REPORTS CONTENTS. Vice-Chancellor of England's Court Vice-Chancellor Bruce's Court Court of Common Pleas Court of Review... 409 ..... 409 410 413 413 414 416 417 ......... 417 Review of Cases decided in the Courts of Common COUNTY COURTS The Small Debts Act..... 419 Reports: Gloucestershire - Bloomsbury-Westmin ster-Yorkshire COURT PAPERS.. LEGAL INTELLIGENCE Heir-at-Law Society CORRESPONDENCE PROMOTIONS, APPOINTMENTS, &C... Mortgage Stamps Election of Mr. Cowan 419 421 421 421 HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN, &c. WANTED.. 422 NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS Action .... Lawyer Legislators... Sham Lawyers BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND Deaths 423 or apply the said annuity of 600l. as the same shall case is, that the will is void for uncertainty, then of Page become due and payable, into the hands of my said course the daughter would take as being the next of daughter during her natural life, and to and for her kin to the testator at the time of his death. My own own proper use and benefit, and independent of any opinion (after having taken some time to consider the 411 husband she may marry with, and so as not to be matter) is, that I am bound to put the plainest and 412 subject to his debts, control, or management; and simplest construction upon the words in question. 412 from and after the decease of my said daughter, then As to the claims of the other next of kin, I mean upon trust that my said trustees, as aforesaid, shall with respect to any other individuals than those who and do pay and apply, assign and transfer, distribute are clothed with the character of heir, they have no and dispose of the said principal trust-moneys, with pretensions whatever, because the testator has himthe interest and dividends thereof, unto and among self, according to my view of the case, put his own the children of my said daughter, if more than one, construction upon the meaning of the word "heirs." share and share alike, at their respective ages of There certainly cannot be shewn to be any substantial twenty-four years, and not before, and to apply so distinction between the word "heirs-at-law" and much of the dividends and interest thereof as shall "heirs," but it struck me when this cause came first be necessary in their maintenance and education; before me at the original hearing, as a very remarkbut if there should be but one such child at the de-able thing that in the gift of the residue of the real cease of my said daughter, or, being more, if such and personal estate to his daughter and her heirs, he child or children should die before the age of twenty- has there shewn that the word heirs is to be taken in four years, then upon trust to pay, assign, and trans- its ordinary meaning,-that is, heirs of the daughter. fer, and dispose of the whole of the said principal Then in another part of his will I find the testator 422 moneys, with the increased interest and dividends speaking of his heirs-at-law, who certainly are heirs422 thereof, unto and for the sole use and benefit of such at-law, since in one sentence they must be taken to 422 child or children at his or their respective ages of be heirs in the same sense in which they are meant to twenty-four years, and in the meantime to apply the be heirs in another, although I admit the ancestor of dividends of the said annuity of 600l. with the increase the parties is different; in the one case the daughter, 423 thereof, or so much as shall be necessary for his, her, and in another the testator himself would be the or their maintenance and education; and if any sur ancestor. The only doubt, therefore, would be, 423 plus should remain, the same to be invested in the whether, according to the form of the gift of this fund, 423 joint names of my trustees in accumulation of the which was to raise an annuity of 600l. a year, the said principal trust-moneys; and if, at the death of persons who are named are those who are capable of my said daughter, she should have no child or children taking in remainder at the time of the testator's deliving, or he or they should die under the age of cease, or persons who should come into esse, and twenty-four years, then I direct my trustees, and contingently bear a given character, at a period subthe survivor or survivors of them, or the executors sequent to the death of the testator. Well now, as or administrators of such survivor, and such new to that the testator has directed a certain fund should trustee or trustees as aforesaid, to sell out the trust-be set apart to produce this annuity, to be for the 427 moneys, with the interest and dividends thereof, and 427 to pay thereout to my son-in-law, John Giles Christian, and to my grandson, George Tempest Rowland, 500l. each, if they be severally alive at the same time. All the rest and residue of the said principal trust-moneys, with the interest, increase, and dividends, I give and bequeath "to and among my heirs at-law, share and share alike." The testator afterwards gave and bequeathed all the rest, residue, and remainder of his estates, both real and personal, and of whatever kind, in reversion, expectation, or possession, together with all bonds, writings, and securities for money and foreign debts, unto his daughter, the said A. M. Slater, and her heirs for ever." 423 ..... WARE v. ROWLAND. Will-Construction-Heir-at-law-Next of kin. A testator directed his executors to lay out certain moneys in the purchase of stock, for the purpose of raising an annuity for the benefit of his wife during her life, and after her decease, to his daughter during her life, remainder for the benefit of her children or child; but if she should have no child or children living, or he or they should die under the age of twenty-four years, the testator then directed his executors to sell out the trust-moneys, with the interest and dividends thereof, and pay thereout to his son-in-law and grandson as therein mentioned. He then directed as follows:-" All the rest and residue of the said principal trust-moneys, with the interest, &c. I give and bequeath to and among my heirs-atlaw, share and share alike." The daughter, who survived the testator, died without children: Held, upon looking at the whole scope of the will, the stock in question went to the person who answered the character of heir-at-law of the testator at the time of his decease. The above will bore date the 18th of July, 1808, and the testator. separate use of his daughter during her life, with remainder amongst the children; then follows this direction, "And if at the death of my said daughter she should leave no child or children living, or he or her or they should die under the age of twenty-four years, then I direct my trustees and the survivor or survivors of them, or the executors or administrators of such survivor and such new trustee or trustees as aforesaid, to sell out," &c. This sentence, it may be observed, is not very well constructed, but it seems to me that it is a direction to sell so much of the fund as, with the interest and dividends, would yield the sum of 500l. a-piece for his son-in-law and grandson; and it does not appear to be a direction to sell the whole fund. There is no doubt but that the gift to each of them is contingent; but if they do happen to answer the were to take their respective legacies. Then follows contingency, so as to be living at the time, then they this sentence: "All the rest and residue of the said principal trust-moneys, with the interest, increase, and dividends, I give and bequeath to and among my heirs-at-law, share and share alike." Now there might have been, for aught the testator could tell, persons of that description at the time of his death, and there might not; but the mere circumstance of Glasse and Ware