hold against the Queen, but that (a) where she is a
party, and where the writ contains the clause "non
omittas propter aliquam libertatum," there the sheriff
may break the outer door. The passages cited to the
contrary, from books of practice, are merely the
opinions of text-writers, unsupported by authority.
Malcom v. Montgomery was a decision on special
grounds; and, besides, the book in which it is reported
is not recognised as an authority.
Norman. When this motion was first made, a
similar observation was made by Mr. Hughes, but in
his own book on Chancery Practice he cites this now-
repudiated case of Malcolm v. Montgomery as an
authority to shew that a party arrested on a Sunday
under an attachment was entitled to be discharged.
(Hughes's Chanc. Pract. 69.)

The LORD CHANCELLOR.-At all events, we may receive the report of the case as a record of what passed generally upon the occasion of the application. As this is ac ase which will be important in its results, I will look into the authorities which have been referred to.

Monday, Aug. 26.-The LORD CHANCEllor, after referring to the case of Burdett v. Colman, and the other cases which had been cited, stated that, in his opinion, the law was not sufficiently settled upon the question at issue to justify him in granting an attachment against the sub-sheriff. He would leave the party to his remedy at law. The Judges would, when the question came before them, decide how the law really was, but the authorities were conflicting, and the question was a very serious one for supposing the sub-sheriff, under circumstances like the present, forced open outer doors and death ensued, it might be for the judges to decide whether he or those who resisted his authority would be answerable criminally for the consequences. Under these circumstances, there being a conflict of authority he did not feel justified in awarding an attachment, and would refuse the motion and give the sheriff his costs against the receiver, the receiver to be entitled to them over against the estate.

MUNSTER CIRCUIT.
Cork County Summer Assizes, August 6, 1847.
(Before MR. BARON LEFROY.)
REG. v. BARRY.

Indictment, Sufficiency of.
The prisoner was indicted for stealing two cowskins,
the property of one O'Brien. The evidence was, that
the cows themselves whose skins formed the subject of
the present indictment were stolen from him while
they were alive.

Quære, was the property qua skins even in O'Brien
sufficiently to sustain the indictment?
John Barry was indicted for stealing two cow-skins
the property of one O'Brien.

On a previous day the prisoner had been tried for stealing the cows themselves, but was acquitted, the evidence shewing that the cows had been stolen in the county of Limerick, and not in the county of Cork, as charged in the indictment; however, the skins having been found in the prisoner's possession in the county of Cork he was now indicted for stealing the skins. Evidence was giventhat the prisoner stole the cows the skins of which were found in his possession. The prosecutor identi- fied the skins as being the skins of his cows.

The prisoner was undefended. Bennett, Q. C. and the Hon. J. Plunket, appeared for the Crown.

The case for the Crown having closed, LEFROY, B. said that he entertained some doubt whether the present indictment could be sustained; whether the property in the skins had ever been in the prosecutor qua skins.

Bennett submitted that as the cows themselves were the property of the prosecutor, their skins were necessarily his also. The wrongful act of the prisoner did not divest the prosecutor's property in

them.

LEFROY, B.-There is this principle of law in favour of the indictment, that there was no rightful possession at any time in the prisoner in contemplation of law; however, in the event of a conviction, I shall reserve the point for the opinion of the judges. The prisoner was found guilty, and sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment, with hard labour.

County of Limerick, Thursday, July 22. (Before Mr. Baron LEFROY.) REG. v. BURKE and KELLY. Evidence-Identification-Practice. A witness who had, two days after the occurrence, identified one of a party who had robbed him, when asked if he saw the person in court, pointed to a prisoner, and said that he thought he was one of the men, but he was not sure; that he had identified a man two days after the robbery; that at the time he was sure that it was the right man, and that he thought the prisoner Kelly was the man whom he had identified, but he had very different clothes on then: Held, that the Crown counsel were entitled to shew by

(a) See Bacon's Abr. tit. "Sheriff."

other witnesses that the prisoner Kelly was the man
who had been previously identified by the former

witness.

case, after settling in that way the true extent of the exceptions, I shall offer my views on their sufficiency for granting a new trial. As there seemed to be a Indictment for robbing one William Sullivan and wish on the defendant's part to carry the questions others of a quantity of Indian corn, on the 22nd of raised in this case to the Supreme Court, and as June. A man named Patrick Ryan having been some of the points are important and novel, placed on his trial upon an indictment charging him I felt disposed to oblige the parties as far as with the robbery for which the prisoners Burke and might be proper by some arrangement under a Kelly were now indicted, W. Sullivan, being ex- decision of opinion in the Court pro formá for amined for the prosecution, stated that a number of that purpose. (See the usage on this in Jones v. men attacked him as he was conveying some Indian Van Zandt, 5 Howard.) But after time allowed to corn, and robbed him of three sacks of it; and counsel to make such an arrangement, and their that after he had proceeded further on his way failure to effect it, I do not feel authorised, when not he was again attacked; that he did not know the present at the trial, to have a difference of views, as men who first attacked him; and that he could not if there existing, certified, in order to enable the paridentify Ryan; but that he knew one of those who ties to go with the case to the Supreme Court, bewere present on the second occasion, and named one cause such a difference was neither real nor possible; Kelly as having been there. Ryan was acquitted; and if a difference should be formally certified as and the prisoners Burke and Kelly being now given existing now (which is possible), neither party could in charge upon a similar indictment; and the witness probably carry the cause up, as it would be a differSullivan being asked if he saw Kelly in court, ence on a matter resting, as a new trial does, in the after considerable hesitation he pointed to the pri- mere discretion of the Court. (United States v. soner Kelly, and said that he thought he was one of McDaniel, 6 Wheat. 542; Lessee of Lansing v. Lonthe men who were present at the robbery, but he don, 4 Wheat. 213; 5 Cra. 11, 187; 4 Washn. C. C. R. was not sure; he also stated that he had identified a 333.) In this condition of things we are both com. man at the police barrack two days after the occur-pelled to examine the questions presented seriatim, that at the time he was sure it was the right and with care; and if we divide, the motion will fail, man, and that he thought that the prisoner was the and final judgment be rendered on the verdict. Such man whom he had then identified, but that he had will also be the case if we agree against the motion; very different clothes on then. The witness further while if we agree in favour of it, then, the verdict stated, in answer to Baron Lefory, that he would not being set aside and a new trial had, it may be possay "that the prisoner was the man whom he had sible that, if both judges are present, some division of identified." opinion may occur, or be possible, which will enable either side to obtain the decision of the Supreme Court upon it.

rence;

Under these circumstances, Bennett, Q. C. (with whom was the Hon. J. Plunket), for the Crown, proposed to call witnesses to prove that the prisoner Kelly was the man whom Sullivan had identified on a former occasion.

