V Monday, June 21. KNILL V. CHADWICK and Another. Practice-Bill of exchange-Indorsee—Injunction Parties-Multifariousness-Demurrer. Where proceedings in equity were taken against an indorsee of a bill of exchange to restrain him from proceeding at law, and it appeared that he was no further mixed up with the accounts as between the acceptor and drawer than the mere circumstance of "having the bill indorsed over to him, a demurrer for want of equity and for multifariousness having been filed by such party, was allowed. ent them from so doing. They were bound to attend stated that for above a century many thousand This was a demurrer, for want of equity and for multifariousness, to a bill filed for an injunc. tion to restrain proceedings at law. The circumstances were as follows:-The plaintiff is a railway contractor, and has been occupied for a number of years, up to the year 1845, in certain transactions relating to the Shrewsbury and Birmingham, and Staines and Richmond, railways, in conjunction with the defendants, who, it was stated, had purchased and sold shares for him in the different companies, but had never come to any account with his employers. The defendants had also been in the habit of drawing bills of exchange upon and filling up blank acceptances given by plaintiff, without consideration, and particularly one blank acceptance, which was filled up by Chadwick for 1,500l. and endorsed over by him to to one William Nicholson, the other defendant. The bill also charged that if a balance of account were made out, it would appear that the said defendant, Chadwick, was largely indebted to plaintiff; whereas an action at law had been brought by Nicholson, in respect of the bill for 1,5001; and the bill charged that he was a trustee for defendant Chadwick and his nominee, and prayed a general account in respect of the transactions between the plaintiff and Chadwick, for an injunction to restrain the action at law, and that the bill for 1,500l. might be delivered up to be cancelled. To this bill the defendant Nicholson put in a demurrer for want of equity; but more particularly on the ground of multifariousness, he not having any thing whatever to do with the transactions in respect of which an account was prayed, and being only mixed up with him as far as the indorsement of the bill for 1,500l. was concerned. Bethell and Wickens appeared in support of the de murrer. Rolt and Prior, for the plaintiffs, contended against the necessity of going into all the accounts relating to the bills of exchange; but that Nicholson was so mixed up with the subject of the suit, as to constitute a necessary party Cases cited: Attorney-General v.. The Corporation of Poole, 3 M. & C.; Turner v. Robinson, 1 S. & S. Wickens, in reply, contended that there was no necessity for making Nicholson a party to the record; for that the whole of the relief sought for might be obtained without any assistance from him, against whom there existed no equity; and that, consequently, the demurrer ought to be allowed. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-I think so too. It appears to me that Nicholson was only mixed up with one transaction, which seems to be distinct from the rest; and it appears to me that the demurrer ought to be allowed with costs. VICE-CHANCELLOR KNIGHT May 4, 5, and 25. CLOUGH v. RATCLIFFE. Practice-Friendly societies-Illegal associations. It is not within the functions of the Court to make a mere declaration of right, and grant an injunction, Rolt and R. Palmer, for the demurrer.-This is without reference to other relic. not a case in which the doctrine of representation Quære?-Whether the Odd Fellows Society is unlaw- will apply. Pearcev. Piper, 17 Ves. 1, is not applic ful at common law, or rendered criminal or un-able here, as in that case there was a single society. lawful by the statutes of Geo. 3. This case came on for hearing upon a demurrer to a bill filed by Elijah Clough and others on behalf of themselves and all other the members of the Loyal Highland Laddie Lodge of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, except the defendants and such members of the said lodge as concurred with them, against Ratcliffe and other officers of the Order. The bill Here there is not a single society. The annual meet- ceptions in that Act are four in number, viz. the Quakers', Freemasons', religious and charitable in. stitutions, being such exclusively. The only class to which it can reasonably be contended that the defendants belong are charitable institutions; but they are no more a charitable institution than a fire or life assurance society is. (Beaumont v. Meredith, 3 Ves. & Bea. 180; Reeve v. Parkins, 2 J. & W. 390.) There is enough stated in the bill to shew that the purpose of the society is not exclusively charitable, nor is it alleged to be so. The organisation of the society is such as to bring it within the Acts. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the inns of court, which frequently appointed deputations for the purpose of considering subjects affecting their interests might be considered as coming within the literal meaning of these Acts. R. Palmer. The literal construction of the Act would apply it to those societies only which have rules and regulations for the purpose of correspond. ing, not to the doing so in certain cases as they arise. Russell and Hargrave, for the bill, contended that the society was of a charitable nature, and did not come within the meaning of the Acts alluded to. They cited Anon. 3 Atk. 277; Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves. 773; Osborne v. Williams, 18 Ves. 379; Ewing v. Osbaldiston, 2 Myl. & Cr. 53; Ex parte Norrish, Jac. 162; and Beaumont v. Meredith, 3 Ves. & Bea. 180. Rolt, in reply, referred to the Lord Chancellor's judgment in Mozley v. Alston (not then reported). March 25.-The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-In this case I have to dispose of a demurrer to an amended bill, filed after a demurrer to the original bill had been allowed, with leave to amend generally. The present demurrer was argued in the course of last Term. The only cause of demurring specifically assigned upon the record was want of equity. I wish, in the first place, to say that I feel some difficulty upon the question, whether the bill is free from the objections upon which Lord Eldon proceeded, when he allowed the demurrer in the case of Lloyd v. Loaring. It is not, I think, superfluous to add, that I doubt whether the contract of partnership, if that is the proper term, or of association for mutual assistance, or however it should be designated, which is the foundation of the suit, is shewn by the bill to be a contract, so circumstanced that the principles and rules of common law can be considered as sanctioning it, or that a court of equity is bound by statute to recognise it. I do not suggest that, abstractedly, such a contract, such an association, is otherwise than morally laudable; but if, from the number of persons concerned in it, or for that reason and others, the contract or engagement is of such a nature as not to enable any of the established judicatures of the realm to deal with it beneficially or usefully, or to act upon it efficaciously, without doing injustice, is it the duty of the Court to acknowledge an agreement of that kind? It may be conceded that for every civil wrong the law of the land provides, or ought to provide, a judicial remedy. But is it inconsistent with this concession that the Court should decline to recognise a contract creating, or affecting to create, interests and claims of which the powers and means confided by the law to the Courts do not enable them to provide for the regulation, enjoyment, or protection,-or that, with reference particularly to cases of this specific sort now before me, the law, among whose oldest institutions is the power of incorporation, with ample means for the government of bodies corporate, and amongst whose provisions of later times, which the changes in the habits of society have seemed to render expedient, are the statutes relating to friendly societies,-the law which gives facilities for such associations should not permit the adoption of every course, or every mode, of effecting a laudable object, of a nature rather public than merely private, for effecting. which it has provided means of a particular kind under wholesome regulations? I doubt, as I have intimated, whether, upon considerations such as these, the association which the bill