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plexion of strategic hatred against the U.S., is no more likely to favor Soviet than U.S. hegemony. Moreover, there are a number of factors which tend to inhibit the Soviet Union from a more adventurous policy: the risks and uncertainty of a U.S. reaction to a forward policy and the effect on U.S.-Soviet relations are of primary importance to the USSR. In addition there are the possible costs that further economic and military commitments in the region might entail along with the essential vulnerability of any Soviet position in the hemisphere.

A brief review of Soviet activities indicates that she has been increasing her political and military presence in Cuba and the Caribbean in recent years and is cautiously seeking opportunities to gain another foothold elsewhere in the hemisphere at minimum cost and risk to herself.

The Soviet Union made considerable advances in the 1960's. Virtually frozen out of Latin America a decade ago, the Soviet Union now has diplomatic relations with thirteen Latin American countries: mainly in South America but increasingly in the Caribbean area. Soviet efforts to establish diplomatic relations likely will focus on the Caribbean mainland and insular republics in the 1970's. Although varying in accordance with the priority attached to the country, about one half of the Soviet embassy staff are intelligence operatives involved in a wide range of non-diplomatic activities. The expansion of Soviet diplomatic presence in the area has increased Soviet subversive activities of various kinds, and this has been especially notable this year in Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, and Uruguay. There are over 200 Russian agents now at work in the region compared to less than 50 a decade ago.

Soviet naval and maritime presence and interests in the Caribbean and South American waters also has undergone an unprecedented expansion in recent years. Soviet naval squadrons have made six separate visits to Cuba and the Caribbean including the historic first intrusion into the area in July, 1969. A seventh Soviet task force was reported on October 18, 1971 to be heading towards Cuba. In addition to the semi-permanent naval presence the Soviet Union maintains 2030 deep sea stern-factory fishing trawlers permanently based on the $40 million Soviet-built Hanava fishing port. Moreover, Cuba's fishing fleet has been used to smuggle arms and revolutionaries into Mexico, Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia and possibly other countries bordering on the Caribbean. The trade and fishing agreements between Cuba and Chile signed in February, 1971, gives Cuba the opportunity to use her merchant and fishing fleet to smuggle arms and revolutionaries into Chile for operations against other countries.

Cuba and the Soviet Union also cooperate closely in oceanographic research in the Caribbean-Gulf of Mexico area which has important military applications. There are an estimated 500 Soviet oceanographic specialists in Cuba. The Soviet Union maintains some 8-10 oceanographic research vessels in the Caribbean area at all times as does Cuba. Neither Soviet fishing, which is negligible. nor Soviet shipping in the area justifies the substantial effort she is making to obtain knowledge of the waters and atmosphere of the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. There can be no doubt of the seriousness with which both Cuba and the Soviet Union intended to exploit those waters for commercial and military

purposes.

The Soviet Union is employing her seapower-not just warships but oceanographic vessels, merchant ships, fishing trawlers and electronic intelligence vessels as an increasingly flexible, sophisticated instrument of her foreign policy and as a means of establishing her presence in areas considered to be of strategic importance. It would be a serious mistake not to view the growing presence of Soviet seapower in hemispheric waters in this light.

There is now little doubt that the Soviet Union intended to establish a limited Holy Loch-type submarine facility in Cienfuegos at the end of 1970 for the use of her Yankee class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines that are now operating in the Western Atlantic and targeted on the U.S. mainland. These missiles have a range of about 1,500 miles and carry nuclear warheads.

The attempt to establish a strategic submarine support facility in Cuba in 1970 would have enabled Soviet Yankee class submarines to remain on station in the Western Atlantic nearly twice as long, thereby compensating temporary Soviet inferiority in this type of strategic weapons system-nuclear missile submarines-in the same way that the emplacement of Soviet land-based missiles in Cuba in 1962 by Khrushchev was an effort to improve the weak Soviet strategic posture against the U.S. Soviet military initiatives in the Caribbean, especially the renewed probings in and around Cuba with Soviet naval power. re

flects the belief of Soviet leadership that conventional military forces can and should be used to support Soviet foreign policy and ideological-missionary duties around the world.

The U.S. reaction combined with secret negotiations with Russia in the fall of 1970 discouraged the Soviet Union from servicing nuclear missile submarines in or from Cuba, including servicing from a submarine tender based on Cuba, at least for the time being. It is not likely, however, to be the last attempt the Soviets will make to use Cuba as a naval base or servicing facility for Soviet warships and strategic submarines.

