Per Curiam. There must be a new trial, in order that it may be ascertained how long the plaintiff's interest continued to be a reversionary interest merely. If it was a reversionary interest at the time of the sale, then such interest was injured by the sale, and not by the original taking. The action, therefore, in respect of the sale, would, in that case, be brought in time; but, if the interest of the sons was determined before the seizure, it might be difficult to say that the action was in time. Rule absolute. On the second trial, before PATTESON J. at the Monmouthshire Spring assizes, 1834, it appeared that the trams were distrained for arrears of tolls due, upon goods carried in them, from Joseph Drayton Jenkins, and John Jenkins, the sons of the plaintiff, and that, at the time of the distress, they were laden with goods belonging to a person named Webb, to whom they had been let by the sons; and the jury expressly found that the trams were the property of the plaintiff, and were hired of him by the sons, and that the hiring had not terminated at the time of the seizure. They then found a verdict for the plaintiff, under the direction of the learned Judge, who reserved leave to the defendant's counsel to move to enter a nonsuit.

Talfourd Serjt. moved (April 16th, 1834,) for a rule to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside, and a nonsuit entered, or a new trial had. The rule was moved for on three grounds, as to the third of which (excessive damages) a rule nisi was granted. The other two grounds were, first, that the defendant had a right to distrain the trams; and, secondly, that, under the facts proved, the limitation clause barred the *375] plaintiff's action. First, as to the right to distrain. The ninety-first section* entitles the company to demand tolls on certain goods, but there is no clause authorizing a toll on trams. Then the hundredth section gives a power to distrain, not only goods, but any waggons or other carriages in respect of which tolls ought to be paid. This must mean the carriage carrying goods in respect of which the tolls are due; otherwise, as no toll is laid on the trams, the words would be without meaning. Again, the same section authorizes the carriage, &c. to be detained until payment be made of such tolls, and of all arrears of the same, due from the owner. These words would be absurd if they were not construed to mean that the carriage, which had carried goods at any previous time, should be liable to be distrained and detained for all tolls remaining due on such goods. [PARKE J. What objection is there to construing the intention of the act to be, that the carriage should be made liable during each trip, as well as the goods, for tolls payable upon the goods for that particular trip; and that there should also be, after seizure, a general lien for arrears due from the owner of such articles upon which the tolls so seized for, are payable? PATTESON J. When the trams were seized, they were not in the use of the two sons, but lent to another person; and you distrained them, not for what they were actually carrying, but for arrears due from the two sons. Now you may distrain for tolls, and keep for arrears; but you cannnot distrain for arrears.] Secondly, as to the limitation clause. The time must be reckoned from the seizure, the sale, or some intermediate period. The seizure would be too far back; and, unless some period can be shown at which the reversionary interest came into possession, the situation of the plaintiff was not altered after the seizure, and therefore his injury must be dated from the seizure, especially as the seizure and the sale are connected together in the declaration as a single transaction. [PARKE J. The plaintiff will say, you ought to have sold no more than the interest of the lessees; the injury, therefore, dates from the sale of the whole property, which is always supposed to be injurious to the reversion, as if a sheriff sell more than the tenant's interest.]

The court (LORD DENMAN C. J., LITTLEDALE, PARKE, and PATTESON Js.) refused the rule as to the first two grounds.

*376]

*WILLIAMS against CLOUGH, Clerk.

A line drawn through two words in the jurat of an affidavit, leaving them, however, perfectly legible, is an erasure within the Rule of court, Michaelmas term, 37 G. 3, and vitiates the affidavit, though the omission or retention of the words would not vary the sense.

Sir James Scarlett, on showing cause against a rule obtained by the attorney-general in this case, objected that an affidavit on which the rule had been grounded was inadmissible, there being an erasure in the jurat; and he referred to the rule of court, Mich. T., 37 G. 3, 7 T. R. 82, which provides, "That no affidavit be read or made use of in any matter depending in this court, in the jurat of which there shall be any interlineation or erasure."