O'Hea, for the prisoner, objected to such evidence being given to prop up the witness's testimony. LEFROY, B.-I remember a case in England in which that kind of assistance was given. A man had shawn off his whiskers, and evidence was allowed to be given of his being the man whom the witness had identified.

Bennett.-There was a case in which, in a prosecution some years ago upon this circuit, I was allowed to give similar evidence, though the witness actually stated that he thought that the prisoner was not the person whom he had identified.

LEFROY, B.-I acted in the same way in several cases three years ago at Nenagh, having first consulted with my brother judge upon the subject. It is simply an imperfect identification of the prisoner. I put the question both to Sheehan (another Crown witness, whose testimony was similar to Sullivan's) and to Sullivan, and they would not say they were not the men.

One of the police was then called, and proved that the prisoner Kelly was the person who had been identified by Sullivan.

A head constable of police also proved that Sulli-
van had identified Kelly on two occasions, on the
latter of which he identified him upon oath.

The learned Baron in his charge to the jury upon
this part of the case, said, "You have seen the iden-
tification of the prisoners, and you are the judges
whether it is satisfactory to you or not."
Both prisoners were acquitted.

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
[We give place with pleasure to the following report
of an important decision upon the imitation of
British trade-marks by citizens of America, de-
livered in the above court, and obligingly for-
warded by a correspondent.]

Massachusetts District, October Term, 1846.
TAYLORS (of Leicester) v. CARPENTER.
Fraudulent imitation of trade marks by citizens of the
United States-Protection of aliens against.
This was an action on the case, brought by the
plaintiffs, citizens of Great Britain, against the de-
fendant, a citizen of Massachusetts, for imitating
and using, from January 1842 to February 1845, in
this State, the trade-marks of the plaintiffs on thread
of the defendant, and selling great quantities thereof
as and for the plaintiffs' thread, to their damage in the
sum of 20,000 dlrs. The defendant pleaded the general
issue; and at the trial here, at an adjournment of
the October Term 1845, a verdict was found for the
plaintiffs for 800 dlrs. This verdict the defendant moved
to set aside, and to grant a new trial for the reasons
assigned in the following motion, embracing various
alleged misdirections and omissions by Sprague, J.
before whom the case was tried. The motion was
argued at the May Term 1846, by Plympton and
Choate in its favour and for Carpenter, and B. R.
Curtis against it and for J. and W. Taylor.

WOODBURY, J.-Not being present at the trial of
this cause, I am unable to decide how far the excep-
tions made accord with what actually took place. But
where the counsel differ upon that, as they do in some
important particulars, it will be necessary to be
governed by the minutes and recollection of my asso-
ciate, who made the rulings complained of. In each

1. The first cause assigned for a new trial is, that the judge admitted a document to prove a bill and answer in Chancery in New York, which was not legal evidence. The document offered here had the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court, with the proper attestation of the presiding judge; and the copy is said to be "exemplified," which means a true copy. Such a copy seems to me to be compe tent evidence of a judgment under the Act of Congress of May 26, 1790. (See 1 Peters, C. C. R. 352; 7 Cra. 403, 484; 9 ib. 122; 3 Wheat. 234.) What force will be given to the judgment itself in another State depends on the expression in the law that "it shall be the same as in the State where it is rendered;" and on the construction given to that law, and the constitution bearing on it in various cases which have been decided. (7 Cra. 481; 2 Dall. 302; 2 Peters, C. C. R.74, 155, 484; 6 Wheat. 189; Sargent's Cons. Law, 383; 13 Peters, 312; 14 Peters, 49.) The expression in the law does not relate to the force of the copy thus certified, because each State is, of course, to prescribe its own wishes and views as to what shall be good evidence in its own courts. But relating to the force of the judgment as just shewn, it is a different question, and one it is not necessary to discuss here; as the question concerning the force and effect of the judgment itself does not arise here, but may be seen as settled in the cases already cited. Conceding, then, that this copy is not such as is used in the New York State Courts (2nd vol. of Revised Laws, p. 403), nor such as is usual at common law (2 Burr. 1179; 4 Barn. & Cress. 85), yet it is such as the Act of Congress prescribes in such a case, and was therefore, as before shewn, properly admitted.

2. The second objection is, that a witness (Warcertain sales and receipts of thread for the plaintiffs, burton) was allowed to testify as to the amounts of without producing the letters or accounts of sales, from which he derived the information. It seems, or examination, that the plaintiffs found a falling off in their sales; and the witness, who was an agent or correspondent, through whom orders and receipts passed, was questioned by the plaintiffs to shew the diminution of such sales. After doing it, on the cross-examination he was asked by the counsel for the defendant if some of this information was not derived from letters addressed to him and accounts rendered; and on his replying in the affirmative, the defendant objected to the evidence, without a produetion of the letters and accounts. If this point ended here, I should think that the witness could not state in detail the contents of letters without producing. them; when, having stated certain specific results, without its first appearing, that they had been obtained from letters, but appearing so afterwards, I think that the statements should then be withdrawn, if due notice is given to produce the letters and they are withheld. (1 Green. Ev. secs. 82, 84, p. 403, note; Swett's case, 2 Mass. 296; 1 Peters, 591–6.) It is immaterial, in my view, whether the facts, being from letters, came out on questions put by the defendant or the plaintiff. But here it is said, that after such notice, and the letters not being produced, the statements were ruled out. That is the first answer to the objection. Again, it is said that the witness did not state the special contents of any letters, but the mere results or general impressions derived from numerous letters and accounts rendered, and rather testified that such letters and accounts were rendered, than detailed their particular contents. This may be permissible.

(3 Camp. 310; Stevens N. P. 215; Peak's Ca. 83; 2 Stark. 274; Green. 109; 1 Stark. on Ev. 154, Am. edit.) And as there is no reason to believe the results were not correctly stated, the verdict was not changed by the admission, and should not therefore be set aside on a mere technical doubt on this point, and the more especially if the evidence was ultimately ruled out, as seems to be the impression on one side. 3. The third objection as to the orders rests on the same foundation.

4. So does the fourth objection as to the aggregate of the sales during six years previous to 1843, derived from such letters and accounts.

