MARRIAGES. said, the attorneys of any court, without special BORTON, E. esq. of Lincoln's-inn, barrister-at-law, to words. (Lit. Rep. 304.) And this case was cited Margaret, second daughter of G. H. Wilkinson, esq. of and confirmed as to all officers of the Superior Courts Haperley-park, Durham, Recorder of Newcastle-upon- in Welles v. Trahern, Willes's Rep. 241. And thereTyne, and Judge of the County Courts for Northumber-fore, as would appear, attorneys and other officers of land, on the 10th inst. at Witton-le-Wear, Durham. HEARLE, T. R. esq. solicitor, Redruth, Cornwall, to H. F. the Superior Courts, as barristers (Com. Dig. tit. "Abatement," D. 6), may still claim to sue or be youngest daughter of Lieut. Nepean, H.M.S. Caledonia, on the 2nd inst. at St. Stephen's, near Saltash. sued in the Superior Courts as at Common Law, notOLDFIELD, T. esq. of the Middle Temple, barrister-at-law, withstanding any thing contained in the County eldest son of T. B. Oldfield, esq. of Champion-hill, Surrey, Courts Act. to Louisa Margaret, third daughter of S. Warner, esq. of Blackheath, Kent, on the 10th inst. at St. Mary's, Lewisham. RICHARDSON, Sir John, Inspector of Hospitals, Haslar, to Mary, youngest daughter of the late Archibald, Fletcher, esq. Edinburgh, on the 4th inst. at Grassmere Church. WATERS, James Denew, esq. solicitor, Great Yarmouth, to Harriet, eldest daughter of Shephard Thomas Taylor, esq. on the 5th inst. at Dilham, Norfolk. WILLIAMS, F. S., M.A. of Trinity College, Cambridge, and of Lincoln's-inn, barrister-at-law, to Katherine Eliza, daughter of J. Smith, esq. of Twickenham, on the 10th inst. at the Church of the Holy Trinity, Twickenham. DEATHS. DALY, Hannah, the wife of R. Daly, esq. barrister-at-law, on the 2nd inst. at Tullamore. aged 67. FORBES, A. esq. Justice of the Peace, at Craigovad, Down, GARRICK, Christopher Philip, a magistrate of the county of Surrey, of Richmond, Surrey, and Cleeve, Somersetshire, on the 9th inst. at Richmond, aged 63. HOUBLON, Ann, the wife of John Archer Houblon, of Hallingbury-place, esq. and daughter of Rear-Admiral Dundas, M.P. on the 8th inst. at the Admiralty. JEFFRIES, Joseph, esq. Major in the 2nd Somerset Militia, and a magistrate for the county of Sussex and borough of Hastings, on the 29th ult. at St. Leonard's-on-Sea, aged 70. RUSSELL, Henshaw, esq. of Dover, a magistrate for the county of Kent, on the 8th inst. at Brussels, aged 59. WARREY, G. esq. of West Coker House, Yeovil, and of New Inn, London, on the 3rd inst. IN preparing this second part of his treatise on the Law and Practice of the County Courts, Mr. MOSELEY has evidently resolved to do justice to his theme; and instead of a mere re-arrangement of the statute, with extracts from another book of the editor, by way of notes, as we have seen one treatise on the new Courts to consist of, Mr. MOSELEY has produced a work which may claim to be an original one, and which can scarcely fail to be a standard one. The present part opens with a review of the jurisdiction of the Courts as to persons, places, and things, and how it is to be enforced; or how answered by suggestion, by pleading in abatement or claim of conusance. Thus he treats of the manner in which the jurisdiction of the County Courts affects ATTORNEYS. It will be necessary, however, here to advert to some very important difficulties which arise on the words of the above sections. And first with respect to the attorneys of the Superior Courts. It is observed that by sec. 67, “ No privilege, except as hereinafter excepted, shall be allowed to any person to exempt him from the jurisdiction of any Court holden under this Act," and the question arises whether these words will be sufficient to extinguish the right which Attorneys of the Superior Courts have of being sued there, or whether they may be sued in the New County Courts. It has been expressly decided that "the privilege of attorneys cannot be taken away, even by an Act of Parliament, unless they are therein mentioned by express words." (Per Willes, C. J. in Welles v. Trahern, Willes's Rep. 240.) This privilege exists by common law, and is a custom as old as the Court itself. (Ibid. Lord Anderson's case, 1 Leon. 149; Butt's case, 1 Rolt. Abr. See a learned note to Elkins v. Harding, 1 Cr. and J. 349.) And it is not destroyed by the doing away with the writ of attachment by the Uniformity of Process Act. (Wright v. Skinner, 1 M. & W. 144; Dyer v. Levy, 4 Dowl. 630.) And indeed it would appear that it is not excluded by the above words of the New County Courts Act; for besides the above authorities, it has been held in a series of cases that Courts of Requests Acts creating a jurisdiction up to a certain amount over certain causes, and declaring that if "any one," or like words, should sue for causes below that amount in the Superior Courts, he shall not recover costs, will not be binding on attorneys or other officers of the Superior Courts, unless express mention is made of them. (Vide Johnson v. Bray, 2 Br. & B. 698; Board v. Parker, 7 East, 46; Hussey v. Jordan, 1 Dougl. 382.) So a statute, or patents confirmed by statute, giving exclusive jurisdiction to the University of Oxford, "so that the king's justices of either bench should not interfere," was held not to affect the privilege of attorneys of such Superior Courts, or, as was Another very important question of jurisdiction ject of his doing any particular act, as buying or selis as to the meaning of the word DWELLING. In investigating the meaning of the word dwell, which is so important a word with respect to the New County Courts, we shall premise by observing, that from common use and from the frequent dicta if not decisions of the Judges, it would appear to be the same as that of inhabit and reside, and that the three words are synonymous. Thus in the case of the King v. Thomson, 2 Leach, 77, the Court said that as no one had inhabited the house, i.e. slept there (for the goods had been removed into it), it could not be considered a dwelling house. So in Rex v. Lyons, 2 East, P. C. 497, the Court said that the house was no mansion in which burglary could be committed, because no one had inhabited it. So, as observed by Mr. Baron Alderson in Crease v. Sawle, 2 Q. B. Rep. 882, the Court held in Sir Antony Earby's case, 2 Bulstr. 354, that the word inhabiting, as used in 43 Eliz. c. 2, as to poorsrates, meant dwelling. So Lord Ellenborough, in Rex v. Nicholson, said that there was no case in which the word inhabitant in the same statute had been held to mean other than a resident within the parish. (Vide per Holroyd, J. in Rex v. North Curry, 4 B. & C. 953.) And it was evidently considered by the Court in that case, that the word inhabitant, irrespective of the subject-matter as to which it was used, or the context by which of course its meaning might be altered, was the same as resident. By the old law it is said, that a man after living in a place for three days, was looked on as an inhabitant. The first day he was a stranger, the second a guest, the third an inhabitant. (Per Lee, C. J. in Rex v. Sowton Burr, S. C. 128.) But no authority is given for this, which appears more like a common saying than a legal maxim. 