The jurat had been commenced thus:- "Re-sworn at Brynhyfrid," the words "at Brynhyfrid" had been struck out by drawing a slight line through them, which, however, left the writing perfectly legible, and the jurat then appeared as follows: "Re-sworn at Brynhyfrid by the several deponents A. B., C. D., and E. F., at Brynhyfrid, in the parish of, &c., on, &c. Before me, G. H., a commissioner," &c. [LORD DENMAN, C. J. The principle of the rule is, that there shall be no alteration in the jurat.]

Sir J. Campbell, attorney-general. That is, that tion which is not submitted to the eyes of the court. by which anything is suppressed.

LORD DENMAN, C. J. I think the rule applies. the rules of court.

there shall be no altera-
There is no change here

Parties should attend to
Rule discharged.

THE King's warrant was this day read in open court, appointing Thomas Chapman, Esq., Assistant Master of this court, to the office of Marshal of the Marshalsea of this court, (a) and the oath of office was administered to him: Immediately after which, the court made the following order, on the motion of Sir J. Campbell, attorney-general, (who stated that a like rule had been made on the appointment of the late marshal.)

That Thomas Chapman, Esq., the present Marshal of the Marshalsea of this court, do take into his custody all the prisoners who are at large without the walls of the prison of the said court, and also all prisoners who have escaped and are not lawfully discharged out of the said prison, and bring them into the prison aforesaid.

(a) In the room of William Jones, Esq., who died in this term, having held the office nearly forty-three years.

*GOODWIN v. LORDON. May 8th..

[*378

A defendant who has been in custody on a charge of felony, and is acquitted and discharged, is not privileged from arrest on his return home; and the court will not relieve him from such arrest, if it does not appear that his apprehension on the criminal charge was a contrivance to get him into custody on the civil suit.

Dunbar moved (May 7th,)(a) that the defendant might be discharged out of the custody of the sheriff of Surrey, under the following circumstances. The defendant was tried at the Surrey sessions on two indictments for embezzlement, on the prosecution of the plaintiff. He was acquitted, and discharged the following day by proclamation. On his way home from the gaol, to which he had been committed for trial, he was arrested on mesne process, at the suit of the plaintiff, for 287., and was afterwards taken back to the same gaol, and there detained in custody on such process. The affidavits in support of the motion alleged, that the defendant had a cross claim against the plaintiff arising out of the same transactions between them as the supposed debt for which the latter had arrested him, and exceeding it in amount; and the defendant stated that he had heard of no charge or claim against him by the plaintiff, till he, the defendant, had demanded a settlement of the accounts, and that he believed the arrest to have been made for the purpose of harassing him, and preventing the enforcement of his demand. PATTESON, J., on summons, refused to discharge the defendant.

(a) Before LORD Denman C. J., Littledale, and WILLIAMS Js.

Dunbar now contended that the defendant, while on his return from the sessions which he had been obliged to attend on a criminal charge against himself, was privileged from arrest. A party in attendance directly on *379] *the business of a court, or even in any matter relative to it, is enti

tled to freedom from arrest eundo et redeundo, Meekins v. Smith, 1 H. Bl. 636, especially when brought there, as in this case, on compulsory process. [LITTLEDALE J. It has lately been held that a party brought before a court in custody on criminal process is not within the rule.] In Wells v. Gurney, 8 B. & Č. 769, a debtor was arrested on Sunday for an alleged assault, in order to gain an opportunity of arresting him upon civil process on the Monday, when he was bailed for the assault: and this court discharged him out of custody as to the civil arrest. [LORD DENMAN C. J. If it appeared here that the arrest of the defendant on a criminal charge was merely a contrivance to get him into custody on the civil suit, that case would apply; but it does not follow that that was so, because the defendant was acquitted. Do your affidavits allege that it was a contrivance?(a)] It may be gathered from the facts. Independently of cases, the privilege ought to be allowed here on principle. [LORD DENMAN C. J. The question comes simply to this; whether a person taken into custody on a criminal charge is privileged from arrest redeundo, when dismissed from such custody? That is a point of great general importance.] Cur. adv. vult.