brings before the Court is not without the province of the Court, and does not fall within the observations of Lord Eldon, to be found in pages 462 and 470, 473, and 474 of Mr. Russell's report of the case of Van Sandau v. Moore, unless there is any statute (and certainly I am not satisfied that there is any) that ought to be considered as making a mate. rial difference in the plaintiff's favour. I am not sure that the members of an association such as that described, so far as there is a description of it in the bill, must not, upon civil questions arising, be left, in the words of Lord Eldon, to regulate themselves by a mutual understanding, and a kind of moral rule,” without judicial interference, where Parliament has not assisted them. An impression, indeed, at once of the moral and civil advantages capable of arising from the societies called "friendly societies," and of the inefficiency or insufficiency of the institutions of the country, without the aid of Parliament to afford them, unless incorporated, stability or protection, produced, I suppose, the Friendly Societies Acts, of which the members of the association now before me have not thought fit to avail themselves,— although it is probable that it might have been placed under the protection of those Acts, and, if it had, the complaint of the plaintiffs, and those for whom they profess to sue, could, by means of those Acts, have been easily, cheaply, and safely redressed. Without that, it ought to be said, in the language of Lord Eldon in Beaumont v. Ridgway, "the objects of societies such as these, are of a nature which no court of justice can execute." It may be suggested that the statutes 33 Geo. 3, c. 54, and 35 Geo. 3, c. 111 recognise the legality of an association such as this, although not having enabled itself to claim the privileges conferred by the Legislature upon friendly societies. The enactment of the 33 Geo. 3, c. 54, which does not profess to be a declaratory Act, commences by providing that "it shall and may be lawful to and for any number of persons in Great Britain, to form themselves into and establish one or more societies of good fellowship, for the purpose of raising, from time to time, by subscriptions of the several members," and so on; and although I do not forget the preamble of the Act, nor the provision of the second section, beginning, "Nor shall any such society which hath already been established," yet I am not, I repeat, convinced that it was the intention of either statute, in the case of any society that should not entitle itself, by the means particularly specified, to have the benefit of the enactment, to be cognisable by the civil judicature, if, independently of the two Acts, they would not have been so cognisable. But, assuming in the present instance, the contract of the association, stated by the bill, not to be illegal-assuming it to be one, the existence of which is not unfit to be recognised by a court of equity-assuming that the principles of Lord Eldon's decision in Lloyd v. Loaring create no difficulty, the question still remains whether a case is stated by the bill which, were the case to go to a hearing upon the bill as it stands, the facts alleged and charged being without addition, diminution, or variation, proved or admitted, would entitle the plaintiffs to some relief, within the range of relief specifically or generally prayed. If it would not, the demurrer ought to be allowed. Now, first, as to the declarations of right asked. It would not, I apprehend, be consistent with the rules relating to the jurisdiction of the Court, to make the declaration asked and nothing else; to make the declarations asked, would not belong to the functions of the Court. In cases where the decree sought is a declaration of right alone, or an injunction alone, it would not be correct; and, I suppose, a decree which contained a declaration of right, and an injunction, and nothing else, would not be correct. When, therefore, in what I am proceeding to say, I shall use the term "relief," I wish to be understood as meaning relief beyond a mere declaration of right. Next, as to the injunction or injunctions asked. The sum of 1481. 38. 4d. or that as to which a permanent injunction is asked, and so far as it extends to more, relief is asked in terms I conceive too vague and too general to be granted. With regard to the 1481. 3s. 4d. its amount, when the number, variety, and extent of interest to which that sum is alleged to be subject, are considered, must be thought very slight and trifling. This, however, is not all; because, conceiving or assuming that there may be cases in which an injunc. tion may be proper, without any other relief, without a view to any other relief, without the supposition that there is any other relief, the present, I apprehend, is not one of those cases. I do not conceive, that upon the record an injunction could be proper, without any views to other relief, and without the supposition of there being other relief to be granted. What other relief could be granted upon this record, or given only as stated in the bill? Beneficially and usefully, I apprehend, none. For, as I conceive, this Court does not possess the capacity and means of acting efficaciously so as, avoiding injustice, to do justice, for the purposes, or any of the purposes, for which the bill seeks to put it in action, under the circumstances which the bill states. The prayer beyond the declaration of right, and injunction or injunctions asked, is this; that an account may be taken of the property and funds of the said lodge, and that the rights and interests of the plaintiffs, and all other persons therein, may be ascertained and declared, and that all necessary directions may be given for giving full effect to such rights and interests, either in manner aforesaid, or by repayment to the plaintiffs of the amount in which they shall be found to be respectively interested in the said property and funds;" and the prayer then ends with one for general relief. The bill must, I think, be understood as denying a dissolution of the society to have taken place, and also, probably, as not seeking a dissolution; nor, as I apprehend, in a suit constituted as this is, relating to an association of the description stated on the record, can the Court put an end to the association, or break it up, or control the governing body, or undertake the regulation or administration of the proceedings and concerns as the proceedings and concerns of such an association must be regulated and administered. And if all individuals interested were added as parties to the bill, neither would the suit be manageable; nor, whether it is so or not, would the matter be mended, the bill being for relief, and not stating facts, the proof or admission of which, without more being done, ought, in the actual state of parties upon the bill, to be a ground of relief, or part of the relief specifically prayed, or some relief not inconsistent with that part of the bill. That description is, I apprehend, applicable to the present bill. I allow the demurrer, but without costs. Leave to amend has been once given; but I think in a case such as this, it would not be right to give leave to amend again. I may add that although I think a conclusion against the bill warranted by principle and by authority, and, if I may speak of myself, not at variance with any decision which I have had occasion to pronounce in any other case; it is a conclusion at which I have arrived not without hesitation, and of the correctness of which I am not confident, neither am I sure that I ought to have given the leave I did to amend, or that upon the occasion of disposing of the demurrer I went into the case so fully as I ought to have done. The mischief caused by this, however, cannot have been considerable. The case, as it stands now upon principle, is one of some importance, although the bill does not in my view of it, render necessary the decision whether the association is or is not unlawful at common law, or is rendered criminal or unlawful by statute, as has been strongly argued by the defendants, upon which if I had formed, I should decline stating any opinion; nor do I decide whether the absence of the Attorney-General upon this record is material or immaterial, correct in form or substance, or incorrect. Common Law Courts. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, BERKELEY v. DE VEAR. Sale of scrip or shares. A contract for the sale of scrip is not void, as being an agreement to assign a partnership-share without the consent of the copartners. Nor is it illegal, as being in respect of a partnership founded upon the principle that the shares therein shall be assignable without restriction, nor as being a wager upon the erent of an Act of Parliament. lars of the supposed contract to render it intelligible : namely-1st, for omitting to state the amount of the capital of either of the companies; 2ndly, for omitting to state into what aliquot parts or shares the capital is divided; 3rdly, and, in consequence, for omitting to shew what proportion of the capital, or what amount of interest plaintiff agreed to transfer, or the defendant to accept; 4thly, for omitting to state that either of the companies had any capital whatever, or any rights or property whatever; 5thly, for omitting to state that the shares were of any value; 6thly, for omitting to state who the plaintiff was to pay for the shares. Second, that the first and second counts of the declaration were also bad, for not shewing any sufficient breach in the following particulars: namely 1st, that they omit to allege that the plaintiff tendered a transfer of the shares, or that the defendant refused to accept or transfer; 2ndly, that they omit to shew that the plaintiff was possessed of the shares, or otherwise had the means of transferring them; 3rdly, that they omit to shew that the aliquot parts or shares supposed to be offered to the defendant and refused by him were the same aliquot parts or shares that is represented in the aggregate, the same amount, proportion, or interest in the com panies as the aliquot parts or shares contracted for. Third, that the 1st and 2nd counts of the declaration were also bad for shewing no legal consideration whatever, inasmuch as, 1st, A share in a partnership not incorporated or associated by Act of Parliament, or by letters patent, or other royal authority, cannot, ex natura rei, be assigned without limit, at the mere will of any subscriber, possessor, or other person en. Ititled to such share, by the mere delivery, from hand to hand, of a scrip certificate, or any other document or symbol whatever; 2ndly, A share in a partnership founded for the construction of a railway for which parliamentary sanction is required, is unassignable, by virtue of the Act 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, until after the shares are registered, in consequence of a special Act authorising the construction of the railway. Fourth, that the 1st and 2nd counts of the declaration were also bad, inasmuch as the consideration stated therein is illegal; 1st, Because a partnership founded on the principle that the shares therein shall be assignable without restriction, is illegal at common law; 1st, As tending to a perpetuity; 2ndly, As involving the assumption of a corporate name; 3rdly, Assumpsit. The first count of the declaration stated, As attempting to protect the partners from the rethat before and at the time of making the promise and sponsibility of partners, and in other respects, undertaking hereafter in this count mentioned, the being in contempt of the prerogative of the Crown; plaintiff and defendant had made and entered into a 2ndly, Because the act of issuing certificates, transcertain agreement respecting certain shares, or aliquot ferable to bearer, is an interference with the curparts, of and in certain joint-stock companies, which rency of the country; 3rdly, Because the contract shares or aliquot parts were the rights and property of stated in the declaration, is a bargaining and wathe said companies, and treated as being divided, and gering upon the event of an Act of Parliament. which said shares then were the subject of sale and He cited Price v. Easton, 4 B. & Ald. 433; Bates v. traffic, and were transferred by the delivery of certain Cort, 2 B. & C. 475; Thorpe v. Thorpe, Salk. 171; certificates called scrip certificates; that is to say, an Kingston v. Preston, Dougl. 689; Jones v. Barkley, agreement respecting 100 such shares of and in a ib. 659; Goodison v. Nunn, 4 T. R. 766; Austin v. certain joint-stock company called the Coventry, Jones, Hobart, 69; Phillips v. Fielding, 2 H. Bl.; Nuneaton, Birmingham, and Leicester Railway Com-123; Morton v. Lamb, 7 T. R. 125; Donellus, lib. pany, and 400 such shares of and in a certain other xiii. c. 15; De societate, Digest, xvii. 2; Crawshay v. joint-stock company called the Somersetshire Mid- Collins, 15 Ves. 228; Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Ves. land Railway Company, by the terms of which 449. said agreement the plaintiff was to cause the said shares to be transferred, and the scrip certificates thereof delivered to the defendant at a certain time, to wit, the 31st day of October, 1845, at, and for, and on the payment of a certain price, to wit, the price of 3371. 10s. for the said 100 shares of and in the said Coventry, Nuneaton, Birmingham, and Leicester Railway Company, and the price of 1,850l. for the said 400 shares of and in the said Somersetshire Midland Railway Company, which said shares were to be accepted, and taken, and paid for at the prices aforesaid, by the defendant upon the same day, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid. It then went on to state that the market-price of the said shares was, on the day last aforesaid, much lower than the price to be given by the defendant by a certain large sum, to wit, &c. and that in consideration of the premises, and that the plaintiff would, at the request of the defendant, allow the defendant to put off and delay accepting, taking, and paying for the said shares for PATTESON, J.-The fallacy in the argument for a certain space of time, the plaintiff undertook and the defendant has been in supposing this scrip should promised to pay the difference, and to accept and take pass for something; whether it did or did not, has the shares and pay for them at the price last afore-nothing to do with the goodness of this declaration. said, on a day certain, which had elapsed before the commencement of this suit. It then averred that the plaintiff had been ready and willing to cause the shares to be transferred, and the scrip-certificates to be delivered; and assigned for breach that the defendant did not pay the difference, nor accept and take the shares, though thereunto requested. The second count was similar. There were also counts for work and labour, money paid, money lent, shares bargained and sold, and shares sold, assigned, and transferred. There seventeen pleas, replications, and demurrers to the replication to the 5th, 11th, 16th and 17th pleas. The question, however, turned wholly on the goodness of the first two counts of the declaration. Solly Flood, in support of the demurrer, contended : First, that the first and second counts of the declaration were bad for omitting to state sufficient particu Rew, contrà.-On the objection that tender was not alleged, this is not an action for shares sold: the bargain is not to give the shares first; the payment is the condition precedent. (Waterhouse v. Skinner, 2 B & P. 447; Rawson v. Johnson, 1 East, 203; Jackson v. Alloway, 6 M. & G. 942; Boyd v. Lett, i C. B. 220; Stephen v. De Medina, 4 Q. B. 422; Hibblewaite v. McMorine, 6 M. & W. 200; De Medina v. Norman, 9 M. & W.; Mitchell v. Newhall, 15 L. J. 292, Ex.; Lamert v. Heath, 15 L. J. 297, Ex. Flood, in reply. Lord DENMAN, C. J.-It is quite unnecessary to go through all the points which the defendant has sought to make out. The question is, whether the declaration is good. I think this phraseology of railway dealings as much a part of the English language as any thing in Johnson; and therefore that the declaration is good. WIGHTMAN, J.-I am of the same opinion. There is no reason for supposing these transactions illegal, especially since the repeal of the Bubble Act. The objection about the tender has been completely answered. ERLE, J.