66 A jurisdiction is also given to the New County Courts by the statute (vide 60th and 128th sections), in causes in which the defendant, or one of the detime of the action brought within the jurisdiction of fendants, is a person carrying on business" at the the Court; in which case the summons may be issued at once, and by leave of the Court for the district in which the defendant, or one of them, shall have carried on his business, at some time within six calendar months next before the time of the action brought, or in which the cause of action arose. As to what will be a "dwelling" within six calendar months. And as it is not a little difficult to understand what is the meaning of the words "carrying on his business," it will be necessary to investigate it by the aid of cases decided on similar words. And first of all it is not necessary, in order to carry on a business, that the parties should keep an open shop or countinghouse, or conduct their business in the usual way; and they may adopt any form or style of proceeding, or manner of keeping their account-books, they please. For it has been held thus with respect to "trading," so as to render a party liable to the bankrupt laws (vide Ex parte Wilson, 1 Atk. 218); and this decision would, no doubt, be equally applicable to the "carrying on a business," so as to render a party liable to be sued in the County Court. And as the term "carrying on business," generally implies the doing so for profit, these words will include all persons who follow any trade, profession, or calling whatsoever, for gain, but not such as live upon their private fortune, without any trading, or calling, or profession whatever. Therefore, it would appear, that all young ladies and gentlemen, and others, not following any trade or profession themselves, or following it as pupils or apprentices to others, and depending on their parents and friends for their support, whether such friends or no so derive their means from professions or trades, could not be sued in the County Courts as persons “carrying on a business," though, of course, they might as persons "dwelling," if such they were. So, perhaps, servants and all persons working as servants to other persons, and not in business for themselves, could scarcely be deemed persons coming within the common acceptation of the term "carrying on their business," though these again might, of course, be liable to be summoned as persons "dwelling," if such they were. (Sed quære.) So, no doubt, in order to constitute "a carrying on of business," it is necessary that there should be a repeated practice of so doing, or a commencement coupled with an intention to continue it, for a single act or transaction, though otherwise of the nature required, would not be sufficient. Thus in order to constitute a trading so as to render a party liable to the bankrupt laws, he must commence such trading with an intention of continuing it, and a mere isolated transaction will not be sufficient. (See the cases in Archb. Bankr. 10 edit. 52.) But if this intention exist, the extent of the trading or semble amount of business so carried on, matters not. (Ibid.) And the declaration of a party as to the obling, or of his holding himself out as one carrying on a business, is admissible, of his intention in so doing. (Gale v. Halfknight, 2 Stark. 56.) And if one follow a line of life, as that of a private gentleman or other. wise, not connected with business, a mere incidental or collateral transaction will not amount to a carrying on a business. Thus, if the owner of a mine buys candles, and sells them to the miners, this will not amount to trading within the bankrupt laws. (Ex parte Gallimore, 2 Rose, 456.) Or a gentleman, who buys dead horses to give to his hounds, and sells the skins and bones. (Summersett v. Jarvis, 3 B. & B. 2.) So merely discounting a bill, or procuring bills to be discounted for friends, will not render a man liable to be a bankrupt as a bill-broker, if he follow some other profession, and does not hold himself out as such. (Ex parte Harvey, 1 Deac. 571.) So if the carrying on business be on the grounds of his trading, he must have bought with an intention of selling again, for, of course, the mere purchasing goods or articles for the purpose of his own use or consumption, could not be construed into a carrying on business. (Vide Archb. Bankr. 49, 10th edit.) But although in order to create a trading within the bankrupt laws, the party must have bought the goods and sold them again, so that farmers could not be deemed traders in respect of selling goods which they had reared or produced themselves, as horses, oxen, or a butcher who kills sheep which he has reared himself (Vide Archb. Bank. 49, 10th edit.), yet this would not apply to carrying on a business; for the word "trading" implies buying to sell again, but the word "carrying on business" does not. And in order to constitute a carrying on a business, it is not necessary that the party should be doing so legally. Thus a party who is carrying on an illegal trade, as that of a smuggler (Ex parte Meymott, 8 Atk. 169; Cobb v. Symonds, 8 Dowl. & R. 11), or a clergyman carrying on a trade, which is forbidden by statute, may be a bankrupt as a trader. (Archb. Pract. 52, 10th edit.) In practice the question must often accrue as to the Jurisdiction within which the cause of action arose. Mr. MOSELEY thus treats of it. WHERE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES. Thus And first of all, the promise must have been made within the jurisdiction, for that of course is part of the gist of the action. Thus where an action was brought in an Inferior Court, on a bond made without the jurisdiction, and judgment and execution obtained thereon, and an action for escape brought against the officer, it was held that the whole proceeding was void, and that the officer was not liable, since the man was never lawfully in his custody. (Vin. Abr. vol. 7, p. 20.) So the promise must have been performable, or performed within the jurisdiction. where one promised to pay when he came to A. and the declaration did not aver A. to be within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court held it bad. (Cro. Car. 571.