5. The fifth exception is, that the Court, under an allegation of sales by the defendant within a certain period, viz. on the 1st of January, 1842, and on divers days between that and the issue of the writ (January 4, 1854), allowed evidence to be given of several sales on different days within that period. But I am aware of no principle to prevent a recovery for several torts or wrongs of a like character, and on different days, in one count, if the times be stated broad enough to cover all. (8 Wentworth, Pl. 434; Webster on Patents, 111; 2 Chit. Pl. 765; Gould on Pl. 104.) And though it is true, that when only one wrong is sued for, it may, in such counts, be shewn to have happened on any one day within the time, there is nothing in this principle to forbid several trespasses on different days to be proved. On any different rule a separate count might be required for every skein or spool of thread sold, amounting, as in this case, to many thousands of spools. It seems to me, also, that a judgment under such count would be, prima facie, a bar to any other suit for a sale within the time covered. And if so, then of course the evidence of any sales within that period is competent. 6. The sixth objection is, that the Court excluded evidence of a general custom in the United States, England, Germany, and France, for the last twenty years, to use and imitate the marks of foreigners with impunity, and that such custom was generally known n the commercial world, and not contrary to the laws ¡of such countries.

7. The seventh exception is similar to the sixth, except that the custom is to have the marks of aliens thus imitated, with a view to have the goods received and used there as if made by those aliens. In respect to these two objections, I am not aware of any principle by which a usage in this or a foreign country is competent evidence in defence of a wrong. To be sure it may be weighed by a Court in settling the law, if a usage existed here, and was ancient and universal, -as such an usage sometimes makes law, when there is nothing in it forbidden by the constitution or Acts of Congress. (United States v. M'Daniel, 1 Bl. Com. 62, 75; 1 Hale's H. of C. E. 1, 2; 1 Reeve's H. of L. 1; 3 Salk. 112; 1 Taunt. 241; 1 Green. sec. 488; 2 Green. 415; 7 Peters, 15.) A custom may be good, though against private rights (1 Law Rep. 217), and though against a bad bye-law. (1 Saund. 312, note; 7 Dowl. & Ryland, 747.) But usage cannot alter a law. (7 Peters, 15.) Though it may be evidence against those acquainted with the usage, and conforming to it, to shew the law is waived, which might otherwise apply, as in case of notice of non-payment of notes. (See Pierpont v. Fowle, 4 Howard, 317. Again, this usage here was not offered to the Court to prove what was law here or abroad, but to the jury; nor was it offered as an ancient usage, which is the gist of it, when affecting the law; nor as one ever existing and tolerated in this country by judicial decisions, nor offered to the jury in mere mitigation of damages; for which purpose it might be competent, so far as regards smart-money or any vindictive damage, if any such were permissible in a case like this. (2 Green. p. 472, sec. 266,; Scott's N. P. 574 to 594.) The defendant now argues, that this evidence was competent to shew an acquiescence by the plaintiff in the use of his marks, or to shew dedication of them to the public; as they knew marks of theirs as well as others were used in this way and without redress, in this country as well as abroad. On this he cites 5 Scott's, 562; Bul. N. P. 30, a; 1 Story's R. 282; 2 Green. 50; 3 Barn. & Cress. 543; 8 Sim. 479. But I am not aware that a neglect to prosecute, because one believed he had no rights, or from mere procrastination, is any defence at law, whatever it may be in equity (1 Story's R. 282), except under the Statute of Limitations, pleaded and relied on, or under some positive statute, like that as to patents, which avoids the right, if the inventor permits the public to use the patent some time before taking out letters. It will be seen likewise that the defendant had the benefit of this evidence under another head more appropriate. There is something very abhorrent in allowing such a defence to a wrong which consists of counterfeiting others' marks or stamps, despoiling others of what had been gained by their industry and skill, and robbing them of the fruits "of their good name," merely because they have shewn forbearance and kindness. A custom ought to be at least moral and reasonable in order to be upheld. (Bac. Abr. tit. "Customs.") A party can hardly set up his own bad conduct or character in defence to an action, nor

