comprehensive character. It refers to all of the circumstances and conditions existing at the time of the transportation. It is useless to un

not that a higher rate shall not be charged per mile, but that a greater aggregate sum shall not be charged. . . The limitations placed upon the prohibition that is made are very significant, and they must not be overlooked. They require that in determining the sum that may be charged for a shorter as compared with a longer distance the requirement must be made:

"I. Between shipments of like kind of property.'

"II. Under substantially similar circumstances and conditions.' 166 III. Over the same lines.'

"IV. In the same direction.

"V. When the shorter is 'included within the longer distance.' “When the act is to be applied in any given case to measure the charge that may be made for any distance, as compared with the longer distance, all of these limitations must be taken into account, and they must all apply to the case-not three or four of them, but all of them. The first, fourth, and fifth of these limitations do not appear to call for any explanation, but the meaning of the second and third may need some explanation. As I understand them, the words 'circumstances and conditions' mean the conditions that govern railway traffic and the circumstances under which it is transported. To my mind these words are full of meaning. They comprehend all the circumstances and conditions that may justify differences in rates, such as competition with other railroads and with water routes, the volume and character of business at different points, the difference in terminal expenses, and the cost of service in each case. If the words used were 'the same circumstances and conditions,' ingenious railway gentlemen would be able to show that the circumstances and conditions were never exactly the same in any two cases. And they might also be able to show that they were not similar,' if that was the word used. But the words 'substantially similar' impart enough latitude to the comparison to enable the courts to exercise a sound discretion and common-sense in passing upon cases that may arise. So far as any one railroad company is concerned,

dertake to specify what these "circumstances and conditions" may be; because each case must be judged by its individual facts.

therefore, the sum which it may charge for a haul from one end of its railroad to the other end becomes the maximum amount it can charge for any shorter haul over that road in the same direction and under substantially similar circumstances and conditions when the shorter distance is included within the longer.

"But the question that seems to trouble those who object to the section as it stands is, whether the maximum thus fixed is the sum which a railroad company charges upon shipments originating at and destined to points upon its own road, or whether the maximum is the sum which it accepts as its share of a through rate upon shipments passing over its road which originate at or are destined to points upon another road. It seems clear to me that there can be but one answer to that question. In the first place, the measure of the charge that may be made for the shorter distance is the sum that is charged for a longer distance over the same line and under substantially similar circumstances and conditions. The rates fixed by a railroad company between points upon its own road are clearly rates upon one line, or, in the terms of the bill, 'the same line.' A railroad company can make and control the rates upon its own road, and the section says that in making such rates the short-haul principle shall be observed. A railroad company cannot control rates over the roads of another company. But when two or more companies unite in making joint rates over their respective roads, they become in the eye of this bill one line, and this section says that the short-haul principle must be observed in making rates over that line, the two or more roads composing it being, within the meaning of the section, the same line so far as such joint rates are concerned. The word railroad is used throughout the bill, and the word line is used only in this section. The courts will be bound to assume that the word line means something different from the word railroad, or it would not have been used in this one instance when the word railroad would naturally have been used if something different had not been intended. The word line means a railroad

It also exclusively refers to a transportation over the same line (does this mean the same company? Is the word "line" line" synonymous

or a combination of railroads. It means a route. Section 7 of the bill requires the carriage of freights to be treated as one continuous carriage from the place of shipment to the place of destination,' and this could not be done in the case of shipments over connecting roads, if the word used in this section was 'railroad,' instead of line.

The joint through rates which are made by two or more railroad companies, between points upon their respective roads, are made over an entirely different and distinct line from that over which any one of the companies individually makes rates. And they are also made under different circumstances and conditions' from those which

govern and determine rates made over a single railroad. The two transactions are separate and distinct, neither being necessarily governed by the other. Furthermore, the making of joint through rates is specifically recognized by the bill in the section requiring publicity of rates, and nowhere in the bill can any thing be found in relation to the division of a joint rate by connecting roads. I am satisfied, therefore, that the only construction that is warranted by the language of the section is the one I have given it, and that, instead of requiring rates to be measured by the percentage of a through rate which a road accepts, or of requiring through rates over connecting roads to be an aggregation of the local rates over each road, as some have claimed, the section as it stands simply requires that each railroad company shall observe the short-haul principle as to its own rates, and that the same principle shall also be observed by a combination of railroads as to the joint through rates between points upon their respective roads agreed upon by such a combination."