-The only point was, that transferable shares in a company not formed by Act of Parliament, must be necessarily illegal. I see no ground whatever for holding that. Judgment for the plaintiff. REG. v. CHASEMORE. Certiorari-Intituling affidavits-Practice where seve ral writs. A rule absolute for a certiorari had been granted, and served in each of three appeals, in which the Sessions had confirmed the rate, subject to a case, but the writ had been served only in one. A rule to discharge the rules for a certiorari in the other two cases was ordered to be made absolute, unless the writs were served within a specified time. Upon such rule the affidavits are rightly intituled, as in the court only, and not in any cause. In each of three appeals against the same poor-rate, the Sessions had confirmed the rate, subject to a case. Rules for writs of certiorari to remove the cases had been obtained, and served, but only one of the writs had been served. After fruitless negotiations for avoiding the expense of bringing up the other two cases, a rule nisi, for discharging the rules for a writ of certiorari in them, was obtained, against which cause was shewn by C. Clark, who first (June 7) objected that the affidavits were wrongly intituled in the court only, and not in the cause; but there is a cause in court, as a rule for a writ of certiorari to remove a case has been made absolute. (Reg. v. Jones, 8 D. P. C.; Franks v. Wicks, 9 D. R. C.; Ex parte Evans, 2 D. N. S. 410.) Wallinger, contrà.-It does not appear that the writ of certiorari has ever issued. Clark. The rule absolute has been served. By the COURT.-There can be no doubt about the principle. The cause remains where it was, and may be proceeded with till the writ is served. A man may keep the writ in his pocket, and serve it at the moment when further proceedings are about to be had. The saving of expense occasionally effected adopting this view, shews it to be the right one. The affidavits are therefore properly intituled, and the case must proceed. Adjourned. C. Clark on a subsequent day shewed cause upon the merits, and contended that to serve the writ and so render a return necessary, would be a useless expense, as the same question was involved in each case, and the hearing of one would dispose of the others; and stated that the attorney would give his undertaking to be bound by the judgment in the case that had been brought up. Wallinger contrà.-The respondents are entitled to refuse the verbal pledge of the attorney for the appellants who may be changed or die before the judgment is given. The statute requires that the writ shall issue and recognizances be given, not only to prosecute the rule, but to do so without delay. By the COURT.-This rule must be made absolute, unless the writ issue and the costs of this application be paid in a fortnight. Wallinger. That a return be made, ought to be part of the rule. Clark.—That is a further needless increase of ex REG. v. INHABITANTS OF CRONDALL. Relief Board of guardians—Acknowledgment by relieving officer. Where application has been made for relief by a pauper living out of the parish to the relieving officer of a union, and he has brought that application before the board of guardians, and they have ordered the relief to be given on account of the parish alleged to be chargeable, and it has been given by the relieving officer, there is evidence as against that parish of acknowledgment of the pauper's settlement in such parish. The weight to be given to such evidence is solely a question for the Court below. Upon appeal against an order for the removal of Martha Croucher and her children from Elstead, in Surrey, to Crondall, in the county of Hants, the Sessions confirmed the order, subject to a case, the material parts of which were as follows:-Martha Croucher's examination, after stating facts which set up a tenement settlement in Crondall, which failed at the trial for want of sufficient evidence, proceeded thus:-"During the time I and my said husband lived at Crookham we were several times relieved during the winter months by the parish of Crondall with an allowance of bread, and I and my children were relieved by being taken into the poor-house of Crondall aforesaid, where we remained six or seven days, with. out any endeavour to remove my husband and family to another parish. I have by my said husband eight children, who are now with me in the workhouse of the Hambledon Union, namely, James, aged eighteen; John, aged about sixteen; Martha, aged fifteen; William, aged twelve; Mary, aged eleven; Ann, aged nine; Jane, aged seven years and upwards; and Charles, aged three years or thereabouts, all of whom were born in lawful wedlock, and during the time I and my said husband lived at Crookham aforesaid, excepting Charles, who was born in the parish of Elstead, in the said county of Surrey. In the year 1838 my husband went to live in the said parish of Elstead; he was taken ill, and unable to work. This was in the latter end of the year 1839 or the beginning of the year 1840. In consequence I applied to Mr. Lodge, Mr. Rowland, and Mr. Chandler, of Crondall parish, for relief. They told me I must apply to the parish where I lived, and they must settle it with that parish. I accordingly applied to Mr. George Woods, the relieving officer of the Hambledon Union, and he relieved my husband several times during his illness. My husband died in the month of June last; at the James Brooks, clerk of the board of guardians of shewed no sufficient evidence that relief was given by the board of guardians, or that the parish of Crondall had notice of such payment or had recognised it; that if they did order it, they had no power to give relief out of the union, or authority to make admissions against the particular parish. The principle of acknowledgment rested upon the power of inquiry into the settlement, and the management of the funds whence payment was made, and that under the Poor Law Act, the guardians had nothing to do with the settlement, and the parish had no longer the ordering relief. That the order might have been made without the knowledge, or in spite of the protest, of the guardians of the parish sought to be bound by such acknowledgment; that no presumption could be made against the parish, and that the examinations left the facts quite open. They cited Reg. v. Lydeard St. Lawrence, 11 A. & E. 616; Reg. v. The Justices of the West Riding, 2 Q. B. 505; Reg. v. Old Stratford, 2 Q. B. 513; Reg. v. Wymondham, 2 Q. B. 511; Reg. v. Totness, 14 L. J. 148, M. C.; and 1 New Mag. Cas. 383; Rex v. Chatham, 8 East, 498; Rex v. Coleorton, 1 B. and Ad. 25; 2 Nolan, 134; Rex v. Maidstone, 12 East, 550; Reg. v. East Winch, 12 A. & E. 697; Reg. v. Bedingham, 13 L. J. 75, M. C.; Reg. v. The Justices of Surrey, 5 Q. B. 506; Reg. v. St. Mary, Southampton, 5 Q. B. 513; Reg. v. Bradford, 15 L. J. JUDGMENT. Lord DENMAN, C. J.-In the case of The Queen v. Crondall, the remaining question is, in effect, whether evidence was produced before the removing justices from which they could legitimately infer that outparish relief had been given to the pauper by the authority of the appellant parish. Where application for such relief has been made to the relieving officer of the union, whose duty it is to examine into the wants of the poor and to report them to the board of guar dians, and when he has brought that application before that board whose duty it is to inquire into the settlement and to order such relief only in case of being satisfied the settlement is in some of the parishes of the union, and the relief has been ordered by that board on account of one of the parishes, and given by the relieving officer according to such order, all the steps now required by the law have been taken, and such relief is legally given. We also think the justices are at liberty to infer the authority of the parish for such relief from these steps. The parish is represented at the board of guardians, and may have its guardians in attendance. Whether they attend or not, it is the legal duty of the board to act for the parish, and to take care of it. In the Queen and Little Marlowe, we decided the person receiving the relief by the relieving officer without proof of the order of the board of guardians, is not legal evidence of the authority of the parish for such relief, on the principle that the relieving officer is authorised to act as agent for the parish in this matter only so far as he is ordered by the board, and therefore without that order from the there is some evidence of the thing to be proved, board his authority as agent was not shewn. We would add, our province ends when we have decided leaving to the proper tribunal the duty of deciding on the effect of such evidence. If the thing to be proved is a species of acknowledgment by the parish of a settlement therein, the justices, either as removing magistrates, at Quarter Sessions or appeal, are to say whether their minds are brought to the required conclusion from all the evidence. As above explained, some evidence was adduced. Our judgment is therefore for the respondents, and both orders confirmed. Orders of Sessions confirmed. Saturday, June 12. WOOD v. MYTTON. Promissory notes-3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, s. 1. Promissory notes, payable to the maker's own order are negotiable within the statute of Anne, Flight v. Maclean, 16 L.J. 41, Ex. not recognized by this Court. This was a rule to arrest the judgment upon a count stating a promissory note payable to the maker's own order. Cause was hewn last Term by M. Chambers, Q. C. Wordsworth and Shee, Serjt. was heard in reply. The fulness of the judgment renders a report of the argument unnecessary. This point was argued Wednesday, April 28, by Wallinger and Pitt Taylor, in support of the order of Sessions. They contended that the case was not governed by Reg. v. Little Marlow, 1 New Mag. Cas. 81; 16 L. J.71, M. C.; as there was evidence of the authority of the board of guardians; that the facts shewed a presumption that the parish of Crondall JUDGMENT. knew and acquiesced in the relief; and that even if Lord DENMAN.