LORD DENMAN, C. J., on this day, delivered the judgment of the court. We think the defendant, in this case, was not entitled to the privilege. The *380] only direct *authority we have been able to find upon the point is an anonymous case in Mr. Dowling's Reports of Cases of Practice, (b) where an application like this was made before PARKE J., who consulted the other judges of this court, and they all held that the privilege could not be claimed. Rule refused.

(a) It was not stated in the affidavits that the alleged debt arose out of the same transactions as the criminal charge.

(b) 1 Dowl. Pract. Cases, 157.

The KING against The Churchwardens of the Parish of ST. SAVIOUR'S, SOUTHWARK. May 8th.

A vestry having, by a show of hands, passed a resolution, directing an illegal application of some charitable funds, and a poll having been demanded of the person presiding at the vestry, and not granted, the court refused a rule for a mandamus to compel such person to grant a poll.

LORD DENMAN C. J. A rule was obtained in the bail court, in Hilary term, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, directing the churchwardens of the parish of St. Saviour's, Southwark, to assemble the parishioners of the said parish, for the purpose of taking the poll upon a motion put to the vote by a show of hands at the general or vestry meeting of the inhabitants of the said parish, holden on the 21st of January last, viz., that the resolutions of the general or vestry meeting of the inhabitants of the said parish, holden on the 7th of January then instant, as to the monuments to be erected to the memory of certain persons, might be confirmed. These persons had bequeathed property to be applied to particular objects of charity in the parish. At a vestry meeting, holden on the 7th of January last, a resolution was proposed and carried, that a tablet or monument should be erected to record the bequests of the devisors, to be paid for out of the funds issuing from the bequests. On the 21st of January, another vestry meeting was held, *at which the *381] resolution of the last meeting was confirmed upon a show of hands. A poll was demanded by the opponents of the resolution; but the churchwarden, who presided at the meeting, refused to grant it. Then the present rule was

obtained. It was objected that such an application of the funds would be a breach of trust, and that this court ought not to grant a mandamus for the purpose of putting it to the vote, whether such a breach of trust should be committed. We are of opinion that the mandamus cannot be granted, and for the reason suggested. It may be said, that the object in demanding the poll was to set aside the illegal resolution which had been passed by the show of hands; but we cannot assume that the result of the poll would be to rescind the resolution. If the result were the other way, it would be said that the poll was taken under the authority of a mandamus from this court.

Rule discharged.

Ball in support of the rule.
R. V. Richards against the rule.

*JONES v. ELLIS and Another.

If a defendant, against whom judgment has been recovered, afterwards become bankrupt, and obtain his certificate within fourteen days of service of process upon his bail, the bail are entitled, under the general rule of 17th June 1833, to have proceedings against them stayed, though no notice be given to the plaintiff, or application made to stay such proceedings, till after the expiration of the fourteen days.

Follett had obtained a rule to show cause why an order made by Littledale J. for staying proceedings in this cause upon payment of costs of the action, should not be discharged. The plaintiff had brought an action against a person named Pring, and the defendants had become bail to the action. On the 10th of August, Pring became bankrupt. The cause was tried, and the plaintiff obtained a verdict against Pring, and signed final judgment. A ca. sa. was issued against Pring, and non est inventus returned; whereupon a writ of summons was issued at the suit of the plaintiff against the present defendants on their recognizance, and was served on them on the 7th of November. On the 16th of November, Pring obtained his certificate. On the 14th of December the defendants served a summons on the plaintiff for the exoneration of the bail; and on the 11th of January last, the order of Littledale J. was obtained accordingly.