appeared for the plaintiffs, the such a contingency amounts to this, that if a plutrustees. rality of persons fill the character of heir, they were Bethell and Hetherington, for G. T. Roland, the ad- to share equally; but if the character of heir were ministrator of A. M. Slater, the testator's heiress-at-filled by one person only, that would of course exlaw at the time of his decease, cited Urquhart v. Ur- clude division, and that person would take the whole. quhart, 13 Sim. 613; Holloway v. Holloway, 5 Ves. It was quite uncertain how the event would turn out. There might have been persons, independently of the facts which might happen to his daughter and her children, who would be in the position of heir-at-law or heirs-at-law at the time of his death; but with this contingency I have nothing whatever to do. And I ought not to assume as a positive fact that the testator was aware that his daughter would be his heir-at-law at the time of his death: he might or might not have known it. I must take the words of the will as they stand, and there does not appear to me a sufficiently binding connection of the parties to take under the description of "my heirs-at-law, share and share alike," with the time which the contingency has pointed out as to prove that those persons only are to take who happened to answer that description when the contingency really did arrive; but it appears to me that the best construction which can be put upon the words is a mere gift of the residue in remainder to the persons who answered the character of heirs-at-law of the testator at the time 403. J. Humphry and Bates appeared for the next of kin of the testator at the time of the decease of A. M. Slater, the daughter, and contended that as to personalty, "heir-at-law" meant next of kin, and that according to the true intent of the will, next of kin referred to the death of the tenant for life. C. P. Cooper and Heathfield, for several of the next of kin to the testator at the time of his death. (Wilkinson v. Garrett, 13 Jur. 560; Scifferth v. Badham, Id. 892.) Philip Slater, the testator, made his will as follows:-"I, Philip Slater, of Hampstead, in the County of Middlesex, do make this my last will and testament, in manner following; first, I order all ny just debts and funeral expenses to be fully paid and Cases cited: Holloway v. Holloway, 5 Ves. 403; discharged out of my estates by my residuary lega- Mounsey v. Blamire, 4 Russ. 384; Gittings v. tee; out of the said residuum, I give my dear wife, M Dermott, 2 M. & K. 69; Evans v. Salt, 6 Bea. Ann Slater, 2001. together with the lease of my house 266; Gwynne v. Muddock, 14 Ves. 488; De Beavoir at Hampstead, and every thing therein contained on v. De Beavour, 10 Jur. 466; Jones v. Colbeck, 8 Ves. or about the said premises for ever (except moneys 38; Jenkins v. Gower, 10 Jur. 702; Clapton v. Buland securities for money) which may be therein at my mer, 4 Jur. 288; 10 Sim. 426, on appeal; 5 Jur. decease; and I hereby appoint my dear wife, toge-477; 5 Myl. & Cr. 108; Bird v. Wood, 2 S. & S. ther with Mr. Thomas Burkitt, and Mr. Sparrow 400; Withy v. Mangles, 4 Bea. 358; on appeal, Toms, joint executors of this my will. And I also 8 Jur. 69; Elmsly v. Young, 2 Myl. & Cr. 82, 780. give to each of the said gentlemen 501. for their trouble in executing my said will. Further, my will is, that my executors, as soon as may be (not exceeding one month from my decease), shall lay out so much money as shall purchase in the Three per Cent ReRolt and Sheffield, for the heirs-at-law at the duced Annuities the sum of 600l. a year; and the daughter's decease, submitted that the word "heirsaid annuities of 600l. a year shall be invested in all at-law," when used in reference to personal property, their joint names, upon trust, to pay to or permit my did not always mean "next of kin,' and that the said dear wife, A. Slater, to receive the said annuity testator intended the death of the tenant for life to herself for and during the term of her natural life, be the period of enjoyment. and for her sole and separate use, and independent of Cases cited:-Vaux v. Henderson, 1 J. & W. 388, any after-taken husband, and so as not to be subject note; Gittings v. M'Dermott, Evans v. Salt, Holloto his debts, management, or control; and from the way v. Holloway (supra); Mounsey v. Blamire, 4 Russ. decease of my said dear wife, I direct that the sur-384; Clapton v. Bulmer, 5 Jur. 477; Wordsworth v. viving trustee or trustees shall and do transfer Wood, 4 Myl. & Cr. 641: Minter v. Wraith, 13 the said trust-moneys, or government securities, Sim. 52. into their joint names, together with such other person or persons as shall from time to time be ointed a new trustee or trustees pursuant to a ver hereinafter mentioned, that is to say, in trust my dear daughter, Anne Maria Slater, and to pay VOL. IX. No. 228. of his death. If that be not the true meaning, then I must say that the thing is so complicated and confused as to render it void for uncertainty, and then the daughter would take. VICE-CHANCELLOR KNIGHT Saturday, May 8. FINDLAY. LAWRENCE. Practice-Costs. After a notice of motion to dismiss, the plaintiff gave notice of an application to the Master for leave to amend, and the Master, with the knowledge of all the circumstances, gave the plaintiff leave, upon payment of 10s. costs. The defendant then brought on possession of the deeds against E. F. without proving his motion to dismiss for the purpose of obtaining the | Held, that C. D. could not in a foreclosure suit obtain costs, and the Court held that he was regular. Notice of motion to dismiss the bill for want of prosecution was served on the plaintiff in this suit on the 1st of May, the motion to be made on the 8th of May. The plaintiff, then, on the 2nd of May, gave notice of his intention to apply to the Master for leave to amend the bill. On the 6th of May, the Master, with a knowledge of all the circumstances, gave the plaintiff leave to amend, on payment of 10s. costs to the defendant. The costs of the notice of motion to dismiss not having been paid or tendered by the plaintiff, Fooks brought on the motion for the purpose of obtaining the costs. He cited The Attorney-General v. Cooper, 9 Sim. 379. Steere contended that the decision of the Master comprised the question of these costs. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the Master had no jurisdiction in respect of these costs, and that the defendant was regular in bringing on the motion. Friday, July 16. GORDON V. ATKINSON. A gift of residue, by will dated previous to 1838, in the residue. The testator in this cause, by his will, dated prior to 1838, gave and bequeathed the residue of his real and personal property to trustees, in trust for four persons, whom he named, "and each of their respective heirs, executors, and administrators." One of the four residuary legatees afterwards died, and the testator, by a codicil dated in the year 1839, and which he directed should be annexed to and taken as part of his will, after making substantial gifts to every one of a large number of persons who were his next of kin, and also to the children of the deceased residuary legatee, "revoked" all benefit given to that residuary legatee by the will; and he also, by the same codicil, revoked the share in the residue given by the will to another of the four residuary legatees, and instead thereof gave his wife an annuity and his children 2,000l. amongst them. The ques tion, therefore, in this suit was, what interest in the residue passed to the two remaining residuary legatees? Wigram and Robertson contended that the two remaining residuary legatees took the whole residue between them. They cited Cresswell v. Cheslyn, 2 Eden, 123; Harris v. Davis, 1 Coll. 416; Shaw v. M'Mahon, 2 Con. & Law, 508; Doe v. Green, 4 M. & W. 229; and Barker v. Giles, 2 P. Wms. J. A. Cooke, Malins, Russell, Heathfield, K. Parker, H. Clarke, J. Parker, Bacon, and Walpole, for other pasties. 280. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that he considered there was an intestacy as to two-fourths of the residue. Monday, July 26. Ex parte CoField. Sale to railway company-Investment. Where a sum was paid into court by a railway company on account of land which belonged to A. B. but was subject to an annuity, the Court directed payment of the dividends to A. B. although no conveyance of the land had been executed. The petitioner in this case was entitled to a copyhold of inheritance in Lambeth, which, together with other property belonging to the petitioner, was subject to an annuity payable to Mrs. Bailey for her life. Notice having been given by the South-Western Railway Company of their requiring the land for the purposes of their Act, a jury was summoned to assess the value of the petititioner's estate and interest in the property; and the money was paid into court and invested in the purchase of stock. A dispute having arisen as to the concurrence of Mrs. Bailey in the conveyance to the company, no conveyance was executed, but this petition was presented for the payment of the dividends of the sum invested to the peti tioner. Foster, for the petitioner. Beales, for the company, objected to any payment being made before the execution of the conveyance. The VICE-CHANCELLOR granted the petition, and directed that the company should pay the costs. Wednesday, July 28. KENDALL v. HULLS. Foreclosure-Fraud-Custody of title-deeds. A. B. a solicitor, having title-deeds in his possession on behalf of C. D. a mortgagee, fraudulently obtains EWS from the mortgagor a fresh mortgage to E. F. and hands the same, with the title-deeds, to E. F.: defendants, said, "You must not read it; it is not usual, and it has been taken." And the deponent afterwards waited in the said G. Platel's office, until half-past eleven, and was not requested by the said two defendants, or either of them, to attend them, or either of them, elsewhere to take their answers or answer. Sarah Staplee, an infant, came to have a guardian assigned, and her answer taken, but in consequence of what had occurred, the deponent did not act as a commissioner in taking the answer. The affidavit of G. Platel stated that the answers of C. G. Staplee and S. Staplee were not taken until halfpast ten, when the deponent concluded that the said G. S. Simpson would not attend. Nalder, for the motion, cited Neale v. Postlethwaite, M. R. 28th of April, 1837, not reported. Selwyn, for the defendants, opposed. The VICE-CHANCELLOR directed the answers to be taken off the file, with liberty to reswear the same answers; the defendants, C. G. Staplee and S. Staplee, to pay the plaintiff's costs of the application. This was a foreclosure suit, instituted under the amined the deed alleged to him to have been a transfer Wigram and W. W. Cooper, for the plaintiffs, con- foreclosed. Bacon and Freeling, for Hunt. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said, that he was of Thursday, July 29. In this case the plaintiff moved that the answer filed Common Law Courts. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. April 28 and July 3. PARSONS v. SEXTON and OTHERS. Warranty-Specific chattel, sale of-Contract, contracted in writing with B. to supply him with construction of. "a 14-horse power engine," and erect the same by a given day upon the premises of B. in a good and workmanlike manner. B. in answer, wrote, “In consideration of your supplying me with a 14-horse power engine, which my foreman has inspected, and erecting the same according to your undertaking, I agree to pay 2601. for the same, by instalments, &c.; and on being satisfied with the engine, to pay the remainder within two months of the completion of the contract." At the time of the inspection, the engine was lying in separate parts on the plaintiff's premises; and upon being put up, the defendants asserted that it did not do the work of a 14-horse power engine, and insisted on their right to return it, and refused to pay the last instalment, upon which the plaintiff brought an action: Held, that the defendants had contracted for the purchase of a specific chattel, and that if there was any breach of warranty, it would not be an answer to an action for the price, but would only amount to eti dence in reduction of the sum agreed to be paid. This was an action to recover 1161. alleged to be the balance due on the sale of a steam-engine, furnished by the plaintiff to the defendants. The declaration was for goods sold and delivered, work and labour done, money paid, money had and received, and on an account stated. The pleas were—non assumpserunt, payment, and set-off. Middlesex, in Trinity Term 1846, it appeared that the At the trial, before Erle, J. at the sittings for contract was contained in two letters which passed between the plaintiff and the defendants, after some previous negotiation had taken place. On the 19th of August, 1845, the plaintiff wrote-"I, James Parsons, do hereby agree to provide a 14-horse engine and 16-horse boiler, with fittings and everything complete for the same, for the sum of 2607. and to deliver and erect the same, and set the same to work; the whole to be completed, in a good and workmanlike manner, on or before October 1st; and I agree, if the work is not completed by the 1st of October next, to forfeit the sum of ten shillings per day for every day's delay." The next day the defendants wrote to the plaintiff-" In consideration of your supplying us with a 14-horse engine, which our foreman has inspected, and putting the same in thorough repair, and supplying a new 16-horse boiler, commonly called a Cornish boiler, with two or more valves, steam-cocks and jets, and delivering and erecting the whole, and setting the whole to work, according to the undertaking signed by you and left with us, we agree to pay for the same the sum of 2601. by instalments. [The letter then provided for the payment of the instalments and proceeded:] And on being satisfied with the engine, we will pay the remainder within two months from the completion of the contract." At this time the engine was lying in the plaintiff's yard in different pieces, and was there inspected by the defendants' foreman. Evidence was given to shew that a competent person could form a very accurate opinion as to the capabilities of the engine, though it was in separate parts. The engine was not ready to work on the defendants' premises till January 1846; the delay which occurred being attributed by the plaintiff to the defective preparations made by the defendants and the parties appointed to do the necessary bricklayers' work. When the engine was erected, it did not work satisfactorily to the defendants; some alterations were made, but the power was still below the work of a 14-horse engine, and fault was also found with the boiler. The defendants had paid two instalments, amounting to 150l. and now claimed the right to reject the engine, and refused to pay the balance. The Judge left it to the jury to say whether the engine was a 14-horse engine; and said that if it was not of the description ordered, the defendants had a right to reject it; and observed that, under the contract, the last instalment was not to be paid until the defendants were satisfied with the work of the engine. The jury found for the defendants, and leave was reserved to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict for him for 1167. A rule having been obtained accordingly, and also for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, Channell, Serjt, and Bramwell, now shewed cause. -This rule was obtained on the authority of Street v. Blay, 2 B. & Ad. 456. But before that case can be applied, it must be shewn that this was a contract for the sale of a specific chattel, and that there was an acceptance of it. This cannot be called a contract for the sale of a specific chattel, for at the time of the contract the engine had no existence; it was in parts, and the boiler was to be new, and part of the money was to be paid in consideration of erecting it and setting it to work. This is not like the case of a horse, which may be removed at once. Here there is no acceptance. [COLTMAN, J.