-In this case the defendant connot, the effect of the Poor Law Amendment Act was tends that the 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, s. 1, does not extend to give to the board of guardians the same powers to the promissory note set out in the declaration, that the parish officers possessed, so far as to support as it is not payable to any other person, but only to the inference of an acknowledgment of settlement the order of the maker; whereas the notes described by relief given to a pauper out of the parish; that in the preamble to the 1st clause, and the 1st section when the board of guardians had made an order for of that statute, are notes made payable to some other relief, and charged it to a particular parish, it was person than the maker; and the same description is some evidence of the liability of that parish. They alleged to apply to the subsequent clause of that seccited Reg. v. Little Marlow, 2 New Mag. Cas. 81; tion, and the notes therein mentioned are such notes 16 L. J. 71, M.C.; 8 L. T. 448; Rex v. Hard as have been before mentioned. The plaintiff has wick, 11 East, 578; Rex. v. Lower Whitley, 1 M. & contended that the description of the payee given in S. 636; Reg. v. Carnarvon, 2 Q. B. 325; Reg. v. the first of those clauses is not adopted in those Lambeth, 5 Q. B. 513; 1 New Mag. Cas. 582; Reg. that follow relating to indorsements, and that under v. Todmorden, 1 Q. B. 185; Reg. v. St. Martin's, 16 the last of the clauses, his right to sue in this action L. J. 123, M. C.; 1 New Mag. Cas. 554; Rex v. is maintained, and the legislature appears to have inEdwinstowe, 8 B. & C. 671. tended to give to all promissory notes the validity of Knapp and Corner, contrà, contended that the case / bills of exchange, and no reason can be assigned why and Lord Denman, C. J. in Reg. v. The Great Western any promissory note containing a promise to pay not likely to prevent them coming to a more correct should be invalid, so as to enable the maker to comconclusion than this Court would hope to arrive at statute closely to see if there are not general words upon affidavits. If there was ground to say that they mit the fraud. We have therefore considered the were chargeable with corruption, no doubt there was of enactment unrestricted to the particulars mentioned an inherent power in this Court to compel them to do at its commencement, which would effect the intenjustice; but, without expressing entire concurrence tion above-mentioned, and it appears to us that there in the decision of the justices here, the Court saw no are. The first section consists of the preamble and occasion to interfere with it. But it had been conthe four clauses of the enactment. The preamble, tended that whatever the Sessions could do as reafter stating the decisions that notes whereby the garded the coroner's own remuneration, yet, as remaker promised to pay another person, or order garded the sums he had expended, they were commoney, were not valid by the custom of merchants, Pashley, contrà.-This Court may certainly review pulsory on him, and he was entitled to be reimbursed recites the expediency of giving to such notes the the decision of the justices (Jervis on Cor. p. 59); them, and the Sessions had no discretion. As to the validity of inland bills of exchange. Then the first and the inquests, which the justices have refused to fees of a surgeon, of a bailiff, of the jury, and the of the four clauses enacts that all notes in writing sanction, were properly held. In one case the coroner sum paid for the room and to the witnesses, some made after a given day, signed by the maker or by received information from a constable that the fingers payable under the old practice and some under a certain agents of the maker therein described, whereby of the deceased had been chopped off with a chaff recent statute, the coroner was compelled to pay them the maker promised to pay to any other person or his cutter, and there were rumours of neglect on the part immediately after the termination of the proceedings; order, or to bearer, the money should be due and of the medical officer of the Union. If in such a case and the statute said that these sums so advanced payable to the person to whom they were made pay- the coroner had not held an inquest, and it appeared should be repaid to the coroner. The coroner was to able. This clause contains, first, the description of afterwards that the death had been occasioned by render his account to the Sessions, and the justices, promissory notes by certain requisites, and then a neglect, the coroner might have been fined or at- if satisfied of its correctness, were to make an order description of the person to whom they are payable; tached, or had a criminal information filed against for payment of the amount. Perhaps some distincand it includes notes payable to bearer, which are not him, or been put out of his office. (Ex parte Par. tion might exist between the fees of the coroner strictly such notes as are mentioned in the preamble, nell, 1 Jac. & W. .) The next case was that himself and the expenses incurred, by summoning but an addition thereto. The three subsequent of a child burnt to death, whose parents had pre-medical witnesses and some other witnesses, on the clauses, the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, relate to the indorse- viously lost another child from the same cause; score of the necessity of the latter. The propriety of ment of notes. The second enacts that every such clearly a proper case for inquiry. All that the justices requiring the attendance of medical witnesses at an note payable to any person or persons, or his or their have to ascertain is, whether the coroner has exercised inquest was so unquestionable as to amount to a order or orders, shall be indorsed over as a bill of his judgment bona fide. They have no jurisdiction necessity, and these expenses might be classed among exchange. This clause, by the words " every such to do more. The discretion as to the propriety of the necessary expenses of every proper inquest. note," adopts the description of the note in the first holding inquests is given to the coroner, and was Although the justices were empowered to examine clause exclusive of the payee, and adds a different properly exercised in the present instances. (R. v. the coroner on oath, that power seemed rather to apply description of payee, omitting to specify bearer, but Clark, 1 Salk. 377; 2 Hale's P. C. 58; 2 stat. 4, to the rate of the sums charged than to any thing extending to any person; it includes, therefore, Ed. 1; Bracton, 121 b.; Stan. P. C. 51; Britton, else. There were many parties who were bound to in terms, notes payable to the maker or his order, c. 1, c. 7; Fleta, I. c. 25, s. 1, s. 9; The Mirror, obey the coroner's mandate for their attendance, and as well as notes payable to other persons; and c. 1, s. 12; 1 East, P. C. 382; R. v. Norfolk Justices, their remuneration certainly would not depend on if the former description of payee was intended to Nol. Ca. Just. P. 141.) Nothing was decided in R. the propriety of holding the inquest. In former be incorporated under the word, such an additional v. Kent; but the argument founded upon it goes too times these sums were paid on the order of the coroner, description of payee would be not only superfluous far; for it would deprive this Court of jurisdiction to and out of the poor-rates. When the coroner was but incorrect. The third clause enacts, that the per- enforce the levying of rates by commanding justices to not the person who actually paid these charges, but son to whom such money shall be by such note made issue distress warrants. At all events, the coroner is they were paid on his order, it was clear that the payable, may sue the maker. The fourth clause enacts, entitled to be repaid the money necessarily expended overseer could not resist the payment merely on the that any person to whom such note that is payable to by him. The 7 Wm. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 68, is quite ground that he had not held the inquest properly; for any person or persons, his or their order, is indorsed, absolute in its terms, and leaves the justices no dis- his own authority in these matters was so great that may sue the indorsee or maker, as in the case of bills cretion; and the last statute, which (by s. 21) au- in most cases it would have been impossible to charge of exchange. Under this clause the plaintiff, as in-thorises them to allow the coroner's travelling ex- him with indiscretion in holding an inquest. If that dorsee, sued, and the construction above explained, penses, although no inquest be taken, shews that the statement were true before the statute, it was not in respect of the former description of note being Legislature wished to relieve the coroner from all pe- altered now, from the mere circumstance that, instead adopted with a new description of payee, applies here, cuniary bias; but if the argument on the other side of ordering the payment of expenses to those whom and any indorsee of the note payable to order is in- succeeds, he will have a strong pecuniary interest to he summoned to attend him, he paid them at once out cluded. Other answers to the contention of the de- obtain a verdict of manslaughter in every case. of his own pocket, and claimed reimbursement from fendant were offered by the plaintiff, but it is not nethe county. In this respect he was the mere agent cessary to consider them if this construction of the of the county treasurer, and, as he was bound to pay, statute is correct; and as there, by the words, applied he was entitled to be repaid by the justices, on their in their ordinary sense, effect is given to all of them, being satisfied of the correctness of his account: this and justice is promoted by it, we adopt it. We were was in accordance with the spirit of the statute. All pressed with the decision in Flight v. Maclean, in the temptation to hold unnecessary inquests was destroyed Exchequer, reported 16 Law Journal, where the judgby making his own remuneration depend on the ment was for the defendant upon a count similar; but propriety of his holding them; but he might be preas that construction of the statute here stated was vented from holding them where they were necesnot brought before the attention of the Court, and as sary, if he was not merely likely to lose all remunethe judgment was for the plaintiff on the second ration for his own trouble, but to be out of pocket count, so that he recovered on the bill, although he for the payment of those whom he had summoned to failed on one count; and as the decision would render attend him, and for those other expenses which were void transactions that have been long considered necessarily and unavoidably incurred in such a case. valid, and operate only to protect a broken promise, The rule as to the allowance of his own fees would and to enable a debtor to defeat a just creditor, we be discharged; as to the other part, it would be feel constrained to give our judgment upon a different absolute. Rule absolute accordingly. construction of the statute, which we have, for this reason, explained at length. Rule discharged. Cur, adv. vult. The judgment of the Court was now delivered. Lord DENMAN, C. J.-There were two questions for consideration; first, Whether, when a coroner held an inquest and paid certain sums to medical men and other parties, the Quarter Sessions had any discretion as to allowing or disallowing him his fees and expenses, and remuneration for the sums he had expended. Secondly, Whether, if the Court of Quarter Sessions had this discretion, this Court had any controlling power over the Quarter Sessions, in the exercise of that discretion. As to the first question, it was unnecessary to go into the ancient law of coroners; for the present payment of them depended on modern statutes, of which the 29 Geo. 2 was the first. That statute enacted, that, in order to induce a coroner to do his duty, he should have certain fees, which it then set forth, and his mileage paid. The Legislature contemplated a reward for services rendered. Two cases were provided for those of persons Saturday, June 12. dying in prison-where the sum to be paid to the coREG. T. THE JUSTICES OF CARMARTHENSHIRE. roner was fixed; and those of persons dying at a disCoroner-Fees of-Discretion of Justices to disallow tance from his residence, where the mileage was to Statutes 25 Geo. 2, c. 27; 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 89; 4 & be ascertained. In both cases, the Legislature con5 Viet. c. 68; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 92. templated reward for holding the inquest, but in both Since the stats. 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 89, 7 Wm. 4, it spoke of an inquest duly taken. The fact that it 1 Vict. c. 68, and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 92, as before, the was duly taken, seemed to be a condition precedent to justices at Quarter Sessions have a discretionary entitle the party to the reward. If the payments power as to the allowance or disallowance of the were to be made without any control, and without coroner's accounts, so far as they relate to his consideration whether the inquisition was duly held, own remuneration, the allowance being dependant it might be dishonestly held, and there might be negupon the opinion of the justices as to the pro-ligence in taking it; while the existence of the right priety of holding the inquests; and the exercise to control secured not only care and diligence in of that discretion will only be reviewed by this Court taking the inquest, but also that inquests should only in cases where corruption is imputed to the magis- be taken where it was proper to take them. That trates, or perhaps in the very clearest cases of mis- was the view taken many years ago by this Court, in take. But with regard to the disbursements that the case of The King v. The Justices of Kent, 11 East, are compulsory upon him under those statutes, as the 229, with which this Court, at the moment, entirely fees of the surgeon and jury, the expenses of wit- concurred. If that was correct, it was obvious that nesses and of hiring rooms, they have no discretion, in the present case the justices in sessions must but are bound to allow his accounts if they find them exercise a discretion whether the coroner's conduct was such that an order of payment should be made. But the second question arose, whether this Court could interfere with what was thus clearly within their jurisdiction. The statute gave no appeal to this Court, and there was no appeal from the Quarter Sessions, unless it was given by statute. That rule of law was a beneficial one. Whether an inquest had been properly taken depended on a variety of circumstances, which it would be impossible to judge of by affidavits, and could be much better inquired of at the Sessions than on motion in this Court. Assuming the absence of corruption, the bias which it was supposed justices would, as ratepayers, entertain on such a subject was correct. This was a rule nisi for a mandamus to the treasurer and justices of Carmarthenshire, requiring them to pay to one of the county coroners a sum of money for his fees and disbursements. The justices at Quarter Sessions had refused to allow some of the items of the coroner's account, on the ground that the inquests had not been properly taken. Monday, May 31.—The Attorney-General and Crompton shewed cause, and contended, first, that the justices had a discretion to exercise in the matter, which could not be reviewed by this Court. R. v. Kent Justices, 11 East, 229, established that rule; COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Friday, June 11. Mining partnerships. One co-adventurer in a mine, though the manager of it, action brought by the plaintiffs, bankers, to recover from the defendants, two of the co-adventurers in the Wheal Providence Mining Company, the sum of 3,700l. the balance of a banking account. At the trial the verdict was found for the defendants. The necessary facts and authorities are sufficiently stated in the judgment. Crowder, Channell, Serjt. and Smirke, for the plaintiffs, and Butt, Kinglake, Serjt. and Merivale, for the defendants. JUDGMENT. WILDE, C. J.