subpoena, and as he could have given no legal evidence whatsoever on the indictment had he been examined by the grand jury, he was not obliged to pay any obedience to the said subpoena, and therefore he left the sessions and returned home.

Dundas now showed cause. The question raised by these affidavits is, whether the Court of King's Bench can attach a person who has disobeyed a subpoena issuing out of the Court of the Quarter Sessions of the Peace. Assuming that a sufficient sum of money was tendered to the witness for expenses, this court has no such power of attachment, either by statute or at common law. The 45 Geo. 3, c. 92, may probably be relied on by the prosecutor. The title of that act is as follows: "An act to amend two acts of the thirteenth and forty-fourth years of his present majesty, for the more effectual execution of the criminal laws, and more easy apprehending and bringing to trial offenders escaping from one part of the united kingdom to the other, and from one county to another." This statute, and the statutes which it recites, were made to compel persons resident in England to obey the process of the courts of Scotland and Ireland, and to compel persons resident in Scotland and Ireland to obey the process of the English courts. The third section, (post, 419,) shows plainly that this was the object of the act.

The 13 Geo. 3, c. 31, and the 44 Geo. 3, c. 92, lead more clearly, if possible, to the inference that this would be the object of the 45 Geo. 3, c. 92. The former of these statutes was passed before the Union with Ireland, and is intituled "An act for the more effectual execution of the criminal law in the two parts of the United Kingdom." Various provisions are inserted in this act to accomplish the object stated in the title of the act. Subsequently to the passing of this statute, the Union with Ireland took place; and the 44 Geo. 3, c. 92, extended the provisions of the 13 Geo. 3, to that country.

This court has no power at common law to punish a contempt to the Court of Quarter Sessions. That court has ample authority to punish for contempt(a) to itself.

M. D. Hill in support of the rule. It will be extremely inconvenient if there is no power in this court, either by the common law or by statute, to punish the witness for the contempt of which he has been guilty, and a subpoena issued from the Court of Quarter Sessions will be useless. In Rex v. Ring, 8 T. R. 585, the witness was served with the copy of a subpoena issued out of the crown office, requiring him to attend at the assizes, and this court granted an attachment against him for not attending in obedience to the subpoena. This case establishes the proposition that the Court of King's Bench has the power of compelling the attendance of witnesses at inferior courts. It certainly shows that this court would in this case grant an attachment, if the subpoena had issued out of the crown office. The subpoena here is issued by the custos rotulorum, and if the rule is that it is necessary to send to the crown office in every case, there will frequently be a denial of justice. [LITTLEDALE J. Was the subpoena served upon the witness within the jurisdiction of the Court of Quarter Sessions?] It was. It is only necessary to issue the subpœna from the crown office when the witness resides out of the county. Mr. Nolan says, (b) "Subpoena to compel the attendance of witnesses, when living within the county for which the sessions are held, are issued by the clerk of the peace, and also from the crown office. But where the witnesses live in a different county, the crown office alone can issue the subpoena." Mr. Nolan also adds, "and if the witness disobeys it, quære, if the Court of King's Bench will not punish him by attachment." Then, with respect to the tender of a sum of money for expenses. [LORD DENMAN C. J. I understand that objection is waived.] The third section of the 45 Geo. 3, sanctions the

(a) Rex v. Lord Preston, 1 Salk. 278.

(b) 2 Nol. P. L. 541, note (4), (442, note (1), third edition.)

opinion that the Court of King's Bench may enforce the attendance of witnesses at inferior courts.

LORD DENMAN C. J.-If the practice had existed of enforcing the attendance of witnesses at inferior courts, by attachment out of this court, there might be good reasons for such a course of proceeding. We cannot, however, give ourselves power because it is convenient to possess it. This court, in my opinion, possesses no such power. It was even doubted in Rex v. Ring, (where the subpoena issued out of the crown office, and required the attendance of the witness at the assizes,) whether this court could possess the power to that extent. The principle of the common law, that this court has a power of punishing for contempt, does not apply, since the offence committed is not a contempt of this court. There is a mode of enforcing the attendance of witnesses by attachment, by issuing a subpoena out of this court. The 45 Geo. 3, c. 3, is confined to persons residing in other parts of the United Kingdom. The preamble to the third section recites that it is fit to provide for the appearance of persons to answer in cases where warrants are not usually issued, and to give evidence in criminal prosecutions in every part of the United Kingdom. It then enacts, "that the service of every writ of subpoena or other process upon any person in any one of the parts of the United Kingdom, requiring the appearance of such person to answer or give evidence in any criminal prosecution in any other of the parts of the same, shall be as good and effectual in law as if the same had been served in that part of the United Kingdom where the person so served is required to appear: And in case such person so served shall not appear according to the exigence of such writ or process, it shall be lawful for the court out of which the same issued, upon proof made of the service thereof to the satisfaction of the said court, to transmit a certificate of such default under the seal of the same court, or under the hand of one of the judges or justices of the same, to the court of King's Bench in England, in case such service was had in England; or in case such service was had in Scotland, to the Court of Justiciary in Scotland; or in case such service was had in Ireland, to the Court of King's Bench in Ireland; and the said last-mentioned courts respectively shall and may thereupon proceed against and punish the person for so having made default in like manner as they might have done if such person had neglected or refused to appear in obedience to a writ of subpoena or other process, issued out of such last-mentioned courts respectively." It is said that this recognises the power of this court. I cannot say that I should hold that this court possessed the power, upon the supposition that the statute inferred its existence.