-Jon. 451.) So it was held an error in a judgment, in an Inferior Court, that in an action on a bond, no place was mentioned in the condition where the money was to be paid, and that, therefore, it did not appear on the record whether the contract was performable within the jurisdiction. (Masterman's case, Styl. 2.) And from these cases it would appear that the contract must be performable within the jurisdiction, and that money, when averred as payable, must be averred as payable within the jurisdiction. And this is important, since it would appear from the forms (See Hennell's Forms) and the practice of the Inferior Courts as far as the author has been able to observe, that the practice is in general at variance with the above cases, and probably bad. So the consideration of the promise must have been performed and have been performable within the jurisdiction. Thus where plaintiff declared in the Palace Court that defendant had promised, within jurisdiction of the Court, to give him 101. if he would procure a certain house for him in Holborn, without averring it was situated within the jurisdiction of the Court, the judgment was set aside by the Court of King's Bench. (1 Lev. 50.) So where a contract was made within limits of a Borough Court, for a ship to go from such a place, situate without its jurisdiction, to another place without its jurisdiction, a judgment in the Inferior Court obtained thereon was reversed (Vin. Abr. 7, 20, pl. 2.) For the promise was not to take place within jurisdiction of the Court, but in Hamburgh, and therefore the Court could not enquire whether it was performed. So where debt was brought in Bristol for wages to be paid on performance of a voyage, to be in locis transmarinis, on writ of error it was held ill, for they cannot enquire at Bristol whether the party has performed the voyage or not. (Willis v. Bond, Styl. 260; Vin. Abr. 7, 21.) So where a plaintiff in Oxford, in consideration of defendant's undertaking to buy wines for him in London, and convey them to Oxford, agreed to pay him the money laid out for the wines, and carriage of them, and half the profits arising from the sale, it was held that the Inferior Court could not try the cause, because they could not enquire of the buying in London and carriage therefrom. (Vin. Abr. 7, 21, pl. 5.) And the point has now been settled, that the goods must have been sold and delivered, and all other facts out of which contracts arise must be averred to have arisen, and must have arisen, within jurisdiction, as well as the express promise to pay. (Vide 2 Wils. 16; 1 Saund. 73; 2 Lev. 87.) So in debt for rent it must be averred that the premises for the rent of which the action is brought, lie within the jurisdiction. (Drake v. Breare, Lev. 104.) So the money must have been had and received within the jurisdiction. (Trevor v. Wall, 1T. R. 151.) So the goods must have been sold within the jurisdiction. (Ibid.) So the work must have been done within the jurisdiction. (Ray, 95.) So the money must have been lent there. (1 Ventr. 72.) So the trespass must have been committed there. (Noy, 129.) So the goods must have been carried within the jurisdiction. (Cro. Car. 571; Harwood v. Lester, 3 B. & P. 617. And see numerous cases cited 1 Saund. 74; Com. Dig. "Courts," p. 8; Vin. Abr. 10 vol. 55, et passim.) As to what is a sufficient statement of the cause of action accruing within the jurisdiction, see Chitty v. Dendy, 3 A. E. 320; Williams v. Jones, Exch. 4 Law T. 318. And it is sufficient to aver an account stated within the jurisdiction, without saying that all the items accrued there. (Emery v. Bartlett, 2 Ld. Raym. 1555). But a mere naked promise within a jurisdiction, without any evidence to support an account stated, is not sufficient. (5 A. E. 208; see also Thorn v. Chinnock, 1 Scott, N. C. 141.) So also the damage, or part thereof at least, whether in causes of contract or tort, must have arisen within the jurisdiction. Thus in an action on the case for calling a woman a whore, whereby she lost her marriage, there not only the words spoken, but the loss of marriage must be laid within the jurisdiction, because the one without the other would not maintain the action, and one may confess the words and traverse the damage. (53 Raym.; Lev. 69.) So in trespass by a master for battery of his servant, the loss of service as well as the battery must be laid within the jurisdiction. (6 Mod. 224.) But it is agreed that where the gist of the action is laid within jurisdiction, mere matter of aggravation, or consequential damage, without which the action would have laid, need not be averred to have arisen within jurisdiction. (Vin. Abr. 7 vol. 21, margin.) So if part of the damage occurred within jurisdiction, and part not, and verdict be given on the whole, semble it is good, for the latter, as only increase of damages, may be rejected. Thus where an action on the case was brought in the Palace Court against a man for having so negligently taken care of his horse that it was taken out of the stable and ridden so violently that it was spoiled, without averring that the riding occurred within the jurisdiction, the Court held that the violent riding was only matter of aggravation. (Salk. 404; 2 Ld. Raym. 795.) So where a party brought an action on the case in the Borough Court of Bath, and declared that he was a tailor there; that he used the said art for several persons dwelling in that city, and elsewhere in the kingdom of England; and that the defendant, to scandalize him in the said art, said to him, "Thou hast stole my cloth," &c. whereby he lost his customers, on a plea of not guilty, it was held that the Court could not proceed to trial, for they could not give damages for the loss of custom arising without jurisdiction, for there, as in other cases, they could not bring in witnesses from without jurisdiction, to prove the loss, or otherwise. (Vin. Abr. 21 vol. 4.) So semble all matters of fact set up as a defence, or at least those requiring to be specially pleaded, as payment, set-off, tender, &c. must have occurred within the jurisdiction, and be averred in the plea to have so occurred, or else it will be bad for the same reasons as apply to declarations, viz. that otherwise the Court cannot enforce the attendance of witnesses or a jury of the visne, &c. to inquire of the fact. ment he obtains is to be in full discharge of all de- Some useful hints may be gathered from the fol- ENTERING PLAINTS. be pleaded or moved in abatement, that the plaint is Digest of the Laws relating to Bribery and Treat- A VERY convenient and complete analysis of the The Law relative to Benefit Building Societies, with Notes and Comments. By CHARLES EGAN, Esq. Barrister-at-Law. 12mo. Hustings, 1847. THE rapid increase in the number and importance of Benefit Building Societies, calls for as wide a promulgation of the laws which affect such institutions as possible. Although these societies are too frequently established with an eye chiefly to the profits of the projectors and officers, it cannot be denied that, properly conducted, they encourage habits of thrift and economy in the people, and therefore are of service in the social economy. The design of Mr. EGAN, in the manual before us, has been to lay before the reader, in popular language, so that the unlearned may understand, the provisions of the statute (6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 32) for the regulation of Benefit Building Societies, with the decisions upon the most important points which have since arisen under that Act. He has accomplished his task with considerable ability, and produced a hand-book of the law which will be found serviceable by all parties interested in Benefit Building Societes. JOURNAL OF PROPERTY. ON A PRACTICAL COMMENTARY By common law, the form of a plaint must be in writing, not by parol. Thus a plaint is defined to be the exhibiting any action, real or personal, in writing. THE LAW OF CONTRACTS RELATING (Kitch. 231.) So the plaint must be in due form, TO REAL PROPERTY. and to do this it must rightly set forth the parties' By WILLIAM HUGHES, Esq. Barrister-at-Law. names to the action, and the characters in which they (Continued from page 387.) sue, the form of action, and, if it be defective in any of these points, it will be bad, and all the proceedings Purchaser, even with notice, may protect himthereon void, unless the objection be neglected till self against dower.