State v. Haverly. Virgin, 36 Nebr., 735; Rockford Watch Co. v. Manifold. 36 Nebr., 801; Ross v. Sumner, 57 Nebr., 588. In regard to the same subject it is observed by the supreme court of New Jersey in Munday v. Vail, 34 N. J. Law, 418: "Jurisdiction may be defined to be the right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in the given case. To constitute this there are three essentials: First. The court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs. Second. The proper parties must be present. And, Third. The point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issue. That a court can not go out of its appointed sphere, and that its action is void with respect to persons who are strangers to its proceedings, are propositions established by a multitude of authorities." See, also, Laflin v. State, 49 Nebr., 614, wherein it is held that the peremptory writ of mandamus must conform strictly to the alternative writ. We there fore arrive at the conclusion that the thing adjudicated in the district court, and the only thing that could be determined under the issues therein presented, was that a vacancy existed in the new First commissioner district, because of the readjustment of the boundary lines of the several districts as before existing, by which the commissioner elected by and from that district became a resident of another district, and that an election should be had to fill such vacancy, and the order was accordingly issued requiring the respondent to call such election. Whether the commissioner elected from that district became entitled to succeed the relator, Connolly, or was legislated out of office, were matters only for consideration in determining whether a vacancy existed; and the finding in respect thereof was no more than a reason given for the conclusion reached, and whether right or wrong, did not enter into and become a part of the question adjudicated. It is frequently held that whether a court gives a right or wrong reason for the conclusion reached, such reason can not determine the correctness of the decision rendered, as the controlling factor is, whether the conclusion Western Travelers Accident Ass'n v. Taylor. reached is right, and not whether the process of reasoning leading to such conclusion was in all respects proper. The plea of res adjudicata can not, therefore, be sustained. From what has been said it follows that the relator is entitled to a peremptory writ of mandamus as prayed, and the same is accordingly directed to issue. PEREMPTORY WRIT ALLOWED. NORVAL, C. J.. dissenting. WESTERN TRAVELERS ACCIDENT ASSOCIATION V. ORVILLE J. TAYLOR ET AL. FILED NOVEMBER 7, 1901. No. 19.203. Commissioner's opinion, Department No. 1. 1. Suit Against Domestic Corporation: CODE: PROPER FORUM. Section 55 of the Code authorizes a domestic incorporated insurance company to be sued (a) in the county where its principal place of business is fixed by its charter, although its actual business is carried on and its officers reside in some other county; (b) in the county where it is situated, and it is situated in any county where it has and maintains a place of business, and servants, employees, or agents engaged in conducting and carrying on the business for which it exists; (c) in any county where the cause of action, or some part thereof, arose. 2. --: Under section 60 of the Code, all actions not provided for by preceding special provisions, must be brought in the county where the defendant, or some one of the defendants, resides, or may be summoned; and that section does not authorize an action to be brought against a domestic incorporated insurance company in a county not authorized by section 55. 3. Purpose of Statute: The purpose of section 73 of the Code is to provide the manner in which summons may be served upon a corporation, and it does not enlarge the number of jurisdictions in which suit may be brought. 4. Statute: CONSTRUCTION. Where one construction leaves a portion of a statute meaningless and nugatory, and another construetion gives to the entire statute an intelligible and consistent meaning, the latter will ordinarily be adopted. Western Travelers Accident Ass'n v. Taylor. 5. Presence of Officer Does Not Confer Jurisdiction. A domestic corporation may be sued only in the places provided by law, and the temporary presence of one or more of the officers of such corporation in another jurisdiction does not authorize the corporation to be sued there. 6. Statutory Provision Exclusive. When the legislature provides the county in which a domestic corporation may be sued, such provision is exclusive. ERROR from the district court for Douglas county. Tried below before DICKINSON, J. Reversed. NORVAL, C. J., dissenting. W. A. Prince and O'Neill & Gilbert, for plaintiff in er ror: Defendant is a mutual insurance company, organized under the laws of the state of Nebraska and located at Grand Island. The cause of action did not arise in this state; for the injury complained of was not received in Douglas county, Nebraska, but in Bryan county, Iowa. The only jurisdiction acquired was by service of summons on the secretary while temporarily in Douglas county. This court has frequently held that the question of jurisdiction might be raised either by special appearance or by answer. It was raised in both ways in the county court and by answer in the district court. There is no contention of fact on the question of jurisdiction. The first question to be considered is whether or not the courts of Douglas county acquired jurisdiction over a domestic insurance company by service of summons upon its secretary while he was temporarily within its jurisdiction. The following points are material: 1. The defendant is a mutual insurance company and domestic corporation; 2. The company has no agency in Omaha and no place of business there; Western Travelers Accident Ass'n v. Taylor. 3. The cause of action did not accrue in Douglas county or in the state of Nebraska; 4. The pretended service was made upon the secretary of the company when only temporarily within the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of effecting a settlement of the matter in controversy. There is a great difference between an agency and an agent. An agency represents the company itself-is in fact the company located at the agency. An agent may be temporarily in the county, but does not carry the company with him. The company's certificate was not issued in Douglas county. No premium was ever paid there. All the business was transacted in Hall county. By no logic could the secretary carry the corporation into Douglas county by his temporary presence there. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Robbins, 53 Nebr., 47; Fitzgerald & Mallory Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S., 98. It is difficult to find cases in point as to domestic corporations. The cases generally refer to foreign corporations. But the principle is the same. Black, Judgments, sec. 910; M'Queen v. Middleton Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. [N. Y.], 5, 7; Brewster v. Michigan C. R. Co., 5 How. Pr. [N. Y.], 183. Section 55 of the Code prescribes that a cause of action may be brought against a corporation in the county where it is situated, or, if an insurance company, where the cause of action arose. Section 73 of the Code clearly refers to causes where the cause of action is brought in Section the county where the corporation is situated. 74 refers to causes where the company has an agency in the county where the suit is brought. Brome & Burnett and Shull & Farnsworth, contra: At common law, the only manner in which a corporation could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court was by distraint of its property; hence, statutes providing service by summens are in derogation or modification of the common law. In construing such statutes, the rule Western Travelers Accident Ass'n v. Taylor. of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to the Code. Its provisions and all proceedings under it are to be liberally construed with a view to performing its object and to assist the parties in obtaining justice. Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 1. It follows that as to a provision of the Code of Civil Procedure that is capable of two constructions, one of which sustains the jurisdiction of the court, and one which ousts it from jurisdiction, the former should be adopted. KIRKPATRICK, C. This is an action brought by defendant in error in the county court of Douglas county to recover of plaintiff in error $514.28 on an accident insurance certificate issued by plaintiff in error. It appears from the record that plaintiff in error is an insurance company incorporated under the laws of this state, its location and place of business being at Grand Island, Hall county; that it issued a certificate to one Henry C. Cook, who was injured by an accident at Sheldon, Bryan county, Iowa, which he claims resulted in his total disability from May 10 to October 1, 1895, to his damage in the sum of $514.28; that the amount due him on his certificate had been assigned to defendant in error. It appears that Arthur L. Sheetz was secretary of plaintiff in error, and came to Omaha on behalf of the company for the purpose of trying to effect a settlement of the claim upon which suit is brought. The parties failed to reach an agreement, and while the secretary remained in Douglas county this action was instituted and a summons was duly issued and served upon him. The company made a special appearance in the county court, pleading that it had no agent in Douglas county; that it was not engaged in business therein; that its business had at all times been carried on at Grand Island, and that it was situated only in Hall county and not in Douglas county, and never had any place of business in Douglas county, or employees or agents engaged |