Kelly now showed cause. By the general rule of 17th June, 1833, 5 B. & Ad. 468, the defendants were entitled to render their principal within fourteen days next after service of process upon themselves, but not later. If the certificate be equivalent to a render, that has been done; for the certificate was obtained within nine days of the service of the writ of summons on the defendants. Before the general rule was made, the certificate was considered to be equivalent to a render, (a) on the ground of its making [*383 the render useless. It is true that the general rule directs the stay of proceedings "upon such render being duly made, and notice thereof given;" and that, in the present case, no notice was given or application made till the 14th December, which was twenty-eight days after the certificate, and thirty-seven days after the service of the summons. But the rule does not require that the notice shall be given within the fourteen days, though the render must be within that time. And a delay in giving the notice, or in applying for the exoneretur, cannot prejudice the plaintiff in this case, as the judge's order directed the payment of costs of the action generally. In many cases notice could not be given within the fourteen days, where the certificate was not known to the bail in time, or where the principal rendered himself on the last day.

Follett in support of the rule. If the certificate be now equivalent to the

(a) See Mannin v. Partridge and Another, 14 East. 599.

render, the application for the exoneretur should be made within the fourteen days. The certificate requires the notice, or the application, to give it an effect tantamount to that of a render; otherwise there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from presuming that he is to continue the proceedings.

LORD DENMAN C. J. I do not think that it was intended, by the general rule, to alter the effect of the certificate, or to prevent it from having, as before, the same operation as an actual render.

*384]

*LITTLEDALE J., PATTESON J., and WILLIAMS J. concurred. Rule discharged.

JONES v. REYNOLDS. May 8th.

Defendant gave a cognovit, not to be enforced "until after the final hearing of a chancery suit instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff, and the final decree or order to be pronounced thereon:" and in the event of the decree being in favour of plaintiff. judgment was to be entered up in accordance with the decree, and defendant was not to impede the judgment by proceedings at law or equity, except as aforesaid. The decree having been given in favor of plaintiff, defendant appealed: Held, that judgment could not be entered up on the cognovit, till the appeal was determined. Follett had obtained a rule (April 17th) to show cause why a judgment signed on a cognovit given in this action should not be set aside for irregu larity. By the cognovit, it was declared that no judgment should be entered up thereon, or execution issue, "until after the final hearing of a certain chancery suit instituted by the above-named defendant against the abovenamed plaintiff, and the final decree or order to be pronounced thereon;" and that, in the event of the final decree or order being in favour of the plaintiff in the action, judgment might be entered up, and execution issue, "and the same shall operate in accordance with such decree or order." The defendant, in the cognovit, undertook "not to take any further proceedings at law or equity (except as aforesaid) to impede or delay the said plaintiff in obtaining satisfaction of the said judgment so to be entered up." The chancery suit was heard before the master of the rolls, who dismissed the bill with costs; but the defendant (the plaintiff in chancery) presented a petition of appeal to the Lord Chancellor, which had not yet been heard. After the petition was lodged, judgment was issued on the cognovit.

Whitcombe now showed cause. The petition of appeal does not prevent the decree from being "final," in the sense in which the word is used in

*385] the cognovit. That word was inserted merely to protect the defendant against judgment being signed upon the making of any order by the master of the rolls directing interlocutory proceedings, as, for example, a reference to a master in chancery to ascertain some fact. The dismissal of the bill is a final decree. Besides, the defendant is not to impede the judgment "except as aforesaid;" that exception relates only to the suit before the master of the rolls.

Follett, in support of the rule, was stopped by the court.

LORD DENMAN C. J. Final decree must mean a conclusive decrce: the decree of the master of the rolls is not conclusive, till the appeal be determined.

LITTLEDALE J., PATTESON J., and WILLIAMS J. concurred.
Rule absolute. (a)

(a) See Dummer v. Pitcher, 3 B. & Ad. 347.