who would be favorably disposed toward his regime, and thus minimize a possible takeover by the Chilean military. Thus far he has not dared try it as this might prompt a coup.

But as far as bringing in outsiders to set up probably a people's militia or something like that to offset the Chilean military, I think this would be counterproductive in the Chilean case. I think if this were taking place it would encourage the Chilean military to take over very quickly.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PEPPER. Do you have anything, Mr. Zion?

Mr. ZION. No further questions.

Mr. PEPPER. Dr. Davis, we thank you very much for your very informative and valuable contribution to our hearing. You are a knowledgeable citizen in this area, and we hope you will keep on alerting the Congress and the country as to what the facts are in this situation. Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, sir. It is a pleasure to be with you. Mr. PEPPER. Thank you very much.

(Mr. Davis' prepared statement follows:)

COMMUNIST INFLUENCES IN LATIN AMERICA

One needs to be careful in using the terms "communist" or "communism" when referring to Latin America. For many centuries there have been various forms of communism there. Communal landholding systems and other communistic practices existed long before the Spanish conquest, the most highly developed being among the advanced aboriginal civilizations of Mexico and Peru. Of course, today in referring to Communist influences in Latin America, we are thinking principally of the Soviet variety, some rather ineffective Chinese efforts, and during the past decade the subversive activities emerging from Communist Cuba.

Often it is difficult to determine to what extent an allegedly Communist movement in a Latin American country actually is connected with Soviet or other Communist intrigue. Most of these republics have experienced radical movements of various kinds; but often these are merely spontaneous protests against some local situation to which there may be significant opposition. Also it often has been the practice of Latin American politicians to brand opponents or opposition groups as "Communists" simply as a matter of political expediency.

Soviet communism appeared in the Western Hemisphere near the end of World War I. Its spread into various South American countries was facilitated by the diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union by Uruguay in 1922. The Soviet legation thus established in Montevideo subsequently served as Communist headquarters for South America, and from there Communist agents and literature were spread to all countries of that continent. With Mexico's recognition of Soviet Russia in 1924, the Soviet embassy in Mexico City became the principal center of operations in Middle America.

Communist political activity actually began in Latin America before formal Soviet recognition was obtained in either Uruguay or Mexico. Communist parties appeared in Argentina in January 1918 and Mexico in 1919. By the 1930s Communist parties had been organized in all Latin American republics, and they were participating in elections in Argentina, Mexico, Cuba, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica and Uruguay.

The history of diplomatic relations between Latin American republics and the U.S.S.R. is an interesting one. For more than a decade Uruguay remained the only South American country that recognized Soviet Russia. In 1935, due to a scare over an alleged "Red" plot, this very democratic republic terminated the relationship on the ground that Russia was financing and directing Communist propaganda through its diplomatic representatives in Montevideo. Mexico's formal relations, which had begun in 1924, were suspended in 1930. Except for Colombia, which established relations in 1935, the Soviet Union did not have a diplomatic base in Latin America in the late 1930s. However, after the United States got into World War II, we pressured many Latin American republics into establish

ing relations with the Russians. Among these were Mexico and Uruguay, which resumed relations in 1942 and 1943 respectively, and Argentina, which recognized the U.S.S.R. for the first time. After World War II all the others broke off relations and until the end of the 1950 decade Mexico City, Montevideo and Buenos Aires remained the only Latin American capitals where the Soviets held diplomatic posts. However, during the last few years there has been a dramatic change in this picture and at present there are Soviet diplomatic missions in eleven Latin American republics.

During the past decade Soviet leaders have gone far in trying to appear respectable and have succeeded rather well in creating an image of the U.S.S.R. as a peace-loving country that is opposed to violent revolution in Latin America. At the same time subversion in various forms has been promoted by Castro, whom the Soviet Union in turn supports. Cuba, then, has become known as the center which trains subversives and from which money and supplies have moved into various parts of Latin America. At the same time the Soviet Union, which has provided the funds and equipment, has gained in respectability.

