTITUTIONAl Law-Police Power-Regulation of SHEEP HERDING.Sweet V. Ballentine, 69 Pac. 995 (IDAHO).-Held, statutes prohibiting the grazing and herding of sheep within two miles of inhabited dwellings, are valid police regulations. Affirming Sifers v. Johnson, 65 Pac. 709 (Idaho).

No such law as this appears to exist in any other State. Apparently the only authority on the subject is 2 Tied., Fed. Con. of Pers. and Prop. p. 838: "The clash of interests between stock-raising and farming calls for the interference of the State by the institution of police regulations; and whether the regulations shall subordinate the stock-raising interest to that of farming, or vice versa, is a matter for the legislative discretion, and is not a judicial question." Stockslager, J., strongly dissents, and holds that to give one citizen an advantage over another in the mere matter of the use of public domain, or in mere matter of general privileges and advantages, is an unconstitutional discrimination.

CUSTOMS DUTIES-IMPORTATIONS FROM ALGERIA QUESTION FOR THE COURTS.-TARTAR CHEMICAL Co. v. UNITED STATES, 116 FED. 726.-The board of general appraisers connected with the State Department had decided, contrary to the evidence furnished by the French government, that Algeria is not a part of France, but simply a French colony and not within the scope of the reciprocal commercial agreement between France and the United States. On appeal, held, that this is a judicial question for the courts and not a political one on which the determination of an executive department is conclusive.

It is clear that section 15 of the Customs Administrative Act, 26 U. S. Stat. 137, under which jurisdiction is claimed to try cases on appeal from the board of appraisers, does not apply to "political" questions, which have always been held to be under the control of the executive branch of the government. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170. The jurisdiction of the court then depends entirely upon whether this question is political or not, and on this point it is difficult to see the correctness of this decision. As is admitted in the opinion, if there was any dispute as to the boundaries or sovereignty of a foreign state, it would be a political question. Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253; Guadalupe Co. v. Wilson Co., 58 Tex. 228. So also if it were a question of the recognition of a foreign state. Luther v. Borden, 7 Howard 1. "Nor is it material to inquire, nor the province of the court to determine whether the executive be right or wrong." Williams v. Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415. Just what questions are "political" has never been judicially determined, and the opinion in the present case holds that the questions involved in such cases as those described above are political, only because connected with some dispute between States. But if questions concerning the boundaries of States be political, 1 Wharton on Internat. Law 551, it is hard to see why the decision as to whether a certain territory is a separate colony or an integral part of a foreign state, is not also political; and though there is no open dispute in the present case, there is a distinct difference of opinion as to the status of Algeria. The reasoning on which the exclusive jurisdiction of the executive over political questions is based would seem to apply. See Williams v. Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253.

GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS-PUBLIC POLICY.-DENEFF V. HELMS, 70 PAC. 390 (ORE.).—Testator just previous to his death, and in expectation of it, de

livered a sum of money to defendant, directing him to care for testator till death, then pay his debts, compensate himself for his services, and turn over the remainder to testator's sister. Held to be a valid gift causa mortis and not assets recoverable by plaintiff, testator's administrator.

The plaintiff contended that this was an attempted testamentary disposition and that defendant was a mere agent. But the court held defendant to be a trustee for testator's sister. As to the right to couple a gift causa mortis with a trust without defeating the gift see Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185; Curtiss v. Sav. Bank, 77 Me. 15; Clough v. Clough, 177 Mass. 85; Laucks v. Johnson, 70 Hun. 565; Hills v. Hills, 8 M. & W. 401; Schoul., Pers. Prop. (2nd ed.) Sec. 195; Schoul., Wills, Sec. 271.

ILLEGITIMATE CHILD-TRANSFER CF CUSTODY BY MOTHER-VALIDITY.— CUSSET V. EUVRARD, 52 ATL. 1110 (N. J.).—The putative father of illegitimate children took charge of them on an agreement by which the mother transferred to him all rights to their custody. Held, that the transfer was valid as against the mother, and being for the interest of the children, would not be set aside.

Contracts for the surrender of the care and custody of children by parents are contrary to public policy. Copeland v. State, 60 Ind. 394; People v. Mercein, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 399. A lawful father cannot by agreement with the mother divest himself of the custody of his child. Johnson v. Terry, 34 Conn. 259; People v. Mercein, supra. Nor can he deprive her of her rights by agreement. Moore v. Christian, 56 Miss. 408; State v. Reuff, 29 W. Va. 751. But where such contracts have been made, courts may, for the benefit of the child, refuse to set them aside. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650. In regard to the child "the court will not exchange a certainty for an uncertainty." Drummond v. Ashton, 8 W. N. C. (Pa.) 563; Bryan v. Lyon, 104 Ind. 227. In the case of illegitimate children the putative father has no right to custody as against the mother. Pratt v. Nitz, 48 Iowa 33; People v. Kling, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 366.

