The two elaborate opinions of Mr. LLOYD and Mr. PULLING, quoted in the Bankers' Magazine, which the dispute has given rise to, we have not at present room to give verbatim, and it would hardly be fair to insert a mere extract from either of them.

It appears that, as a preliminary step, before the question in dispute (which involves the right, on the brokers' part, to a charge amounting to many thousands in the course of the year) underwent a regular judicial investigation, a petition was presented to the Court of Aldermen, complaining of certain parties named, as having infringed the civic regulations. The petition, we are told, "was heard by the Court of Aldermen on three different occasions, the complainants' case being on the first occasion supported by Mr. Thomas Baker and Mr. Wire, solicitors, and on the two subsequent occasions by Mr. Bovill and Mr. Pulling, barristers; the brokers being represented by their counsel Mr. Greenwood. The power of the civic authorities over brokers, the operation of the existing regulations, the relation between the selling broker at a public sale and the bidder or purchaser, and the policy and expediency of the civic authorities interfering in the matter, were all very fully and elaborately discussed, and a great many legal cases and authorities were cited. At length, in June last, the Court of Aldermen delivered their final determination that, "under all the circumstances, it was inexpedient to proceed further in the matter!"

tion in the sale of their stock, for Whitfield v.
Brand, 16 L. J. 103, Ex. ; Law T. 347, decides
that it is so notorious that a bookseller receives books
to sell on commission, that books so received by him
on those terms, and found in his possession at the
time of his bankruptcy, do not pass to his assignees
under the reputed ownership clause.

In Alcock v. Sutcliffe, 16 L. J. 129, Q. B.; 8 Law T. 395; 2 New Prac. Cas. 37, it appeared that the execution was levied on the 1st of December; that a fiat of bankruptcy issued on the 8th, and that the official assignee was appointed on the 11th, and no step was taken till the affidavits were made on the 8th of January following. This, Mr. Justice Erle held, was clearly too late. (See further, Amadio v. Showell, 2 New Pract. Cas. 28; 8 Law T. 369.)

because sixteen months afterwards the bankrupt fulfilled his promise, and gave security for the debt, the assignees, under a subsequent fiat, sought to enforce the penal provisions of the Act in question. It is difficult to see any grounds of justice by which such a claim could be supported, and it is satisfactory, therefore, to find that the attempt failed. Ship Registry Act.-A very important question Time for assignees to apply to set aside prowas decided in Boyson v. Gibson, 16 L. J. 147, ceedings.-It may be taken as a general rule, that C. P. as to the construction of the Ship Registry assignees are in no better position than the bankAct. (3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 55.) The 31st section rupt whom they represent, and ought to apply of that statute provides that the sale of a registered within the same period as he must have done to set ship shall be by an instrument in writing, contain- aside any proceedings for irregularity. It would ing a recital of the certificate of registry, "other-perhaps be going too far to say that in a delay wise such transfer shall not be valid or effectual could in no case be explained; but the Courts are for any purpose whatever, either in law or equity. becoming more strict in these matters. Sec. 34 provides that no instrument shall be valid to pass the property in a ship, or for any other purpose, until it shall have been registered by the proper officers. Sec. 35 enacts that when and so soon as the instrument has been registered, it shall be valid and effectual to pass the property thereby intended to be transferred as against all and every persons whatsoever, and to all intents and purposes, except as against such subsequent purchasers and mortgagees who shall first procure an indorsement on the certificate of registry in the manner thereinafter-mentioned. In this case the plaintiffs claimed as mortgagees under a bill of sale executed before, but not registered till after, the bankruptcy, the assignees contending that no property passed, and that the ship was the bankrupt's property at the We quite agree with the Bankers' Magazine, time of the bankruptcy, or at least in his reputed that the Court of Aldermen, "being expressly em-possession. The judgment is an elaborate review powered by ancient custom and by statute to regulate of the statutes and cases as to the registry of ships, and control brokers within the City, and having so but we need only give the concluding sentences, recently as 1817 made a regulation apparently which contain the point decided. They are as applicable to the very point at present in dispute, it follows:looks like an admission of inefficiency to refuse to adjudicate on the question submitted to them, and to dismiss so important a matter without alleging any reasons which may serve to guide the commercial world in calling in aid their authority in future."

Procuring goods to be taken in execution.-It is curious that there is no earlier judicial interpretation of the 3rd section of the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, as to the period at which a procurement of goods to be taken in execution becomes

an

act of bankruptcy. In the principal case, however, it has been now settled that procuring goods to be taken in execution, has no effect as an act of bankruptcy until the goods be taken; or, to put the same proposition in another form, there is no relation back from the time of the taking to the time when the acts or any of them were done by the bankrupt, by which the execution was obtained. The good sense of this decision is clear; for to determine which of a series of acts was the commencement of the proceedings ending in execution, would be a difficult and ever-varying subject of inquiry; whereas, the rule now established is incapable of being misunderstood. The act of the bankruptcy dates from the seizure. It is, as observed by Lord Denman, also in accordance with the true principle which now governs all questions of relation, as laid down in Higgins v. M'Adam, 3 You. & J. 1, in the Court of Exchequer; viz. "The relation back to any antecedent period, to make an act of bankruptcy, is a case strictissimi juris, and ought not to prevail, except where the words of the statute upon which that construction is to be framed,

are clear and without doubt.

Reputed ownership-Booksellers' stock.-The assignees of booksellers should observe great cau

"The whole effect of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 35, as to the registration, seems to be, that it is the registration and not the execution of the bill of sale from which its operation for any purpose commences; that on registration it operates on an interest which the party making the transfer has at that time, but that all rights which have accrued before registration are no more affected by it than they would have been if the deed had been executed as well as registered afterwards."