—The rule indeed with respect to after verdict. Thus where a plaint in an Inferior notice is now applicable to all cases of purchasers inCourt was against Francis, and the party's name was tending to avail themselves of the protection of prior John, it was held void. (Brereton v. Mornington, legal estates, with the single exception of dower, which Style, 115.) So where an original writ, which is the it has long been determined a purchaser may prosame in the Superior Courts as the plaint is in In- tect himself against by obtaining the assignment of ferior, mis-stated the defendant's name, and that through the fault of the plaintiff, it was held bad, and an attendant term, notwithstanding he purchases not amendable. (Lady Essex v. Caius College, Freem. with express notice of the marriage. (Radnor, 69.) But if the mistake occurs through the clerk of (Lady) v. Rotherham, Pre. Cha. 65; S. C. 1 Vern. the court, it is amendable. (Cro. Car. 74.) And it 179, by the name of Bodmin v. Vandebendy; S. C. must rightly state the character in which parties sue, Show P. C. 69; Brown v. Gibbs, 1 Vern. 97; Wray where that is necessary. Thus when the plaint in an v. Williams, Pre. Cha. 151; S. C. 2 Vern. 378; 1 Inferior Court was of A. B. and the declaration was Eq. Ca. Abr. 219, pl. 4, but best reported 1 P. Wms. of A. B. executor of C. D. it was held void upon a 137; Dudley and Ward v Dudley, Pre. Cha. 241; writ of error, there having been no verdict to cure it. Cas. Temp. Talb. 140; Baker v. Sutton, 2 P. (Clare v. Hale, 1 Salk. 266.) So it was held that an Wms. 700, 707; Swannock v. Lydford, Ambl. 6; original could not be altered by making a plaintiff an administrator instead of an executor. (Barnes, 15.) S. C. by name of Hill v. Adams, 2 Atk. 208; So by common law a plaint must be certain in what Wynn v. Williams, 5 Ves. 130; D'Arcy v. Blake, it demands. Thus the plaint in replevin must, both 2 Sch. & Lef. 387.) Still, to obtain this equitable by common law and the statute, describe the cattle, protection as against a widow's title to dower, the of what sort they are, and how many of each, in order term must be actually assigned to a trustee in trust that the bailiff may know which to deliver. And for the purchaser; for, if it be left outstanding, he where the declaration which must follow the plaint, will not be permitted to avail himself of it. was for a hundred sheep, without saying how many of each, ewes or wethers, it was held bad. (Cart. (Maundrell v. Maundrell, 7 Ves. 567.) Before 218; Styles, 71; and see Vin. Abr. "Replevin," E.) dismissing this subject, it may not be improper to So when the original writ was unde pactum habet, make a few remarks upon the operation of the reSPLITTING DEMANDS. when it should have been unde chartam habet, it cent enactment, 8 & 9 Vict. with respect to outThough it would, however, thus appear that little was held utterly bad. (Vin. Abr. 2 vol. 394.) So standing terms. By this Act, all satisfied terms are practical difficulty is thus likely to arise with respect where a quare impedit was quod nominare debit, where to cease on the 31st of December, 1845; but it to what shall be said to be amount for which the ac- it should have been quod presentare, &c. (Ibid.) So still continues the same protection as before against tion is brought, so far as giving the Court jurisdic- the plaint must be certain in the form of action. As tion over the matter is concerned, yet it is not free if in replevin it be not in the detinet only, it will attendant by express declaration. (Secs. 1, 2.) Still incumbrances, in those cases where it has been made from difficulties considered in other points of view. be bad. (Hallett v. Burt, Carth. 380.) So where Thus, as has been observed, where the cause of ac- the writ was in debet only, when it should have been as this protection is restricted to terms attendant by tion is above the sum of twenty pounds, the plaintiff in the debet and detinet, it was held not amendable, express declaration, and as no such declaration can may sue for the debt in the County Court, but he though a fault of the clerks, because the error was of be made after the 31st of December, 1845, all permust abandon the excess, and in such case the judg-substance. (Freeman's case, 5 Rep. 45.) So it may sons who had not obtained an assignment before On the point raised by Mr. PALMER in his memorable decision at Bristol, Mr. MOSELEY, who appears to have written before that case was reported, as he does not notice it, thus expresses himself: that time are wholly debarred of all benefit of such satisfied terms. A learned writer, when treating on this subject, also observes (see Browell's Real Property Statutes, 281, n. b.), "Before it can be assumed that a term is brought within the operation of the Act, there must be a full disclosure of the trusts or purposes for which it was created, or to whom it may have become subsequently liable, and the clearest evidence that none of them are subsisting and capable of taking effect. It is obvious that difficulties will frequently arise in satisfying a purchaser upon these points; and whenever he omits to obtain an assignment, he will be liable to have the term used against him in ejectment, and may have the onus cast upon himself of proving that the term is satisfied. Even possession of the deeds relating to the term will not prevail against an actual assignment to a future purchaser without notice; and such purchaser will perhaps be enabled to give a continued and permanent existence to the term, merely by having it assigned upon express trust, to protect him from the afterwards-discovered mesne incumbrance. The operation of the statute is similar to that of the old proviso for cesser, which," as he truly remarks, "is very rarely relied on in practice, though it might be with less hazard, inasmuch as the proviso specifies the events on which the term is to cease, and there is seldom a difficulty in proving that such events have happened; but much more than this is requisite to satisfy a purchaser that the term has ceased by force of the statute.' circumstances connected therewith. (Plumb v. c. 110, a decree of a court of equity was only bind. Fluitt, 2 Anstr. 