INJUNCTION-AGREEMENT NOT TO OPPOSE.-NATIONAL PHONOGRAPH Co. v. SCHLEGEL, 117 FED. 624.-Complainant applied for a perpetual injunction and defendants signified in writing their consent to its issuance. The object of the transaction was to use the injunction to intimidate others in positions similar to that of the defendants. Held, that the writ should not issue.

In American Co. v. Vail, 15 Blatch. 315, apparently the only similar case on record, the injunction asked was granted, but with the specification that no judgment was passed on the merits of the controversy. The Supreme Court, in Ford v. Teazie, 8 How. 251, has ruled that a judgment in a suit at law where there is no real contest is a "nullity." The same principles apply still more strongly in the case of injunctions, which lie, not as of right, but in the discretion of the court; Wormser v. Brown, 149 N. Y. 163; Story, Eq. Jur., 10th ed., 959a; and the use of which should be carefully guarded. Atty.-Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 370;Story, Eq. Jur., 959b.

INJUNCTION-PICKETING.-FOSTER ET AL. V. RETAIL CLERKS' PROTECTIVE ASS'N. ET AL., 78 N. Y. SUPP. 860.-Defendants, sympathizers with a labor union by design and agreement, distributed cards asking union men to keep away from the store of the plaintiffs and sought by picketing the vicinity to

peacefully persuade the public from patronizing their store. Held, an injunction would not be granted restraining the defendants.

Questions of this sort frequently arise and the decisions are by no means uniform. Where one knowingly injures another he must show justification or privilege. Here public policy is the justification. 8 Har. Law Rev. 1. The recent decisions which separate picketing and peaceful persuasion from all circumstances of threat warrant the refusal to enjoin. Allen v. Flood, (1898) App. Cas. 1; Justice Holmes in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92.

MASTER AND SERVANT-FELLOW SERVANT.-ORMAN ET AL. V. SALVO, 117 FED. 223.-Workmen engaged in constructing a railroad grade were divided into day and night shifts. A member of the night shift was injured by a blast, of which no notice was given, while sleeping in a tent provided by the master. Held, that the fellow servant doctrine did not apply.

In Washburn v. Nashville & C. R. Co., 40 Tenn. 638, the rule is well stated that one is not a fellow servant unless at the time of the injury he was acting in the service of the master. The following cases illustrate this princíple; a deck hand not on duty, Ry Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377; a section boss, killed while crossing tracks on way home from work, Columbus & T. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 515; an employee of a factory, injured by negligence of co-employee in leaving street in front of factory in a defective and dangerous condition, Baird v. Pettit, 70 Pa. 477. Contra, railroad employee injured while on cars, but off duty, Ry. Co. v. Ryan, 82 Tex. 565; Ry. Co. v. Welch, 72 Tex. 298.

MINORS NECESSARIES-COUNSEL FEES.-CRAFTS V. CARR, 53 ATL. 275 (R. I.).—An action for damages for indecent assault was successfully prosecuted by an attorney for a 17-year-old minor. After judgment, the minor attempted to enter into a disadvantageous compromise of the claim, but by the attorney's efforts the full amount was collected. Held, that the services of the attorney were necessaries.

There is no unanimity among the authorities as to what shall be the test to determine whether services rendered by an attorney to a minor are necessaries. A large class of cases hold that services rendered in relation to property are not necessaries. Dillon v. Bowles, 77 Mo. 603; 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law 275 (2nd ed.). Some authoritie adopt this rule excepting from it, however, services that are beneficial to the infant's estate. Epperson v. Nugent, 57 Miss. 45. Probably the best test, and the one sanctioned by the court in this case, is that no services shall be deemed necessaries unless indispensable to the personal relief, protection and support of the infant. Munson v. Washband, 31 Conn. 303; Barker v. Hibbard, 54 N. H. 339.

NEGLIGENCE-INJURIES TO CHILDREN-LIABILITY OF LANDOWNER.-PAOLINO v. McKENDALL, 53 ATL. 268 (R. I.).—Where an occupant of premises on which children were accustomed to play, set a fire thereon, and a young child was attracted thereby and burned, the occupant, though he had taken no precautionary measures, was held not liable for the injuries.

This case involves an application of the rule in the so-called "turn-table cases," established by the Supreme Court in Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657. It was there held that an owner of machinery or other property attractive to children, is liable for injuries happening to them, although wrongfully interfering with such property on his premises. The court