justify them when prosecuted, because they may not not exist; but here no claim is made for them or under
have been materially worse than of some other per- them. It is made not for copying but copying and sell-
sons. (15 Pick. 506.) It is rather an aggravation ing as if the original, and this is for deceit and fraud.
to the plaintiffs that many others have injured them as The statute undertakes to confer patents and copy-
well as the defendant; and it is only an argument ad rights when desired; and it was adjudged in Wheaton
hominem to them that in England an alien in a case v. Peters, 8 Peters, 591, that no copyright as by com-
like this cannot recover (if such be the usage and mon law existed here as to a book; but any claims
law), but cannot affect our own sense here of what is or rights which did exist before in the manuscript, or
moral towards others-what is due to our own self-in a mark, or for deception and fraud, remains un-
respect in punishing frauds-and what seems to be touched. This last right is like that to any particular
demanded from us, both by justice and law, however tool or machine made by one individual, and any in-
others may conduct themselves in like cases.
jury to it, or deceit in relation to it, may be prose-
8. The eighth objection is, that the Court refused cuted as at common law. But a mere open or ac-
to instruct the jury that the plaintiffs could not re- knowledged copy or imitation of it might probably not
cover because citizens and residents of Great Britain, be prosecuted, except under the statute. The statute
or foreigners. This seems to be the point most confers such additional protection under a constitu-
laboured and most relied on. The first inquiry under tional injunction, though with a more sparing hand,
this head is, whether the subject-matter here is one on foreigners than citizens. There is still another
over which this Court has jurisdiction and can be pro- exception which is urged to this right existing at
secuted at all here by an alien friend. Being an common law in aliens: it is, that a trade-mark may
action for a tort or wrong gives to this Court be regarded merely as a generic name when it comes
general jurisdiction; but being one for a parti- here from abroad; and that our people have a right
cular king of wrong, an injurious deceit to the to use any generic name for their goods which they
damage of the plaintiffs, practised here, though they please. Thus, that "James's Fever Powders" are
live abroad, is said to give them no cause of action. now rather a generic name to distinguish a certain
It is next argued, not that such conduct towards a chemical substance, than a mark of any individual, in
citizen by another citizen may not have been held to which he has a monopoly. (See 19 Pick. 216.) It
be actionable, as many suits and legal proceedings of is contended that no property exists here as to mere
that kind have been sustained (Bell v. Locke, 25 marks or words, and that they are unlike the good-
Am. Jur. 273; Hopkins's R. 347; 8 Paige, 75; will in a trade or store, for business. And it is fur-
Thomson v. Winchester, 19 Pick. 216; Millington ther urged, that if a foreigner can obtain no redress
v. Fox, Eden on Injunct. 226; 2 Kren. 213; 3 Myl. in such a case, and a citizen might, he should not
& Cr. 711; Couter v. Jones, 4 B. & Al. 410; 3 B. & complain, and may remain at home, as in many things
C. 541; 2 Ves. & Bea. 218); but the counsel for he is not allowed here all the rights and privileges of
the defendant question the soundness on which these a citizen, and ought not to be. He cannot, by the
cases have proceeded, and rely on Blanchard v. constitution, be president; he cannot, in many states,
Hill, 2 Atk. 485. But in Blanchard v. Hill, it vote; he cannot hold land in many, or take by de-
was merely decided that the Court would not en- scent, though in others he can; he cannot take out
join one tradesman from using the same mark as patents and copyrights in all cases, and under like
another, a generic one-"The Great Mogul;" rules with a citizen; he cannot own vessels here; he
but they admitted, as in Poph. 151, it was decided cannot engage in the coasting trade here; he cannot,
right, that if one used the same mark "to draw in the conflict of laws, enforce some rights-in cases of
away customers from the other," or with any fraudu- discharge in insolvency-which citizens may. (Story's
lent design, it was actionable. (Thompson v. Win- Conf. of Laws, 33, 415; Turner v. Smith, Mars.
chester, 19 Pick. 214; Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. Dict. May 1846.) But an alien is not now regarded
541; S. C. 5 Dow. & Ry. 292.) The law is to be as the "outside barbarian" he is considered in China.
deemed settled then as between citizens, that a suit And the struggle in all commercial countries for some
lies, because it violates what one has appropriated centuries has been to enlarge his privileges and
and made profitable. It impairs public security also powers as to all matters of property and trade. It
in the quality of the article. (Scott's N. R. 573.) was one of the grievances in Magna Charta, as well
It has been recently held, that if the quality of an as the Declaration of Independence, that the natu-
article, such as pork, sold under one's brand, is in-ralization of foreigners had been too much obstructed.
ferior, the maker of the brand is liable; and it is So, too, heavy taxation of alien merchants was
made expressly punishable or actionable by the French guarded against in Magna Charta, allowing them
code (Ord. 3, lib. 2, sec. 4) to use another's mark.to go and come, to buy and sell,'
In the next place, in this country proceedings have any evil tolls." (Art. 31.) Thompson on Char-
been sustained in favour of aliens, as to their marks, ters, 55. It is hence undoubtedly that Montes-
as well as citizens, holding that the former have all quieu observed, "that the English have made the
the rights in such personal matters here as citizens, protection of foreign merchants an article of their
against forgery and deceit, and can resort to this national liberty;" and Thompson on Charters,
court for their protection. The solicitude has been such p. 232, says, that once they enjoyed it even in
to remove any doubt on this point, that in the largest war, in common with the clergy and husbandmen,
commercial state in the Union, on the 14th of May, in order that those who prayed, ploughed, and traf-
1845, an Act was passed, not only forbidding the ficked, might be at peace." For many years it has
counterfeiting of marks on goods, but punishing it been held that pleas of alienage are to be discou-
with imprisonment, and inflicting a like punishment raged, and are a defence not favoured in the law.
on one who sells such merchandize with forged marks (8 D. & E. 71, 166; 2 Bl. R. 1326; 13 East, 332;
knowingly. (See New York Stat. May 14, 1845.) 10 ib. 326; 1 Bos. & Pul. 165, 170; 9 East, 321;
The exceptions taken to this position as to the rights Stephen, Pl. 67; 2 Gall. 127, Soc. for Propagat-
of foreigners, I take to be two-fold, if no more; one tng Gospel v. Wheeler and Another. Even as long
is, that it is not reciprocal, no such right being ago as the time of Lord Chief Justice Hale, it
granted to exist, and which may be prosecuted, in was held, that "the law of England rather con-
Great Britain by our citizens. But this might be a tracts than extends the disability of aliens; be-
good reason for legislation by Congress, not allowing cause the shutting out of aliens tends to the
aliens to have any rights, or to prosecute them in loss of people, who, when laboriously employed,
this court, unless they are reciprocal, and allowed to are the true riches of any country." (Bac. Abr. tit.
our people in their respective countries. But no such" Aliens," C. note; Vent. 427; 2 Rol. R. 94.) An
discrimination has ever been made by Congress, and alien may bring an action for slander of his character.
no court could make it by mere construction without (Bac. Abr. tit.; "Alien," D.; Yelv. 198; and by 31
an exercise of judicial legislation. The cannibal of Hen. 6, c. 4, he may sue for any injury on sea, or in the
the Fejees may sue here in a personal action, though realm. Personal actions being transitory, are not
having no courts at home for us to resort to. An- limited to any particular country. (Story, Conf. of
other exception is, that the right to one's marks, if Laws, 450; 3 Bl. Comm. 249.) And the laws of a
existing at all in foreigners, must be vindicated and sovereign lawfully extend over persons who are domi-
prosecuted in conformity to the patent-laws, and not ciled within his territory, and over property which is
by an action on the case like this, independent of there situate. (Sec. 539.) And he may deem all in
those laws. In support of this is urged the analogy his limits as subjects, and legislate over them as to
from the decision in Taylor v. Miller, 4 Burr. 2377, contracts and property. (Sec. 541.) Suits for tres-
that if a common-law right existed to the copy of a passes to property lie in the country where committed
book, and to sue for violations of it, the interest given (sec. 554), though sometimes they are brought for in-
by the statute of Anne was a substitute or merger of juries, in unsettled countries, to person, but not to real
the common-law right, and no suit could be sustained estate, in the place where the offender is found.
under the statute. (See also Philips on Patents, 91, (Livingten v. Jefferson, Camp. 180; 4 D. & E. 503.
Hen. Bl. 403.) But it has been held here in the Our duties are such, to redress wrongs to foreigners,
cases before cited, that the action in this instance that they are by the constitution allowed to sue in
still lay at common law, though this point was per- the United States courts, so as to secure greater ex-
haps not raised and pressed there so elaborately as emption from local partialities or prejudices against
here. Nor is it pretended that the right of action them. And a refusal of justice to them in the judi-
here, as at common law, is expressly taken away by cial tribunals is one just cause of war. (4 Elliott,
the statute. But if taken away, it is done merely by Debts, 167. The 11th section of the Judiciary Act
implication. I have no doubt the statute in this case confers the same power on this Court to sustain suits
meant to confer some benefits as to copyrights and where an alien is a party as when a citizen is. Aliens
marks on aliens, which the latter did not before pos- may sue here as extensively as in the State Courts.
sess, instead of stripping them of any old rights. Our (19 Pick. 214.) In Barry's case, so notorious for eight
law as to the mere patent and copyrights seems to or ten years past in both the courts of New York and
proceed on the ground that at common law they did of the Union, he, though an alien, has been allowed,