The Court accordingly held that no property had passed by the unregistered bill of sale, and consequently that the assignees were entitled to the ship. This, therefore, is a well-considered judgment, and, in every transaction relative to the sale or mortgage of interests in ships, the attorney for the purchaser must at once see that it is duly registered. He would unquestionably be held liable for the consequences of an omission.

mean

Construction of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 112-Certificate void for gaming, &c.-In our Review of Michaelmas Term, (see 8 Law T. 282), we noticed the former decision in the case of Wearing v. Smith, that the Court has no original jurisdiction to entertain an application by a bankrupt for discharge on production of his certificate, the statute having given it expressly to "a judge." The construction of the statute was not then decided; but another application was made to Mr. Justice Erle, at chambers, which he dismissed with costs. The full Court of Queen's Bench was then moved to rescind this order, it being contended that the judge was bound to have discharged the bankrupt, and therefore had no jurisdiction to dismiss the summons with costs. The Court decided that the words in the 42nd section, "producing a certificate," a certificate not void from any of the causes specified in section 38; and that whether it be void or not, must be tried and decided judicially by the judge or Court before whom such certificate is produced. The statute giving no appeal, the Court could not review the decision of the judge. At first, this may appear to conflict with the principle laid down in Graham v. Sandrinelli, 16 L. J. 67, Ex. that the Court, by virtue of its general jurisdiction, may review an order of a single judge; but the distinction is, that the general jurisdiction may apply wherever the judge is acting under his general powers as a judge of one of the courts, and deciding upon any point of practice or proceeding in the Filing cognovits.-Bushell v. Boord, 8 Law T. course of an action. But here the jurisdiction is 320; 16 L. J. 57, Q. B.; 1 New Pract. Cas. 16, given by a specific statute, and over a subjectis too important a case to be passed over, although matter not appertaining to a common law court at it was decided in Michaelmas Term, but not re- law, but arising out of a separate jurisdiction altoported for some little time. An attentive consider-gether, viz. the Court of Bankruptcy. We think ation of Green v. Wood, 7 Q. B. 178, which decided this observation will dispose of the apparent disthat warrants of attorney need not be filed within crepancy. twenty-one days, provided judgment be signed within that time, to take them out of the operation of the invalidating effect of 3 Geo. 4, c. 39, must, we think, have left little doubt upon the mind of any one that the same construction would be adopted as to cognovits. The doubt arose as to how far the Court would incorporate the second section of the Act with the third, without any express words of reference being used. The third section, after requiring the filing of cognovits, adds, as a penalty, that otherwise they shall be void "in like manner "" as warrants of attorney. These Patteson, J. said were sufficient words of reference to incorporate the second section, the evil in each case being the same, and the intention of the Legislature being plainly to put warrants and cognovits upon the same footing.

Committal of bankrupt for answering unsatisfactorily.-Decisions upon the mode in which the discretionary power of commitment should be exercised by Commissioners of Bankruptcy are now of great importance, since by the 99th section of the County Courts Act, a similar power is given to the judges of those Courts. Re Lord, 16 L. J. 118, Ex.; 8 Law T. 348; 2 New Pract. Cas. 217, will therefore be a leading case upon the subject. The Court of Exchequer decided just as Mr. Justice Erle had previously done, that a judge may be justified in committing a person for answering unsatisfactorily, although the answers are clear and coherent, if the story told by him is in his opinion false, or so suspicious as to be "unsatisfactory." The committal is also good, if the answers taken as a whole are unsatisfactory, although some particuCompounding fiat.-In the same case it was de-lar questions may be answered altogether to his "which cided that the penal provisions of 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, satisfaction, and the warrant may allege s. 8, by which a petitioning creditor compounding answers are not, nor are any of them, satisfactory." the fiat, not only forfeits his debt, but is liable to In Martin's case, 16 L. J. 186, Q. B.; 9 L. T. refund the money received by way of composition 107, it was decided by Mr. Justice Erle, that to such person as the commissioner shall appoint, affidavits may be received on behalf of the bankrupt, do not apply where the effect of the arrange- to shew facts not appearing on the face of the rement is in no way to diminish the assets of the turn. This case has caused a difference of opinion bankrupt applicable to the debts at the time. The upon another point, the Court of Review having fact was, that by the petitioning creditor withdraw. held the commitment bad, after Mr. Justice Erle ing the fiat, upon a promise that the bankrupt had held that it was good. (See 9 Law T. 230.) would at a future time pay the whole debt, the creditors received more than they would have done under the fiat, and released their debts. Then,

The bankrupt, on being examined before a single commissioner, was committed to the custody of the messenger to be brought before a Subdivision Court.

former warrant.