-In this case there was a motion for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, and that the verdict was against evidence. The facts appeared to be shortly that Robinson was, in his own name, and in his son's, the owner of 99 shares out of 128, into which the mine was divided; that he had bought the mine, according to his statement, for 1,500l. and that the shares (so he appears to have called them) were shares of 157. each, he having purchased the mine, and having disposed of some shares. The evidence is silent as to the precise period when the defendants came in as shareholders,-when they as far as the result of the case is concerned, because in point of law, make him answerable for bills drawn purchased, or how they purchased, or what was the the learned judge goes on to say that, simply by rea- or accepted by those who took upon themselves to price for the shares, being owners of a small number son of their being co-adventurers, they did not give manage the concern." The same doctrine would of shares, one of four, and the other of two or three. another co-adventurer authority to borrow money on apply, I apprehend, to other liabilities said to be imRobinson, though not the actual purchaser of the mine their credit. "But," says the learned judge, "there posed; you would consider whether the mere cir(for he represents it as if his son were purchaser of the was no express authority on their part." But, it may cumstance of being a shareholder did, or did not, mine), appears, in the original purchase of the mine, be, Robinson had an implied authority, from being furnish authority that would bind for the acts of the to have assumed the control and management, with the manager of the concern; and then the learned persons who had the management. Mr. Justice the assistance of his son, and to have continued in judge leaves to the jury the question of whether Bayley says, "In order to establish the defendant's that management from the time of his original pur- the defendants, being co-adventurers with Robinson, liability, it ought to have been made out affirmatively chase down to the period of the closing of the bank and Robinson being the manager of the mine, and on the part of the plaintiff, that this was a company account as to which this action arises. No names having a private account with the bank, on ac- in which the directors were authorised to bind the were given to the bankers when the account was count of the mine, whether, by reason of the na- other members by drawing and accepting bills. Now, opened with Robinson, who, it appears, was known to ture of the management of that concern, having re- upon that point, the only question which could them by having a private account at the bank at the gard to the evidence given on the part of the plaintiff, be submitted to the jury was, whether companies, time, and also having other accounts connected with whether there was an implication of authority, from instituted for similar purposes had constantly been other mines, which he kept with them. He opened the the nature of the concern, from what was usual in the in the habit of drawing and accepting bills, or account in question in the name of the adventurers conduct and managing of the concern. The misdi- whether it was absolutely necessary for the purof the mine," The Wheal Providence Adventurers rection is as to the first part. What authority is it pose of carrying on the concern that there should Dr. to the Bank." That account opens by the bor- supposed has been presented to the Court for holding have been such a power." There was no evidence in rowing of 2801. to pay off a debt due to the Helston that a co-adventurer, simply by reason of his being this case that it had been usual to borrow money for Bank, which appears to have been a private account so, gives authority to another co-adventurer to pledge the purpose of the mine on the credit of the advenof his son's, on which an advance of 2801. remained his credit for money borrowed? In a general trading turers generally; not the slightest evidence was due; and at the time of the opening of the account it concern all the partners prima facie are supposed to offered on the subject. The question of authority in appears he communicated to the manager of the be actually in the management of the concern, and Dickinson v. Valpy to bind by bills, is put not upon bank that they (the adventurers) would want a sum all therefore have, by implication, such authority the question of what it is usual and necessary to do of money; that the transactions would be "very from their partners as is necessary for the conduct of (it being open to the inference of what was usual and large," which is another word for saying that the the concern according to the usual course of business. necessary), but what was the extent of the authority accommodation required would be large, and that, Therefore, in general trading concerns, it is now the granted in that particular case. It is true that Mr. therefore, the interest was to be only four per cent. well-established and extensive usage, it is implied, Wilkes, who drew the bills in that case, was the which was the consideration, according to Robinson's that there is authority to a great extent to bind by managing agent and not a mere co-adventurer. The account, not to take the usual interest of five per cent. bills of exchange, to bind for money borrowed, and judges discuss the case, on the footing of its being a Then it was said that when the accommodation was various other authorities; but that is in concerns bill authorised by the directors on the same footing as so large, Robinson promised that the interest should where, from their nature, all the partners may be though the bill had been drawn by the directors; and be increased to five per cent. the account to be open supposed, in the absence of all knowledge to the con- Mr. Justice Bayley says "There was no evidence that on the terms that money was to be advanced; and trary, to be actually in the management, and there- such a power was usually vested in the directors of 2801, was advanced, and applied for the purpose that fore actually vested with the authority, measured by other companies, or that it was necessary for the purI have mentioned within a fortnight afterwards. It what is usual and necessary in the conduct of that pose of carrying on the concern," and I think that was said they advanced the money to pay a dividend; concern. But in the case of co-adventurers in a mine, such a power is not necessary for such a purpose. It and, according to Robinson's account, he held at least is every co-adventurer supposed to have occasion for must mean that so far as the facts were laid before ninety-nine shares-whether or not is a little doubtful. equal authority derived from the rest? By no means. the Court of any inference of law, there was no He does not draw out the amount of his own divi- It is a well-known fact that it is only certain adven- ground from which to infer that such an authority was dend, or cause any amount to be placed to the credit turers, either as agents or acting with the agency of necessary, as would be the case where a man employs of his account, so as to shew what was really borrowed the rest in the character of co-adventurers, who have another to do an act for his benefit, when it would be for the dividend. It appears he made three dividends; the management. But, if it is a principle of law that implied that he intended to give him authority to do and when the evidence comes to be looked at, every co-adventurer is authorised to borrow money all that was necessary to accomplish the act in a pro it distinctly states that he had drawn out various on the credit of another, if that is to be taken inde- per manner. Bayley, J. further says, "The directors sums for his own purpose, which he chooses to pendently of the management, would it not be may bind themselves personally, and pledge their own say were drawn out on account of his dividend. a principle decidedly contrary to all experience responsibility, but not that of the other members. 