tion, suppose him to be extraterritorial, and therefore, in point of law, not within the jurisdiction of the sovereign at whose court he resides, still the immunity itself is granted by the governing power of the nation to which the minister is deputed. This fiction of exterritoriality could not be erected and supported against the will of the sovereign of the territory. He is supposed to assent to it."'

The subject will be more fully discussed in the chapter devoted to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors.

To Consuls and to Foreign Residents in Certain Eastern Countries. From the beginning of intercourse with the Mohammedan nations inhabiting the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea it has been found necessary, by reason of the radical difference between their legal and religious systems and those prevailing among the Christian nations of Europe, to withdraw from the operation of the local laws such subjects of the latter powers as were obliged, on account of their business or official character, to reside in the Levantine ports and commercial cities. These exemptions have been obtained in every case by treaty stipulations or concessions, and they are enlarged and modified, from time to time, in the same manner. When intercourse became general with China and Japan similar concessions were obtained in behalf of the subjects of the principal commercial nations of Europe and America. The subject will be treated at length under the head of "Consular Jurisdiction."

Exterritoriality; Application of the Principle to Things. It is proper to observe, in conclusion, that the principle of exterritoriality, as recognized at international law, relates primarily to persons, and has to do with things only because of their relation to such persons as are clothed with an immunity from the operation of local laws. It applies to the hotel of an ambassador, for example, because it is his official residence, and it ceases to exist whenever he ceases to occupy it as an official residence. It applies also to the legationary furniture

'The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116, 138.

and to other articles of personal property so long as he continues to use them in his official capacity as a public minister; when they are sold or otherwise disposed of, however, the privilege ceases to exist, and, with the transfer of possession, the articles become subject, in every respect, to the operation of the local law. Such, too, is the case with a public armed vessel; the privilege attaches to the ship on account of its occupation by its officers and crew; if, therefore, it be wrecked or destroyed and abandoned in the territorial waters of a foreign state, the privilege of exterritoriality ceases to attach and the ship becomes a mere article of property and, as such, subject to the law of the state in whose waters it lies.'

References. The theory of state sovereignty and jurisdiction is derived directly from the Roman law. Upon the application of that theory to the mutual relations of states is based the claim of Grotius to the honor of being the founder of the modern science. The first edition of his work, "De Jure Belli et Pacis," was published in Paris in 1625. It has been translated into almost all of the modern languages of Europe. The last French edition appeared in 1864. An English translation appeared in 1738. The usual English edition, however, is that of Dr. Whewell, which was published in 1853. The formal or constitutional classification of the powers of government is of relatively recent origin, and can be studied to advantage in the constitutions of modern states. See Cooley's "Constitutional Law," Cooley's edition of "Story's Commentaries," and Holmes's edition of Kent for the United States. For England, see Stubbs's "Constitutional History," Bagehot's "English Constitution," and the works of Hallam, Amos, and Maine. The rules regarding territory and territorial jurisdiction are largely adopted from the Civil Law. The principle of servitudes is of similar origin, although in the doctrine of easements a modified form of the principle is known to the Common Law. For an account of the Law of Servitudes, see Morey, "Outlines of the Roman Law," pp. 289-292; Bluntschli, §§ 353359; I Phillimore, pp. 330–332. For the subject of the High Seas and the freedom of the sea, see Grotius, "Mare Liberum," written in reply

1 Hall, § 55. p. 195; the Charkich, L. R. iv. Adm. and Ecc. Cases, 93 and 96. See also the case of the Constitution, reported in the Lon

don Times of January 29, 1879; Woolsey, § 58; Bluntschli, §§ 333336.

to Selden's "Mare Clausum." See also I Azuni, chaps. i.-iii.; I Phillimore, pp. 209-224; Vattel, chap. xxiii. §§ 279-294; Heffter, pp. 146– 148; I Martens, G. F. De, § 43, and § 18 of Wheaton's "History of the Law of Nations." The fiction of exterritoriality is fully discussed in I Halleck, chap. vii. §§ 24, 26; Boyd's Wheaton, pp. 139, 151; Heffter, pp. 86-90; Creasy, pp. 176-190, and p. 686; Lawrence, "International Law," §§ 120-131; I Phillimore, chapters ix. x. and xi.; II Ibid. pp. 127-257; Walker, "Science of International Law," pp. 221-230; I Twiss, §§ 165, 166, 199–223; Bluntschli, §§ 69, 126–158, 317-342; I Dig. Int. Law, §§ 13, 17a, 17b, 26-40, 92-98; Dana's Wheaton, §§ 95-110, notes 58-68.

1

CHAPTER III

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT RIGHTS-COMITY-CEREMONIAL

Perfect Rights. The essential attributes of a state have been defined to be those of sovereignty, independence, and equality. Any state right fairly deducible from any one of these, or from all of them, is a perfect right. The right to resist invasion, to an immunity from external interference in purely internal affairs, and to protect its citizens from wanton injury while travelling or sojourning abroad are examples of perfect rights, and a state would be said to have a just cause for war if any one of them were deliberately violated. It is thus seen that the denial of a perfect right constitutes an invasion of the sovereignty of the offended state, justifying, if not atoned for, forcible measures of redress. If the sovereign rights of a state can be denied, trespassed upon, or invaded in one respect, they can in all respects, and its sovereignty and independence would be abridged, and finally lost, by such repeated invasions or denials. For these reasons the rule has received universal sanction that the perfect rights of a state can be drawn in question or denied only at the risk of war.'

Imperfect Rights. There is another class of state rights or duties to which attention will now be drawn. It has been seen that a state, in its capacity as a body politic, possesses many of the attributes of a moral person. It may express sympathy, it may perform acts of charity, humanity, or courtesy, and may be held morally responsible for their non-performance. The performance of such acts is incumbent upon a state for the same reason and to the same extent that it is incumbent upon an individual.. Its failure to perform them, like a similar failure on the part of an individual, violates no perfect right, and is therefore not punishable, or a proper subject for forcible redress. As a nation is actuated to the performance of these duties by considerations of courtesy or goodwill, and as a failure to observe them does not constitute a sufficient cause for war, they are called imperfect rights; or, since they are founded upon considerations of comity, or moral obligation, they are sometimes called moral claims.

PERFECT RIGHTS.

Classification. The perfect rights of a state are susceptible of classification under one of two heads.

First. The right of a state to a free and independent existence within its territorial limits.

Second. The right to be respected as a sovereign state in its intercourse with other states.❜

Some of the more essential of the perfect rights and duties of states are:

of our forests."-Gallatin to Everett, II Gallatin's Writings, p. 494. The action of the President, which is criticised in the foregoing extract, related to the measures resorted to with a view to secure a settlement of the French indemnity in 1835 and 1836. See also Pomeroy, § 79; I Halleck, chap. iv. § 1, chap. xiii. § 3; Woolsey, §§ 17, 18; Wheaton, § 60; I Phillimore, $$ 138-154; Vattel, prelim. chap., §§ 17-23.

'Dr. Woolsey was, I think, the first to use this term. It explains the obligation more fully than does the other, which is the more generally used. For further discussion of the subject of imperfect rights, see p. 116; see also I Phillimore, §§ 142, 143; Vattel, prelim. chap. § 17; Hall, § 13.

"Heffter, pp. 47, 48; Pomeroy. § 79; I Halleck, chap. iv. § 1; Woolsey. §§ 17, 18; I Phillimore, §§ 138

154.