The fiat was allotted to Commissioner Shepherd. of the rule that each partner is the general agent for qualified persons, and applies the same principle to The bankrupt was brought before the Subdivision all, where the firm has been held out as the parties votes upon matters wholly foreign to the defined Court, but another commissioner sat for Commis- to whom credit is given. "J. B. and Co." was and particular object of a public meeting. That sioner Shepherd, who was unwell. The Sub- not the firm, and therefore the lender of the principle is, that where an elector before voting division Court not being satisfied with the bank- money had no right to fix C. H. a partner receives due notice that a particular candidate is rupt's answers, committed him to Newgate; he was who had only authorised liabilities to be incur- disqualified, yet will do nothing but tender his vote subsequently brought up before Commissioner red in the name of "J. B." In the case first for him, he must be taken voluntarily to abstain Shepherd, and made a statement in reference to his mentioned the liability depended upon an express from exercising his franchise; and therefore, howanswers before the Subdivision Court. But the authority, pro hac vice. Norton v. Seymour ever strongly he may, in fact, dissent, and in howCommissioner remanded him to Newgate on the hardly weakens Kirk v. Blurton, for the mere addi- ever strong terms he may express his dissent, he Mr. Justice Erle held that the tion of the Christian names would never have satis- must be taken to assent to the election of the commitment was a continuing commitment until fied a jury that there was any difference between opposing and qualified candidate, for he will not the bankrupt should remove the dissatisfaction the actual signature and that used by the firm. Mr, take the only course by which it can be resistedcaused by his examination, and that as this was not Justice Maule's observation, indeed, goes farther, that is, the helping the election of some other per. If the disqualification depends upon a fact done when he was before Mr. Shepherd there was and, in some degree, impeaches that authority. son. no occasion to state what then took place. Upon He said, "With respect to the signature of the which may be unknown to the elector, he is entitled a habeas subsequently granted by the Vice-Chan-note, this was a note signed by one partner of a to notice, and his assent will not be implied in cellor Bruce as Chief Judge of the Court of Re- firm with the true names of himself and the other absence of such notice; but if the disqualification view, it was held that there ought to have been a partner. I should hesitate to decide in the nega- be of the sort whereof notice is to be presumed, record of that examination, and that as it was not tive, with respect to this being binding upon both none need expressly be given. done, the bankrupt was entitled to his discharge. partners, even if there were no evidence of one hav- Jurisdiction of justices under 53 Geo. 3, c. 127. ing authority to sign in the names of both. Sup--Connected with the preceding case, Dale v. Pol. pose A. and B. trade under the name of B. and Co. lard, 9 Law T. 100; 2 New Mag. Cas. 169, should I should be sorry to say one partner could not bind be noticed, as pointing out what is required to oust the other by signing the true names of the partners justices of their jurisdiction of enforcing churchrates under 201. by virtue of the 53 Geo. 3, c. 127. as well as the fictitious name of the firm.” Notice of dishonour.-The gist of the decision The party summoned must shew a bona fide intenin Carter v. Flower, 9 Law T. 128; 16 L. J. tion of contesting the validity of the church-rate, 199, Ex. is, that the cases in which exceptions to but, it may be, of contesting it either in the Comthe rule requiring notice of dishonour to be given mon Law Court or in the Ecclesiastical Courts. A have been allowed, are not to be extended; and that written notice, therefore, stating his intention not it would be very dangerous in any case not within to contest it in the Ecclesiastical Court, but to the very letter of those cases, for the holder to omit commence actions in the courts of Common Law, giving such notice even as against the drawer, and as he should be advised, against all persons concerned in the rate, and for all proceedings as he still more so as against an indorser. should be advised were illegal, was a sufficient notice to oust the justices of their jurisdiction.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.

Promissory notes made payable to maker's own order. The decision in Flight v. Maclean, 16 L. J. 23, Ex. caused great consternation among the moneylenders, by whom the form of note there held to be incapable of negotiation had been frequently taken as security. It was, however, a decision by no means acquiesced in by the Profession, and from the report of it, the argument in favour of the negotiability of the notes seemed strangely meagre. This, however, was satisfactorily explained when Wood v. Mytton came on to be argued, in the Queen's Bench; for it was stated that the learned counsel for the plaintiff in the former case had no object in contesting the inclination of the Court as to the first count, because he obtained judgment upon the second. This also may, in some degree, account for the rapid way in which the important question was disposed of by the learned Barons, when perhaps a little time taken to consider and examine the statute, might have prevented that clashing of authority which has now taken place between themselves and the Judges of the Queen's Bench. In Wood v. Mytton, 9 Law T. 266, the latter Court, upon a minute examination of the words of the statute itself, held that such note was negotiable, and that the indorsee could sue the maker under the words of the fourth clause, viz. that any person to whom such note, that is, "note payable to any person or persons, or his, her, or their order, is indorsed," may sue the maker. This view was not presented to the Court of Exchequer, for the reason we have mentioned; and it is, therefore, the more to be regretted that their Lordships did not take time to consider a question of so much importance. Flight v. Maclean produced numberless demurrers and settlements of actions, and it will be little consolation hereafter for the plaintiffs to hear that, if the Court had weighed the subject more, they would have come to a different conclusion. We presume this question will come before a court of error, but we believe the general opinion is in favour of the decision in Wood v. Mytton.

a

be treated as dishonoured." In Jenkins v. Morris,

CLERGY.

Sufficiency of notice.-It is now settled law that notice of dishonour must be such an intimation as will leave no reasonable doubt,-first, that the bill has been presented; secondly, that it was dishonoured; and, thirdly, that the party addressed is v. Bluck, 8 Law T. 535, would have been passed over Statutory liberty as to non-residence.—Sharpe looked to for payment. (Burgh v. Legge, 5 M. & by us, but that it is so glaring an instance of blunW. 418; Lewis v. Gompertz, 6 M. & W. 399; dering that we mention it, in the hope that it may Furze v. Hearwood, 2 Q. B. 388.) East v. rouse some one to procure the amendment of Smith, 9 Law T. 130; is only an application the statute which, passed to prevent the non-resi of this rule, in which a notice under the fol- dence of the clergy, actually allows them, by a little lowing circumstances was held insufficient :-The ingenuity, to remain away from their cures nearly action was by the indorsee against the drawer of a six months. The 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106, s. 32, appabill of exchange made on the 22nd of September, 1846, rently renders an incumbent liable for non-resi payable a month after date, which became due, dence for any period exceeding three months in the therefore, on Saturday, the 24th day of October, course of the year, but some wiseacre or crafty and which was indorsed by the drawer to one Day, friend of absenteeism, inserted section 120, which and by him to the present plaintiff (East). The enacts that "the year" throughout the Act shall defendant pleaded no notice of dishonour. From "be deemed to commence on the 1st day of the evidence it appeared that, on the bill becoming January, and to be reckoned therefrom to the 31st due on the Saturday, East (the holder) called upon of December." The Court accordingly had to Monday. On the same day he called on Day, and and they held that the three months must be in a the acceptor, who told him he would pay it on decide what effect was to be given to this clause, saw his foreman, Pritchard, and told him that the year between January 1st, and December 31st. bill was not taken up; and afterwards, on the same Consequently two months and twenty-nine days at day, Smith, the drawer, called at Day's house, the end of one year, and the same time at the bewhere he saw Pritchard, and was told by him that ginning of the next, would not be three months Can this be allowed to remain unthe bill was not taken up. The defect in this evi- within the Act. We think not. dence was, that it was not shewn that Pritchard had altered? any authority to give the notice of dishonour.