438; Mertins v. Jolliffe, Ambl. ing on the parties and their privies in represen 311; Marr v. Bennett, 2 Cha. Cas. 246.) Thus tation or estate, and was not therefore held to be per knowledge of a lease has been held to be construc-se for a constructive notice to any other persons. tive notice of its contents (Hall v. Smith, 14 Ves. But if a person who is neither party nor privy ac426; Taylor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves. 410; Daniels v. tually had such notice, he was, and still will Davison, 16 Ves. 249; Allen v. Anthony, 1 Mer. be, bound by it. (Harvey v. Montague, 1 Vern. 262); so notice of a deed, which recites another 57, 122; Stor. Eq. 327; 2 Fonlb. Eq. 153, n.) deed, will be constructive evidence of such latter Now under the statute 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, decrees deed; nor will a party so presumed to be possessed and orders of courts of equity are to have the effect of knowledge of this kind, be permitted to dis- of judgments (sect. 18); but with respect to the latprove it by evidence. And this rule has been ter, the act of docketing was not of itself conextended so far as to establish that where a pur- sidered as notice to a purchaser, neither is a regischaser cannot make out a title but by deed which tration of a judgment or decree under the more leads him to another fact, he will be presumed cog- recent enactments; but if it can be shewn that a nizant of that fact (2 Fonbl. Eq. 151): and it has party actually had such notice, he would be bound also been holden that whatever is sufficient to put accordingly, and the act of searching the register a party upon inquiry, is sufficient notice in equity. will be sufficient to affix him with such notice, unless (Ib. n. m; Smith v. Low, 1 Atk. 1; Mertins v. it can be shewn that the search was restricted to a Jolliffe, Ambl. 313; Taylor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves. particular period in which the judgment in question 437; Daniels v. Davison, 16; ib. 250; Newman v. was not entered. (Hodgson v. Dean, 2 Sim. & Kent, 1 Mer. 240.) But a purchaser is not bound Stu. 221.) Neither is an act of bankruptcy, nor to take notice of an equity arising out of mere con- a commission or fiat bankruptcy, notice of those struction of words, which are uncertain (Cordwell facts to a purchaser (Wilker v. Bodington, 2 Vern. v. Mackrill, 2 Eden. 347); nor of any matters 599; Collet v. De Gols, For. 65; Ex parte Knott, beyond those which affect his present purchase. 11 Ves. 609; Sowerby v. Brooks, 4 B. & A. 523); (Mertins v. Jolliffe, Ambl. 311.) Hence, if a man nor does the Act 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 83, which purchase an estate under a deed which happens to makes the issuing of a commission-notice of an act relate also to other lands not comprised in that of bankruptcy in certain cases affect a purchaser. purchase, and afterwards he purchases the other Neither will a bonâ fide purchaser without notice be lands to which an apparent title is made, indepen- affected by a secret act of bankruptcy before his dent of that deed, the former notice of the deed will purchase, although it be followed by a fiat after his How a purchaser should be pleaded.-A purchaser not itself affect him in the second transaction; for purchase. (Pearce v. Newlyn, 8 Mad. 186.) The for valuable consideration, in order to avail himself he was not bound to carry in his recollection those registering of a conveyance or other document, of this equitable protection, must do so by plea and parts of a deed which had no relation to the particular even in a register county, will not be deemed not by answer; for if he does the latter, he will be purchase he was then about to make, nor to take no-constructive notice to subsequent purchasers; bound to answer fully (Richardson v. Mitchell, tice of more of the deed than affected his then purchase. but that, to be binding, actual notice must be Sel. Cas. Cha. 51; Clanrichard v. Burk, Vin. Abr. (Hamilton v. Royal, 2 Sch. & Lef. 327; 1 Stor. Eq. brought home to the party. "In America, howtit." Chancery," (W. A.) ; 2 Atk. 155; Blacket v. 321, n. 1.) Neither are vague and indefinite rumours ever," the great law writer of that country obLanglands, 1 Anstr. 14; Hughes v. Garth, 2 Eden, sufficient to a party upon inquiry. Still, as a celebrated serves, "the doctrine has been differently settled; 168; S. C. Ambl. 421; Ovey v. Leighton, 2 Sim. modern writer on equitable jurisprudence observes and it is there uniformly held, that the registration & Stu. 234; Portarlington (Lord) v. Soulby, 7 (1 Stor. Eq. 322), there will be found almost infi- of a conveyance operates as constructive notice to Sim. 28; Trevanion v. Mosse, 1 Vern. 216)-the nite grades of presumption between such rumour all subsequent purchasers of any estate, legal or plea, in fact, being the cause assigned for not putting and suspicion, and that certainly as to facts which equitable, in the same property. (Parkhurst v. in the answer. The plea should state the purchase no mind could hesitate to pronounce enough to call Alexander, 1 John Ch. R. 394.) The reasoning according to the facts (Egerton v. Egerton, 3 P. for further inquiry, and to put the party upon his upon this doctrine," he says, "is founded upon Wms. 281; Aston v. Aston, 3 Atk. 302; Walwyn diligence. No general rule, therefore, he proceeds the obvious policy of the Registry Acts; the duty v. Lee, 9 Ves. 32; Attorney-General v. Backhouse, to state, can be laid down to govern such cases. of the party purchasing, under such circumstances, 17 Ves. 290; see also 2 Mad. Pract. 322; Rede's Each must depend upon its own circumstances. to search for prior incumbrances, the means of Tr. pl. 215), and must set forth an actual convey- (Hine v. Dod, 2 Atk. 275; Eyre v. Dolphin, which search are within his power; and the danger ance, for a mere agreement to purchase is insuffi- 2 Ball & Beat. 301; 2 Fonbl. Eq. 303, n. b.) There so forcibly alluded to by Lord Hardwicke, of letcient (Heap v. Egerton, 3 P. Wms. 280); and is no case which goes the length of saying that the ting in parol proof of notice, or want of notice, of also aver that the purchase-money was actually paid failure of the utmost circumspection shall have the the actual existence of the conveyance. The Ame(Moor v. Mayhow, 1 Cha.Cas.34; Harrisonv. South- same effect of postponing a party as if he were rican doctrine," the same learned writer proceeds cote, 1 Atk. 538; Story v. Windsor (Lord), 2 ib. guilty of fraud or wilful neglect, or he had positive to remark, "certainly has the advantage of cer630; Hardingham v. Nicholls, 3 ib. 304; Hardwood notice (Plumb v. Fluitt, 2 Anstr. 433, 440); and tainty and universality of application; and it imv. Tooke. 2 Mad. Pract. 323)—this being absolutely though a mistake of law upon the construction of a poses upon subsequent purchasers a reasonable derequisite to support it; for if merely secured to be deed or contract will not alone discharge a pur-gree of diligence only in examining their titles to paid, it will insufficient. (Ib.) But the plea will not chaser from the legal effects of notice of such deed estates. But this doctrine," he adds, "as to the be bad merely because the sum paid was inadequate or contract, yet there may be a case of such doubt- registration of deeds being constructive notice to to the value of the purchased property. (Bassett v. ful equity under the circumstances, that it ought all subsequent purchasers, is not to be understood Nosworthy, Finch, 102; Mildmay v. Mildmay, not to be enforced against a purchaser. (Bovey v. of all deeds and conveyances which may be, de Ambl. 767, cited; Bullock v. Sadleir, ib.) The Smith, 1 Vern. 144, 149; Walker v. Smallwood, facto, registered; but of such only as by law are plea must also deny notice of the plaintiff's title Ambl. 676; Cordwill v. Mackrill, 2 Eden, 344, required to be registered, and are duly registered, previously to the completion of the purchase, 348; Parker v. Brooke, 9 Ves. 583, 588; Stor. in compliance with law. If they are not authorised. which notice must be denied in positive terms, and Eq. 322.) Nor will the mere fact of possession of or required to be registered, or the registry itself is not evasively or equivocally. (Moor v. Mahaw, the title-deeds, unless accompanied with some other not in compliance with the law, the act of regis1 Cha. Cas. 34; Cason v. Round, 1 Pre. Cha. 226, n. a; circumstances, be sufficient to affect a purchaser with tration is treated as a mere nullity; and then the Ashton v. Curzon, and Weston v. Berkeley, 3 P. notice; but if, in addition to the knowledge that no subsequent purchaser is affected only by such noWms. 