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Mr. SCHULTZ. In view of the late hour, I will not pursue further questions. Do you have any other statement that you would like to make in summary prior to the chairman asking questions?

Mr. MARIN. I would like to emphasize the statement that I mentioned before in regards to the mutual respect that should exist among the forces that are fighting the regime of Castro and the people that are conducting the affairs of the Federal Government of the United States.

In that atmosphere of mutual respect and since we are both struggling against a common enemy, we feel that the activities of Cubans within the area of the United States and outside of the United States should be respected.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Marin, was this Venceremos Brigade organized in Cuba or in the United States?

Mr. MARIN. The Venceremos Brigade was organized in the United States. It was organized primarily from forces of the SDS people and other so-called radical forces in the United States and invited later on to Cuba for the affairs of sugarcane cutting.

Mr. PEPPER. It was organized ostensibly to fight the communism in Cuba and to reestablish the freedom and independence of the island? Mr. MARIN. Do you mean our organization?

Mr. PEPPER. No; the Venceremos Brigade.

Mr. MARIN. No; on the contrary. I read an editorial which appeared in Granma on the 24th of August of this year, in which they have an open letter to the people of Cuba in which they declare that their only intention for visiting Cuba happens to be to help with the agricultural process and the farming of sugarcane in Cuba.

However, after these people have come back to the United States, they have engaged in representing not the people of Cuba, who happen not to share the wealth that the government now has; they are representing the side of the Cuban regime.

Mr. PEPPER. Are the members of this brigade young Cuban students in the United States, or who are they?

Mr. MARIN. The majority of these members happen to be American students. I think on the whole, with very few exceptions, they are American students. Of Cuban origin, there are a very slight percentage; however, they are of Mexican-American origin and Puerto RicanAmerican origin also within the brigade.

Mr. PEPPER. Have some of the members of this brigade gone down to Cuba?

Mr. MARIN. Yes.

Mr. PEPPER. How many, would you say?

Mr. MARIN. I cannot actually tell the figures; a thousand members of the brigade have traveled to Cuba.

Mr. PEPPER. How many members do you think the brigade has in the United States?

Mr. MARIN. Well, there have been a number of defections, and our reports indicate that in many cases many of the members of the brigade become disenchanted and refuse to participate in the pro-Castro activities in the United States. But I would indicate only a minority is actively participating in the pro-Castro propaganda and activities within the United States.

Mr. PEPPER. How many Cuban students in the United States, in your opinion, are supporting the Castro regime?

Mr. MARIN. Cuban exiles in the United States?

Mr. PEPPER. Any Cuban students who happen to be in the United States. What percentage of them support the Castro regime?

Mr. MARIN. A very slight minority, and from that it is due perhaps to their own ignorance and their experience of having been removed from areas where news about Cuba comes daily. That is very few people.

Mr. PEPPER. You are the founder and the present president of the organization ABDALA. On page 2 of your report you give, as I understand it, something of the character and the objectives of ABDALA. You say:

Young, committed only to the task of freedom for our enslaved nation and a Cuban future that we hope to make better, we named the new movement after our José Marti's youthful epic hero: ABDALA.

If those are the objectives of your organization, I commend you for it and wish you all success in your endeavors.

Mr. MARIN. Thank you very much.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Schmitz.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I think, in view of the time, I will pass up the questioning: just to thank Mr. Marin for his fine testimony here and wish him luck in his fight.

Mr. MARIN. Thank you very much.

Mr. PEPPER. Thank you very much, Mr. Marin. We appreciate your coming and giving us your testimony today.

The committee will recess until October 14.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., Thursday, October 7, 1971, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene on Thursday, October 14, 1971.)

STATEMENT OF JAMES D. THEBERGE

(After the close of the hearings, a statement and biographical data were submitted by Prof. James D. Theberge for inclusion in the record. The biographical material and statement follow :)

James D. Theberge

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Director of Latin American Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University and Consultant on Foreign Policy Research. Former Research Associate, Latin American Centre, St. Antony's College, Oxford University (1969-70); Adviser, Inter-American Development Bank (196669) Member of Vice President Humphrey's Task Forces on Latin America and Foreign Aid (1968).

Head of the Lending Coordination Division, Latin American Bureau, ARA/ AID, Department of State (1965–66) and Economic Adviser to the U.S. Foreign Aid Mission, Buenos Aires, Argentina (1961-64). B.A. Columbia University (1952), M.A. Oxford University (1960) and M.P.A. Harvard University (1965). Author of books and articles on international affairs and international economics. Mr. Theberge recently prepared a report on Russia in the Caribbean to be published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and edited a book Soviet Seapower in the Caribbean: Political and Strategic Implications to be published in 1972 by Praeger.

