malicious motives in prosecuting him, and that he had no sufficient reason to believe him to be guilty. If either of these be wanting, the action must fail; and so are all the authorities from a very early period to the present time. Golding v. Crowle, Sayer, 1; Farmer v. Darling, 4 Burr. 1,974; 1 Hillard on T. 460.

"It is true, as before remarked, that want of probable cause is evidence of malice for the consideration of the jury; but the converse of the proposition cannot be sustained. Nothing will meet the exigencies of the case, so far as respects the allegation that probable cause was wanting, except proof of the fact; and the onus probandi, as was well remarked in the case last referred to, is upon the plaintiff to prove affirmatively, by circumstances or otherwise, as he may be able, that the defendant had no reasonable ground for commencing the prosecution. Purcell v. McNamara, 9 East, 361; Willans v. Taylor, 6 Bing. 184; Johnstone v. Sutton, 1 Term, 544; Add. on W. and R. 435; Turner v. Ambler, 10 Q. B. 257.”

While it is true that the want of probable cause is required to be shown by the plaintiff and the burden of proof is upon her in this respect, such proof must necessarily be of a negative character, and concerning facts which are principally within the knowledge of the defendant. The motives and circumstances which induced him to enter upon the prosecution are best known to himself.. This being true, the plaintiff could hardly be expected to furnish full proof upon the matter. She is only required to adduce such testimony as, in the absence of proof by the defendant to the contrary, would afford grounds for presuming that the allegation in this respect is true. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 78. In other words, the plaintiff was only obliged to adduce such proof, by circumstances or otherwise as are affirmatively within her control, and which she might fairly be expected to be able to produce. As Mr. Justice Clifford put it, in Wheeler v. Nesbitt, supra,

the plaintiff must prove this part of the case "affirmatively, by circumstances or otherwise as he may be able."

It is contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error that Miss Brown produced all the testimony in the case which she might reasonably be expected to control, and it is pertinently asked, What more could she prove? We think an inspection of the record furnishes an answer to the question. With respect to the search warrant, the charge was not that the plaintiff and Mrs. Levy stole or wrongfully took the property of the defendant, but the belief of the defendant was averred that the property had been by some one thus taken and was concealed in or about the premises of the plaintiff and Mrs. Levy. The plaintiff could readily have shown that, within the time named in the search warrant, so far as she knew, with the means which she had of information, the property in question had never been upon her premises. She could have shown by Mrs. Levy, whom she produced as a witness, that Mrs. Levy did not take the property from the premises of the defendant and that the property was not upon the premises of Miss Brown at any time so far as her knowledge and opportunity of knowing extended.

Failing to adduce proof of the facts to which we have called attention, and, in clear cases the question of probable cause being one of law for the court, we think that there was no error in taking the case from the jury.

Judgment of the District Court of Appeals is affirmed.

VOL. CCXXIV-13

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. GOODRICH TRANSIT COMPANY.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. SAME.

UNITED STATES v. WHITE STAR LINE.

UNITED STATES v. SAME.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COMMERCE COURT.

Nos. 879, 880, 881, 882. Argued February 20, 21, 1912.-Decided April 1,

1912.

Conclusions and argumentative deductions set forth in the bill as to effect of orders of a governmental body upon complainant are not to be regarded under the rules of pleading as allegations of fact and admitted. United States v. Ames, 99 U. S. 35.

Carriers partly by railroad and partly by water under a common arrangement for a continuous carriage are as specifically within the term of the Interstate Commerce Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, c. 3591, as any other carrier named therein.

Such carriers are subject to the provisions of the act authorizing the Commission to require a system of accounting.

Such carriers, while engaged in carrying on traffic under joint rates with railroads filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, are bound to deal upon like terms with all shippers availing of the rates and are generally subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. Section 20 of the Interstate Commerce Act gives the Commission ample authority to require accounts to be kept by carriers in the manner prescribed by the Commission.

A statute requiring a carrier doing both interstate and intrastate business to render accounts of all of its business is not beyond the power of Congress as a regulation of intrastate commerce.

Carriers partly by land and partly by water may be required to keep accounts of all their traffic, both interstate and intrastate, under the provisions of § 20 of the act of June 29, 1906.

Congress may not delegate its purely legislative power; but having laid down general rules of action under which a commission may pro

224 U. S. Argument for the Interstate Commerce Commission.

ceed, it may require that commission to apply such rules to particular situations.

The provisions of § 20 of the act of June 29, 1906, authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to require accounts to be kept in a specified manner by interstate carriers, are not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

Under § 20 of the act of June 29, 1906, the Interstate Commerce Commission is to be fully informed of all business conducted by a carrier of interstate traffic; and this includes all operations of such carriers, whether strictly transportation or not; in this case held to include amusement parks operated by a carrier of interstate commerce partly by land and partly by water.

190 Fed. Rep. 943, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the constitutionality and construction of the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act in regard to accounts to be kept by carriers partly by land and partly by water, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Charles W. Needham for the Interstate Commerce Commission:

The provisions of § 20 have a real and substantial relation to the execution of the powers and the attainment of the purposes of the Act to Regulate Commerce; therefore Congress has power to require statistical reports from, and a uniform system of bookkeeping by, every common carrier subject to the act, and the Interstate Commerce Commission acted within its statutory power in requiring such reports from, and classification of accounts by, such carriers. Gibbon v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196, 223; Inter. Com. Comm. v. Balt. & O. R. R. Co., 145 U. S. 276; Int. Com. Comm. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 506; Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 438; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 178; Inter. Com. Comm. v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 215 U. S. 452, 474; Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 31; Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Int. Com. Comm., 221 U. S. 612, 618; Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20,

Argument for the Interstate Commerce Commission. 224 U. S.

24; N. Y., N. H. & H. Railroad Co. v. I. C. C., 200 U. S. 361, 391.

The primary objects of the Act to Regulate Commerce are to destroy favoritism, to prevent rebating and undue advantages of every kind which give to one shipper over the public highways an undue advantage over contemporaneous shippers, and when these unlawful acts by an interstate commerce agent are discovered by an examination of carriers' accounts, it becomes apparent that there is a real or substantial relation or connection between what is required by these orders in respect to accounts and the object which the Act to Regulate Commerce obviously is designed to attain. Reports would be valueless for the purposes of comparison with former reports by the same carrier unless the classification was uniform.

Common carriers by water, who have voluntarily filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission joint tariffs under which they operate jointly with railroads in transporting interstate passengers and property over through routes partly by railroad and partly by water, are agents of interstate commerce and as such may be lawfully required to classify their accounts and make statistical reports of their entire business as common carriers.

The relation of a carrier to a particular traffic, or to instrumentalities which are under the regulating power of Congress, determines whether such a carrier is subject to the act. Re Oyster Police Steamers, 31 Fed. Rep. 763; The City of Salem, 37 Fed. Rep. 846; Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; So. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Inter. Com. Comm., 219 U. S. 498.

These cases recognize the power of Congress to legislate in reference to the agents of interstate commerce who are carrying on a transportation business which is subject to the act. It is not the terminology of the statute or the manner in which its agents are brought under the regulating power of Congress, but it is the fact that they are