"without

terests to promote those of others. (Chitty on Con. 13. The next objection conveys an idea not exactly
26.) But that is a very different thing from taking correct, as the judge informed the jury, that though
what is valuable from them without acknowledgment a large dealer buying of the defendant might know or
or compensation. So we may be, it is said," rea- be told that the mark was imitated, yet if he knew
sonably selfish," but we should not cheat, lie, and the thread was to be sold again at retail without
deceive to the injury of individuals, whether aliens or giving that information, and it was so sold, the plain-
citizens. Comity and courtesy are due to all friendly tiffs should recover. This was undoubtedly right,
strangers rather than imposition or pillage. Taking for the defendant was thus accessary to the eventual
their marks, and using them as and for theirs, sales of the thread under a forged stamp, as if a true
their damage, is like preying on a visitor, stamp; and he thus took the profits of sales, which
inhospitably plundering a wreck on shore. would otherwise have gone to the plaintiffs and their
elevate our own character as a nation and agents. (3 Barn. & Cress. 541.)
purity of our judicial tribunals, it seems to
me, we ought to go as far in the redress and
purishment of them as can be vindicated on any
sound principles. Some of the statutes passed in
what we consider a comparatively barbarous age are
not without admonitory lessons on this subject. The
9 Edw. 3, c. 1, s. 1, besides one before referred to,
empowers alien merchants to sell and buy freely
anywhere, and to have redress, if disturbed, and da-
mages. (1 Stats. at Large, 465.) And 27 Edw. 3,
cc. 18, 19, s. 2, provides that as such merchants
"cannot often long tarry in one place, we will and
grant that speedy right be to them done from day to
day and from hour to hour, according to the laws,
&c. (Ib. 631.) Again, in the 3rd section of
our treaty of 1794 with England, each power is
authorised in America "freely to carry on trade and
commerce with each other." So we are under treaty-
obligations to Great Britain, and most other Eu-
ropean powers, to admit their merchandise on favour-
able terms, and to allow their merchants to trade
here as those of favoured nations. But it would be a
mockery of such provisions and engagements if we
prevented them from selling their goods after arriving
here (Brown v. St. of Md. Ch. J. Marshall in 12
Wheat. 447), unless noxious to health or morals; or,
if we made onerous discriminations against them, or
prevented them from receiving the prices of their
goods, or abstained from yielding protection against
injuries to them or to their marks. (Taylor v. Car-
penter, 3 Story's Rep. 461.) I am not satisfied,
then, that the judge at the trial did wrong in not
charging on this point as desired; nor am I dissatis-
fied with the verdict in point of law or fact in this
respect.

as to regaining the custody of his child from his wife
and her connections, the same remedies and principles
as are granted to citizens. (Barry's case, 2 Howard.
See Mercein v. The People, 25 Wend. 64. Barry's
case, 5 Howard.) An alien gets the right of protec-
tion and security from his obedience, industry, and
art while he resides here, and the usefulness of his
capital and skill employed here when he resides abroad.
In Story's Conflict of Laws, s. 565, he says, "It may
be laid down as a general rule that all foreigners sui to
juris, and not otherwise specially disabled by the law or
of the place where the suit is brought, may there To
maintain suits to vindicate their rights and redress the
their wrongs." 2 Bligh. 51; 1 Dow. & Clk. 164;
1 Clark & Fin. 333; 2 Levins, 94; 8 Barn. & Cress.
427; 9 Ves. 347; 4 Johns. Ch. 370; and 13 Peters,
512, extends comity of suits to corporations out
of a State. A person from abroad suing in this
country is to enjoy no greater nor less rights than
citizens. "He is to have the same rights which all
the subjects of this kingdom are entitled to." (Lord
Tenterden in De la Vega v. Vicuna, 1 Barn. & Ad.
284; 2 Cowen, 626; 1 Peters, C. C. 317; 1 Waskn.
C. C. 376; 2 Johns. 345; 10 Wheat. 1; Henry on
For. L. 81, 86.) Foreign contracts, as well as laws,
are respected and enforced only from comity, not
proprio vigore; but almost invariably enforced. (Story's
Conflict. of Laws, 244.) Much more then should we
allow to persons protection and redress by comity,
than respect contracts and laws made abroad, as we
do daily in every appropriate case. Alien merchants
may not only sue for personal property, but, if
resident in England, be allowed the benefit of
their bankrupt laws. (Bac. Abr. tit. "Mer-
chants.") The whole system of modern facilities
for intercourse, through consuls and ambassadors,
through less rigid exclusions, through improved
roads and steamships, through freer trade and lower
duties, and the increased brotherhood caused by the
art of printing, the mariner's compass, and Chris-
tianity, all tend to connect nations closer, and equal-
ise their rights and privileges in business. The pro-
gress of civilisation and commerce, and the whole
character of our institutions and laws, are more and
more friendly to foreigners, regarding them more as
brethren, of one blood and origin and hope, rather
than barbarians and enemies. So, as to permitting
them to trade here, to sell and buy, to recover
for conversions or injuries, or sales of their pro-
perty, to sue for frauds and receipts in relation
to it as well as contracts,-this has been the
law ever since the constitution empowered Con-
gress to have courts to try suits where an alien
was a party, and ever since Congress conferred that
power in 1789 on the Circuit Court. We, as well as
the State Courts, have yearly sustained alien friends
in vindicating their personal rights, as fully as we do
citizens in all analogous cases. Courts acting under
the Law of Nations-as does the District Court
sometimes, and this one on appeals-are said to be
less rigorous as to aliens than even common law
Courts. (1 Peters, C. C. 106.) Indeed, by the very
nature of our institutions encouraging emigration
here and naturalisation, and filling up our waste
lands with the industrious of all nations, a more libe-
ral course has always been countenanced here in re
spect to foreigners than in England. Thus says
Tucker:-" An alien in America, antecedent to the
revolution, was entitled to all the rights and privileges
of an alien in England, and many more-to all that
an alien in England could claim." Again :-" An
alien in America was also entitled to many more
rights than an alien in England." (1 Black.
Comm. 99, by Tucker.) The modern system of
reciprocal treaties with foreign nations adopted by
us, has for a quarter of a century been breaking
down the barriers against aliens. The alien being a
resident abroad makes no difference in his right or in
our jurisdiction, if the subject-matter of the action
arises here. If he is an alien, in order to give juris-
diction (7 Peters, 413) he may reside either abroad or
here. Again the complaint here is not so much taking
the mark of the plaintiffs, as a generic or any other
name, as the defendant selling the thread with such a
mark as and for the plaintiffs. That is the gist of the
wrong: that is a deceit and an injury; and I do
not see why it is not one of those injuries to the per-
sonal rights and personal property of the plaintiffs,
which, when committed here, should be redressed here
in favour of alien friends no less than citizens. We
reprint, to be sure, foreign books, as Hallam's History,
and put that on the title-page. But we do not add
to it the words, shewing it to be a London, or Paris,
or Dublin edition, and sell it as and for such. If we
did, it would be reprehensible and to be discounte.
nanced. So, in manufactures, we may strive to
imitate the good fabrics of other countries, or to
surpass them. That is one thing and is commend-
able. But if we go further, and adopt their peculiar
marks and sell our goods as and for theirs, we deceive
and injure foreigners, who Own them, and this
whether the fabric be of as good a quality or not.
(Bell v. ———, 8 Paige, Ch. 78.) And if it is inferior,
we injure our own people in a pecuniary view, as well
as in the moral tone of trade and in national liberality:
It is said we are not bound to sacrifice our own in-