STATEMENT OF JAMES D. THEBERGE

For The

Internal Security Committee

House of Representatives

October 20, 1971

SOVIET POLICY IN THE CARIBBEAN

James D. Theberge1

It is the purpose of this brief statement to define Soviet policy, expectations and intentions in the Caribbean with particular reference to Cuba and to outline some of the main opportunities and problems facing Soviet policy there at this time.

Historically, neither Caribbean nor South America have been areas of vital interest to the USSR. Prior to the Cuban revolution, when the Soviets successfully established their first foothold in the Western Hemisphere, this vast region was free from the direct threat or influence of Soviet military power. The successful firing of an ICBM in 1957 made it possible for the USSR to directly threaten the Western Hemisphere and other areas remote from the Soviet homeland with devastating destruction. However, this threat was never credible in view of overwhelming U.S. strategic superiority throughout most of the 1960's before the USSR achieved strategic parity.

The Soviet post-war challenge to the U.S. and its allies has been largely restricted at least until relatively recently-to areas around the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. To a large extent this followed from the fact that traditionally the USSR has been a land power and Soviet maritime policy essentially of a defensive nature. However, Soviet interest in the Caribbean and South

1 Director of Latin American Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Georgetown University. Mr. Theberge has prepared a study on Russia in the Caribbean to be published soon by the Center and is the editor of a book Soviet Seapower in the Caribbean: Political and Strategic Implications to be published by Praeger in 1972.

America has increased considerably since the Soviets established a politicalmilitary base in Cuba close on the flank of their principal rival. The establishment of a Marxist regime in Chile; leftist-nationalist military regimes in Peru, Panama and for a time in Bolivia; and the left-ward drift in Venezuela, Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica increase the opportunities for the USSR to establish or strengthen her diplomatic, economic, commercial and maritime relations with the region as a counterweight to U.S. political and economic influence.

Moreover, the rapid expansion of Soviet naval and maritime power in the 1960's has ushered in a new era in which the USSR is increasingly capable and willing to enter into military commitments further from the Soviet homeland to support her foreign policy. With the emergence of the USSR as a superpower enjoying strategic parity, or near-parity with the U.S., the level of Soviet diplomatic and military activities in the Caribbean and elsewhere has increased perceptibly and may be expected to continue to expand along with her naval and maritime capabilities.

The Soviet Union, after a period characterized by caution, relative inaction, and opposition to armed struggle following the 1962 missile crisis, is again pursuing a more active diplomatic and military policy in the Caribbean area. Soviet policy in the Caribbean at present is much the same as her policy elsewhere in Latin America: to neutralize U.S. power, to enlarge Soviet influence by eroding U.S. political and economic predominance, to defend "socialist" Cuba, and to influence the foreign policy of the Caribbean states so that it is more favorable to the Soviet viewpoint. An anti-Communist government whose foreign policy is pro-Soviet is preferable to a "socialist" state that resists Soviet influence. In the final analysis, an amenable yet essentially anti-Communist regime, such as Peru for example, suits the Soviet Union better than Tito's Yugoslavia. While the pattern varies from country to country, the USSR is active on a broad front in the Caribbean. She is employing diplomacy, propaganda, political agitation and infiltration, as well as her commercial, and naval presence to influence the Carribean political environment. The Soviets simultaneously are employing a more active "traditional" diplomacy that seeks "normal" state-tostate relations with bourgeois governments; a military policy of massive build-up of strategic forces and seapower in support of this diplomacy; and "ideologicalmissionary" guidance and support to local Communist, Marxist or Marxistoriented parties and front groups.

Although the policy of the USSR, local Communist parties and other groups loyal to her emphasizes "constitutional" or "legal" methods of struggle, Soviet policy is essentially opportunistic and prepared to support all forms of struggle, peaceful and violent, singly or in combination, depending on the opportunities presented by local conditions. Maintaining "normal" diplomatic relations with Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay has not deterred the USSR from openly intervening in their internal affairs during the past year which led to the expulsion, or threatened expulsion, of Soviet political agitators posing as diplomats.

The Soviets advocate peaceful methods whenever they seem to offer a chance of success or gain and condemn armed revolutionary struggle when failure appears likely. In countries where a peaceful path to "democratic" revolution is blocked, such as Nicaragua, Halti, and Guatemala, the Soviets are prepared to consider armed struggle as the only possible form of change. The local proSoviet Communist parties must be prepared "to meet any eventually" if power cannot be achieved peacefully. Since the early 1960's the major Moscow-oriented parties in the Caribbean have sought coalitions or "fronts" with anti-U.S. nationalist groups.