-Is acceptance necessary?] Yes, according to Street v. Blay. [CRESSWELL, J.-Ollivant v. Bayley, 5 Q. B. 289, in which Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399, was acted upon, was a case very like this.] That case differs from this, inasmuch as there the article oridered was a patent article. But if this is to be considered as a contract for the sale of a specific chattel, then the whole contract must be looked at; and then it appears that this is a contract clogged with conditions, and the defendants are not bound to pay until those conditions have been complied with. [CRESSWELL, J.-It seems to me to be thrown back at last upon what was the contract; if it was that the plaintiff should put up an engine which should do the work of a 14-horse power engine, and not be paid until he had done so, then it is part of the contract that 14-horse work shall be done; but if he bought this particular engine, which the other party called a 14-borse engine, that does not imply a warranty] The contract is to be found in the two writings taken together. It may be conceded that if it had depended on the writing signed by the defendants, the plaintiff would not be bound to do more than shew that he had delivered the engine, which had been inspected. But the writing signed by the plaintiff imports a warranty that the engine should do 14-horse work. The boiler was not in existence, and the power of the engine must depend on the boiler. It is a contract to purchase particular things, some in being, and some not provided; when put together in a particular manner, they answer a particular purpose. There is always a warranty implied when goods are sold, that they shall be fit for use. (Shepherd v. Pybus, 4 Scott, N. R. 434; Cave v. Coleman, 3 M. & R. 2.) The defendants were not liable to pay this last instalment till the engine worked to their satisfaction. Byles, Serjt. and Maynard, contrà.-There was no warranty in this case, either express or implied; full opportunity of inspection was given to the defendants, and they availed themselves of it. A full description and the dimensions of the several parts were laid before them, and their foreman examined and measured them, and it was proved that the engine could be seen as well, and in some respects better, in pieces than together, and they then entered into a contract to buy the 14 horse engine which their foreman had inspected." It is called "a 14-horse engine," but that implies no warranty of the work to be done, but merely a description of the engine to identify it with the one which had been inspected. But suppose there is an express warranty which has not been complied with, if the article has been accepted, it is no answer to an action for the price, but only a ground for reduction of damages. (Street v. Blay.) Cur, adv. vult. July 3.-WILDE, C. J. now delivered judgment, and after stating the pleadings and the letters as before set out, proceeded. For the defendants it was contended they had contracted for an engine of 14-horse power, and the engine supplied not being such as was ordered, that they are not bound to take it or to pay for it. On the other hand, it was contended for the plaintiff, that the defendants had bought the specific engine delivered, and that they could not reject it on account of any alleged want of power; but if hey could establish that there had been any breach of contract, they might bring an action. The Judge left Et to the jury to say whether the engine delivered was of 14-horse power; and told them if it was not of the description ordered, the defendants were at Liberty to reject it, though he also observed that under the contract the last instalment was not to be paid until the defendants were satisfied with the work of the engine. The jury found for the defendants, and eave was reserved to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict for him for 1167. A rule nisi for entering the verdict for the plaintiff or for a new trial having been granted, the question was argued in Easter Term. The case stood over for consideration. The only lifficulty in the case was in ascertaining the true effect of the evidence; for if the defendants bought a specific chattel, without doubt they are bound to retain and pay for it, although the warranty might have The returning officer rejected the vote; and for this been insufficient as to the power of the engine, rejection the action was brought. At the trial, the and had not been performed; for it is well settled jury having declared themselves satisfied that the that the breach of a warranty is no answer to plaintiff was not entitled to vote, and that the dean action for the price of a specific chattel supplied, fendant was not actuated by any malicious motives, though it may be used in reduction of the price, and but that the act was wilful, found a verdict, by direc may be the subject-matter of an action at law. It tion of the Judge, for the defendant; but leave was would seem that after some correspondence about the reserved to the plaintiff to move to have the verdict engine, the defendants' foreman went over to inspect it; entered for him for 40s. if the Court should be of and though it appeared it was in different pieces and in opinion, upon the facts proved, that in the absence of different rooms at Grimsby's premises, where it used malice an action could be maintained. A rule nisi to work, yet the whole of the engine was there, and having been granted in conformity with the leave the foreman had as good an opportunity of forming a reserved, it was contended, on behalf of the plainjudgment respecting it as if it had been put together. tiff, that as the provisions of the statute 6 & 7 Then the plaintiff offered to provide a 14-horse engine Vict. c. 18, s. 82, are express that it shall and put it in repair, and furnish all the fittings, &c. &c. not be lawful to reject any vote tendered at any elecand provide a 16-horse boiler for 2601.; the defend- tion of members to serve in Parliament by any perants then agreed to take on those terms "the" son whose name shall be upon the register of voters 14-horse engine their foreman had inspected, but the in force for the time being, except by reason of its evidence shewed that the fittings were no part of the appearing to the returning officer, or his deputy, engine. On this state of facts we think the defendants upon putting such questions mentioned in the statute, bargained for and bought the specific engine which that the person so claiming to vote is not the same was afterwards erected on their premises; and assum- person whose name appears on such register as aforeing that there was a warranty as to its power, and said, or that he had previously voted at the same that it was broken, it was not an answer to the action election, or except by reason of such person refusing according to the case of Street v. Blay, 2 B. & Ad. to answer the questions, or either of them, or to take 456, and the case of Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. the oath, or make the affirmation respecting them, or 399. Also, it is an established and well known and to take or make the oath or affirmation against briascertained law, that if an article is ordered and bery; that therefore it is a clear violation of