LITTLEDALE J.-With regard to the general practice, no instance has been found in which this court has enforced the attendance of a witness by attachment, in a case similar to this. I understand that before an attachment can be granted, there must be some disobedience either to a rule or to the process of this court. If it is wished to enforce the attendance of a witness at the Quarter Sessions, the party should issue a subpoena from the crown office; and if the witness disobeys that subpoena, he may be proceeded against by

attachment.

TAUNTON J.-I inquire why it was not matter of attachment where the subpoena issued out of the Court of Quarter Sessions, as well as where it issued out of the crown office. The answer is, that in the one case there is a contempt of process issuing out of this court, and in the other not. Rule discharged.

WILLIAMS J., concurred.

The KING v. The JUSTICES of the West Riding of YORKSHIRE.

-p. 757.

The court will not grant a mandamus commanding the justices in session to try an appeal dismissed for want of notice of trial, where the Court of Quarter Sessions has granted a case upon the question whether it had been rightly dismissed, which has been abandoned by the party applying for the mandamus.

AN appeal against an order for the removal of James Bullas and his family, from Doncaster to Warmsworth, was entered, and notice of trial given for the West Riding sessions, at Pontefract, 8th April last. This appeal was respited until the following sessions at Rotherham, on the ground that Bullas was undergoing imprisonment for a term which would expire previously to the sessions at Rotherham. At these sessions the appeal was dismissed for want of due notice of trial at the Rotherham sessions, subject, however, to a special case. The appellants abandoned the case, and obtained a rule calling upon the justices to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, commanding them to cause continuance to be entered to the next sessions, and then to hear and determine the merits of the appeal. The affidavits in support of and against the rule were contradictory, with respect to the fact whether the appeal was respited at the instance of the respondents or of the appellants.

Milner now showed cause.(a) A mandamus will only be granted where the parties have no other remedy. In this case the Court of Quarter Sessions granted the applicants leave to draw up a case for the opinion of this court, and of that permission they have declined availing themselves.

Dundas contrà. It is a more convenient course for the parties to apply for a mandamus.

LORD DENMAN C. J.-We are always unwilling to interfere with the practice of the Court of Quarter Sessions, and if that court has granted the party a complete remedy, we ought not to interpose. I think the Court of Quarter Sessions cannot adopt a better course than granting a case to a party who is dissatisfied with their decision, where the law is doubtful. When that has been done, a party cannot require this court with high hands to grant a mandamus to the justices to rehear the case.

LITTLEDALE J., TAUNTON J., and WILLIAMS J. concurred.

Rule discharged.

(a) Another point was discussed in the argument, but the court pronounced no decision upon it.

The KING v. The EQUITABLE GAS COMPANY.—p. 759.

In addressing the court in aggravation of punishment, upon a conviction for a nuisance, it is competent to the prosecutor to advert to provisions contained in an act, relating to a private company, if such act contain a clause declaring it to be a public statute, though it be not referred to in any of the prosecutor's affidavits.

THE defendants had been convicted of a nuisance in corrupting the water of the river Thames. Campbell A. G., in the course of his address to the court, in aggravation of punishment, referred to an act relative to another gas company, (which contained a clause directing that it should be a public act,) by which it was provided, that the latter company should incur a penalty of 2001. for every offence of this description.

Sir James Scarlett, who was of counsel with the defendants, objected that this act could not be referred to, as it was not stated in the affidavits filed; and he cited Brett v. Beales, 1 Mood. & Malk. 416; (S. C. not S. P. 10 Barn. & Cressw. 508.)

Campbell A. G., contrà, contended that Brett v. Beales was wholly inapplicable.

LORD DENMAN C. J. We think the attorney-general may refer to the statute to which he has alluded.

In the matter of Arbitration between the SUN FIRE OFFICE COMPANY and CHARLES WRIGHT.-p. 819.

The profits of a business are insurable, but they must be insured qua profits. Under an insurance by A. of his "interest in the Ship Inn and offices," A. cannot recover compensation for the loss of his business as an Innkeeper, in the interval between the fire and the rebuilding.

THIS was a rule calling upon Wright to show cause why an award between the parties should not be set aside. The award had been made by a barrister, appointed as arbitrator under a submission by bonds under the respective seals of Chas. Pole, Esq., as one of the managers and on behalf of the Sun Fire Office, and Chas. Wright, of Dover, Innkeeper, and which submission had been made a rule of court. The condition of the respective bonds recited, that Wright had insured with the Sun Fire Office Company, on, among other things, his stock, utensils and goods in trust in the Ship Inn and offices at Dover, only 25007., and on his interest only in the said Ship Inn and offices 10007., and that he took out a policy to that effect; and whilst the policy was on foot a fire had broken out in the said premises, whereby, it was alleged, Wright had sustained a loss in his stock, utensils and goods, and his interests in the Ship Inn and offices, so insured, of 12007. The arbitrator awarded that there was due from Pole, as manager, &c., to Wright, 1207. for the loss sustained by fire on the goods in the Ship Inn and offices, and 4507. for the loss "sustained in his business as an inn keeper by not being able to occupy the Inn and offices during the time that elapsed between the fire and the rebuilding of the said premises.'