Frequently it has been said that the most backward countries, those with the lowest standards of living and those with dictatorial forms of government are the ones most vulnerable to Communist penetration. The history of Latin America since World War I strikingly contradicts this. In careful studies I have made of the degrees of Communist influence in the Latin American republics, three countries stand out as showing the least influence during the past half century. What are these? They are Haiti, Nicaragua and Paraguay. By no stretch of the imagination would any of these be considered among the more advanced states of Latin America. Certainly they are not the most democratic-just the opposite. Definitely they are not ones with high standards of living-quite the contrary. Yet in these three countries there has been a very insignificant amount of Communist infiuence throughout this entire period. Why?

We come around to other reasons for Communist influence. It is not just a matter of the economic level of the country; it is not just the type of government. Very important is how strongly entrenched the government is and how effectively anticommunist it is or can afford to be. In the three countries just mentioned, in which some form of dictatorship has been in existence throughout this period, the governments in power have not had to depend for their tenure on any particular bloc of voters, especially on any Communist bloc. They have been independent, have been strongly in control, and have been able to keep a tight lid on Communist activity. Thus the Communists have not been free to operate and very little Communist influence has been evident.

On the other hand, what the Communists have been able to do in Latin America, as in some other parts of the world, is to take advantage of opportunities which appear, particularly favorable political situations. In some of the more democratic countries at certain times they have found opportunities to make considerable progress.

The first serious attempt by Communists to gain control of a Latin American republic was a miserable failure. They adopted a wrong tactic. This was in El Salvador in 1932-an attempt to take over the country by violent revolution. Subsequent Salvadoran governments have kept a tight rein on Communist activities and the latter have been of very minor consequence. Moreover, recent governments have been quite reform minded and have promoted programs that have undercut any the Communists might offer.

The most effective case of Communist influence in a Latin American country prior to Cuba was in Guatemala in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In fact, Guate mala was a prelude to Cuba, and some of those who later were involved in the Castro takeover in the latter gained experience in Guatemala. Traditionally dictator-ruled Guatemala had lived from 1930 to 1944 under the Ubico dictatorship, which carefully suppressed Communist activity and also did not permit labor organization. The fall of Ubico ushered in an unusually democratic era. Juan José Arévalo, elected on a reform platform for a six year term (1945–51), had virtually no backing from the army or conservative civilian groups. With his support based almost entirely on the laboring classes, he encouraged labor organization and also instituted a land reform program. He needed assistants to help carry through his program, but there were very few qualified people upon whom he could call. This provided a favorable opportunity for Communist penetration and came at the very time when, due to their role in World War II, the Communists' star was at its zenith. Under these circumstances a few well-placed Com

munists were able to worm their way into positions of importance and gradually to infiltrate the government and gain an ever-increasing element of control. This was magnified under the succeeding administration of Jacobo Arbenz, and during the early 1950s the situation became extremely serious. Guatemala was drifting toward a complete Communist takeover. It was only as a result of the revolution of mid 1954, in which the United States was involved quietly but effectively, that the Arbenz government was removed and this menace destroyed, at least for a time.

We might examine Communist activities in a few other countries. Costa Rica is certainly one of the most democratic states in all of Latin America, but the two leftists administrations in power between 1940 and 1948 permitted a Communist infiltration into the government that for a time seriously threatened the country. This danger disappeared with the revolution in 1948, which served to preserve democracy.

In Mexico broad economic, social and cultural reforms, arising from the 1910 Revolution, were well under way before the Communists began extensive international operations, and the Mexicans have been able to carry out their revolutionary program without serious Communist interference. The Mexican Communist party, founded in 1919, did manage to gain a foothold in some labor unions, but has never had much success in politics and for many years has not shown sufficient strength to participate in elections. Mexico's one strong political party, now known as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, has held undisputed control of the country since its organization in 1929, and minor parties have been of little consequence. Thus, contrary to some other Latin American republics, leading Mexican political figures have not found it necessary or expedient to seek or accept Communist support and in turn have not been vulnerable to Communist intrigues. In Mexico, where Communists have been free to operate, politically they have little strength, but Marxism as a philosophy does play a significant role, especially among certain artists, writers and students. The Mexican Revolution, on the other hand, was home-grown, and there has been no place in it for Communist influence.

