in an action by him as administrator, when his neglect is a contributing cause of the injury.

This question has never before been directly passed upon in New York, but this result is in accord with the decisions of other States. Bamberger v. Ry. Co., 95 Tenn. 18; Wolf v. Ry. Co., 55 Ohio St. 517; Tiffany, Death by Wr. Act, secs. 69-71; Beach, Contrib. Neg., sec. 44; Shearm & R., Neg., sec. 71. Under the view taken by these authorities the question is whether the beneficiary shall be allowed to profit by his own wrongful act, and the doctrine of imputed negligence laid down in Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615, does not apply. Metcalfe v. Ry. Co., 12 App. Div. 147. But where the cause of action is considered a survival of the child's right, damages are a part of the child's estate, and are cast on the beneficiary by operation of law; the parent's negligence in such case could only effect his recovery as sole beneficiary by applying the doctrine of Hartfield v. Roper, supra. Ry Co. v. Groseclose's Adm'r., 88 Va. 267; Wymore v. Mahaska Co., 78 Ia. 396. In New Jersey the court was evenly divided over the question. Consolidated Traction Co. v. Hone, 59 N. J. L. 275.

DOWER-ALLOTMENT-EXONERATION OF HUSBAND'S ALIENEE.-LONGSHORE V. LONGSHORE ET AL., 65 N. E. 1081 (ILL.).-Held, where a husband has aliened land with warranty, a court of equity will exonerate the alienee by alloting dower for the whole estate out of the descended lands whenever they are of sufficient value.

This question is a new one in this court, and does not seem to have been passed upon elsewhere except in New York and Kentucky. Wood v. Keyes, 6 Paige 478; Richmond v. Harris, 102 Ky. 389. But the decision is in accord with recognized equitable principles.

EMINENT DOMAIN-DELEGATION OF POWER-PUBLIC USE.-Fallsburg POWER AND MFG. Co. v. ALEXANDER, 43 S. E. 194 (Va.).—A manufacturing company, incorporated to generate power, light and heat, was granted the right of eminent domain. By the charter it had the option of devoting its products to its own use or the use of the public. Held, that as the public had no definite right to the use of the products, the provision giving the company the right of eminent domain was unconstitutional.

The law is becoming settled on the point involved. The right of eminent domain was given to manufacturing companies upon consideration of “general good" in French v. Braintree Mfg. Co., 23 Pick. 220, and Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, and denied in Hay v. Cohoes Co., 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 47. The reasons with which this policy of "general good" originated have long since ceased to exist. Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 323. By the modern doctrine, to justify the granting of the right of eminent domain to a private corporation, the interest of the public must be well defined. Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229. And the State must have a voice in the manner in which the public may avail itself of that use. Board v. Hoesen, 14 L. R. A. 114. See also C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. State, 50 Neb. 399.

EQUITY-JURISDICTION-TRESPASS-INJUNCTION.-FREER ET AL. v. Davis ET AL., 43 S. E. 164 (W. Va.).-Held, that where irreparable mischief is being done to real estate, and the title of the land is in dispute, a court of equity will enjoin the trespass pending the determination in a court of law of the question of the title. Brannon, J., dissenting.

This court has held in Watson v. Ferrell, 34 W. Va. 406, and in Becher v. McGraw, 48 W. Va. 539, that controversy as to title excludes the jurisdiction of a court of equity to enjoin trespass to real estate. The majority opinion, by the present decision, recognizes the modern practice. Pending the litigation of an estate at law, equity may issue an injunction to prevent waste. Griffith v. Hilliard, 69 Vt. 643; Erhardt v. Boaro et al., 113 U. S. 537; Fulton v. Harman, 44 Md. 521; Duvall v. Waters, 18 Am. Dec. 350.

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIONS OF DEVISEES.-DENNIS V. NEAL ET AL., 71 S. W. 387 (TEX.).—In proceedings for the probate of a will contested on the ground of undue influence, held, to be error to admit evidence of admission of one of several devisees, tending to show such influence.

This case holds according to the decided weight of authority. 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 343. The decisions are based on the principle that there is merely a common interest among devisees and in order that an admission of one may be used against another there must be a joint interest. 3 Starkie, Ev. 1708. There are, however, decisions to the contrary. Beall v.. Cunningham, I B. Mon. 399.

INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY.-RORICK V. RAILWAY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES' ACc. Ass'N, 119 FED. 63.-A policy insuring only "against physical, bodily injury resulting in disability or death," provided that notice of such accident should be sent "within fifteen days from the date of the accident causing the disability or death." Plaintiff's husband struck his head against a projection in a car, but thinking the injury trivial he continued to work for six days. He then became insane and died on the seventh day, an autopsy showing that the blow was the sole cause of death. Notice was given to the insurers within fifteen days from the disability but not from the blow. Held, that the condition of the policy was satisfied. Gilbert, Circuit J., dissenting.