Through the expansion of her naval presence in the Caribbean and hemispheric waters, the Soviet Union appears to be aiming at the further strengthening of Soviet-Cuban political and military ties; accelerating the progressive satellization of Cuba; demonstrating moral and material support for an isolated and economically unsuccessful Soviet client; conditioning the U.S. to the acceptance of a permanent naval presence in the Caribbean based on Cuba; and producing insecurity about American territory itself by "revenging" the U.S. encirclement policy of the 1950's.

The Soviet Union and Cuba are both interested in gaining allies outside of the Carribbean area-which is still generally friendly to the U.S.-in order to enable Cuba to break out of the diplomatic and economic blocade imposed by the OAS member states in 1964. And the Marxist government of Chile-and to a lesser extent the left-wing nationalist government of Peru-is providing such an opportunity.

Although President Allende claims he desires normal relations with the U.S. a revealing sign of his true intentions-far more important than his decision not to meet the broad international law standards of fair compensation for expropriated U.S. copper properties in Chile-is his recent effort to forge a new political alliance with Cuba and to persuade other countries of the Andean bloc to follow his lead.

Allende clearly aims at establishing a broad foreign policy re-alignment in favor of Cuba and against the U.S., Brazil and especially the Caribbean members of the OAS opposed to a policy change towards Cuba. The purpose is to split the OAS into antagonistic political blocs, end Cuba's political and economic isolation and enhance Communist and anti-American influence in the hemisphere. Cuba's relations with Chile are of highest priority in Havana's foreign policy. During the past year, especially since February, 1971, President Allende and Fidel Castro have made exceptional efforts to strengthen Chilean-Cuban political, commercial, maritime and cultural relations. Havana's involvement in the internal affairs of Chile appear to be growing and accepted by Allende's Marxist regime. Chilean intelligence operators, for example, have been trained in Cuba and Chile by Cuban intelligence in methods reported to be aimed at neutralizing and then controlling Chile's armed forces and security services.

The U.S. understands that Chile is trying to solve her social and economic problems in her own way and it is entirely an internal matter whether she establishes a so-called "socialist", fascist or any other kind of regime. However, if Chile's Marxist leadership becomes involved in the subversion of neighboring countries or in her external affairs attempts to further undermine hemispheric solidarity and inter-American relations she must expect to provoke reactions by her neighbors and those who oppose her foreign policy.

In summary, Caribbean America, with the exception of Cuba, is of low order priority to the Soviet Union but Soviet interest and encroachment is on the increase. On the other hand, the region is of first order strategic and political importance to the U.S. and Soviet conduct is strongly conditioned by the U.S. definition of the limits of tolerable Soviet activity in the area.

The greatest danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere is not the ideology or social system established in Cuba, Chile, Peru or elsewhere. Even the most militant anti-American Communist or military police state in the Caribbean or South America would not constitute a threat to the security of the U.S. and its friends in the area. While such a regime should properly be deplored as a setback for the democratic open society, it could be easily tolerated. Without Soviet support Castro would be a minor nuisance.

The real danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere is that an antiAmerican regime would seek Soviet protection and tempt her to extend her military power in the hemisphere which could prove to be a serious miscalculation on the part of the USSR setting in motion uncontrollable forces that could lead to another major confrontation between the superpowers.

COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA

(A study on communism in Latin America prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress for the House Committee on Internal Security by Barry Sklar, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Division, September 9, 1971 follows:)

Introduction

COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA

This study on Communism in Latin America focuses on those countries in which the Communists are a significant, or a potentially significant influence. Highlighted are Cuba, because the Castro government rules through a Communist system, and Chile, because the Communist Party is a key participant in the leftist coalition led by Salvador Allende.

The most notable urban guerrilla group, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, are also discussed because of their relative success and their function as an inspiration and model for Latin America's urban guerrilla movement.

Although Communist elements in other Latin American countries are represented in many of the leftist guerrilla groups, both urban and rural, in the main they do not predominate and therefore are not discussed in detail. Brief reference, however, is made to the status of Communist activity in these countries, alphabetically arranged following the reports on Cuba, Chile and Uruguay.

CUBA

The Cuban Communist Party has its origins in the Socialist Workers' Party which was founded in 1905. The impetus to form the Communist Party came from those Socialists desiring affiliation with the new Russian Third (Communist) International or "Comintern". In August, 1925, representatives of the six small Communist groups which had been forming in various regions of the country attended the founding congress of the National Confederation of Cuban Workers (CNOC), and later in the month the six groups formed themselves into a united Communist Party. The Party formally accepted the leadership of the Comintern in Moscow and, as was the practice with other Latin American Communist parties, general direction came from the international movement. Julio Antonio Mella became the intellectual leader of Cuban communism.1

The Communists gained some influence within the CNOC and in 1926 a party member became secretary general of the organization although the anarchosyndicalists, the prime force in organizing the confederation, still were prominent. In the late 1920's the CNOC was made up of 35 trade unions and was affiliated with the Profintern, the "Red Union" in Moscow, although it was not considered specifically Moscow-directed."