One of the grounds of the rule nisi for setting aside this award was, that the supposed interest in respect of which the arbitrator had awarded the sum of 450%. was not within the meaning and legal effect of the policy.

R. V. Richards showed cause. The "interest" which Wright had in the Ship Inn and offices, consisted in the power to use them in his business as an innkeeper, and therefore the loss sustained by him, by reason of the temporary impossibility of using the premises in the business, falls within the meaning of the policy. Suppose that Wright had been obliged to hire and pay for the use of other buildings whilst these premises were being rebuilt,-would he not have been entitled under this policy to call upon the insurers to indemnify him? The loss of business by reason of his not being able to use the premises, would be equally within the policy. The profits of an innkeeper, arising from the use of his inn, constitute an insurable interest analogous to the freight of a ship. Although the subject matter of an insurance must be properly described, the nature of the interest which the assured has in the subjectmatter of the insurance may be left at large. Crowley v. Cowen, 3 Barn. & Adol. 478; Flint v. Flemyng, 1 Barn. & Adol. 45.

F. Kelly, contrà, was stopped by the court.

LORD DENMAN C. J.-It is clear to us that the arbitrator had no authority to award compensation to Wright for the loss he had sustained in his business by not being able to occupy the premises. The policy was not intended to cover the profits of the business.

LITTLEDALE J.-I am of the same opinion.

TAUNTON J.-I think that profits are insurable, but they must be insured qua profits. A party is not entitled to compensation for loss of profits under an insurance of his "interest in the Ship Inn."

WILLIAMS J. concurred.

Rule absolute.

In the matter of Arbitration between LEE and HEMINGWAY.—p. 860. Where, in articles of agreement for the sale of lands by A. to B., it is stipulated that the price shall be fixed by an arbitrator, and the agreement be made a rule of court, the award being published, and the agreement made a rule of court, A. cannot have an attachment against B. for non-payment of the price awarded. A.'s only remedy is by action on the articles.

By articles of agreement under seal, entered into for the purpose of settling certain differences between the parties, it was covenanted that Hemingway should purchase certain lands and shares in mines belonging to Lee, at a price to be determined by A. and B., who were to make their award before a certain time; Lee covenanted to make out a perfect abstract of title at his expense, and to execute a conveyance upon payment of the price fixed by the award. The agreement was made a rule of court. A. and B. in respect of one portion of the property awarded 14,0007., and in respect of another, 2007. The money was demanded by Lee, and a conveyance tendered by him to Hemingway, but the latter refused to pay the price assessed by the arbitrators.

R. V. Richards now moved for a rule nisi for an attachment against Hemingway. The agreement is a contract to purchase, and the arbitrators are only to assess the amount to be paid; but it is submitted that it is a case in which the court will grant an attachment. [LITTLEDALE J. This agreement is hardly within the statute of William (8 and 9 Will. 3, c. 15.) That which is said about the price is not the primary part of the agreement, as the statute contemplates. (a) You cannot have the attachment, but you can bring your action; (b) so that you are not without remedy. PARKE J. Even supposing that we had the power, this is not a case in which it would be fit to issue an attachment.]

PER CURIAM.

Rule refused.

(a) The statute authorizes "all merchants, traders and others, desiring to end any controversy, suit, or quarrel, for which there is no other remedy but by personal action or suit in equity, by arbitration to agree, that their submission of their suit to the award or umpirage of any person or persons, shall be made a rule of any of his majesty's courts of record," &c. The authority here given is expressly confined to controversies, suits, or quarrels existing at the time of the submission, and then the proper subject of a personal action or suit in equity; whereas, at the time of the submission in the principal case, although some difference had existed between the parties, the matter submitted was one, respecting which there was no question between the parties, except that raised by the submission itself.

(b) Namely, an action of covenant, on the articles of agreement.

AVRIL v. The SHERIFF of WARWICK and Others.―p. 871.

A return of nulla bona made by the sheriff to a fieri facias against A. is admissible in evidence upon the trial of a question as to property in goods at the time of such return between A. and a succeeding sheriff.

So, although the bailiff entrusted with the execution of such writ did not himself search for goods of A., but sent his assistant.

TROVER to recover the value of goods taken under an execution before Tindal C. J. at the spring assizes for the county of Warwick in 1834.

The defendant's officers, having a fi. fa. against one Cooper, and hearing that some of his goods had been removed to Avril's house, seized the goods in question there. Cooper's goods were removed to Avril's house under colour of an assignment from Cooper to Avril. To prove that, subsequently to the time of the execution of the deed of assignment, Avril had no goods of his own, the bailiff of the preceding sheriff was called, who stated that he had sent his followers to search for goods of Avril to satisfy two writs of fi. fa. against