Mr. Hoar asked Mr. Cullom whether the construction put upon the section by the Senate conferrees (that it only prohibited the charging of a larger gross sum for the shorter than for the longer haul, and did not prohibit a larger proportionate charge) was the sense in which the House conferrees construed it.

Mr. Cullom in substance replied that there was no question but that every member of the conference committees of both houses un

tance.

qualifiedly understood that the fourth section was not to be construed as a pro rate per ton per mile law, but as a prohibition to charge in the aggregate the same amount for the short as for the long distance, unless under certain circumstances. One of the elements in the objection to the bill was the misinterpretation of this fourth section. There has seemed to be a determination to construe this section as a pro rate per mile section. He undertook to say that no member of the conference committees ever dreamed that the language of the fourth section could be so construed.

Mr. Hoar suggested the case of the export trade of Boston (amounting to $125,000,000 a year), and on the materials of which the Massachusetts railroads were allowed a rebate of 5 per cent. on account of the ports of New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore being 250 miles nearer to Chicago than the port of Boston; and he intimated that, under the fourth section, the Massachusetts railroads would either have to cut down their local rates or Boston would lose its foreign trade.

Mr. Cullom thought that perhaps it was a little unfortunate that Boston was further from the centre of gravity than New York, but he did not think there was any thing in the bill which would prevent railroads carrying produce to Boston just as cheaply as the railroads carrying produce to New York from Chicago, Omaha, or San Francisco.

Mr. Hoar, suggesting that Mr. Cullom misapprehended his meaning, restated the proposition.

Mr. Cullom in substance replied that, so far as the fourth section was concerned, there was nothing in it which would prohibit railroad companies taking these products at exactly the same rate to Boston as to New York. It was pretty difficult, he said, to pass any act providing any regulation whatever which would not appear to interfere harshly with what somebody was doing. He had no disposition to interfere with the foreign commerce of the country. He would very much prefer to see the foreign commerce increase, if it could be done

VI. Finally, there is no doubt that "the Commission may from time to time prescribe. the extent to which such designated common.

consistently with the protection of the interests of the great mass of the people outside of the seaports. They were met here with this condition of affairs,-unjust discrimination, extortion,, secret rebates, and all manner of unjust practices, which had been. going on for years by railroad corporations because there had been. no regulation of them by the Government of the United States. Now they had before them a bill which undertakes, in a moderate degree, to apply to them some sort of regulation. The bill provided. that there should be no secret rebate, no unjust discrimination, no extortion, and that there should be no greater charge for a short haul than for a longer haul (on the same line) under exactly similar circumstances and conditions. He did not believe that the bill. would interfere with the foreign trade of Boston. He did not. believe that the Senator's constituents would be interrupted in their foreign commerce in the slightest degree by this bill. But if Congress was going to regulate railroad corporations at all, and to stop the discriminations by which towns were built up and towns were destroyed, there must be something in the bill to do it,. or else the bill might as well be laid on the table.

[From editorial in New York Times, January 15, 1887:

THE LONG AND SHORT HAUL.

"The debate of the last two days in the Senate on the Inter-State Commerce bill has turned almost wholly upon the long- and shorthaul provision of the fourth section. The explanations and arguments which have been made confirm us in our original opinion of the meaning and effect of this provision. Our confidence in the view first taken was somewhat unsettled by the protests of prominent. railroad men who ought to be capable of understanding the exact. meaning of the bill, and who have exceptional knowledge of the: facts and requirements of the railroad business. But we are con-vinced that their protests have been based either upon a misconcep-tion or a wilful perversion of the long- and short-haul section. Their obstinacy in adhering to an untenable ground was well illustrated in