of resignation and peace, it were almost superfluous to say. Long tormented, and at length exhausted by the disease which we have mentioned, he sunk on that pillow, amidst the tears of fidelity, friendship, and love-to be regretted by his neighbourhood, as one of the severest losses it hath ever sustained-to be lamented, through a far more extensive circle, as the most respectable and amiable of charac ters to be remembered, as one of the fairest examples of human worth, till memory shall cease to sigh over departed virtue, till the sense of honour shall be extinguished among men."

ART. IX.-The Monarchy, according to the Charter. By the Fiscount DE CHATEAUBRIAN D, Peer of France, Minister of State, Chevalier of the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis, Member of the Royal Institute of France, &c. London. Murray. 1816.

"As a peer of France," says the author, "it is my duty to declare the truth to France, and I will declare it. As a minister, it is my duty to declare the truth to the King, and I will declare it." And he does so, with the frankness of a free man, resolved to be free; with the zeal of a subject, determined that his Sovereign shall not long be misled. But M. de Chateaubriand was, when he wrote, a minister of state; or what, in England, we call a privy counsellor. He has, therefore, been accused of a dereliction of duty, in conveying to the public, through the medium of the press, information respecting the biasses, the intentions, and reservations of his colleagues:-as if the case were the same at Paris and in Westminster. Nothing can be more different. An upright minister here ceases to sit and consult in council, from the moment when he cannot conscientiously support the measures which it adopts. This it has not, for many years past, been necessary to do in France. Under the Jacobins, acts of the Government, with the exception of such as related to massacres and pillage, were unprecedentedly open, and usually carried by acclamation: under the tyrant, they were necessarily very secret: and since the charter was drawn up, a sort of middle course has, in general, been pursued. The two first had much experience, both in legisla

tion and government; the other has had a good deal: but none of them can be justly said to have enjoyed the benefit of much of that sound sober practice in affairs, through which ministers of state are rendered highly useful to the public. The mob assembled in the streets, were the privy counsellors of France during the democracy: Napoleon seldom consulted any but the Saint who accompanied him to Moscow. And as for Louis XVIII., the novelty and the difficulty of his situation, according to his account; but, in reality, a wish on the part of his ministers to render the royal charter a nullity, has hitherto prevented him from consulting his servants, otherwise than individually.

"If the council of which I have the honour to be a member were assembled, I might be told, Do not write, but give your advice in council: but that council does not meet. I am therefore obliged to resort to other means

to fulfil the first duty of a minister....... And shall it be said, that if France appears to me to be menaced with new misfortunes, if the legitimate monarchy is in danger, I must be silent, because I am a privy counsellor and peer! On the contrary, it is my duty to point out the danger; to fire the signal of distress, and call out for help."

M. de Chateaubriand is, then, not very criminal on the score of divulging secrets of state. But had it even been doubtful whether he ought, or ought not, to publish his thoughts, he is not the man to have balanced long as to the preferable course. Why, as he himself asks, should one be silent at this crisis, who had always spoken out fearlessly on past occasions-none of which were more ominous than the present? Burke, whom Chateaubriand closely resembles in ready and ardent zeal for well qualified and mixed monarchy, would not have remained an unconcerned spectator at such a crisis.

What the truths are which he purposes to deliver, we shall see in due time. His objects in delivering them, will be allowed by all to be most important; being, to prevent the king from undoing himself; his ministers from ruining their country. "Do you know," says he to them, "what will happen, if you are not more decided in your views and wishes-more consistent with yourselves? Either you will destroy the constitution, and God knows what the result of that would be, or you yourselves will be carried off by it. Take care, for in the present state of things it is probably stronger than you are." This is an useful advice-a warning full of solemnity. Undoubtedly Undoubtedly a wide deviation from the royal charter would effect the overthrow of the minis

ters: nay, who can be sure that the throne itself could stand, under the obloquy which such a deviation would create? The prejudices of the French are, unfortunately for themselves, not all in favour of the charter: and yet all would resent, or affect to resent, the infringement of it :those who are partial to it, because they would consider its infringement an injury done the state; those who dislike it, because they would be happy to find an opportunity afforded of joining in new commotions.

The Viscount states distinctly the form of government which his country may, or may not, adopt; the ancient regime, a despotism, the charter of the king; without so much as alluding to the republic-a proof how much he reckons on the horror with which it must have filled the breast of every honourable Frenchman. He observes," The old regime is impossible. Despotism can be established only by having, like Buonaparte, six hundred thousand soldiers devoted to their leader-an iron hand-an audacious spirit. There remains, then, the legitimate monarchy, under the constitutional charter." Having said this, he proceeds to treat, in order, of the privileges of the monarch, of the peers, and of the deputies; and, in setting out, furnishes us with the following judicious ideas, on the right of initiating laws vested, by the charter, in the king.