the sent, it must be paid for, although it does not duty of the returning officer to reject the vote of answer the purpose for which it was ordered. such a person, who is prevented enjoying as a voter Ollivant v. Bayley, 5 Q. B. 288, is to the same the right the statute has given to him, for which an effect. The defendant could not reject the engine action of law may be maintained. Ashley v. White, because it was not a 14-horse power, and the 2 Lord Raym. 954, and the case in 6 Q. B. 468, and direction of the Judge in this respect was wrong. But the dictum of Lord Denman in the latter of those we think the plaintiff cannot have the verdict for 1161. cases, were particularly relied upon for the plaintiff. entered in his favour, for the defendants may give in It was said that when the clear right of a party is evidence the alleged warranty, and the breach of it in infringed by another's breach of duty, he must be reduction of the price agreed to be paid. This would entitled to an action against the party by whom he be sufficient to dispose of the rule, because the ver- has been prejudiced. On the part of the defendant dict for the defendants was found on the misdirection the 79th section of the statute 6 & 7 Vict. was relied already referred to. But it was further contended on, by which it is said "that no person shall be entifor by the defendants that by the contract they were tled to vote at any future election for a member or not to pay the last instalment till the work was done members to serve in Parliament for any city or boto their satisfaction. It appears to us that this stipu- rough, unless he shall, ever since the 31st day of July, lation refers to the work in erecting the engine, not in the year in which his name was inserted in the the engine itself, and no question was left as to register of voters then in force, have resided, and at whether it was such as that it ought reasonably to the time of voting shall continue to reside within the satisfy the defendants, who relied on their dis-city or borough, in the election for which he shall satisfaction with the engine, not with the work or the claim to be entitled to vote, or within the distance manner of erecting it. It appears to us the verdict thereof required by the said recited Act to entitle such for the defendants cannot be sustained, on the ground person to be registered in any year." It was con that the time of paying the last instalment had not tended that the plaintiff in seeking to vote, contrary to arrived before the action brought, and there must the express provision of the Act of Parliament made be a Rule absolute for a new trial. in that respect, was endeavouring to commit a misdemeanour for which he might be criminally responsible. It was not denied that the returning officer, in refusing to admit the vote, had mistaken his duty, and acted in contravention of the 82nd section of the Act, and might have subjected himself to a criminal information for a breach of public duty; but it was said that the rejection of the vote, under these circumstances, could not be made the ground of a civil action at the suit of the person whose vote he rejected. It appears to us this view of the case is correct. The object of the statutes 2 Wm. 4, and 6 & 7 Vict. in limiting the questions to be put to voters, appears to be to prevent a waste of time by going into intricate questions of law and fact, so that all who are entitled to vote might have an opportunity of doing so within a limited time now allowed for the purpose. This restriction of the enquiry as to certain questions, highly convenient with reference to the general conduct of elections, was incidentally attended with this inconvenience, that it put it in the power of parties not entitled to vote to have their names put on the poll, and thereby to influence the election. It appears, though a party in the situation of the plaintiff has the power to compel the returning officer, under the apprehension of a prosecution, to put his name on the poll, he has not the right to do it so long as he is acting in direct contravention of the Act of Parliament, the terms of which are express that he shall not be entitled to vote, and the rejection of his vote would not amount to a violation of anything in the law concerning the right. The foundation of the plaintiff's action is the injury done to his right; and we think, for the reasons above given, he has no right, and consequently he has suffered no injury, and the rule for entering the verdict for him must be discharged. This is the judgment of my brothers Maule, Cresswell, and myself; the Chief Justice, having been counsel in the case, declines to interfere. Rule discharged. May 25 and July 3. PRYCE V. BELCHER. A person who is not entitled to vote in the election of a member of Parliament for any place, although his name be on the register of voters, cannot sustain an action against the returning officer for refusing his rote tendered at such election. In this case, which was tried before Maule, J. at the last Summer Assizes for Berkshire, a verdict was found for the defendant, with leave for the plaintiff to move to enter the verdict for himself. The nature of the action and the pleadings are set forth in 3 C. B. 58; 15 Law J., N. S. (C. P.) 305; 7 Law T. 281. The rest of the facts and the arguments which is material, will appear from the judgment. Talfourd, Serjt. and Maynard, shewed cause on behalf of the defendant. Whateley, Q. C. Kinglake, Serjt. and Phipson, for the plaintiff. The following authorities were referred to :-Cullen v. Morris, 2 Stark. 577; Young v. Spencer, 10 B. & C. 145; Mellor v. Spateman, 1 Saund. 346; The Dippers' case, 2 Wils. 422; Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 954; Luders on Elections, 245; Davis v. Black, 1 G. & D. 432; Planck v. Anderson, 5 T. R. 40; Wylie v. Birch, 4 Q. B. 577; Blofeld v. Payne, 4 B. & Ad. 410; Clifton v. Hooper, 6 Q. B. 468; Williams v. Mostym, 4 M. & W. 145; Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247; Saxon v. Castle, 6 A. & E. 652; Comyn's Dig. tits. "Action on the Case," "Misfeasance," A. 2; 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 45; 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18. Cur adv. vult. July 3.-The judgment of the Court was now delivered by Coltman, J.: JUDGMENT. This was an action against the returning officer for the borough of Abingdon, for refusing to permit the plaintiff to give his vote at the election of a member of Parliament for the borough. The plaintiff's name bad been placed on the register of voters for the borough, but he had ceased to reside there at the time of the election, and was residing at a farm at Gravesend. He however tendered himself to give his vote at the election, insisting that upon his answering in a satisfactory manner the questions which the returning officer put to him, and taking the oaths with respect to voters at the election of members of Parliament, he was entitled to have his name placed on the poll, and reckoned up at the final close of the poll. Bankrupt and Ensolvent Courts. COURT OF REVIEW. March 8 and 31. Ex parte SHUCKARD, re ARCHER. Construction-8 & 9 Vict. c. 127, s. 3-Costs. "Costs remaining due at the time of the order of imprisonment being made," in the 3rd section of the above Act, are the costs ordered to be paid by instalments, and “all subsequent costs" in the same section are the costs occasioned by default in payment of the instalments. Jurisdiction of the Court of Review under the above statute. Mr. Vizetelly having obtained a judgment against the petitioner, Mr. Shuckard, for a debt of 31. and 51. 