provided for. In connection with the subject of interpretation the following definitions are given of terms frequently used in connection with treaties:

Protocol. This is a word of Byzantine origin, and was at the outset applied to the first, or outer, sheet of a roll of manuscript upon which was written or impressed the writer's name, the date of the instrument, and the title of the minister from whose office it issued. In diplomatic usage it signifies a preliminary draft of a document, or, like the French term procès verbal, it stands for the minutes of a conference.

Parafé (Tapaypapí) is a term adapted from the Greek, signifying a marginal note. In diplomacy it is the placing of their initials in the margin of a proposed treaty by the negotiators.

Declaration. The announcement of certain principles of international action, as, the Declaration of Paris appended to the treaty concluding the Crimean War and stating principles of sea law.

Recez. This term is applied to the act of a diet, or congress, in reducing to writing the result of its deliberations upon a particular subject, before final adjournment.

Separate Articles. These are clauses added to a treaty after it has been formally signed and ratified. They are contained in a separate instrument, and are duly authenticated, but are construed in connection with the treaty to which they refer, and of which they form a part.

The Most Favored Nation Clause. The use of this clause is becoming constantly more frequent in treaties, especially in those of a commercial character. It commends itself by its convenience. Its effect is to extend the scope and operation of a treaty to cover any concessions of privileges, of a similar character to those stipulated for, which may be granted in the future, by either party, to other states, or to their citizens or subjects. The clauses of later treaties granting such concessions in this way become an integral part of the early treaty. The following clause,

extracted from a recent treaty of the United States, illustrates the principle involved: "Every right, privilege, or immunity that the Egyptian Government now grants, or may grant in future, to the subjects or citizens, vessels, commerce, and navigation of whatsoever other foreign power, shall be granted to citizens of the United States, vessels, commerce, and navigation, who shall have the right to enjoy the same" (Treaty with Egypt, November 16, 1884.) A recent example is art. xiv. of the treaty with Japan of February 21, 1911.

Concordat. This term is applied to conventions concluded by the Holy See. With the absorption of the Papal States by the Kingdom of Italy, the Pope, to whom there remain the Vatican, the Lateran, and the Zecca palaces at Rome, and the suburban estate of Castel Gandolfo, finds himself without territory or subjects and yet enjoying a status extranational in character and akin to international. He maintains diplomatic relations with many governments, notably Bavaria, Spain, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Austria. His official utterances are termed decrees, encyclicals, pastorals, constitutions; the term motu proprio is also used. The Italian government has defined its attitude in a statute passed May 13, 1871, the "law touching the prerogatives of the sovereign Pontiff as to his seat and his relations to the State and Church"; it is known as the Law of Guarantees. He enjoys a large annual appropriation from the Italian royal treasury, never yet actually utilized. As a mediator in many international disputes the Papacy has maintained a position of consistent usefulness to modern civilization. (The Guarantee Law is printed by Fleischmann, Völkerrechtsquellen, No. 31; a very full bibliography of the subject is given by M. Gidel in his Quelques Idées sur la Condition International de la Papauté, Paris, 1912; Fauchille, in his edition of Bonfils (iii, chap. ii.), No. 896, treats the theme exhaustively.)

CHAPTER IX

THE CONFLICT OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS: THE ADJUST. MENT OF DISPUTES, MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, RETORSION, REPRISALS, PACIFIC BLOCKADE

Procedure in Cases of Conflict. When a conflict of international rights arises, as is the case whenever one state has a cause of difference with another, it is customary for the state whose rights have been denied, or trespassed upon, to make known its cause of complaint to the offending state, and to demand that justice be done for the wrong that has been committed. The urgency of this demand is always proportional to the gravity and importance of the injury sustained. The motive of some violations of perfect or sovereign rights may be so obvious and unmistakable that no explanations are asked for by the offended state, and resort is at once had to forcible measures of redress. On the other hand, the offence may consist in the violation of some minor rule of comity of so little importance that a mere exchange of diplomatic notes is deemed a sufficient remedy. Between these two extremes lie the various methods of settling international disputes.'

Methods of Adjustment. Those most frequently resorted

to are:

(a.) An amicable adjustment of the difference by the interested states.

(b.) Mediation.

(c.) Arbitration.

The Amicable Adjustment of Disputes. A cause of difference between two sovereign states may arise, (a) as a consequence of friction in the relations of the states themselves

' III Phillimore, pp. 1, 2; II Ferguson, p. 220; Walker, Manual, p. 93.

as bodies corporate, or (b) as a consequence of injuries alleged to have been sustained by a citizen of the one from the government of the other. In the latter case it is a rule observed by all states that the citizen or subject who prefers the complaint will be required to show, to the satisfaction of the Foreign Office of the state to which such complaint is presented, that he has resorted to, and exhausted, all local means of redress provided by the state by whom the injury is alleged to have been inflicted, before bringing the matter to the attention of his own government.'

Procedure. Whenever a state has occasion to complain of the action of another towards itself or towards one of its subjects, a statement of the particular act complained of is prepared in the Foreign Office of the offended state. This statement is based upon all the ascertainable facts of the case, which should be so carefully sifted and verified, by those charged with their investigation, as to make it impossible to question their substantial accuracy. This is necessary because it is impossible, in international affairs, to produce evidence in the ordinary legal acceptation of the term. The facts thus ascertained and verified are next examined with a view to ascertaining whether they do, or do not, constitute a violation of international law. If they do a statement of the case is prepared and a formal demand for redress is submitted, through the proper diplomatic channels, to the government by whom the injury was committed. In support of this case reference is made to the works of standard text-writers, to the provisions of treaties, if the case be covered by them, and to precedents in international intercourse, especially to those established by the offending state in its international relations. In conclusion, such explanation, disavowal, or reparation is demanded as is warranted by the circumstances of the case.'

If that government be clearly in the wrong it acknowledges its error, or disavows the act of its subordinate officials; and offers reparation, accompanied by such explanation and apology as the occasion seems to demand. In cases where such a remedy is suitable, money indemnities are agreed upon and paid to injured parties. It rarely happens, however, that either state, in a particular controversy, is either entirely right, or entirely wrong; and the same facts are, in general, differently regarded by each of two interested states. This leads to controversial discussion, each state advancing arguments and citing authorities in support of that view of the

I II De Martens, § 251; Creasy, First Platform, §§ 322-372; III Phillimore, pp. 1-17; Vattel, liv. ii. ch. xviii. §§ 323-326; II Ferguson, § 158; II Dig. Int. Law, §§ 213-222.

2

See, in this connection, the discussion of the right of a state to protect its citizens abroad, pp. 95

98.