"The royal prerogative ought to be stronger in France than in England. ......But, sooner or later, it must be relieved from an embarrassment, which arises from the charter itself. By giving exclusively to the King the initiation of laws, it was intended to strengthen the prerogative; and the effect has been to weaken it.....The form in which this power is exercised, is as inconvenient as the principle is false: ministers come down to the houses with their proposed law, in the shape of an ordonnance: Louis, by the grace of God, &c. The ministers then borrow the individual person and identity of his Majesty; they make him propose this law as the result of his own wisdom and mediation; then the law is discussed; then come alterations, omissions, and amendments; and the wisdom of the King receives a legislative denial, in the rejection of his first conceptions. Then must come a second ordonnance to declare (still by the grace of God, and the wisdom of the King,) that the wisdom of the King had been deceived, and that the grace of God had been invoked in vain.....All this is miserable, and inju rious to the royal person and royal dignity. It must be changed; and this solemn form must be reserved for the final sanction of the law.....On all occasions these royal ordonnances should be used with moderation. The style and form they assume, is that of absolute authority, because the King of France was formerly the supreme legislator: but now that his legislative functions are divided with the two houses, it is more decent, it is more legal, it is more constitutional, that the crown should speak with absolute autho rity, only when it ratifies and perfects the law, which the wisdom of the other branches of the legislature has previously framed.....The present practice No. XIX.-VOL. III. - Aug. Rev.

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would at length lead to one or other of the following serious inconveniences? either the King's name would 'produce a degree of respect inconsistent with free discussion; or a free discussion would impair the respect due to the King's name, and tend to a degradation of the royal authority; in whichi, and in which alone, consist our hopes of tranquillity and happiness..... Every one knows that, in England, the wise rules of Parliament and the constitution would be infringed by a member's using the name of the King, either in support of, or in opposition to, any proposition whatsoever.

"But if the chambers have alone the initiative, or if they enjoy that right in common with the crown, shall we not revive that mania of law-making which has once before, under the constituent assembly, overturned the constitution, and desolated the country?....This objection forgets that the spirit of the nation was not then what it is now; that the revolution was then beginning, that it is now ended; that the minds of men are now tending to repose, as then to motion; and that instead of a spirit of pulling down, the general wish is now to repair and strengthen.....The objection forgets, too, that the constitutions are not the same: there was then but one assembly, or two councils of the same nature. Now the charter has established two distinct chambers, composed of very different elements: these chambers are a mutual check; and one of them would serve to restrain, when necessary, any impetuosity of the other.....The objection, too, forgets, that motions can be no longer made in the heat of the moment, and debated on the instant, and in a hurry; that every proposition must be stated in writing, and laid on the table; that, if the chambers decide that it is fit to entertain the proposition, it cannot be discussed but after an interval of three days; that it is then referred to the committees; and that it is not till after these processes, that it returns to the chambers modified, and, as it were, cooled, to be examined-to be debated-to be amended; perhaps to be still longer retarded, if there happens to be other orders of the day which have a priority. And, finally, it forgets that the King has the power, the absolute power of rejecting the law, and of dissolving the chambers, if the public interest should require this measure.... ....Besides, what is it we propose? To abolish the royal initiative ?-by no means. Leave the initiative to the crown, which will employ it on great and popular occasions: but give it also to the chambers, which, in fact, possess it already, since they have by the charter the right of suggesting laws.

"To grant the initiative to the chamber is clearly the interest of the King; the crown would then propose only acts of grace and popularity, and would leave all the more painful duties of legislation to the peers and deputies.Then if a law should be rejected, the name of the King will at least have been respected, and the royal dignity spared the applause or the censure of the galleries: then we should no longer have ministers working upon the conscience of the loyal by exclaiming, It is the King's proposal; it is his royal will; his Majesty never can consent to this or that amendment.'”

These passages are good specimens of Chateaubriand's lively, yet vigorous mode of thinking and expressing himself. His style and manner very much resemble those of Montesquieu; his acuteness and depth, allowance being made for the rapidity with which he has written, are not inferior, as will be seen more clearly by and by. The allusion to the folly of the Constituent Assembly in framing such multitudes of laws as it did, with so little attention to

the good or the evil they might produce, is à propos enough; and the censure passed on the serious error in the charter, of vesting in the King the exclusive right of proposing laws, is so just, that its effects are very likely to be beneficial to France. The King, at least, will readily renounce his right;, for never had that country a Sovereign who gave more unquestionable proofs of a sincere desire to make sacrifices for the common good. In execrating the recall to office of Fouché, whom Talleyrand actually forced upon the King, Chateaubriand exclaims: "Oh, Louis the desired! Oh, my unhappy master! you have indeed shown, that there is no sacrifice which your people may not expect from your paternal tenderness!" Nay, the case of Louis XVIII. is, in all respects, a new one; new, from the character of the. people whom he governs; new, from the political and military state of the monarchy; new, from what some of his subjects desire of him; but newer still, from what he every day voluntarily concedes to them. Other Kings, in other countries and ages, had drawn odium and ruin upon them-. selves, by a rash or wicked approximation to despotic power: Louis seems to think even the mild exercise of legitimate royalty too harsh for his subjects. Priestcraft is no longer said to resort to his court; he dismisses able ministers because they are said to be too sincerely attached to him; and he dissolves the Chamber of Deputies, not, as we might suppose, for trying to erect imperium in imperio, or for threatening to withhold the national supplies; but," because they hesitated to oppose any thing produced to them in the King's name, and hardly knew how to act when, in the name of the King, they were invited to attack the best interests of the crown." What France may gain by the dissolution of the chamber, it is difficult to conjecture; we wish it may not suffer by. the step. With the most faithful, though not the most humble members of his cabinet, as well as with one of the most loyal assemblies that ever deliberated on public affairs, he has parted, to gratify the wishes, not of the nation, not of the majority in the cabinet or in the senate, but of the minority in both the cabinet and the two houses of Parliament! This is another novel trait in his Majesty's conduct, which mankind will be able to appreciate by and by. If unanimity prevail in the cabinet and in the legislative assemblies, he will be compensated: if his people be satisfied, he will be happy. But if, after all, they be