The Communists gained control of the CNOC in 1930-31 through domination of many unions. The Party policy at this time was to rid the labor confederation of all non-Communist members even if it meant betraying them to the police of the dictator Gerardo Machado. During this period many Communist Party leaders important in the formative years of the Castro government became prominent, including Anibal and Cesar Escalante, Blas Roca, and Joaquin Ordoqui.3

The Cuban Communist Party has a history of collaboration with various governments for the ultimate benefit of its cause. The ideology of the Cuban government in power was of little concern to the Party which cooperated with rightist dictators as well as reformers. In 1933, the Communists actually worked against a general strike designed to bring down the Machado dictatorship because it

1 Thomas, Hugh. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York. Harper and Row, 1971, p. 575-78.

2 Ibid., p. 578.

Ibid., p. 596-97.

feared that U.S. intervention would result. Although rumors circulated that the Communists were preparing to assume power in the hectic days after the abdication of Machado, organizationally and strategically they were not in a strong position since they had collaborated with the dictator.“

Communist agitation against the short-lived government of Grau San Martin was one of the principal factors in bringing his downfall and Col. Fulgencio Batista, who a few months earlier as a sergeant was instrumental in installing Grau, then installed Colonel Carlos Mendieta."

Although the Communist Party had been declared illegal, the second party Congress was held in April 1934 with 67 members addressed by Bob Minor of the Communist Party of the United States. It has been observed that the Cuban Communist Party from time to time had better relations with its counterpart in the United States than with the Communist Party organizations in Latin America. Shortly after the meeting, a visit from the Comintern representatives resulted in a purge of many of the middle class intellectuals from the party, but Blas Roca remained secretary general.'

In line with the international movement, the Cuban Communist Party in 1935 began to follow the Popular Front line and Earl Browder, the Secretary General of the U.S. Communist Party, became virtual head of all of the parties in West Coast Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Communists kept pressure on the Cuban governments in this period which were actually controlled by Colonel Batista. In April of 1937, the party attempted to rally all anti-Batista forces into a Popular Front alliance. Soon after, however, the Party began to make gestures of friendship toward the dictator. In mid-1937 the government granted permission for the formation of a front party, the Revolutionary Union Party (PUR) which included the Socialists under the leadership of Communist poet Juan Marinello. At this time the Communists also controlled the Ala Izquierda Estudiantil, a radical student group.' This marked the beginning of Batista's courtship of the Cuban Communists. He began to undertake some social reform-oriented measures and thus began to develop a following among the masses. Batista sought the support of labor and was willing to work with the Communists to attain it.

In December, 1937, Batista backed a general political amnesty and in May of 1938, although the Communist Party was still illegal, he permitted the publication of the Communist Party organ, Hoy, under the editorship of Anibal Escalante, a member of the Party's National Executive Committee.10 The Party held its Tenth Plenum in July, 1938, where it was resolved that they must adopt "a more positive attitude toward Colonel Batista, compelling him, . . . to take yet more democratic positions, in order that real guarantees for the exercise of democratic rights shall be established." At this meeting the Communists also referred to Batista as "no longer the focal point of reaction, but the defender of democracy." " Blas Roca pointed out that Batista was closely associated with the revolutionary movement surrounded by ex-sergeants, corporals, and other enlisted men.12

A week after the Plenum. Blas Roca and Ordoqui conferred with Batista at the major military installation, Camp Columbia, and agreed to back the strongman's plan for the calling of a new constitutional assembly in return for the legal recognition of the Party and permission to reorganize the trade union movement under Communist control. The Communists after the meeting also tried to form a united revolutionary party including the followers of Grau San Martin. Grau, however, rejected the invitation. 13

After the historic meeting with the Communists, Batista in a special meeting with newsmen stated, "The Communist Party, according to its constitution, is a democratic party which pursues its ends within the framework of a capitalist regime and renounces violence as a political means, and consequently it is entitled to the same status as that of any other party in Cuba." Thus on September 25, 1938, the Communist Party was legalized for the first time in its

Ibid., p. 632.

5 Alexander. Robert J. Communism in Latin America. New Brunswick, N.J. Rutgers University Press, 1957. p. 275.

Thomas. Op. cit., p. 692.

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