CHURCH-RATE.

of

COSTS.

Where judgment arrested-Rule as to costs of the cause.-James v. Brook, 16 L. J. 168, Q. B. is the first decision upon the mode of taxation where the defendant succeeds in several issues, and judgment is arrested upon those found for the plain

Acceptance by one of several joint contractors. like 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122 (which authorises the plea Plea of non assumpsit.-The effect of a statute In Byles on Bills, 118, 3rd edit. it is said, that "if of the general issue where the defence is under the a bill be drawn on several persons not in partner-statute), is to do away with the prohibition conship, it should be accepted by all, and if not, it may tained in the New Rules against the plea of non as 9 Law T. 150, this was commented upon, and sumpsit in actions upon negotiable instruments. tiff. It was an action of slander. The declaration decided not to be correct where the drawers, (Weeks v. Argent, 9 Law T. 129.) consisted of three counts, to which not guilty was though not in partnership, have mutual authority pleaded, and also pleas of justification. The deto accept, and that in such case an acceptance by Judgment in the very important case fendant had a verdict upon the general issue as to one in his own name would bind the others. Gosling v. Veley was given at the sittings after the second and third, and the plaintiff as to the Kirk v. Blurton, 9 M. & W. 284, was cited as an Hilary Term. (8 Law T. 555; 7 Q. B. 406 first and upon the special pleas. Subsequently the authority against the validity of such acceptance; 2 New Mag. Cas. 113.) The nature of the judgment on the first count was arrested, and upon and also in the case of Norton v. Seymour, 8 Law subject precludes a lengthened notice of it taxation the Master gave the defendant the general T. 339; 16 L. J. 100, C. P. where it was con- in the present Review, and we must content costs of the cause. We have often pointed out tended that a note made by Thomas Seymour in ourselves with the statement that the Court of that the only mode of ascertaining the right to costs the names of Thomas Seymour and Sarah Ayres, Queen's Bench have given their unanimous opinion in a particular case, is to look at the statutes, as it did not bind his partner Sarah Ayres, because the that where the parishioners are assembled, in obe- is only by statute that any costs at all are recoverable. evidence was that the business was carried on in dience to a monition, for the sole purpose of The judgment in the present case so concisely illusthe names of "Seymour and Ayres." The Court, making a rate for the repairs of the church, trates this principle, and by its application shews however, held that this was binding upon the firm. and the fact of the repairs being needed, and that the defendant in such case is only entitled to In Kirk v. Blurton, a firm consisting of J. B. and C. the amount necessary is admitted, it is not the costs of the particular issues, that we give it in H. the partnership name being J. B. only, were competent for the numerical majority to pre-extenso :held not to be bound by a bill accepted by C. H. vent a rate being made by moving and carrying in the name of J. B. and Co. The distinction be- an amendment against the propriety of church- Before the statute of 23 Hen. 8, the defendant was tween this and the first-mentioned case is, that the rates in general, but that, as under the circum- not entitled to any costs. By that statute, and the liability of J. B. could only rest upon the implied stances, it is conclusively the duty of the parish- 4 Jac. 1, c. 3, the defendant was entitled to costs in authority given to his partner to obtain money on ioners assembled to make the rate, the minority against him. Those statutes gave the defendant no case the plaintiff was nonsuited, or a verdict found the credit of the firm as it was known and recog- may make a valid rate in spite of the majority. The right to costs where the verdict was in part for the nised; and that in cases of negotiable instruments, judgment also fully confirms the principles laid down plaintiff. By the 8 & 9 Wm. 3, c. 11, s. 2, the dethe necessities of trade only require the application in former cases as to the effect of votes given for dis- fendant became entitled to costs if he obtained judg

ment on demurrer, but that has no application here: | W. 734, n. where, however, the important word
therefore, until the rules of Hil. Term, 2 Wm. 4, and
"not "' is omitted.)

cidental, although necessarily incidental, to their continuing there, because essential to their existHil. Term, 4 Wm. 4, the defendant in such a case as Security for costs ordered to be given by de- ence. This is consistent with former decisions, this was not entitled to any costs. Those rules, as it fendant.-Williams v. Crossling, 16 L. J. 112; (the Court of Exchequer Chamber having affirmed appears to me, give him only the costs of the issues found for him. By the rule Hil. Term, 2 Wm. 4, r. 1, 2 New Pract. Cas. 112; 8 Law T. 390, offers an the judgment of the court below in Muspratt s. 74, the plaintiff's costs upon issues on which he exception, but only an apparent exception, to the v. Gregory, 1 M. & W. 633; 3 M. & W. 677, has not succeeded are taken away, and the costs of rule that defendants will not be ordered to find where Mr. Baron Parke, in an elaborate judgment, the issues found for the defendant are directed to be security for costs. We say apparent, for, in fact, differed from the rest of the Court,) and a condeducted from the plaintiff's costs. Under this rule, the defendant was as much a plaintiff as defendant. trary judgment would have very much extended the plaintiff cannot claim the costs of the cause. He was resident in Scotland, and had obtained a the number of exceptions. That such would be The rule Hil. Term, 4 Wm. 4, r. 7, directs that, in the judgment and issued execution against one Cross- the result of any discussion of the question before case of several issues, a verdict and judgment shall ling. Immediately after the seizure, Crossling be- the highest tribunal is not impossible, for no one pass at the trial against either party in respect of the issues which he has failed to establish, and that he came a bankrupt, and the assignees having claimed can, we think, read Mr. Baron Parke's judgment shall be liable to the other party in respect of all costs the goods, an issue was directed, in which the as- in the case just referred to, without seeing that occasioned by such issues. Under this rule, the de- signees were plaintiffs and the original plaintiff strong arguments may be adduced in favour of a fendant can only claim the costs of the issues found defendant. Upon this state of facts, the Court much more liberal doctrine as to distresses; and in for him at the trial. The taxation should, therefore, made absolute a rule calling upon the defendant in the abstract, it is difficult to see what justice there be reviewed on that principle. the interpleader issue to give security for costs. is in giving the landlord any priority at all. The Costs under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122, s. 19.-The whole question almost depends upon whether the Bankruptcy Act has put a check upon the improper instances mentioned in the earlier books are to be exercise of the summary remedies therein given by taken as mere illustrations of the principle of filing an affidavit of debt against a trader, by pro-exemption, or as limiting or comprehending the viding that if the defendant swears that he whole exception. We think an elaborate arguhas a good defence to the action, the summons issued shall be dismissed; and if the plaintiff does not recover the sum sworn to be due in the affidavit, the defendant may apply to the Court for his costs, on the ground that the plaintiff had "not any reasonable or probable cause for making such affidavit." Whatever be the precise meaning of the section, which is not free from difficulty, Smith v. Temperley, 8 Law T. 318; 2 New Pract. Cas. 33; 16 L. J. 105, Ex. decides that the application should be made promptly, and certainly within the four first days of Term after the trial, as in motions in arrest of judgment, or new trial.