9. The ninth objection is, that the judge did not charge that the plaintiffs had forfeited their right to sue, if they knew for a long time of these forgeries and sales and did not sue. We have before shewn that there is no legal principle to bar such a suit, unless the delay to prosecute is equal to the time fixed in the Statute of Limitations; or, as in patents, the inventor permits a public use so long as by the express statutory provision to be estopped. (See antè.) 10. The tenth objection is, that the judge did not instruct the jury it was competent to infer from certain depositions in the case that the plaintiffs had abandoned their marks to be used by the public. But the further statement under this head, as to what the judge did charge the jury on this point, repels the idea that any error occurred; for he instructed them that if the use was for such a length of time, and under such circumstances as to indicate a dedication or abandonment of the marks to the public, or a license to use them, the plaintiffs could not recover. This accords with the views in Wyeth v. Stone, 1 Story's R. 282; Redding v. Howe, 8 Sim. 479.

11. The eleventh objection is, that the Court did not instruct the jury that if the thread made by the defendant was not inferior in value to the plaintiffs', the latter ought not to recover. I concur in his view, that it was no defence as to the plaintiffs' injury, as the defendant would not have sold his thread so extensively, and thus lessened the plaintiffs' sales, without accompanying it by the mark of the plaintiffs, which had obtained an established reputation. The public might not have so much reason to complain if they got as good an article. They would, however, run more risk, not having the guarantee of goodness which they expected, as Taylor's forged name and mark were palmed on them for the genuine. (4 B. & Al. 410; 3 B. & C. 541; 4 Man. & G. 179.) Nor would they have the remedy against the plain. tiffs which they otherwise might have if the article proved inferior to what had been sold under the genuine brand. To be sure the plaintiffs, in their declaration, aver that the thread sold by the defendant was inferior in quality. But the proof of this is no condition precedent to recover damages for the loss of sales, though it would be to recover damages for loss from the injury to the character of their thread. Not proving that last injury, they did not recover for it, but, proving large sales by the defendants, as and for the plaintiffs, they proved a probable loss of such sales by themselves, and ought to recover for that, as they lost the usual profits on sales to that amount.

12. The next objection was, that the plaintiffs in such last case should recover only nominal damages. But the actual damage suffered by loss of sales by the plaintiffs, which was the ground of recovery, was just as great as if the thread had been inferior, though the credit of their mark and thread might not suffer so much thereby, if it did at all.

or

14. On the question of damages, however, in respect to giving "exemplary" ones, there is some doubt whether the charge was in the exact form deemed proper under modern analyses and decisions on this point. (3 Am. Jur. 287-308, by Metcalfe ; 2 Greenlf. Ev. 253-272: 19 Pick. 216; 7 Law Rep. 530.) That the jury should have given more than nominal damages, I have no doubt; and I have as little doubt that there were materials enough in the case from which to estimate actual damages-such as the probable extent of sales by the defendant under these marks, and the loss of sales and profits thereon by the plaintiffs. The jury would, in a case like this, of a known and deliberate imitation-often renewed and very prejudicial to the plaintiffs-not be very nice in their data and inferences, but be sure to give enough to cover all losses, and prove an ample indemnity. (2 M. & Sel. 77; 13 Conn, 320; 6 Cowen, 254; 7 Mars. 251.) Not smart money, vindictive damages, but full atonement for the wrong done." (8 Carr. & Payne, 7; 7 M. & G. 1033; 5 Watts, 375; 5 Taunt. 442.) In a case like this, if in any, no reason exists for giving greater damages than have actually been sustained, or what have been called "compensatory." There is nothing peculiarly atrocious in the conduct of the defendant to be punished by damages, and in no other way, as a public example, considering the blameable usages which exist on this subject. So in very corrupt or flagitious wrongs, if a criminal prosecution lies for the public offence, I do not see much justification for what are called vindictive damages there, or smart-money in the civil suit, as the criminal one covers them. But what may be allowable in other cases it may not be proper to decide here, but leave them to be considered when those of a different character from this occur. (See Sedgwick on Damages, 39; 2 Greenlf. Ev. 253 to 256, sections and book before cited.) If here by "exemplary damages" the judge meant a full indemnity for the individual wrong in every equitable view, and thus, by such an example, operating in a preventive manner the more effectually against a repetition of such injuries, then no error happened on his part. On the contrary, if he, in the burry of the trial, used language which the jury were likely to construe as going beyond the range of indemnity, yet, in point of fact, the jury do not appear to have given more than was sufficient to make the plaintiffs whole, but rather less than that amount; this state of things does not seem to constitute a good ground for a new trial. It would be idle and worthless, even to the defendant, to have a new trial, with no probability of lessening the amount of the verdict. My associate, who tried the cause, entertaining this opinion as to the verdict for 800l. and seeing nothing myself which is apparently exorbitant in that sum, I do not feel justified in disturbing the verdict on that account. (Wiggin v. Coffin, 3 Story Rep. 11.) SPRAGUE, J. expressed his concurrence in this opinion.

New trial refused, and judgment on the verdict. [It appears the custom in the American Courts to give only the page of the work referred to, and not the name of the case in every instance, as is done in our Courts.-Ed. LAW T.]

THE LEGISLATOR.

Summary. AMONG the Legislative changes in the Laws regulating the Administration of Justice which will be brought forward next Session, we are informed that the LORD CHANCELLOR'S comprehensive measure for remodelling the Law of Bankruptcy and Insolvency will be early introduced. We venture to hope that the absurd mode of issuing fiats in bankruptcythat remnant of the old system which occasions so much expense and such vexatious delay, will be attentively considered before his Lordship's measure be completed. As at present existing, the law is a sheer absurdity. For instance, a creditor lives at Newcastle there is a Newcastle Commissioner; the debtor lives at Newcastle. The creditor is ready with his witnesses to prove the debtor's bankruptcy, or the debtor is willing to make himself bankrupt; yet nothing can be done without

SEPT. 18.]

sending to London for the LORD CHANCELLOR'S authority on parchment, authorising the creditor or debtor-to do what?" to prosecute his complaint before the Commissioner in the town where he resides." Some remarks on this absurdity will be found appended to the case Re Good, among our reports.

THIRD REPORT OF HER MAJESTY'S
COMMISSIONERS

NAL LAW.