The courts are not inclined to place a narrow and technical construction upon insurance policies but favor the insured. McNally v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 137 N. Y. 389. In Tripp v. Provident Fund Society, 140 N. Y. 23, notice within ten days of the finding of the assured's body buried in a fallen building, fulfilled the requirement of notice within ten days from date of the accident.

INSURANCE-FIRE-BLANKET AND SPECIFIC POLICIES-PRORATING LOSS.SCHMAELZLE V. LONDON AND L. FIRE INS. Co., 53 ATL. 863 (CONN.).-Property consisting of several items was insured by several policies, some blanket and some specific, each policy providing, "This company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of any loss on the described property, than the amount hereby insured shall bear to the whole insurance." Held, that for the purpose of determining the proportional liability of the blanket and specific policies, on the first item the full amount of blanket insurance is to be considered, on the second item such amount less its liability on the first item, and so on.

The existence of the specific policies makes necessary a construction of the prorating clause, to determine what shall be considered the "whole insurance" on each item. Where no question of apportionment arises, the whole amount insured by a blanket policy attaches to each item thereunder. 3 Joyce, Ins. 2456. Yet the weight of authority has held, where there was specific as well as blanket insurance, that the "whole insurance" on any item

should be determined by apportioning the amount of the blanket policies among the various items. Blake v. Ins. Co., 12 Gray 272; Lesure Lumber Co. v. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 101 Iowa 514; Mayer v. Am. Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. Supp. 227. These decisions, however, are but slightly supported by argument, and the carefully reasoned solution adopted in the present case seems a much more logical method of fixing the liability in accordance with the contract obligations of a blanket policy. The single similar decision did not go so far, holding only that blanket policies cover property specifically insured, to their full amount, "where there is no other property, described in the compound policies, which has suffered loss." Page v. Ins. Co., 74 Fed. 203, 33 L. R. A. 249.

INSURANCE-TRANSFER OF TITLE-CONDITION.-ROSENSTEIN V. TRADERS INS. CO. OF CHICAGO, 79 N. Y. Supp. 736.-Certain premises covered by an insurance policy were conveyed by the plaintiff to his son by a deed which the plaintiff recorded and in which a consideration was recited. No consideration was, in fact, paid nor was there any change in possession, the deed having been made for the sole purpose of preventing the enforcement of a judgment against the land. Held, that this constituted such a change in "interest, title. or possession" as to avoid the policy. McLennan and Spring, JJ., dissenting.

It has been held that a change in fact and not mere evidence of change is necessary; Ayres v. Hartford L. Ins. Co., 17 Ia. 176; and that there must be an actual change of possession in the case of personalty. Forward v. Ins. Co., 142 N. Y. 382. A mere agreement to represent to creditors that a sale has been made will not avoid the policy, Orrell v. Hampden F. Ins. Co., 13 Gray 431. The minority's contention that in the absence of intention to pass title by deed none will pass, is well supported by the decisions; Ten Eyke v. Whitbeck, 156 N. Y. 341; Steel v. Miller, 40 Ia. 402; Stevens v. Hatch, 6 Minn. 64; and it would seem that no such intention as a matter of law appears. Opinon of McLennan, J., p. 742.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-ORIGINAL PACKAGes-Cigarettes.-COOK V. MARSHALL COUNTY, 93 N. W. 372 (IA.).—A large number of small boxes of cigarettes, absolutely loose, were shipped into the State in violation of the State law. Held, each box will not be considered an “original package."

It was contended that this case should be distinguished from Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, because of the mode of shipping. In that case the packages were shipped in an open basket furnished by the express company, and, following In re Harmon, 43 Fed. 372, that a package need not be covered or closed in order to constitute an original package, it was held that the basket constituted the "original package." In the present instance the packages were piled in a loose heap and the carrier was told to take a certain number; but the court refused to distinguish the cases. In Iowa v. McGregor, 76 Fed. 956, it was held that the State cannot prohibit the importation of cigarettes in small boxes. See also Sawrie v. Tennessee, 82 Fed. 615. The position taken here, however, seems more reasonable and just, and will probably prevail.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS-CIVIL DAMAGE-Liability.-STAHNKA ET AL. V. KREITLE, 92 N. W. 1042 (NEB.).—Under a statute declaring that one licensed

to sell liquors shall pay all damages that individuals may sustain in consequence of such traffic, an action was brought by a wife against a saloonkeeper, for having induced habitual drunkenness in a previously sober and industrious husband. The defendant had retired from the business several months previ ous to the bringing of the action, Held, that the defendant was liable for the husband's consequent dissipated career, although he had ceased to furnish the husband with liquors.

The weight of authority is against this view because of the remoteness of the cause. Damages are recoverable only where the injury is caused proximately by the sale. Barks v. Woodruff, 12 Ill. App. 96. The continuance of the habit should not be considered a natural and proximate consequence. Although the injury-failure to support-results from a general besotted condition rather than from any single intoxication, yet those who have in the past contributed to the condition cannot, we believe, justly be held liable along with those causing the present continuing condition.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS-DELIVERY BY COMMON CARRIER, C. O. D.NECESSITY FOR LICENSE.-U. S. v. ADAMS EXPRESS Co., 119 FED. 240.-A common carrier having delivered a quantity of liquor in Iowa and having collected the price of the same for an Illinois vendor, was indicted for selling without a license in Iowa. Held, there had been no sale in Iowa.