244; Attorney-General v. Gower, 2 Eq. title-deeds can be produced, he has such informa- tice as would amount to a fraud." (1 Stor. Eq. Ca. Abr. 685, pl. 11; Bodmin (Lady) v. Vande- tion as would induce any one possessing ordinary 324, 325, referring to.) bendy, 1 Vern. 179; Storey v. Windsor (Lord), caution to make further inquiries, which he fails to Notice to agent, notice to principal.—It has been 2 Atk. 630; Fitzgerald v. Burk, ib. 397; Hughes do, he will be construed to have notice of those a long-established rule of equity, that notice, whev. Garner, 2 You. & Coll. 328.) At the same facts which, if he had used ordinary diligence, he ther actual or constructive, to an agent, is to be time, it will be sufficient to deny notice generally might have informed himself of. (Whitbread v. treated as notice to the principal; since it would (Ovey v. Leighton, 2 Sim. & Stu. 234), unless Young, 1 You. and Coll. 303.) be a breach of trust in the former not to communicertain facts are stated in the bill as evidence of What acts or circumstances will amount to no-cate the knowledge to the latter (2 Fonbl. Eq. 154; such notice (Bennington v. Beechy, 2 Sim. & Stu. tice.-A public Act of Parliament is said to be Com. Dig. tit. "Chancery," 4 c. 5 & 6; 1 Stor. 282; Thring v. Edgar, ib. 274); in which case public notice to the whole world, and binding upon the facts so stated must be denied as specially as all mankind; but a private Act only binds the parthey are charged. (Mader v. Birt, Gilb. Eq. Rep. ties to whom it relates. Upon the same principle 185; Radford v. Wilson, 3 Atk. 815; Foley v. that public Acts of Parliament must be supposed to Hill, 2 Myl. & Cr. 478.) be universally known, it was formerly presumed that every man must be attentive to what passes in the courts of justice of the state or sovereignty where Our next consideration will be, what will be suf- he resides; and that therefore any one purchasing ficient notice to preclude a person from all claim to property which was actually in litigation, pendente equitable protection?—a question involved in much lite, was considered to have notice of the suit, nicety, depending sometimes on matters of fact, and to be bound by the judgment or decree therein. sometimes on matter of law. It may be either (3 Prest. Abs. 355.) But now lis pendens will not positive, as where the knowledge of the fact is be binding on a purchaser who has no express notice brought directly home to the party (1 Stor. Eq. 320); thereof, unless, as we have already seen, it is duly or constructive, as where, from the knowledge of registered in pursuance of the stat. 2 & 3 Vict. c. some certain fact or circumstance, he must be pre-11, s. 7. III. Of Notice. sumed also to have a knowledge of other facts or Decrees.-Previously to the statute 1 & 2 Vict. Eq. 326; Merry v. Abney, 1Cha. Cas. 38; Brotherton v. Hatt, 2 Vern. 574; Jennings v. Moore, ib. 609; Sheldon v. Drummond, Ambl. 624; Coote v. Mammon, 2 Bro. P. C. 596; Le Neve v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 646): and this, even if the principal is an infant. (Toulmin v. Steere, 3 Mer. 222); Sheldon v. Cox, 2 Eden, 228.) It would indeed cause great inconvenience if the rule were otherwise, and notice would be avoided in every case by employing agents. Notice to the counsel or attor ney is notice to the party who employs him in the transaction. (Attorney-General v. Gower, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 685; Brotherton v. Hatt, 2 Vern. 574; Newstead v. Searles, 1 Atk. 265; Maddox v. Maddox, 1 Ves. sen. 61; Ashley v. Baillie, 2 ib. 386; Le Nevev. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 646; S. C. 1 Ves. sen. 64; Tunstall v. Trappes, 3 Sim, 301.) THE GAZETTES. AMOUNT OF DIVIDENDS DECLARED. Monday, Aug. 2. Ash ey, H. carrier, last exam. Nov. 1.-Cowell, J. boot Tuesday, Aug. 3. Brecknell, H. B. draper, outlawed.-Bromley, B. cattle Friday, Aug. 6. Addison, J. C. grocer, last exam. passed.-Day, R. J. wine merchant, assignees, Aug. 31.-Moore, J. C. bookseller, div. next week.-Morris, J. C. cabinet maker, last exam. passed.-Westripp, G. cab master, assignees, Sept. 6. Saturday, Aug. 7. Nor is it necessary that such counsel, attorney, or (To be continued.) SALE OF THE CONISHEAD PRIORY ESTATE.The Rt. Hon. Henry Labouchere, M.P. President of the Board of Trade, is the purchaser of the Conis. head Priory estate, late the property of the Braddyll family. The right hon. gentleman, it is stated, in tends making the mansion his occasional residence. Brentnall, E. bookseller, last exam. Oct. 19.-Broom, H. DIVIDENDS. Bankrupts' Estates. Official Assignees are given, to whom apply for the Ashley and Ashley, bankers, final jt. 5d. sep. J. Ashley, Insolvent's Estate. Haworth, J. engraver to calico printers, Accrington, first, ASSIGNMENTS THE following scale of charges, reduced 1s. Hobson, Manchester. more than one-third, has been adopted for Advertisements of Estates for Sale, &c. exceeding 10 lines in length: For the first 70 words 5s. 1s. Sat. Mon. Tues. 867 861 863 874 87 87 863 87 87 871 874 1d 2p par 4p id 21 21 30 1113 29 174 29 29 28 18 18 17 18 .. 56 55 56 561 561 56 To Trustees for the equal benefit of Creditors. Hughes, J. joiner, Liverpool, June 15. Trusts. J. Har- Gazette, Aug 10. Hudson, J. draper, Mansfield, July 15. Trusts. W. Foster, Horbury, near Wakefield, and H. Smyth, Nottingham. Sols. Parsons and Co. Mansfield.-Knight, S. draper, Yarmouth, July 26. Trusts. J. F. Pawson, warehouseman, St. Pul's Church-yard, and W. Rider, draper, Newport. Sols. Pittis, Newport, and Jones, Sise-lane.-Rolfe, H. tailor, Minster, Isle of Thanet, Aug. 5. Trust. V. Hoile, woollen draper, Sandwich. Sol. Wright, Margate. Bankrupts. DATE OF FIAT AND PETITIONING CREDITORS' NAMES. BAKER, JOHN, grocer, Redcliff-hill, St. Mary Redcliff, BYERS, THOMAS, licenced victualler, 7, Upper Lisson-st. Groom, off. ass.; Boulton, Northampton-sq. sol. Date of fiat, Aug. 3. H., W. and P. Gardner, brewers, St. John-st. pet. crs. DAVIS, MARY, otherwise MARY ANN DAVIS, spirit dealer, KING, JOHN, surgeon and apothecary, Helmsley, Yorkshire, PEARSON, THOMAS, cut nail manufacturer, Birmingham, SAYER, JOHN and WILLIAM, oil and colourmen, 50, Highst. Portland-town, St. Marylebone, Aug. 13, at half-past eleven, Sept. 10, at one, Basinghall-st. Com. Fane; Whitmore, off. ass.; Tucker and Co. Sun-chambers, Threadneedle-st. sols. Date of fiat, July 31. Bankrupts' own petition. WORTHY, JOHNSON, builder, Hartlepool, Durham, Aug. 16, at half-past ten. Sept. 16, at eleven, Newcastle, Com. Ellison; Baker, off. ass.; Forster, Newcastle, Turnbull, Hartlepool, and Meggison and Co. King's-road, Bedfordrow, sols. Date