224 U.S. Opinion of the Court. the court, notwithstanding its complete jurisdiction over the subject and parties, has no power to pass judgment of imprisonment in the penitentiary upon the defendant. If the action be for a libel or personal tort, the court cannot order in the case a specific performance of a contract. If the action be for the possession of real property, the court is powerless to admit in the case the probate of a will. The judgments mentioned, given in the cases supposed, would not be merely erroneous: they would be absolutely void; because the court in rendering them would transcend the limits of its authority in those cases." Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, 282. See also Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 265–268. Barnes v. Railway, 122 U. S. 1, 14. The defendants claim that the present case is within this principle that the judgment for a fine of $50,000— which some of the Missouri court thought should have been a million dollars-was not only a criminal sentence in a civil suit, but beyond the issues and the prayer for relief in the Information-and therefore void as having been in substance entered without notice and opportunity to be heard. This raises the old question whether Information in the nature of quo warranto is a civil or a criminal proceeding, and the further question whether, under general allegations of misuser in an Information with only a prayer for ouster, a fine may be imposed in those jurisdictions where quo warranto has ceased to be a criminal proceeding. The uncertainty as to the relief that may be granted in such case arises from the fact that at one time the proceeding was wholly criminal and those guilty of usurping a franchise were prosecuted by Information instead of by Indictment, and punished both by judgment of ouster and by fine. But in England before the Revolution, and since that date in most of the American States, including Missouri, quo warranto has been resorted to for the purpose of trying the civil right, and determining whether the defendant had usurped or forfeited the franchise in question. After this method of procedure began to be used as a form of action to try title, it was inevitable that the civil feature would tend to dominate in fixing its character for all purposes. But the discussion as to the nature of such writs and the character of the judgment that could be entered, though not controlled by their use (Coffey v. County of Harlan, 204 U. S. 659, 664; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 667; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 634), has been prolonged by the retention of the words Information, Prosecute, Guilty, Punish, Fine-survivals of the period when the writ was a criminal proceeding in every respect. In some jurisdictions the writ is still treated as criminal both in the procedure adopted and in the relief afforded. State v. Kearn, 17 R. I. 391, 401. But there are practically no decisions which deal with the nature and amount of the fine which can be entered, in States where, as in Missouri, quo warranto is treated as a purely civil proceeding. The references to the subject both in text-books and opinions are few and casual. They usually repeat Blackstone's statement (3 Comm. 262) that the writ is now used for trying the civil right, "the fine being nominal only." Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 470; Commonwealth v. Woelper, 3 Serg. & R. 29, 53; High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 593, 697, 702. These authorities and the general practice indicate that in most of the American States only a nominal fine can be imposed in civil quo warranto proceedings. We shall not enter upon any discussion of the question as to the character of the proceeding nor the amount and nature of the money judgment. For, in Missouri, and prior to the decision in this case, the rulings were to the effect that the Supreme Court of Missouri had jurisdiction not only to oust but to impose a substantial fine in quo warranto. In 1865, under a constitution which, like the present, Opinion of the Court. 224 U. S. conferred power "to issue writs of quo warranto and hear and determine the same," the court tried the case of State ex Inf. v. Bermoudy, 36 Missouri, 279, brought against the clerk of a Circuit Court for usurpation of the office. There was a prayer for judgment of ouster and costs. The court said: "No evidence is offered to charge the defendant with any evil.intent, and it being probable that he acted from mistaken views only, the court will not avail itself of the power given by law, to impose a fine on him, and will compel him to pay the costs only of this proceeding." In 1902, in State v. Armour Packing Co. et al., 173 Missouri, 356, 393, information in the nature of quo warranto was filed in the Supreme Court against three corporations, praying that their franchises be forfeited because they had formed and maintained a conspiracy in restraint of trade. The court held that, "under the circumstances, the judgment of absolute ouster is not necessary, but the needs of justice will be satisfied by the imposition of a fine." It thereupon adjudged that each of the defendants should pay the sum of $5,000 as a fine, together with the costs of court. In State ex Inf. v. Delmar Jockey Club, 200 Missouri, 34, quo warranto was brought to forfeit the charter of the company, because it had violated a criminal statute prohibiting the sale of pools on horse races. A judgment of ouster was entered and a fine of $5,000 was imposed. On rehearing the judgment was amended and the provision for a fine omitted. Evidently this was not for want of jurisdiction to impose such sentence, but because it was considered that ouster was all that was demanded by the facts. This appears from the fact that in the present case the court adopted the language of the original Delmar decision, in which it was said that the fine is imposed for a violation of the corporation's implied con tract not to violate the franchise granted by the State (218 Missouri, 360). So that, whatever may be the rule elsewhere, in Missouri a corporation may in quo warranto be subjected to a money judgment-whether called a fine as punishment, or damages for its implied contract not to violate its franchise. 3. But the defendants insist that even if the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and was authorized to impose a fine, there was nothing in the pleading to indicate that such an issue was to be tried, nor any prayer warranting such relief, and hence that the judgment is wanting in due process of law and void for want of notice of what was to be heard and determined. It is true that the Information did not ask for damages or that a fine should be imposed. But if this be treated as a criminal case a prayer was no more necessary than in an Indictment or ordinary Information, since such proceedings never contain any reference whatever to the judgment or sentence to be rendered on conviction. In civil suits the pleadings should no doubt contain a prayer for judgment so as to show that the judicial power of the court is invoked. The rules of practice also may well require that the plaintiff should indicate what remedy he seeks. But the Prayer does not constitute a part of the notice guaranteed by the Constitution. The facts stated fix the limit of the relief that can be granted. While the judgment must not go beyond that to which the plaintiff was entitled on proof of the allegations made, yet the court may grant other and different relief than that for which he prayed. 4. Nor, from a Federal standpoint, is there any invalidity in the judgment because there was no statute. fixing a maximum penalty, no rule for measuring damages, and no hearing on a subject which it is claimed was not referred to in the Information. At common law, and under many English statutes, the amount of the fine to be im posed in criminal cases was not fixed. This was true of the statute of 9 Ann, chapter 20, which, in quo warranto cases, made it "lawful as well to give judgment of ouster as to fine for usurping or unlawfully exercising any office or franchise." The amount to be paid in all such cases was left to the discretion of the court, "regulated by the provisions of Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights that excessive fines ought not to be demanded." 4 Black. Comm. 378. Or, considering the fine as in the nature of a civil penalty, the case is within the principle which permits the recovery of punitive damages. They are not compensatory, nor is the amount measured by rule. But "where the defendant has acted wantonly or perversely, or with such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations" (Lake Shore &c. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101), damages may in some jurisdictions be assessed, even in civil cases, by way of punishment. It is true that, except in cases for the breach of a contract of marriage, punitive damages have been allowed only in actions for torts. But no Federal question arises on a ruling that, in Missouri, punitive damages may be recovered from a corporation for the violation of its implied contract when, as alleged in the Information, the defendants "wilfully and wantonly misused their licenses." Iowa Central Ry. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389. The real objection is not so much to the existence of the power to fix the amount of the fine as the fact that, when exercised by the Supreme Court of the State, it is not subject to review, and is said to be unlimited. But it is limited. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86, 111. It is limited by the obligation to administer justice, and to no more assess excessive damages than to impose excessive fines. But the power to render a final judgment must be lodged somewhere, and in every case a point is reached where litigation must cease. What that point is can be determined by the legislative power of the State, |