as said before, there is nothing to show that any debt of the estate was created after the purchase of the teams, except that of appellant, who had actual notice." As Wicks v. Mc

Connell was cited as sustaining this statement, it is not probable that the court regarded it as overruling or departing from what had been said in that case; and this view receives added support from the fact that the opinion in Swafford's Adm'r v. Asher was marked by the court "Not to be officially reported." These considerations, coupled with the further fact that in cases such as Bowles' Ex'r v. Jones, supra, where subsequent creditors prevailed over such a mortgagee, the court was careful to state, not only that the claims of the creditors arose after the date of the unrecorded mortgage, but also that the creditors had obtained attachment or other liens upon the mortgaged property before the mortgage was recorded, are persuasive that what was said in Wicks Bros. v. McConnell should be accepted as reflecting the true construction of § 496, in the absence of some more positive and direct ruling upon the subject by the Court of Appeals of the State. Such was the view of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and we are at least unable to say that it was wrong. It follows that, as here the subsequent creditors had not fastened any lien upon the property covered by the mortgage prior to the proceedings in bankruptcy by which the title passed to the trustee, the mortgage, although unrecorded, was valid and effective against them.

Decree affirmed.

Opinion of the Court.

224 U.S.

BRINKMEIER v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.

No. 206. Submitted March 11, 1912.—Decided April 1, 1912.

The Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, c. 196, did not embrace all cars on the lines of interstate carriers, but only those engaged in interstate commerce. It did not, until amended by the act of March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943, c. 976, embrace all cars used on railroads engaged in interstate commerce.

A declaration for injuries sustained prior to the amendment of March 2, 1903, which did not allege that the car involved was engaged in interstate commerce, was properly held defective.

The rule that decisions of the state court on questions of pleading and

practice under the laws of a State are not reviewable by this court held to include the denial, on the ground that the period of limitation had expired, of an application made after trial to amend the declaration, so as to state a cause of action. Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408.

Although the petition may declare under a Federal statute, if it states no cause of action thereunder but at most a right of recovery at common law, rulings on the sufficiency of evidence do not involve Federal questions.

81 Kansas, 101, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the construction of the Safety Appliance Acts, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. C. V. Ferguson, with whom Mr. Kos Harris and Mr. V. Harris were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Bailie P. Waggener, Mr. Charles E. Benton and Mr. David Smyth for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action to recover for personal injuries

224 U. S.

Opinion of the Court.

sustained by a brakeman while coupling two freight cars on a side track of the defendant railway company at Hutchinson, Kansas. The defendant prevailed in the state courts, 81 Kansas, 101, and the plaintiff brings the case here. The injury occurred November 12, 1900, and the action was begun March 15, 1901.

The question first presented for decision is, whether the petition stated a cause of action under the original Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, c. 196, which made it unlawful for any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad "to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact," etc. The petition, if liberally construed, charged that defendant was a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad; that the cars in question were not equipped with couplers of the prescribed type, and that the plaintiff's injuries proximately resulted from the absence of such couplers; but there was no allegation that either of the cars was then or at any time used in moving interstate traffic. The Supreme Court of the State held that in the absence of such an allegation the petition did not state a cause of action under the original act. We think that ruling was right. The terms of that act were such that its application depended, first, upon the carrier being engaged in interstate commerce by railroad, and, second, upon the use of the car in moving interstate traffic. It did not embrace all cars used on the line of such a carrier, but only such as were used in interstate commerce. Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 25. The act was amended March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943, c. 976, so as to include all cars "used on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce," but the amendment came too late to be of any avail to the plaintiff.

In 1908, after the case had been twice tried without any

decisive result, the plaintiff sought to amend his petition by charging that the cars were used in moving interstate traffic, but the application was denied, the period of limitation having expired in the meantime. Error is assigned upon this ruling; but as it involved only a question of pleading and practice under the laws of the State, it is not subject to review by us. Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408, 416.

It also was held that the evidence produced upon the third trial was not sufficient to sustain a recovery under the petition, and error is assigned upon this. As the petition did not state a cause of action under the Safety Appliance Act, but at most a right of recovery at common law, the ruling upon the sufficiency of the evidence did not involve a Federal question, and so is not open to reexamination in this court.

Finding no error in the record in respect of any Federal right, the judgment must be

Affirmed.

STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF INDIANA v. STATE OF MISSOURI ON THE INFORMATION OF HADLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUCCEEDED BY MAJOR.

REPUBLIC OIL COMPANY v. SAME

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

Nos. 47, 48. Argued November 8, 9, 1911.-Decided April 1, 1912. It is essential to the validity of a judgment that the court rendering it have jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; but it is for the highest court of a State to determine its own jurisdiction and that of the local tribunals.

Where the constitution of a State gives to its highest court the power

to issue writs of quo warranto and to hear and determine the same, judgment of ouster and fine entered by that court implies that it had jurisdiction to so decide and enter judgment and is conclusive upon this court whether the judgment is civil or criminal or both. Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U. S. 420.

Under due process of law one is entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard, and the notice must correspond to the hearing and the relief must be appropriate to the notice and the hearing.

Even a court of original general jurisdiction, civil and criminal, cannot enter a judgment beyond the claim asserted. It would not be due process of law.

Quare: Whether under general rules, information in the nature of quo warranto is a civil, or criminal, proceeding, and whether under general allegations of misuse, with only a prayer for ouster, a fine may be imposed in those jurisdictions where quo warranto has ceased to be a criminal proceeding.

Whatever the rule elsewhere, in Missouri a corporation may in quo warranto be subjected to a money judgment, whether in nature of fine or damages for breach of implied contract not to violate its franchise.

The prayer for relief is not a part of the notice guaranteed by the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts state the limit of the relief.

It is not a denial of due process of law for a court having jurisdiction to determine quo warranto and to enter judgment for a fine because there is no statute fixing the maximum penalty.

The power to fine reposed in a court of last resort is not unlimited, but is limited by the obligation not to impose excessive fines.

Right of appeal is not essential to due process of law, and the legislature may determine where final power shall be lodged and litigation cease. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 111.

If due process has been accorded as to notice and opportunity to be heard, it is not for this court to determine whether error has been committed in construction of statute or common law.

If the judgment of the state court is not void, this court cannot consider collateral and non-Federal questions.

A corporation tried under information in the nature of quo warranto for combination in restraint of trade and sentenced to ouster and fine is not denied equal protection of the law, because corporations prosecuted under the anti-trust statute of the State would not be subjected to as severe a penalty.

The highest court of Missouri having held that quo warranto for mis