Although Cuba's drift into communism and subsequent events there have been widely publicized, a brief discussion here is in order. A Communist party was organized in Cuba in 1925, but under the Machado dictatorship (1924-33) its activities were severely restricted. In the late 1930s, after Batista had become the Cuban strong man, the Communists were given greater freedom, in line with his then policy of trying to appear democratic. While still illegal, the party was allowed in May 1938 to begin publication of a daily paper, Hoy. Following this, the Communists began to cooperate more closely with Batista and a few months later the party was legalized for the first time. During the next few years, and especially from 1340 to 1944 while Batista served as President, the Communists made significant progress, particularly in organized labor, where apparently they were given a free hand. Under these circumstances party membership rose to about 150.000.

In March 1943, after the party became an official part of the coalition supporting Batista, he appointed a Communist to his cabinet-the first time in Latin America that a Communist attained such a position. In the 1944 elections the Communists won three seats in the Senate and nine in the Chamber of Deputies. For a time in the mid-1940s there was cooperation between the Communists and President Grau San Martín as he needed their support, but subsequently the government began to restrict their activities. Especially under the Prío Socarrás administration of 1948-52 Communists found the going difficult and began to lose ground rapidly. Between 1948 and 1950 party registration fell from about 150.000 to 55,000. After Batista's seizure of power in March 1952, the party met with severe treatment and in less than two years was declared illegal. The Communists could claim no credit for Batista's return to power, and by now he needed U.S. friendship more than Communist support. Although some of its former members remained in the government, the party went underground.

When he gained control of Cuba at the beginning of 1959, one of the first things Fidel Castro did was to free the Communist party. Party membership, reported at that time as 12,000, increased very rapidly. Castro, formerly a fascist, found Communist support most welcome as his rise to power and control of the country were based to a large degree on anti-United States policies. Subsequently, as is well known. Castro of necessity has been closely allied with the U.S.S.R., which has furnished most of his external economic support, although from time to time he has appeared to prefer the Chinese Communist philosophy.

Brazil, the largest Latin American republic, has faced a serious Communist threat within the past decade. For many years the Communists there were carefully held in check and their party remained illegal. Particularly was this so during most of the 15 year dictatorship of Getulio Vargas (1930-45). However, there was a rather sudden turn of events in 1945. Vargas, seeing potential use of this additional political support in elections scheduled for December, legalized the Communist party. Elections were held in late 1945-after a coup had toppled Vargas from power. A major surprise was the relatively strong showing of the Communists who received more than 600,000 votes. In elections of early 1947 they did even better, polling 800,000 votes-about 16 percent of the total. By now they had elected 2 senators, 14 members of the Chamber of Deputies and about 70 members of state legislatures. President Dutra was so disturbed by this show of strength that within a few months the party was declared illegal. Communist members were expelled from Congress, and Brazil broke diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. But as an outlawed party the Communists were permitted to operate freely because there were many politicians who recognized that here was a bloc of votes. From time to time there were agreements whereby Communist support would go to a given party which in turn would back certain Communist candidates running under other labels. Communist advances under this system reached a climax in the early 1960s during the Goulart regime. He apparently was trying to use this situation to his advantage, but actually was being used by a few effective Communist leaders who were rapidly gaining control of the government. This increasingly dangerous situation together with a serious economic crisis resulted in the revolution of early 1964 which toppled Goulart from power. Under the strongly anti-communist military regimes which have followed, Communist influence has been drastically curtailed.

At the present time the two Latin American countries, outside of Cuba, in which the Communists are operating most successfully are Chile and Uruguay. As the current Chilean situation is of such great concern, some details on how it came about should be of interest.