2s. costs, in which matter Mr. Archer acted as Vizetelly's attorney, and the petitioner having made default in payment, on an application under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 127, to Mr. Commissioner Evans, an order, dated the 17th of February, 1846, was made, whereby it was ordered that the petitioner should pay the said debt and costs by monthly instalments of 11. each, until the said debt and costs were fully paid. After the payment of five instalments, Shuckard made default in the payment of the two following instalments, and thereupon a further application was made to the Commissioner ex parte under the said Act by Archer as Vizetelly's attorney, and a warrant for the imprisonment of Shuckard was issued. While this warrant was in Archer's hands, and on the 14th of October, Shuckard went to Archer's office and offered to pay the instalments then due, but he was informed that unless he paid costs to the amount of about 71. the warrant should be enforced, and accordingly he paid the sum demanded under protest. Archer's bill of costs was sent to Shuckard's solicitor on the 20th of October. Shuckard afterwards filed an affidavit in this Court, stating the said facts and the circumstances which occasioned his default in payment of the instalments. An order was then made upon motion by Shuckard, that Archer should answer the matters contained in the affidavit. Swanston and Tripp now appeared for Shuckard. Wigram and Cooke appeared for Archer. The CHIEF JUDGE inquired whether both parties were willing to consider the application as one for the taxation of Archer's bill of costs delivered on the 20th of October. This being assented to, a discussion took place with regard to the meaning of the terms as to costs in the 3rd section of the before-mentioned Act. By that section it is enacted "that no imprisonment under this Act shall in any wise operate as satisfaction or extinguishment of any debt or demand; but any person imprisoned under this Act, who shall have paid or satisfied the debt or demand, or the instalments thereof payable, and costs remaining due at the time of the order of imprisonment being made and all subsequent costs, shall, upon entry of such payment endorsed on the order of imprisonment, signed by the plaintiff or his attorney, be discharged out of custody by leave of a commissioner or judge of the court in which the order of imprisonment was made." The CHIEF JUDGE (after communicating with Mr. Commissioner Fane) said, that he considered the expression "costs remaining due at the time of the order of imprisonment being made," meant the costs mentioned in the order for payment by instalments; and that the expression "all subsequent costs,' meant the costs incurred by default in payment of the instalments. The question upon the construction of these words was a difficult one. He could make no order upon these points, but his opinion might be mentioned to the taxing officer. March 31.-After the taxation of the bill, the case was brought on again for the purpose of having the costs disposed of. The CHIEF JUDGE. The mere circumstance of a particular jurisdiction being given to the commissioner of bankrupts does not of necessity throw upon the Court the duty of interfering with cases under this Act. Supposing that Archer were within the jurisdiction of the Court of Review, the case would be merely one of alleged misconduct of an officer of the court in a matter which, of itself, was out of the jurisdiction. There might be such misconduct on the part of an officer of the court in a matter not belong ing to its jurisdiction, as to render it the duty of the Court to interfere. The difficulty I have felt is, whether, assuming the present not to be a matter within the jurisdiction of the Court of Review, the matter complained of was sufficiently grave, as an act of misconduct, to induce the Court to interfere. What I should have done with the costs, if the offers which Archer made before the application had not been declined, I will not say. The fact is, that offers were made and were declined. The right conclusion seems to me to be, to direct payment of the amount which has been taxed, the costs in this court, and of taxation, except so far as they have been increased by filing affidavits on either side before the order for taxation; and so far as they were increased, there must be no costs on either side. COMMISSIONERS' COURTS. (Before Mr. Commissioner GOULBURN.) Re ROBERT BANISTER. Bankrupt in custody-Power of commissioner-Stat, 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 119. Where a bankrupt is in custody under a criminal sentence for a misdemeanour, a warrant may issue from this Court for his being brought up to be examined Aspinall made an application under the stat. 6 Geo. Sturgeon said that if that was his Honour's opinion, they must go to the Court of Review. LEEDS DISTRICT COURT OF Saturday, August 7. (Before Mr. Commissioner AYRTON.) Re ROBINSON AND TARLEY. Satisfaction of debt by imprisonment. In pursuance of notice in the London Gazette, Mr Van Sandau, of London, in company with his clien Mr. Joseph Norton, of Clayton West, near Hudder which he claimed to want of the bankrupts on a ju field, attended to prove a debt of upwards of 1,000, ment obtained against them prior to the bankrup' §, and upon which he had detained one of the bik rupts in custody from the arrest up to the ti of his having obtained his certificate. The proof opposed by Mr. J. H. Hill, barrister, and Mr. J. E Upton, solicitor to the assignees. After much disparte Mudie, 3 M. D. & De Gex, 66, the debt was cussion, the learned Commissioner refused to admit the proof, being of opinion that, according to Ez satisfied in law by the imprisonment and discharge of the bankrupt. PREROGATIVE COURT. GOUT V. ZIMMERMAN. assignees, proceeded to give his opinion upon the ap- commissioners." And so the law remained until the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 119, above set forth, the Monday, August 9. (Before Mr. Commissioner FANE.) His HONOUR said he did not know that he had the His HONOUR did not think that he had, for though This was a question touching the legal domicil of a testatrix, upon which would depend the validity of her will, it having been made in conformity with the Bayford appeared in support of the act on petition, alleging the deceased to have died subject to the Dutch law. Harding, contrà, that the domicil of the deceased was British. Before going into the merits of the question, Harding took the objection that there was a discrepancy between the act on petition and the affidavit in support of it, since in the former the father of deceased was described as a native of Holland, whereas his son, one of the parties in the cause, had deposed in his affidavit that his father was a native of Riga, in Livonia; that such discrepancy was fatal to the proceedings; that the variance was similar in effect to a case where a party proceeding as next of kin in a cause was described as being next of kin in one degree, whereas he was in fact next of kin in another degree more remote, and in which case such error would be fatal. Bayford contended, in reply, that the discrepancy could not affect the real merits of the case; that proceedings by act on petition were not conducted with that technical strictness observed in proceedings by plea and proof; and that the affidavit being the statement from which the Court would take the facts of the case, the error in the act on petition could not mislead the Court, and therefore was wholly immsterial. The objection was overruled, as not being of sufficient importance to affect the merits of the case. From the facts of the case it appeared that Mrs. Duverliez, the deceased in the cause, was a widow at the time of her death; that she was the daughter of a Dr. Golthard Waldermar Zimmerman, and Annetta Fusti his wife; that she was born at Smyrna, in the Turkish dominions, in May 1774; that her father, Dr. Zimmerman, was a native