In cases of trespass after written notice.-By applying the principle we have just referred to, we came to the conclusion, in our Review of Michaelmas Term, 1845 (6 Law T. 277), that a plaintiff in an action for trespass, after a written notice, was absolutely entitled to full costs, where the fact of such notice was duly suggested upon the record. The question was directly before any of the Courts for the first time in Bowyer v. Cook, 9 Law T. 76; 2 New Pract. Cas. 203. The Common Pleas decided that in such case the plaintiff is entitled to full costs. A reference to the judgment will shew that the decision was there founded upon the simple test of the statutory enactment.

In the same case the following was held to be a sufficient notice within the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 24, where the trespass complained of was the continuance of an encroachment :-" We are directed by Mr. Bowyer to give you notice that unless you divert the course of the water so as to prevent it flowing over his land and ditch, and restore the ditch to its former shape, and remove the earth, stumps, stakes, and other encroachments on his land and fence, in the parish of A. in such a manner as shall be satisfactory to him, a further action will be brought against you previous to Michaelmas Term." Death of defendant.-Hill v. Brown, 9 Law T. 39, is one of those cases of hardship which must arise now and then from adherence to technical The plaintiff postponed the cause, upon the defendant's agreeing to pay the costs of the day,

rules.

ment was published a few years ago, against the
legality of the landlord's right; but we speak from
vague recollection, not having met with the work
ourselves.
(To be continued.)

COUNTY COURTS.

BELOW we give the cases of most prominent interest in the County Courts which have reached us during the week. We direct attention to an important judgment pronounced by Mr. GALE in the County Court of SouthAllowance of country attorney's attendance at a trial in London.-Dawson v. Ewens, 9 Law T. ampton, as to meaning of " Causes of Action," 248, should be noted by the country attorney, as it &c. It will be seen that although entertaining may save him from incurring a considerable risk. little doubt himself on the question, the learned The Court there refused to interfere with the Mas-Judge is willing to give any defendant an ter's discretion, who, in an ordinary case, had dis-opportunity of taking the opinion of the Court We invite allowed, upon taxation, the expenses of the de- of Queen's Bench on the matter. fendant's country attorney attending a trial in town, our readers to forward, as early as possible in he not being a witness, and the town agent's ex-the week, accurate reports of any cases involving In a similar case it would points of interest, in the construction and applipenses being allowed. perhaps be more prudent to claim only for the cation of the law, or in the practice of the country attorney's expenses, which, of course, would Courts, which may come under their observaform by far the heavier item.

Of application to the Court.-In noticing White Feltham, 18 Law T. 281; we expressed our apprehension that the system of proceedings at Chambers would not be improved by the Courts arbitrarily declaring that costs would not be allowed if the parties chose to go to the Court. We were pleased, however, to hear Mr. Baron Rolfe refuse to follow the Common Pleas in that course, and grant the successful party costs, upon a rule to set aside proceedings for irregularity, which might, no doubt, have been disposed of at Chambers. White v. Feltham, 16 L. J. 14, was cited, but his Lordship declined to adopt that novel course. Burton v. Crawford, 8 Law T. 393.

-to be taxed under an order of Nisi Prius. The
following day the defendant died, and his executrix.
opposed the taxation before the Master; upon
which he declined to act. The Court refused to
grant any rule in the matter, as there was no means
of enforcing the payment of the costs when taxed.
Costs of first trial.-Where a new trial is granted,
on the ground of the verdict being against evidence,
but the costs are reserved, because an objection has
been made in arrest of judgment, and not decided,
and upon the second trial the plaintiff is again suc-
cessful, and the objection in arrest of judgment is
disposed of in his favour, he will be entitled to the
costs of the first trial, just as if the rule had been
made absolute in the first instance, without the costs
being reserved. (Hunter v. Caldwell, 9 Law T.
73; 2 New Pract. Cas. 173.)

Costs against executors as plaintiffs.—Plaintiffs who are suing as executors should bear in mind that they will not be exempted from costs merely because the defendant's conduct has been such as to induce them to go on, as by silence or otherwise, but that there must have been actual deception or misrepresentation to deprive the defendant of his right. (Birkhead v. North, 16 L. J. 284, Q. B.; 9 Law T. 106; 2 New Pract. Cas. 188.)