(Continued from page 479.)
CHAPTER VI.

THE LAW TIMES.

sion three or more pieces of false or counterfeit coin Article 14 of this chapter, resembling, or [apparentl pass for, any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin of any foreign prince, state, or country, knowing resembling, or apparently intended to resemble or intended] to resemble or pass for, any gold or silver coin, knowing the same to be false and counterfeit, the same to be false or counterfeit, shall, in respect and with intent to utter or put off the same, shall in- of a first offence, suffer six months' imprisonment, six months; in respect of a second offence, suffer two cur, in respect of a first offence, the penalties of the and find sureties for his good behaviour for six months the penalties of the 5th class. 17th class, and in respect of any subsequent offence, more, to be computed from the end of the said first 10. Whosoever shall knowingly and without law-years' imprisonment, and find sureties for his good ful authority (the proof of which authority shall lie on behaviour for two years more, to be computed from the party accused), make or mend, or begin or pro- the end of such first two years; and in respect of any ceed to make or mend, or buy or sell, or shall know- subsequent offence, shall incur the penalties of the 3rd excuse shall lie on the party accused) have in his cusFOR REVISING AND CONSOLIDATING THE CRIMI-ingly and without lawful excuse (the proof of which class. tody or possession any puncheon, counter-puncheon, matrix, stamp, die, pattern, or mould in or upon which there shall be made or impressed, or which will make or impress, or which shall be intended to make or impress, the figure, stamp, or apparent resemblance of both or either of the sides of any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin, or any part Ör shall without lawful authority (the proof whereor parts of both or either of such sides; of shall lie on the party accused) make or mend, or begin or proceed to make or mend, or buy or sell, or shall without lawful excuse (the proof whereof shall lie on the party accused) have in his custody or possession any edger, edging-tool, collar, instrument, or engine adapted and intended for the marking of coin round the edges with letters, grainings, or other marks or figures apparently resembling those on the edges of any of the Queen's current gold or silver as aforesaid: coin, knowing the same to be so adapted and intended

Offences relating to the coin, and to bullion and gold and silver plate.

Art. 1. Whosoever shall falsely make or counterfeit any coin resembling, or apparently intended to resemble or pass for, any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin, shall incur the penalties of the 5th class.

2. The offence defined in the last preceding article shall be deemed to be complete, although the coin made or counterfeited as therein mentioned shall not be in a fit state to be uttered, or the counterfeiting thereof shall not be finished or perfected.

3. Whosoever shall gild or silver, or with any wash or materials capable of producing the colour of gold or of silver, shall wash, colour, or case over any coin whatsoever resembling, or apparently intended to resemble or pass for, any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin;

Or shall gild or silver, or with any wash or materials capable of producing the colour of gold or of silver, shall wash, colour, or case over any piece of silver or copper, or of coarse gold or coarse silver, or of any metal or mixture of metals respectively, being of a fit size and figure to be coined, and with intent that the same shall be coined into false and counter feit coin resembling, or apparently intended to resemble or pass for, any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin;

Or shall without lawful authority (the proof whereof shall lie on the party accused) make or mend, or begin or proceed to make or mend, or buy or sell, or shall without lawful excuse (the proof whereof shall lie on the party accused) have in his custody or possession any press for coinage, or any cutting engine for cutting by force of a screw or of any other contrivance, round blanks out of gold, silver, or other metal, knowing such press to be a press for coinage, intended to be used for or in order to the counterfeitor knowing such engine to have been used, or to be Or shall gild, or with any wash or materials capa-ing of any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin, 11. Whosoever shall without lawful authority (the ble of producing the colour of gold, shall wash, shall incur the penalties of the 5th class. colour, or case over any of the Queen's current silver coin; or shall file or in any manner alter such coin, with proof whereof shall lie on the party accused) knowintent to make the same resemble or pass for any of ingly convey out of any of her Majesty's mints any puncheon, counter-puncheon, matrix, stamp, die, the Queen's current gold coin; pattern, mould, edger, edging-tool, collar, instrument, press or engine used or employed in or about the coining of coin, or any useful part of any of the several matters aforesaid, or any coin, bullion, metal, or mixture of metals, shall incur the penalties of the 5th class.

Or shall gild or silver, or with any wash or materials capable of producing the colour of gold or of silver, shall wash, colour, or case over any of the Queen's current copper coin; or shall file or in any manner alter such coin, with intent to make the same resemble or pass for any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin, shall incur the penalties of the 5th class.

4. Whosoever shall impair, diminish, or lighten any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin with intent to make the coin so impaired, diminished, or lightened pass for the Queen's current gold or silver coin, shall incur the penalties of the 9th class.

5. Whosoever shall buy, sell, receive, pay, or put off, or offer to buy, sell, receive, pay, or put off, any false or counterfeit coin resembling, or apparently intended to resemble or pass for, any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin, at or for a lower rate or value than the same by its denomination imports, or was coined or counterfeited for, shall incur the penalties of the 5th class.

6. Whosoever shall import into the United Kingdom from beyond the seas any false or counterfeit coin resembling, or apparently intended to resemble or pass for, any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin, knowing the same to be false or counterfeit, shall incur the penalties of the 5th class.

7. Whosoever shall tender, utter, or put off any false or counterfeit coin resembling, or apparently intended to resemble or pass for, any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin, knowing the same to be false or counterfeit, shall incur, in respect of a first offence, the penalties of the 30th class, and in respect of any subsequent offence, the penalties of the 5th class.

8. Whosoever shall tender, utter, or put off any such false or counterfeit coin as in the last preceding article is mentioned, knowing the same to be false or counterfeit, and shall, at the time of such tendering, uttering, or putting off, have in his possession, besides the false or counterfeit coin so tendered, uttered, or put off, one or more piece or pieces of false or counterfeit coin resembling, or apparently intended to resemble or pass for, any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin, or shall, either on the day of such tendering, uttering, or putting off, or within the space of ten days then next ensuing, tender, utter, or put off any more or other false or counterfeit coin resembling, or apparently intended to resemble or pass for, any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin, knowing the same to be false or counterfeit, shall incur, in respect of a first offence, the penalties of the 20th class, and in respect of any subsequent offence, the penalties of the 5th class.

9. Whosoever shall have in his custody or posses.

12. Whosoever shall falsely make or counterfeit
any coin resembling, or apparently intended to re-
semble or pass for, any of the Queen's current copper
coin;

Or shall knowingly and without lawful authority
(the proof of which authority shall lie on the party
accused) make or mend, or begin or proceed to make
or mend, or buy or sell, or shall knowingly and
without lawful excuse (the proof of which excuse
shall lie on the party accused) have in his custody or
possession any instrument, tool, or engine adapted
and intended for the counterfeiting of any of the
Queen's current copper coin;

Or shall buy, sell, receive, pay, or put off, or offer
to buy, sell, receive, pay, or put off, any false or coun-
terfeit coin, resembling, or apparently intended to
resemble or pass for, any of the Queen's current
copper coin, at or for a lower rate or value than the
same by its denomination imports, or was coined or
counterfeited for, shall incur the penalties of the 14th

class.