of fiat, July 20. J. Davison, builder, Hartlepool, pet. cr. Gazette, Aug. 10. ALLETSON, THOMAS, dry salter, Rumford-place, Liverpool, and Boughton-house, near Chester, Aug. 27 and Sept. 17, at eleven, Liverpool, Com. Perry; Morgan, off. ass.; Wilde and Co. College-hill, and Duncan and Radcliffe, Liverpool, sols. Date of fiat, July 30. R. Bell, esq. 112, Bishopsgate-st. Within, on behalf of the National ProBAKER, RICHARD, tailor and draper, Cheapside, Aug. 20, vincial Bank of England, pet. cr. at two, Oct. 1, at half-past two, Basinghall-st. Com. HILL, THOMAS, ironmonger. Liverpool, Aug. 27 and Sept. JORDAN, JOHN, WHITE, JAMES, and ALDRIDGE, JOHN OSBORN, JAMES, glass and china dealer, now a prisoner for RATCLIFF, JOHN, wine and spirit merchant, Derby, Aug. SHACKELL, EDWARD GODDARD, grocer and tea dealer, THOMSON, THOMAS, and SABIN, WILLIAM, brewers, Ro- Meetings at Basinghall-street. Gazette, Aug. 6. Dewsbury, Aug. 17, at eleven, Leeds-Rose, G. sawyer, Sedgley, Aug. 14, at twelve, Birmingham. - Russett, J. victualler, Bristol, Aug. 26, at half-past eleven, Bristol.Smith, C. labourer, Thornhill, Aug. 17, at eleven, Leeds.Taylor, J. and J. out of business, Darfield, Aug. 17, at eleven, Leeds.-Tuxford, P. I. printer, Great Grimsby, Aug. 18, at half-past ten, Hull.-Usherwood, J. clerk, Lei From the Gazette of Friday, August 13. Bankrupts. paid by R. Hall.-Jones, W. I. and Kempson, H. C. tablecover manufacturers, Birmingham, Aug. 3. Debts paid by Jones.-Kidney, T. Brown, J. and Bryson, W. drapers and tea dealers, East Stonehouse, so far as regards Bryson, Aug. 2. Debts paid by the remaining partners.-M Clure, J. and Stroyan, W. general Manchester Warehousemen, Manchester, Aug. 3. Debts paid by M'Clure.-Martin, R. and Steventon, T. tallow chandlers, Nantwich, July 12.-cester, Aug. 20, at eleven, Nottingham. Muller, J. and Fisher, B. coachmakers, Whitechapel-road, July 24, 1843.-Moss, E. and S. plate glass factors, Liverpool, July 1.-Padley, G. and Wakefield, F. jun. ironfounders, Mansfield, May 25. Debts paid by Wakefield.Painton, W. and Emberlin, A. bakers, Leicester, July 29. -Pemberton, J. and Bennion, W. plumbers, Manchester, Aug. 2. Debts paid by Pemberton.-Sands, T. Turner, C. Stirling, W. and Church, J. merchants and commission agents, Liverpool and Hong Kong, April 14.-Simpson, Z. and T, drapers, Farringdon-st. Aug. 6. Debts paid by T. Simpson.-Steel, T. and Appleby, R. builders, Gateshead, July 31.-Stitt, J., S., T. H. and J. J. iron merchants, Liverpool, July 31.-Debts paid by S., T. H. and J. J. Stitt, who continue the business.- Wakefield, F. sen. and Padley, G. ironfounders, Mansfield, July 27.-Walker, J. and Wright, J. wholesale grocers, Liverpool, Aug. 2-Ware, J. and Dodson, C. coachmakers, Fulham, Aug. 2.-Webster, T. and Witty, R. wine merchants, Hull, Aug. 2. Debts paid by Webster.-Whiteley, J. and Sutcliffe, E. paper manufacturers, Halifax, July 1. Debts paid by Whiteley.Lett, T. builder, Apsley Guise, Sept. 1, at eleven, aud.- Wood, H. and J. woollen cord manufacturers, Huddersfield, Aug. 3. Blashfield, J. M. cement manufacturer and builder, Albion-wharf, Blackfriars, Aug. 27, at eleven, aud. and Aug. 28, at eleven, div.-Collyer, A. cowkeeper, Stoke Hammond, Aug. 30, at half-past eleven, aud.-Fugler, W. Manchester warehouseman, 10, Lawrence-lane, Cheapside, Aug. 27, at eleven, div.-Hall, C. grocer, Uxbridge, Aug. 28, at eleven, aud.-Palmer, E. agricultural agent, Great Surrey-st. Aug. 27, at half-past eleven, aud.-Prentice, G. fishmonger, Tollesbury, Essex, Sept. 1, at eleven, final div. MEETINGS FOR ALLOWANCE OF CERTIFICATES. Gazette, Aug. 10. Pearl, J. W. horse dealer, Milton-st. Dorset-sq. Sept. 1, at half-past eleven, aud.-Rollings, J. stay manufacturer, Landport, Aug. 28, at half-past twelve (adj. July 28), last exam.— Wade, R. tailor, Cheapside, Sept. 1, at twelve, aud. MEETINGS FOR ALLOWANCE OF CERTIFICATES. Dunlop, A. land agent, Lower Belgrave-pl. Aug. 31, at twelve.-Pearl, J. W. horse dealer, Milton-st. Dorset-sq. Sept. 1, at one.-Sandrinelli, G. Q. merchant, Bishop's-pl. Brompton, Sept. 1, at twelve-Wade, R. tailor, Cheapside, Sept. 1, at half-past twelve. final div. Meetings in the Country. Gazette, Aug. 6. Burns, G. C. upholsterer, Devizes, Aug. 30, at eleven, Bristol, aud.-Davies, T. merchant and commission agent, Liverpool, Aug. 27, at eleven, Liverpool, aud. and Aug. 30, at eleven, sec. div.-Green, W. coachmaker, Cheltenham, Aug. 30, at twelve, Bristol, aud.-Osborne, B. table knife manufacturer, Sheffield, Aug. 27, at ten, Sheffield, first and MEETINGS FOR ALLOWANCE OF CERTIFICATES. Cox, R. mason, Chalford, Aug. 31, at eleven, Bristol. Jagger, T. victualler, Birkenhead, Aug. 27, at eleven, Liverpool.-Kay and Co. brassfounders, Bury, Aug. 31, at twelve, Manchester.-Shepherd and Shepherd, wine merchants, Exeter, Sept. 2, at one, Exeter.-Twigg, C. button maker, Birmingham, Aug. 31, at twelve, Birmingham. Gazette, Aug. 10. Insolvents Petitioning the Courts of Bankruptcy. PETITIONS TO BE HEARD AT BASINGHALL- Ashton, J. White Hart-st. Kennington, Aug. 12, at Carroll, A. jun. newspaper proprietor, 334, Strand.-TayHoxton Old Town.-Bartlett, A. fly proprietor, Millbrook, lor, S. plumber, Tonbridge-wells, Kent.-Brooks, T. baker, Southampton.-Marks, T. carpenter, Westbury-upon-Trym, Bristol.-Home, T.W. hotel keeper, Pelham-terrace, Bromp ton.-Jolley, W. poulterer, Charing-cross. Pearse, W. Liverpool.-Bewlay, C. R. grocer, Leamington-priors, War. surgeon, St. Tuyde, Cornwall.-Johnston, J. flour dealer, wickshire. Whittaker, T. warehouseman, Manchester. — Turner, A. grocer, Huddersfield. ADVERTISEMENTS. LAW TIMES EDITION OF IMPORTANT STATUTES. In the press, THE 9th and 10th of Victoria, comprising:- 1. The Companies Clauses Consolidation Act. 2. The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act. 3. The Railway Companies Clauses Consolidation Act. 4. The Markets and Fairs Clauses Consolidation Act. 5. The Gas-works Companies Clauses Consolidation Act. 6. The Public Commissioners Clauses Consolidation Act. 7. The Water-works Clauses Consolidation Act. 8. The Harbours, Docks, and Piers, Clauses Consolidation 9. The Towns Improvement Clauses Consolidation Act. With Introduction, Notes, the Cases already decided upon By EDWARD W. COX, Esq. Barrister-at-Law, and forming a distinct branch of the law, of universal inThis important series of Statutes being now completed, terest, which every member of the Profession will continually require to use in a collected form, and with facilities for reference, a portable edition of them will not, it is supposed, be unacceptable. As the Acts are long, and in immediate request, the work will be published in Parts, as fast as it can be issued from the press, so that the Practitioner will not need to wait until the whole is completed. Price of each Part, 2s. 6d.; of the entire Volume, 10s. 6d. LAW TIMES Office, 29, Essex-street. Beale, J. grocer, Cadoxton, Sept. 2, at eleven, Bristol, aud.-Carpendale, W. jeweller, Hull, Sept. 1, at half-past ten, Hull, aud.-Chalicombe, H. sailmaker, Swansea, Sept. 2, at half-past eleven, Bristol, aud.-Cox, H. B. victualler, Coventry, Aug. 31, at twelve, Birmingham, aud.