Costs of summons.-An attempt was made in Stockbridge v. Owen, 9 Law T. 77; 2 New Pract. Cas. 205, to obtain the authority of the Court of Common Pleas against the practice of harassing parties with summonses before a judge at chambers, and abandoning them before hearing, so as to deprive the judge of jurisdiction and consequently to escape costs. The Court, however, would not grant a rule nisi to have the question discussed, holding it to be clear that the abandonment of the summons left the party without remedy. Here, then, is a simple subject for reform-a practical grievance, and easily remedied; but such reforms our legislators despise. For several years now has the similar vexatious practice of abandoning pleas when demurred to been adopted, and as yet no power has been given to a judge or the Court to inflict costs. (See Hutton v. Turk, 2 Law T. 74, and 13 M. &

DISTRESS.

Horses and carriages al livery.—A question of general interest to the more wealthy classes of the community was judicially settled in Parsons v. Gingell, 9 L. T. 222, in which case it was sought to exempt from distress horses standing at livery, or, to use the words of the plea, "sent to A. to be kept, taken care of, fed, cleaned, and managed in the way of his business as a common public livery and bait stable-keeper." It was, in fact, little else than what was twice argued in Francis v. Wyatt, 1 W. Bl. 483; 3 Burr. 1498; and although not judicially decided, was generally considered as law. The privilege which protects goods delivered to factors, wharfingers, auctioneers, carcase butchers, and commission agents, is founded upon the prin. ciple that the things are delivered to a person exercising a public trade, to the carrying on of which it is necessary that the goods should be delivered there, and some thing is to be done there so as to alter the former shape or condition of the thing, or to the goods to be dealt with as articles of commerce. But horses sent to livery stables do not fall within this principle, because, although sent to a person carrying on a public trade, they are not sent for the purpose of having anything done to them, in the sense which the Courts have adopted as the test. It is not a mere temporary purpose for which they are sent, and what is done is not so much the object for which they are sent as it is in

tion.

GREENWICH COUNTY COURT.
Friday, August 13.

(Before G. CHILTON, Esq.)
Dismissal of servant-Right of servant to wages.
The plaintiff sued the defendant, the proprietor of
the Crown and Sceptre Tavern, for seven days' wages
as a waiter, at 3s. each day.

The plaintiff stated that the defendant desired him to cleanse a drain by throwing some water down; he considered it not part of the duty of a waiter, and he him 18s. but witness refused it, because he had enrefused. The defendant discharged him, and offered

tered upon his services the seventh day.

Defendant said the plaintiff was very insolent, and refused to do his duty.

The JUDGE said he had no doubt of that, but the money must be paid, as he had entered upon the employ of his master on the seventh day. An order was made for 17. 18.

[If the learned Judge meant that the discharge was justifiable, his decision was clearly wrong, and the plaint should have been dismissed. Ridgway v. The Hungerford Market Company, 3 A. & E. 171.-Ed. LAW T.]

HAMPSHIRE.
Southampton.

(Before J. H. GALE, Esq.)

- v.

Division of suits-Meaning of "causes of action"Staying proceedings upon undertaking to apply for a prohibition.

Where two bills of exchange, accepted by the defendant, drawn for separate considerations, are in the hands of the plaintiff, a separate summons may issue in respect of each.

At the opening of the Court, the learned Judge delivered the following important judgment:

Several applications have been made to the Clerk of the Court upon which questions have arisen upon the construction of the 63rd section of the County Courts Act, which prohibits the division of a cause of action for the purpose of bringing two or more suits in a County Court. An application is now made for leave to issue two summonses on two separate bills of exchange, accepted by the defendant, but drawn by two different persons, and founded on two separate considerations. I am of opinion that both the summonses ought to be granted. It seems to have been

cision of Lord Tenterden, and that it is rather too I have looked with some degree of attention into much to expect a Judge of the County Court to over- the Act, and it appears to me that the duties of each rule it. As, however, great doubts have been made office are most clearly defined,-that it is incumbeat on this subject, if the defendant in any case in which on the clerk to make out both the summons and the point arises will undertake to apply to one of the duplicate, and that the office of the Bailiff is to serve Superior Courts for a prohibition, I will suspend the them. If it were otherwise, it would of course be proceedings here to enable him to do so. necessary for the latter to be furnished with a seal of the court similar to that of the Clerk, for the purpose of sealing the duplicates, or he would be necessitated to attend at the Clerk's office with every copy he made, to get it sealed, which was certainly never contemplated by the Act.

PROCLAMATIONS OF OUTLAWRY.-Hemp, the bailiff to the Sheriff of Middlesex, called on Thursday week upon the following persons to surrender themselves into his custody, or to stand severally outlawed :—Andrew Henry Lynch, at the suit of William Witham; Arthur Hogue, at the suit of Orlando Edmunds, a registered public officer; Phillip Bennet Lucas, at the suit of Oliver Jackson; James Tuffs, at the suit of John Sewell; George Fitch, at the suit of Chamberlain Birch; Henry Welchman, at the suit of John Coope Hadden; John William Montague, at the suit of William Thompson; Herbert Cornewall, at the suit of Jeremiah Robert Ives; Stephen Bradley, at the suit of Mary Hegarty; John Hunter, at the suit of Lewis Henry Braham; Henry John Hunter, sued as Henry J. Hunter, at the suit of Lewis Henry Braham; Richard Norman, at the suit of Leon Johnson; and Major-General Sir Howard Elphinstone, bart. at the suit of Richard W. Boyd.-Globe.