of Russia, as alleged by those contending for an English domicil, but of Holland, by those contending for a Dutch domicil, but that he had for some time previous to the birth of his daughter (the deceased) resided at Smyrna; that the husband of the deceased was born of a Swiss father and an English mother; that he carried on the business of a merchant in the city of London; that his father had been naturalized as a British subject by Act of Parliament in the year 1779; that the deceased was married at Smyrna according to the rites and ceremonies of the Church of England, by a minister of the Church of England; that in 1803 the deceased, together with her husband, came to England, where they remained until 1818, when the deceased went with her husband to Smyrna, of which place he had been appointed British consul; that the husband of the deceased died in 1832; that the deceased, notwithstanding her husband's death, continued to reside at Smyrna and other places in the Levant, but that she acquired no property in any of such places; that she was in the habit of attending the service of the Church of England, and receiving the sacrament according to the rites of that church, and that she frequently declared it to be her intention that her property should pass by the operation of the law of England, and that she should make an English will, and that she often so expressed herself to the British chaplain at Smyrna; that he accordingly, st her request, drew up her will for her in the English form; and that she was, agreeably to her own e press desire, buried in the English burying-ground at Smyrna, the British chaplain reading over her the burial service according to the form in use by the Church of England. These facts, it was contended, proved that the domicile of the deceased was British, and that, consequently, her will was to be governed by the law of this country. course. THE LEGISLATOR. Summary. transferred to and vested in and shall hereafter be Small Debts and Demands in England," in manner hereinafter mentioned. distance of twenty miles, to which district the juris diction of the said Court and the Commissioners there. of under the aforesaid Acts is hereby restricted; and the said County Courts aforesaid in all cases wherein the insolvent or defendant shall have resided elsewhere, and shall have resided for six calendar months next immediately preceding the time of filing his petition, or the suing out of any summons within the district of such County Court to which such insolvent shall prefer his petition, or to which any plaintiff may apply for any summons as aforesaid; and that every Commissioner of the Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, and every such County Court aforesaid, shall, from and after the time this Act shall commence and take effect, have and exercise, in the prosecution of such petitions and summonses filed and issued in such Courts respectively, the like power and authority in all respects under the aforesaid Acts as the Commissioners of her Majesty's Court of Bankruptcy and District Courts of Bankruptcy have heretofore had and exercised on the presentation of petitions of insolvent debtors, and on such summonses as aforesaid, under such Acts, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, and shall each, singly, be and form a court for every purpose under this or the aforesaid Acts; and that every Commissioner of the said Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors shall henceforth, singly, be and form a Court for every purpose under all Acts now in force or which may hereafter be in force relating to insolvent debtors. 7. Recited Acts to apply to persons petitioning who have been in prison.-That the said two first-mentioned Acts shall apply to the cases of persons petitioning under the said Acts, although they may have been already in prison under judgment or otherwise for debt. -That if any such insolvent shall not have so resided for six months in any one place as aforesaid, then he shall file his petition in the said Insolvent Debtors Court, and the jurisdiction aforesaid in the matter of such insolvency shall be vested either in the Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors in London, or in such the Relief of Insolvent Debtors shall direct. one of the said County Courts as the said Court for 9. Petitions now pending under recited Acts, &c. to be disposed of notwithstanding the pussing of this Act. That with respect to petitions under the aforesaid Acts or either of them which are now in dependence, or which shall have been presented to the Court of Bankruptcy or any district Court of Bankruptcy before the time at which this Act shall commence and take effect, the provisions of such Acts, and the jurisdiction of such Courts and the Commissioners thereof under such Acts, or under the rules and orders made in pursuance thereof, shall remain in full force and effect notwithstanding the passing of this Act. It was alleged in reply, that if the deceased did reside with her husband in this country, and only left it on account of his being appointed consul at Smyrna, yet that her domicil at the death of her husband reverted to her by her own selection, and that in consequence of her being under the protection of the Dutch consulate at Smyrna, and her father having been born in Holland (the fact was, he was born in Russia), she was to be considered a Dutch subject. Sir HERBERT JENNER FUST.-The Act of Parliament which naturalized the father of the husband of the deceased, virtually rendered him, and consenently his son, a British subject. His forum originis en is not a material question, unless he abandoned is acquired domicil with an intention to revert to that of his native country; his going to Smyrna could not have that effect, and at the time of his death there could be no doubt he was a British subject; the deceased then, by her marriage with him, also acquired a British domicil. Did any act of her's subsequent to her husband's death change her legal status? It has been argued that by her placing herself under the protection of the Dutch Consulate she 4. Jurisdiction of Courts of Bankruptcy under 5 & reassumed her domicilium originis, namely, that of 6 Vict. c. 116, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, and 8 9 Vict. c. Holland, the native country of her father. But it 127, transferred to Court for the Relief of Insolvent does not appear that her father was of Dutch exDebtors and to the County Courts. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. traction; and had such been the case, the British-That from the time this Act shall commence and domicil was too firmly attached to be loosened by such take effect all power, jurisdiction, and authority given an equivocal act. I have no hesitation in pronouncing to her Majesty's Court of Bankruptcy and District the domicil of the deceased to have been British, and Courts of Bankruptcy, and to the Commissioners that her will must be construed by the law of this thereof, in matters of insolvency, by an Act passed in country. I therefore reject the petition. It is a case the sixth year of the reign of her Majesty, intituled in which costs should follow almost as a matter of "An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors," and by 8. If insolvent shall not have resided six months, an Act passed in the eighth year of the reign of her Ma-jurisdiction rested in Insolvent Court or County Court. jesty, intituled "An Act to amend the Law of Insolvency, Bankruptcy, and Execution," and by an Act passed in the ninth year of the reign of her Majesty, intituled "An Act for better securing the Payment of Small Debts," or by the rules and orders made in purTHE tumult and distraction of the elections suance of any of the said Acts, shall be transferred to is fast subsiding, and another week will bring Debtors in England, and to and in the Commissioners and vested in the Court for the Relief of Insolvent in the last returns from the counties; after thereof for the time being, and to and in the County which for a while the members will be but too Courts constituted or to be constituted under an Act happy to seek repose or recreation, according passed in the tenth year of the reign of her Majesty, to their tastes, after the excitement and anxie-intituled "An Act for the more easy Recovery of ties which they have recently endured. In a leading article will be found a list of all 5. In Insolvent Debtors Court the Provisional Assigthe members of the upper and lower ranks nee, and in County Courts the Clerk, to act as official of our Profession who have been candidates assignee; Clerks of County Courts to act as registrars: (successful or otherwise) for seats in the Bailiffs of County Courts to act as messengers.