-Marsh, R. PETITIONS TO BE HEARD IN THE COUNTRY. provision dealer and victualler, Upholland, Lancashire, Aug. Arr, D. beer retailer, Abercorn, Aug. 12, at half-past ele31, at twelve, Liverpool, aud. and Sept. 3, at twelve, div.ven, Bristol.-Butterworth, J. painter, Royton-road, OldMorgan, W. draper and grocer, Treforest, Sept. 3, at half-ham, Aug. 13, at twelve, Manchester.-Deacon, E. out of past eleven, Bristol, aud.-Norman, M. jun. cabinet maker, business, Birmingham, Aug. 7, at eleven, Birmingham.upholsterer, and building contractor, Richmond, Yorkshire, Furries, T. out of employ, Preston, Aug. 11, at half-past Aug. 31, at eleven, Leeds, aud. and Sept. 9, at eleven, second eleven, Liverpool.-Giles, R. butcher, Liverpool, Aug. 11, div. Potter, J. portable weighing machine and scale-beam at eleven, Liverpool.-Hutchinson, T. chair maker, Newmaker, Manchester, Sept. 1, at twelve, Manchester, aud. castle, Aug 26, at half-past ten, Newcastle.-Lees, A. shop- The Profession has secured to itself the profits of Inand Sept. 2, at twelve, div.-Woodhead, J. and J. worsted keeper, Oldham, Aug. 17, at twelve, Manchester.-Marge-surance by the establishment of Legal Offices, which have stuff manufacturers, Bradford, Yorkshire, Aug. 31, at eleven, rum, R. H. brewer, Monckton Combe, Aug. 12, at eleven, been attended with eminent success. Leeds, aud. and Sept. 9, at eleven, third div. Bristol. Matthews, F. carpenter, Highworth, Aug. 10, at MEETINGS FOR ALLOWANCE OF CERTIFICATES. twelve, Bristol.-Palmer, E. toy merchant, Bath, Aug. 23, at Atkinson, W. F. woolstapler, Wakefield, Sept. 2, at eleven, Bristol.-Pickford, J. pork butcher, Hyde, Aug. 17, at eleven, Leeds.-Cole, H. builder, Birkenhead, Sept. 3, at twelve, Manchester.-Priest, E. C. master painter, Nether eleven, Liverpool. Stowey, Aug. 18, at eleven, Exeter.-Thomas, J. grocer, Bebbington, Aug. 11, at eleven, Liverpool.-Truscott, C. clerk, Redditch, Aug. 7, at eleven, Birmingham. Partnerships Dissolbed. Gazette, Aug. 3. erests. But it is remarkable that, while boasting of many Life Assurance Offices, and one Fire Office, the Legal Profession has not yet sought to avail itself of the still larger source of profit arising from the purchase of Reversions and Policies of Assurance. Arrangements are made for immediately supplying this deficiency, by the establishment of a LAW REVERSIONARY INTEREST SOCIETY. The LAW REVERSIONARY INTEREST SOCIETY proposes to adopt all the improvements in the conduct of its business which the experience of late years has suggested. secured as Consulting Actuary. It offers peculiar advantages to all parties. First. To the Shareholder, it proposes that the calls sha not exceed 17. per share at one time, and at intervals of no less than four months; that interest, after the rate of 41. pe profits shall be divided from time to time in the form of cent. per annum, be paid upon the capital advanced from the time of payment; and that, in addition to this, the Ball, J. and J. E. boot makers, High-st. Kensington, June 24. Debts paid by J. E. Ball.-Barker, T. and J. grocers, Bury and Heywood, July 19.-Barnes, A. H. and Dobbs, C. E. point lace manufacturers, Regent-st. June 24.-Brown, T. and Creak, W. A. ironmongers, Burnham Westgate, July 23.-Charters, T. and J. and Bromley, H. brewers, Corkickle, July 31.-Coates, E. and W. drapers, Liverpool, Aug. 2. Debts paid by E. Coates.-Courage, J. and Donaldson, T. and R. brewers, Shad Thames, July 29.-Crosby, B. and Hillyard, W. S. stock brokers, York, July 1.-Dawborn, E. and W. grocers, Edgeware, July 31. Debts paid by W. road, Aug. 13, at three.-Berridge, T. lace dealer, Luton, bonuses. Reversionary Interests differ from all other inDawborn-Farmer, C. and Matts, J. ironmongers, Edgeware-rd. July 31. Debts paid by Matts.-Halibarton, A. F. and Bevan, R. copperas manufacturers, Aspull, June 1. Debts paid by Bevan.-Hall, G. Hills, T. and Fulton, R. ship builders, Newcastle, so far as regards Hall, July 31, Debts paid by the remaining partners.- Jerdein, J. and Blackburn, T. jun. Liverpool, July 28. Debts paid by Jerdein.-Jessop, J. and Knight, J. gunsmiths, Bradford, July 29: Debts paid by Jessop. Pratt, R. and Frankland, G. shipbrokers, Newcastle, June 15.-Rosling, S. and Watson, E. T. corn merchants, Upper Ground-st. July 28. Debts paid by Watson.-Smith, J. and Thompson, J.C. warehousemen, Friday-st. July 30.-Tunstall, W. C. and Hunt, J. comb manufacturers, Upper Easton, July 27. Debts paid by Tunstall. Gazette, Aug 6. Bache, G. and Brooks, J. glass manufacturers, Mexborough, July 27-Bell, C. and Beverley, M. B. stock brokers, Leeds, Aug. 24.-Billings, F. and Harcourt, J. and H. publicans, Gravesend, Aug. 4.-Borrenstein, D. A. and Banks, J. stereotypers, Fetter-lane, Aug, 2. Debts paid by Banks. -Callis, J. and Waddington, P. boat builders, Rotherham, July 29. Debts paid by Callis.-Clothier, W. sen. and jun. pawnbrokers, Borough-road, July 31.-Crickett, J. sen. and jun. drapers, Cable-st. Wellclose-sq. June 21.-Dixon, J., J. B., G. J. and S. H. wholesale jewellers, Hatton-garden, so far as regards S. H. Dixon, Feb. 1. Debts paid by the remaining partners.-Gardner, E. and Farrant, T. jun. manufacturing stationers, Wellington-st. North, Aug. 3.Hall, R. and J. engineers, Middlesborough, Aug. 3. Debts one.-Austen, W. shipwright, Portsea, Aug. 19, at half-past PETITIONS TO BE HEARD IN THE COUNTRY. Coates, S. solicitor, Liverpool, Aug. 18, at half-past eleven, Liverpool. - Dickenson, W. lodging-house keeper, Hull, Driffield, Aug. 18, at half-past ten, Hull.-Elliott, J. frameAug. 18, at half-past ten, Hull.-Easingwood, J. porter, work knitter, Humberstone, Aug. 20, at eleven, Nottingham.-Gay, E. out of business, Chalford, Aug. 20, at twelve, Bristol.-Gibbon, J. clerk, Pendleton, Aug. 25, at twelve, Manchester.-Hall, J. brick maker, Whitwick, Aug. 20, at eleven, Nottingham.-Hancock, J. hair dresser, Liverpool, Aug. 18, at eleven, Liverpool.-Humphreys, W. shopman to pool.-Jackues, B. hosier, Nottingham, Aug. 20, at eleven, a provision dealer, Toxteth-park, Aug. 18, at eleven, LiverNottingham.-M'Donough, J. grocer, Liverpool, Aug. 11, at eleven, Liverpool.-M Phail, A. tailor, Huncoat, Aug. 17, at twelve, Manchester.-Mason, J. gardener, Leverton, Aug. 20, at eleven, Nottingham.-Mason, T. innkeeper, Richmond, Aug. 17, at eleven, Hull.-Nowell, J. carpet weaver, Second. To the Profession it is proposed to offer the advantages of a fair commission on all business they bring to the office. Third. To the public it will offer the advantages of fair prices for Reversionary Interests and Policies, with an option of converting Reversionary Interests into present Income, so facilitate family arrangements. as to make provision for immediate wants, or otherwise to lion; but as it can be converted only by degrees, as ReverIt is proposed that the ultimate capital shall be One Milsions, &c. offer, the business will commence as soon as a sufficient fund is subscribed to make purchases. The Directors will be chosen from among the Shareholders, paid. and the Trustees by the Directors before the first call is to the Promoters of the Law Reversionary Interest Society, Applications for Shares in the usual form, to be addressed at the LAW TIMES Office, 29, Essex-street, Strand, London. HERBERT COX, Sec. 29, Essex-street, Strand, London, Jan. 1847. |