Boothby, and L. Temple, esqrs. West Riding Bo- | his cause. Many defects which we pointed out last
roughs, except Ripon, Pontefract, and Knaresborough year have been remedied, and the grumbling and
-William Gray, esq. East Riding and boroughs of ridicule then indulged in have ceased. There is a
York, with Knaresborough and Ripon-G. F. Pol- great anxiety now felt that this city should be placed
lard, esq. North Riding and its boroughs, except on the same footing with every other town in the
York-Stephen Temple, esq. Durham and boroughs kingdom, and have two assizes a year, and that there
Richard Mathews, esq. Northumberland and bo- should be another court for criminal business, instead
roughs-T. J. Hogg, esq. Cumberland and bo- of the prisoners being sent to Gloucester. Why this
roughs, with Kendal-Woronzow Greig, esq. West- has not been managed before, no one can tell.
moreland, North Lancashire, Clithero, and Lancaster
-Charles Otter, esq. South Lancashire, Warring-
ton, and Rochdale-P. A. Pickering, W. Corie, and
J.P. Wild, esqrs. Liverpool, Wigan, Bolton, Preston,
and Blackburn-F. S. Brandreth, esq. Boroughs of
South Lancashire, except Liverpool, Wigan, Bolton,
Rochdale, and Warrington-Hop. R. Deuman.
MIDLAND CIRCUIT.-Lord Denman, C. J. has
completed the appointments of Revising Barristers
for the Midland Circuit as follows:-For the southern
division of Derbyshire and borough of Derby, Mr.
John Mellor; for the northern division of Derbyshire,
Mr. Graham Wilmore; for the southern division of
Warwickshire and borough of Warwick, Mr. Robert
Miller; for the northern division of Warwickshire
and borough of Birmingham, and city of Coventry,
Mr. George Hayes; for the southern division of Lin-
colnshire and borough of Stamford, Grantham, and
Boston, Mr. Maunsell; for the northern division of
Lincolnshire and borough of Great Grimsby, the Hon.
F. Ponsonby; for the southern division of Notting-
hamshire and borough of Newark, Mr. J. H. Cham-
berlain; for the northern division of Nottingham-
shire and town of Nottingham, and borough of East
Retford, Mr. Stephen Denison; for the southern
division of Leicestershire and borough of Leicester,
Mr. Philip Brockett Bulow; for the northern division
of Leicestershire and Rutlandshire, Mr. Allan Maclean
Skinner; for Northamptonshire and borough of
Northampton, and city of Peterborough, Sir Eardly
Wilmot.

from the custody of the County Court to this Court,
the clerk making the parcel, directing, and despatch-
ing it. The carriage will be paid here on arrival.
Probably you will think it best to retain the sche-
dule when a case is adjourned to a future court, and
to return it to us after such adjourned hearing.
Nevertheless it seems expedient that a report should
be made of the proceedings of each sitting, giving by
a calendar such information as this form has been
used to contain. This might be sent by post, when
the schedule and its accompaniments are retained.
It may be useful to observe, that the practice has
been, for the affidavits of service and newspaper ad-
vertisements to be examined with the schedule,
whether by a clerk in London, or by the circuit clerk,
previously to the hearing; he minutes in pencil, in
the fold of the schedule, all defects in notices or the
service thereof, which should be brought to the atten-
tion of the commissioner. All Gazette advertise-
ments whatever have been examined at the office here,
immediately after publication of each Gazette.
There is a fee, not in our list, which will no doubt
be payable to the clerk of the County Court; namely,
the fee of five shillings, which by the 106th section of
1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, has been paid to the clerk of the
peace. So the fee of one shilling and sixpence pay-
able by the insolvent to the gaoler is not in our
list.
You will observe, at the end of the 10th section of
the new Act, a provision for ordering the expense of
THE LAW OF CHURCH-RATES.-A question of the
bringing up a prisoner to be paid by the provisional
highest importance to the church and to parishioners
assignee. This means the expense of conveying him,
generally has just occurred, and which will probably
when the hearing is ordered at some other town than
tend to a settlement of this hitherto bitterly agitated
that where the gaol is. If the prison towns are
question. At the Bishop of Gloucester's visitation
places of sitting in your district, you will probably
his Lordship summoned before him the churchwarden
always appoint the hearings at such places; and the
of Bedminster, near Bristol. In answer to questions
case in question cannot arise. But if a case of con-
from the right rev. prelate, the churchwarden replied
veying an insolvent to another town should arise, we
that the population was extremely large-that there
beg to recommend that the expense should be ordered
was very insufficient accommodation for the pa-
to be paid, as heretofore, by the treasurer of the
rishioners, and that the church was in so dilapidated
county; using the usual form, which we forward with NORTH WALES CIRCUIT.-The following is the a state, that, unless speedily restored, it would
the rest. This, by the words of the Act giving you list of appointments of Revising Barristers for the inevitably fall. He added, as a reason for this appa-
all powers, &c. &c. you clearly have jurisdiction to do. present year, as made by Mr. Justice Maule, for the rent neglect, that vestry after vestry had been called
The provisional assignee has not by virtue of his office North Wales Circuit. They are as follows:-North for the purpose of levying a church-rate; but that
any concern with the fund so spoken of at the end of the Cheshire, Mr. W. H. Welsby; South Cheshire, Mr. the parishioners invariably opposed it, and there were
10th section, though we may for convenience employ W. Yardley; Flintshire, Mr. W. C. Townsend; consequently no funds in hand with which to make the
him in making payments of it by small advances. The Denbighshire, Mr. Gaunt; Carnarvonshire and An- necessary repairs. The bishop inquired whether or not
fund is in the names of the Commissioners at the glesey, Mr. R. Meeson; Merionethshire and Mont- the churchwarden was acquainted with the decision
Bank of England; and the chief clerk, who is ac- gomeryshire, Mr. F. J. Walker Jones.
of the Lord Chief Justice on the subject of levying
countant with the Government, when he goes to audit, IRISH POOR-LAW APPOINTMENT.-Mr. Twistle-church-rates irrespective of the votes of the vestry,
gives account of it. There are prior claims on this ton, who has been for some time past the assistant to which the churchwarden replied that he was aware
interest fund which arise from time to time. Even commissioner for administering the poor-law in Ire- of the law as laid down by the learned judge, but had
if the County Court had been authorized to draw on land, is appointed to the head of the Irish Board, in abstained from acting upon it. The bishop ordered
the Commissioners, there may not always be money conjunction with the Secretary for Ireland, in pursu- that another vestry meeting should be convened
in hand; so that the gaoler's order for the few shil-ance of the amended Act of last Session, for Admi- within a month, and that, in the event of the rate
lings that he requires might be dishonoured.
nistration of the Laws for the Relief of the Poor in being again refused, the churchwardens should pro-
Ireland.
ceed to enforce one under the decision of the Lord
Chief Justice. The parishioners, it appears, are de
termined to oppose the imposition of a rate; so that,
in all probability, the matter will ere long be brought
before the Ecclesiastical Court.-Standard.