13. Whosoever shall tender, utter, or put off any false or counterfeit coin, resembling, or apparently intended to resemble or pass for, any of the Queen's current copper coin, knowing the same to be false or counterfeit, or shall have in his custody or possession three or more pieces of false or counterfeit coin, refor, any of the Queen's current copper coin, knowing sembling, or apparently intended to resemble or pass the same to be false or counterfeit, and with intent to utter or put off the same, shall incur the penalties of

the 22nd class.

14. Whosoever shall [falsely] make or counterfeit any kind of coin, not the proper coin of this realm, nor permitted to be current within the same, but resembling, or [apparently intended] to resemble or pass or country, shall incur the penalties of the 14th class. for, any gold or silver coin of any foreign prince, state, 15. Whosoever shall bring into this realm any such false or counterfeit coin as in the last preceding article is mentioned, resembling, or [apparently intended] to resemble or pass for, any gold or silver coin of any foreign prince, state, or country, knowing the same to be false or counterfeit, to the intent to utter the same within this realm, or within any dominions of the same, shall incur the penalties of the 14th class.

16. Whosoever shall tender, utter, or put off any such false or counterfeit coin as is mentioned in

17. Whosoever shall [falsely] make or counterfeit any kind of coin, not the proper coin of this realm, nor ordered by the royal proclamation of her Majesty to be deemed and taken as current money of this realm, or any part thereof, but resembling, or [apparently intended] to resemble or pass for, any foreign prince, state, or country respectively, shall copper coin, or any other coin made of any metal or mixed metals of less value than the silver coin of any incur in respect of a first offence the penalties of the 22nd class, and in respect of a second offence the penalties of the 14th class.

18. Where "the Queen's current gold or silver coin," or "the Queen's current copper coin," is mentioned in any Article of this Chapter, the same shall be deemed to include and denote any gold or silver coin or any copper coin respectively coined in any of Her Majesty's mints, and lawfully current in any part of Her Majesty's dominions, whether within the United Kingdom or otherwise:

And any of the Queen's current coin which shall have been gilt, silvered, washed, coloured, or cased over, or in any manner altered so as to resemble, or be apparently intended to resemble, or pass for any of the Queen's current coin of a higher denomination, shall be deemed and taken to be counterfeit coin, within the intent and meaning of those Articles of this Chapter, wherein mention is made of "false or counterfeit coin, resembling or apparently intended to resemble or pass for any of the Queen's current gold or silver coin."

19. If any broker, not being a trading goldsmith, molten silver, he shall incur the penalty of the 24th or refiner of silver, shall buy or sell any bullion or class.

20. Whosoever, being suspected of buying or selling unlawful bullion, in whose possession such unlawful bullion shall be found, shall not, upon his trial on an indictment for melting the current silver coin of this realm, prove, by the oath of one credible witness at the least, the bullion so found to be lawful silver, and 24th class. that the same was not the current coin of this realm, nor clippings thereof, shall incur the penalty of the

21. Whosoever shall forge any die or other instrument, or any part of any die or other instrument, Company of Goldsmiths in London [or Edinburgh], provided or used or to be provided or used by the or by any of the several companies of goldsmiths in the cities of York, Exeter, Bristol, Chester, or Norwich, or the town of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, or by the companies of guardians of the standard of wrought-plate in the towns of Sheffield or Birmingham respectively, for the marking or stamping of any such forged die or other instrument, any ware of gold gold or silver wares; or shall mark with any such forged die or other instrument, or with any part of or silver, or any ware of base metal, or shall utter, [expose to sale or export out of the kingdom] any such ware of gold or silver, or any such ware of base an imitation of, or shall utter, knowing the same to metal so marked, knowing the same to be so marked; or shall forge, or by any means whatsoever produce mark of any such die or other instrument provided be forged or an imitation, any mark or part of any or used or to be provided or used as aforesaid, upon any ware of gold or silver, or any ware of base metal; or shall transpose or remove, or shall utter, knowing to be provided or used as aforesaid, from any ware the same to be transposed or removed, any mark of any such die or other instrument provided or used or or to any ware of base metal; or shall without law. of gold or silver to any other ware of gold or silver, other instrument, or any ware of gold or silver, or any ful excuse (the proof whereof shall lie on the party accused) have in his possession any such forged die or ware of base metal, having thereupon the mark of any such forged die or other instrument, or having thereupon any such forged mark, or imitation of a mark, or any mark which shall have been so transrespectively to have been forged, imitated, marked, posed or removed as aforesaid, knowing the same transposed, or removed; or shall cut or sever from any ware of gold or silver, any mark or any part of any mark of any die or other instrument provided or used or to be provided or used as aforesaid, with intent that such mark or such part of a mark shall or may be placed upon or joined or affixed to any ware of gold or silver, or any ware of base to any other ware of gold or silver, or to any ware of base metal; or shall place upon or join or affix metal, any mark of any die or other instrument provided or used, or to be provided or used as aforesaid,

authority, to transfer [or accept] any share or interest | constables, all classes, 41; amount paid to the of or in any such stock, annuity, public fund, or county police-rate, 3,001l. 9s. 11d. Expenditure for capital stock, as is mentioned in Article 4, or to re- 1846 pay and allowances, 2,4017. 16s. 10d.; inciceive any dividend payable in respect of any such dental expenses, 4147. 11s.; total, 2,8167. 7s. 10d. share or interest, or shall utter any such power of Cumberland (Derwent Division).-Number of petty attorney, or other authority, with the name or hand- sessions districts, 1; population, 29,500; number of writing of any person forged thereon as an attesting constables, all classes, 4; amount paid to the county witness, knowing the same to be forged, shall incur police-rate, 2801. Expenditure for 1846: pay and the penalties of the 14th class. allowances, 2301. 10s.; incidental expenses, 351. 6s. 11d.; total, 2651. 16s. 11d.

Bedford.-Number of petty sessions districts, 6; population, 98,758; number of constables, all classes, 47; amount paid to the county police-rate, 3,4491. 69. 2d. Expenditure for the year 1846: pay and allowances, 3,2481. 16s. ; incidental expenses, 3061. 16s. 8d.; total, 3,555. 128. 8d. Cambridge (Isle of Ely).-Number of petty sessions districts, 4; population, 54,785; number of