Chile has the longest history of democratic government of any country in Latin America. For many years it has been a multi-party state and government is usually by coalition. The Chilean Communist party was organized in the early 1930s and began to gain a following, especially among the rather numerous industrial labor element. As part of a coalition this effectively run party has been able to wield far greater influence than would be possible under other circumstances. In 1946 Gabriel González Videla was elected President. He was a member of the Radical (actually a moderate) party, but some of this support had come from the Communists. In return he appointed three Communists to his cabinet. However, they soon caused so much trouble that they were thrown out, the party was outlawed, and Chile broke off diplomatic relations with all Communist countries. But shortly before the 1958 elections, the Communist party again was legalized and has been very active and successful since. In each of the last three presidential elections (1958, 1964 and 1970) Salvador Allende has been the candidate of a coalition composed of his own Socialist party (actually more radical than the Communists), the Communist party and several other leftist groups. It was such a coalition that brought him to the presidency in 1970. In this election he polled only a slightly larger vote than Jorge Alessandri, his conservative opponent. As he did not have a majority, Congressional approval was necessary. In order to obtain this, Allende had to back away to a considerable degree from his announced campaign platform. One thing he had to promise was to preserve democratic government in Chile in very much the same form it has been known for so long.

In almost all Latin American states the military plays a very important role politically and in the majority of them it is the controlling factor. Chile is an exception to the general pattern. It has probably the best organized military in Latin America, but it is a military which customarily has been non-political. However, in 1924 the military did step in, took over the government, and until 1932 was in a controlling position. After that it faded again into the background. Since his election Allende has been very much aware that he has to be careful as far as the military is concerned. I was in Chile a few months ago, and one of the most interesting things I found was a standoff between Allende and the military. Military leaders were saying, "We support constitutional, democratic government in Chile." In other words, "We support the government as long as it remains constitutional." If he strays too far from the democratic path or they think he is going too far, Allende may find himself out of office.

A casual observer viewing the Latin American scene today probably would conclude that in most of these countries Communist interest and effectiveness have declined to the point where the Communist movement no longer should be considered a danger. The Sino-Soviet rift has weakened Communist efforts in many cases, and general Soviet policy appears to have mellowed to the extent of opposing violence. Recent attempts at cultural and economic exchange, aimed at eliminating Latin American fear and distrust, have met with only minor success. However, a closer look coupled with an understanding of the background should reveal a somewhat different picture. Officially the U.S.S.R. has turned away from its former crude efforts to promote revolution in Latin America and today is following a more peaceful and sophisticated policy. But Soviet leaders really have not abandoned their long-range objective of establishing Communist power in this part of the world. They still hope, through skillful exploitation of urban labor and rural peasant classes, as well as certain pseudo-intellectual groups, to convert the Latin American republics to socialist systems. On the other hand, recent desires of Latin American governments to establish diplomatic and economic relations with the U.S.S.R. have been based primarily on an attempt to pursue an international role independent of the United States rather than any love for the Soviets and communism. Moreover, in the past a very large percentage of Latin American political and military leaders have shown keen awareness of Communist designs and considerable skill in dealing with them. This awareness and skill should be expected to continue.

Mr. PEPPER. Is there any other witness now, Mr. Schultz?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes, sir. I would like to call Albert Solomon, investigator.

STATEMENT OF ALBERT H. SOLOMON, JR.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you state your full name for the record, please? Mr. SOLOMON. My name is Albert H. Solomon, Jr.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Where are you employed?

Mr. SOLOMON. I am employed as an investigator by the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Solomon, Dr. Davis has just given testimony regarding the English-language version of the Cuban newspaper, Granma, and commented on its content. The masthead of this publication identifies it as the official organ of the Communist Party of Cuba.

Did you make inquiries to determine the number of copies of this publication which come into the United States and its distribution in the country?

Mr. SOLOMON. Yes, I did. However, I determined that there is no established procedure for monitoring, screening, or following such material by the U.S. Postal Service or by the Bureau of Customs. Accordingly, I was unable to develop any precise information regarding the number of copies coming into the country or its distribution here. Mr. SCHULTZ. Were you able to determine the manner in which the English-language version of Granma entered the United States?

Mr. SOLOMON. While I was unable to obtain specific data in this regard, the best information indicates that single copies are air mailed directly from Havana, Cuba, to addressees in the United States and that other copies come in from Cuba by mail through Mexico and Canada.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you determine why the Postal Service or the Bureau of Customs does not monitor or control the import of this publication?

Mr. SOLOMON. I made inquiry at the Postal Service and determined that the mailing into the United States of this publication and others