The courts are in conflict on this point, the difference of opinion being upon the question as to when the title passes from the vendor. In State v. O'Neil, 58 Vt. 140, such a sale, C. O. D., was regarded as one upon condition subsequent, the title passing only upon payment to the carrier as agent of the vendor. This decision was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, three justices dissenting, in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323. The majority of decisions support this view, and under it, the carrier's liability seems unquestioned. See U. S. v. Shriner, 23 Fed. 134, and 12 Yale Law Jour. 165. The opposite view, held in the present case, viz.: that the title passed when the carrier received the goods, is sanctioned by the American note in Benj. on Sales, book ii, chap. iii. But it appears that unless the goods are sent C. O. D. the carrier ought in no case to be liable, for an unconditional delivery to a carrier passes the title to the vendee. Stanton v. Eager, 16 Pick. 467; Whiting v. Farrand, I Conn. 60.

LIBEL-NEWSPAPER CORPORATION-MALICE OF REPORTER-PUNITIVE DAMages. Gifford v. Press Pub. Co., 79 N. Y. SUPP. 767.-Held, that in a libel suit against a newspaper corporation, evidence of the express malice of a reporter is admissible for the purpose of recovering punitive damages. Ingraham, J., dissenting.

There is no authority on either side of this question in New York, and but little elsewhere. Exemplary damages on account of the express malice of its agents have frequently been allowed against railway corporations, however. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101; Elliott, Pri. Corp., p. 235, note 4; Sedg., Dam. sec. 377, note (d). But the analogy should not be extended to libel suits. Samuel v. Evening Mail Ass'n, 9 Hun. 294. It has been said that the granting of punitive damages is an anomaly in a purely civil suit and should never be allowed except for an actual wrong, and that therefore a corporation which was guilty of no fault in the selection of its agents should not be held; Mor., Pri. Corp. sec. 728; and this result, at least in the

case of newspaper corporations, was reached in Detroit Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447; Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481; Eviston v. Cramer, 57 Wis. 570. Where a corporation is held, it is on the ground of public policy, Mor., Pri. Corp. sec. 729, and cases. Of the cases directly in point, in Bruce v. Reed, 104 Pa. 408, evidence of the express malice of a reporter was admitted for the purpose of recovering exemplary damages from a corporation, but similar evidence for the same purpose was excluded in Robertson v. Wylde, 2 Moody & R. 101.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC UTILITIES -DEALING IN FUEL.-IN RE MUNICIPAL FUEL PLANTS, 66 N. E. 25 (Mass.).— Held, where there is a scarcity in the supply of fuel, falling short of a famine, but yet so great as to create widespread and general distress in the community, so that persons desiring to purchase are unable to supply themselves through private enterprise, municipalities may be authorized by the legislature to establish plants for the sale of fuel. Loring, J., dissenting.

This same matter was considered in Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 601, where it was held that the purchase by a municipality of coal or wood as fuel and the resale thereof to its citizens, is not, under ordinary circumstances, a public service which can be authorized by the legislature. But Holmes, J., dissenting, said: "When money is taken to enable a public body to offer to the public, without discrimination, an article of general public necessity, the purpose is no less public when the article is wood or coal than when it is water, gas, electricity, education, etc." No other court has passed upon the exact question. But municipal ownership of water and lighting plants has been generally upheld. 29 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 2; Crawfordsville v. Braden, 130 Ind. 149.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR PROPERTY DESTROYED BY MOB.CHICAGO V. PENNSYLVANIA Co., 119 FED. 497.-Mobs within the city limits destroyed property which was being protected by the military forces of the State and of the U. S. Held, that under a statute imposing liability for property destroyed by mobs, the city was liable.

The principle of making the city or county responsible for property destroyed by mobs is very old. As early as 1285 Parliament provided a remedy against the hundred, county, etc., in cases of robbery and murder. 13 Edw. I. This liability was extended to damage from mobs in the famous Riot Act of I George I. Responsibility is not removed because the State and national authorities are assisting in protecting the property. The fact that the State sends troops does not absolve the city from its obligation to preserve the peace. Allegheny v. Gibson, 90 Pa. St. 397.

STREET RAILWAYS-CONSENT OF ABUTTING OWNERS-CONTRACT TO PURCHASE. HAMILTON, ETC., TRACTION Co. v. PARISH, 65 N. E. 10II (OHIO.).— Held, that a contract purchasing the consent of an owner of lots abutting on a street, to the construction of a street railroad on such street is valid and not opposed to public policy.

The only decision on this exact question is directly opposed to the present holding. Doane v. Chicago City R. R. Co., 160 Ill. 22. But the general tendency of courts seems to be to construe statutes requiring the consent of abutting land-owners to the construction of street railroads,