Being realists the Soviet leaders recognize that the "objective" conditions for a Communist victory in the Caribbean and South America are not yet ripe. They belleve that the region must first pass through a "popular democratic" revolutionary process on the path to socialism. The backwardness of Latin America requires a "transitional stage" to prepare the economic and political base for socialist reconstruction. Since "objective" conditions are not yet ripe, Communist parties during the transitional stage should, wherever possible, play a prominent role in leftist-coalition governments, radical revolutionary governments or even "progressive" military regimes. The U.S. "stranglehold” on the economy must be broken, strategic sectors of the economy nationalized and broad popular support for communism organized.

While the ultimate Soviet objective is to establish reliable pro-Soviet Communist regimes in the Caribbean and South America, she believes that much work must be done to prepare the ground for Communist victories. The USSR is more interested in practical and immediate methods of reducing U.S. influence and enhancing her own in the hemisphere. Opportunities for Soviet advance in the Caribbean and South America appear to be more favorable today than at anytime in the post-war period. The powerful economic and cultural impact of the U.S. on weak, underdeveloped societies has made her the primary target of local nationalists and the scapegoat of their intractable economic problems and frustrations. At the same time, the Latin American policy of the Nixon Administration is one of retrenchment and inaction-a dangerous pause-which gives U.S. friends in the area a sense of abandonment and drift. The upsurge of economic nationalism and left-wing military regimes are two trends that are considered by the USSR to be working in her favor since they lead to a reduction of U.S. political and economic predominance and offer opportunities for penetration at minimum risk and cost to herself.

Soviet policy in the Caribbean aims at intensifying and exploiting the antiimperialist potential of the national and petty bourgeosie (essentially sup porters of the free market economy) which feels threatened by the intrusion of foreign capital and favors diplomatic and trade relations with the Communist bloc as a counterweight to the U.S. and other capitalist powers. The petty bourgeosie are expected to gradually lose faith in technological and industrial progress and higher living standards achieved through the inflow of capital. The anti-U.S., anti-foreign capital elements of the technocratic and intellectual elite are considered to be responsive to Communist "anti-imperialist" propaganda and are potential Soviet allies.

The nationalist sectors of the middle class are considered to be the decisive force behind the "national liberation" movements in South America and the Caribbean. In time, it is believed that the nationalist middle class will come to power, nationalize U.S. property and break with the U.S. A coalition of Communist, left-wing and nationalist middle class forces, united by their hostility to growing U.S. economic power and frustrated at the pace of social progress, will gain power in peaceful political competition, or may share power through cooperation with "progressive" leftist-nationalist military regimes. Accordingly, U.S. overseas direct investment becomes the unwitting agent of its own destruction.

The Soviets are under no illusion that the peaceful accession to power by proSoviet Communist or Marxist-oriented groups through united front or coalition tactics will be easy in the Caribbean where the communist movement is severely splintered and unity of "left-wing democratic forces" largely a myth. Nevertheless, the victory in Chile of the Popular Unity coalition of Communists, Socialists, Radicals, and radical Christian Democrats represents an important victory for Soviet policy and undermines the position of the advocates of revolutionary violence who frequently receive training and other support from Castro.

It should be remembered that Cuba's intelligence organization (DGI) continues to train Latin Americans in guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism, although Castro is now giving greater emphasis to penetration and infiltration of the armed forces and other institutions. The DGI has an estimated 100 officers training Latin American revolutionaries in a half dozen training camps. However, at present nowhere in the Caribbean are the prospects very good for the success of revolutionary violence; nor, except perhaps Guyana, is power or even substantial influence within the grasp of local communist parties allied to "antiimperialist" parties and groups. The Chilean electoral route to power may prove to be no more exportable than Castro's revolutionary way.

As Allende himself pointed out, the election of a Communist or Socialist government requires the existence of Marxist political parties that are free to present candidates in national elections. This situation does not exist in most South American and Caribbean countries. The Caribbean Communist parties generally are either weak, splintered, proscribed or of negligible importance. However Colombia, Venezuela, and Guyana-where national elections will be held over the next few years the Communists are pursuing a modified Chilean strategy and are promoting a broad front or coalition of anti-imperialist and popular forces.

In spite of improved Soviet opportunities as the politics in the Caribbean and South America shifts to the left, it is by no means certain she will be able to turn them to her advantage. Intense nationalism, unless it takes on the com

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