1 The bank lent money to pay the dividend. They do and justice, and inconsistent with the carrying am therefore of opinion that there was in this not distinguish in his book what is the dividend, for on of the mine at all? Who would venture to case no evidence of any authority conferred upon the purpose of contradistinguishing it from what is buy a share in a mine if it was to authorise the directors by the defendant or any other advanced for other purposes, but they pay his cheques every co-adventurer to borrow money, or pledge his members of the company to charge them individually upon the understanding that some of those cheques credit at all? It is only by reason of the association by drawing or accepting bills." Mr. Justice were drawn in respect of the dividend. He then which the co-adventurers have with the management Littledale says, "In the case of an ordinary gets advances from the bank and the power of draw- that any authority arises to pledge the credit; and trading partnership, the law implies that one partner ing, and in the result he over-draws the account to where you bring in the management to aid that, it has authority to bind another by drawing and acceptthe extent of 3,700l. and the two defendants appear- results from the management. There is, therefore, ing bills, because the drawing and accepting bills is ing to be shareholders, according to his statement, to what has been said (though many remarks were made necessary for the purposes of carrying on a trading the extent I have mentioned, the present action is with respect thereto, it appears to me the remarks partnership; but it does not follow that it is neces brought by the bankers against them to recover the were not made in a just view of the sense in which sary for the purpose of carrying on the business of a 3,7001. the balance of that account, so that the action the expressions were used)-a difference in mining mining company." In this case there is no evidence seeks to charge men who are holders of six or seven concerns from other trading concerns. The expres- of its being usual, certainly not of its being necessary. 157. shares to the extent of 3,7001. as the balance of a sions used must be applied to the consideration giving The learned judge goes on more at length, which it is private account composed, at least to that extent, of rise to the remark. Partners in a trading concern are not necessary to read, pretty much to the same effect money borrowed. It appears that though the de- all supposed to be engaged in the management of it; as I have stated, that what was usual and necessary fendants received certain sums as dividends on their therefore there is a great difference in a man being may, under circumstances, be implied. Mr. Baron shares, not the slightest notice is given to them of part owner in a mine and a partner in a general trading Parke goes at length into the subject. His judgment payments made to them as for dividends or of money concern: and, I would repeat, where is the authority, is precisely to the same effect. The result of the borrowed, nor is there the slightest evidence, till the independently of the management, which has ever whole being, that, in a partnership for the working of whole debt accrued, that they had notice of such suggested that the mere character of co-adventurer a mine, only such authority will be implied by law as account existing. These appear to be the facts-that gives any authority at all? No one of the cases will is necessary for the usual and ordinary conduct of the this is an action against the defendants by reason of be found to warrant such a proposition. In every case business of a mine, and as is usually granted and their being shareholders in a mine, by the bankers, to it will be found that the course which various judges exercised. That is the result of Dickinson v. Valpy. recover the present demand as money lent to Robin- have settled to be the right course to be pursued on a How, therefore, any thing can be extracted from that son, the managing co-adventurer of this mine. Now trial of a cause like the present, is precisely the course case, either to impeach the ruling on the present octhe case on the part of the plaintiff was not very dis- taken by the learned judge in this case. The question casion, or to impeach the finding of the jury, I do tinctly put, I apprehend, at the trial, nor has it ever in this case first of all decided is a question of law, not perceive. The next case is Tredwen v. Bourne been distinctly put in the course of the argument, that the character of co-adventurer simply did not 6 M. & W. 461. That was a case of goods sold and whether the plaintiff insists that the defendants are give such authority. Then it is left to the jury whe- delivered on the credit of the mine. The learned liable simply by reason of their being shareholders as ther Robinson and the defendants, being co-adven- judge in that case told the jury that if they were adventurers, or by reason of their being shareholders turers, and Robinson having the management,-have satisfied that the defendant was a shareholder, and partners, who managed the mine; whether, by ing regard to the concern on the evidence in and knew of the concern being carried on by reason of the one or the other, or of the two mixed the cause,-whether there was any implied autho- the directors and the parties in their employ in together, is not very distinctly put. But it is most rity to borrow money on the credit of such co-ad- the manner in which it was, he was liable. Now, material to distinguish what are the grounds of the venturers. The express authority I alluded to in I observe that Mr. Crowder, in the argument present motion. I think the only difficulty arising this case is by the positive evidence of Robinson, who of that case, stated something which does not appear is from the mine, and distinctly attaching itself to stated he had no such authority, and that he did not in the evidence; he must have stated it therefore the point as it arose. The objection is to the misdi- give intimation to the defendants that he had been either upon some knowledge of his own or some inrection; first, in point of law, on the part of the acting on such authority, or, in other words, that he formation and belief that it was correct. He says, learned judge; secondly, to the finding of the jury, as had been borrowing money on their account. Now, "The business of the mine was carried on quite dif. contrary to the just and true effect of the evidence. as regards the questions left to the jury, various cases ferently from that of an ordinary trading firm; reguNow, the objection is to the learned judge's ruling, have been cited, but, in the course of the argument, lar calls are made, as money is wanted for the partthat the defendants simply, and independently of all it was difficult to say whether they were applied for nership, which are paid down, and the directors have the other circumstances, were not liable, in their the purpose of shewing that the jury had drawn a only authority to manage the concern with the funds character of co-adventurers of the mine, for money wrong conclusion, or to the accuracy of the judge's so supplied, but not to pledge the credit of individual borrowed by another co-adventurer; in other words, ruling. In the case of Dickinson v. Valpy, 10 B. & C. shareholders." In a cost-book mine I believe he is the being co-adventurers, did not authorise another 128, the question was, whether a co-adventurer was quite correct; certainly no such fact was proved in co-adventurer to pledge their credit for money bor- liable for bills of exchange or promissory notes drawn this case. Therefore the learned counsel must have rowed. Now, therefore, it is to be considered whe-by one of the directors of the company. There were stated that from some information given him. Then ther the ruling was correct, that one of several co-adMr. Baron Parke says, "The directors have autho venturers, in respect of his interest in the same subrity to do all that is usual to do in the management ject-matter, which is expressed by the term co-advenof a mining company." And in that particular case turer, whether that gives him authority to borrow the party is held to be liable upon the direction to the money. However, the learned judge's ruling is to be jury that they are to hold him liable provided he was looked at as not standing simply on that proposition, a shareholder, and knew that the mine was being car other questions in that case than simply the one of |