Concerning assignees, our circuit practice has been the same as formerly, when country cases were heard at Quarter Sessions. The Commissioners have nominated the assignees, as the justices did; but the appointment is made by the Court.

The Commissioners' orders, allowing costs of opposition to creditors, have been signed on circuit but retained and sent to London with the schedule. The

agent afterwards applies here for the order and taxes

his costs.

The 112th section of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, will shew before whom, besides yourself and ourselves, affidavits may be sworn. We have appointed all gaolers in England Commissioners for taking affidavits: possibly there may be some who have failed to take out their appointments.

The seal of the Court is applied to every document here before it is issued.

We are, Sir,

Your faithful and obedient servants, &c. &c.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE LAW TIMES.

The Queen has been pleased to grant to Mr. Cornish, barrister, of the Western Circuit, her royal license and authority that he may, in compliance with an injunction contained in the will of George Isaac Mowbray, esq. deceased, henceforth take and use the surname of Mowbray only.

The Lord Chancellor has appointed Robert Clarke, the younger, of Bath, in the county of Somerset, gent. to be a Master Extraordinary in the High Court of Chancery.

COURT PAPERS.

THE NEW COUNTY COURTS.-Although there is are authorized to adjourn the courts from time to no vacation in the New County Courts, the judges time, so that they shall sit once a month. In pursuance of this privilege, notifications have been given that the Westminster Court will adjourn in a few days to the 21st of September, and the Bloomsbury Court to the 8th of September.

LEGAL INTELLIGENCE.

WESTERN CIRCUIT.

SIR,-Allow me, through your columns, to express
an earnest hope that my brother clerks who have not
as yet sent you the returns necessary to enable the
completion of the County Court Law List, shewing
the parishes in each district, &c. will, without delay,
do so. The extreme inconvenience which is constantly
sustained by the absence of such a work ought to be BRISTOL, Tuesday, Aug. 17.-The commission for
a sufficient inducement. At the same time it is to be holding the assizes for this city was opened here
hoped that the useful plan of advertising their Court terday by the Mayor, the Chief Justice having been
days in the COUNTY COURTS CHRONICLE, men- detained at Devizes by a most severe cold. The busi-
tioned in your last, will be adopted by them gene-ness is much heavier than usual, the entry consisting
rally. I shall not hesitate to incur the risk of the
expense being allowed. The obvious advantage of it
leaves hardly any room for fear on this point.
Yours, &c.

yes

of fifty-five causes; many of them, however, will not
take much time. To-day, at twelve o'clock, Chief Jus-

tice Wilde took his seat on the bench, and the busi-
ness commenced. Several undefended actions were
disposed of, but nothing occurred which demands our
notice. We must not omit to mention one thing, and
that is, that since the last assizes the court has been

altered, and, we are glad to be able to say, very much
improved. There is a complaint, however, that the
attorneys cannot get near their counsel, and no doubt
this is a very crying evil, but we really cannot see a
remedy; the fact is, that the members of the Bar are
so numerous that it is impossible to provide accom-
modation for them, and therefore they catch at every
seat that is not occupied by one of their body, the
consequence being that no attorney can approach
those to whom he has entrusted the management of

DEFAMATION.-PENANCE.-On Wednesday week a defamation case was tried in the Bristol Consistorial

Court. It was brought by Maria Duffett against Henry Evans, a brewer, for having, in the month of October, November, or December last, defamed her reputation by saying she was a young woman of improper character, and that he had committed adultery with her. There was no defence. Evidence in support of the case had been given by four witnesses; ant, in exceedingly gross terms, declared the plaintiff who proved that while in a public house the defendceeded to deliver judgment. After recapitulating the to be guilty of incontinence, The Chancellor proevidence adduced, he said the testimony in support of the case was unequivocal. The plaintiff had been since married, but that did not alter the case in the least. The law was clear on the subject, and the case must take the usual course. He must pronounce for the defamation, with the usual sentence, which is, that the guilty party stand in church in a white sheet. The case was of an aggravated nature, and he must condemn the defendant to pay the whole of the costs. Sunday, the 22nd inst. was fixed for the defendant to do penance, in the plaintiff's parish church.-Felix Farley's Bristol Journal.

Heirs-at-Law, Next of Kin, &c. Wanted.

[This is part of a complete list now being extracted for the

LAW TIMES from the advertisements that have appeared
in the newspapers during the present century. The re-
ference, with the date and place of each advertisement,
cannot be stated here without subjecting the paragraph
to duty but the figures refer to a corresponding entry
in a book kept at the LAW TIMES OFFICE, where these
particulars are preserved, and which will be communicated
to any applicant. To prevent impertinent curiosity, a
fee of half-a-crown for each inquiry must be paid to the
publisher, or if by letter, postage stamps to that amount
inclosed.]

1013. RELATIONS or NEXT OF KIN of AHMET CHIOGLA,
who visited Constantinople temporarily, and there
died of the plague, in September 1837. Something
NEXT OF KIN of MR. RICHARD SHAW, who in 1824
to advantage.
carried on business as an accountant, at 12, London.

1014.