-That new Parliament. in the Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors the If numbers and not purpose Provisional Assignee, and in the said County Courts were mainly necessary to ensure the protection the Clerk of the Court, shall in every case of insol. of the interests of our body, then would the vency under such two first-mentioned Acts be and Profession be admirably represented in the act as the official assignee of the estate and effects approaching Session. It remains, however, of the insolvent; and that in each of the said County to be seen whether any one, and, if so, who, trars of the Court of Bankruptcy have heretofore Courts the Clerk of such Court shall act as the regiswill interest himself on behalf of the law-been accustomed to act under any of the said Acts; yers; in the meantime we content ourselves and every such Clerk shall do and perform all Acts with simply observing that whoever will do so heretofore done and performed by such registrars or may be assured of receiving all honourable by the Clerk of the Insolvent Debtors Court under support, and the cordial wishes of the Profes- any of the said Acts; and every such Clerk shall do and perform all such acts and duties necessary for sion. carrying this Act into effect as shall be ordered by any such County Court, or by any Commissioner of the said Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors; and that the High Bailiff of every such County Court and his assistants shall be and act as a messenger of the Court of Bankruptcy and his assistants have hitherto been accustomed to act under the said Acts; and such High Bailiff and his assistants shall do all acts heretofore done under the said Acts, and shall possess and enjoy all the powers, authorities, and THE following is a verbatim copy of the import-privileges when acting under the said Acts as have been heretofore done, possessed, or enjoyed by any ant Statute that transfers to the County Courts the messenger of the Court of Bankruptcy or his assist urisdiction in County Insolvency. ants when acting under any of the said Acts, and shall do and perform all such Acts as shall be ordered An Act to abolish the Court of Review in Bank- by any such County Court for the purpose of carruptcy, and to make Alterations in the Jurisdic-rying this Act into effect. tions of the Courts of Bankruptcy and Court for Relief of Insolvent Debtors. (July 22, 1847.) Court of Review abolished.-Whereas it is expedient to abolish the Court of Review in Bankruptcy, and to make alterations in the jurisdiction of the Courts of Bankruptcy and Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors; be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that the Court of Review in Bankruptcy and the offices of the Chief Judge and other Judges of the Court of Bankruptcy, be hereby abolished. PUBLIC GENERAL STATUTES, 10th Victoria, A.D. 1847. [The most important Statutes relating to the Law are given verbatim; of the less important an abstract is presented; of the rest the title only is extracted.] (Continued from p. 399.) THE BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY CAP. CII. 2. Jurisdiction of Court of Review transferred to one of the Vice-Chancellors.-That all the jurisdiction, powers, authorities, and privileges of the said Court of Review in Bankruptcy hereby abolished shall be 6. Jurisdiction of Insolvent Debtors Court and County Courts.-That from the time this Act shall commence and take effect the Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors in England, and the Commissioners thereof, and the Judges of the County Courts aforesaid, shall have jurisdiction in all matters of insolvency and debt under the aforesaid Acts in manner following; that is to say, the said Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, and the Commissioners thereof, in all cases in which the insolvent in cases of insolvency, or the defendant in the case of any summons issued under the aforesaid Act for the better securing the payment of small debts, shall have resided for six calendar months next immediately preceding the time of filing his petition, or of the suing out of any such summons aforesaid within any parish the distance whereof, as measured by the nearest highway from the General Post Office in London to the parish church of such parish, shall not exceed the 10. Jurisdiction of the Court for Relief of Insolvent Debtors on circuit transferred to County Courts.-That from and after the fifteenth day of September next for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors shall be abolished; the circuits of the commissioners of the said Court and that if thereafter any insolvent debtor in custody in any of her Majesty's gaols situated elsewhere than within the district to which the jurisdiction of such Court is restricted as herein-before mentioned shal petition such Court under any Act or Acts relating to insolvent debtors, other than the two first-mentioned Acts or this Act, or if any such prisoner shall have so petitioned prior to the passing of this Act, and his petition shall not have been heard, or if the same shall have been heard and the consideration thereof shall have been adjourned, such Court, or some commissioner thereof, shall forthwith, after the schedule of such prisoner shall have been duly filed in the case of any new petition, and at any time which to such Court or Commissioner shall seem fit in the case of any petition which shall not have come on for hearing, or the hearing of which shall have been adjourned as aforesaid, make an order referring such petition for hearing to the County Court within the district of which such insolvent debtor is in custody, and shall transmit such petition and schedule to such Court for hearing accordingly; and that the Judge of such Court shall appoint a time and place for such prisoner to be brought up before such Court, and cause the usual notices to be given; and that any Court to which any such petition shall be so referred and transmitted shall have and possess the same power and authority with respect to every such petition, and shall make all such orders, give all such directions, and do all such matters and things requisite for the discharging or remanding of such prisoner, and otherwise respecting such prisoner, his schedule, creditors, and assignees, as the said Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors or any Commissioner thereof might make, give, or do in the matters of petitions heard before such Court or Commissioner under such Acts; and that every such petition and schedule, and all judgments, rules, orders, directions, and proceedings pronounced, made, and done thereon in all and every the matters aforesaid by such County Court, shall be returned to the said Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, signed by the Judge of such County Court, |