224 U.S. Argument for Appellees. panies for themselves. A company may build its own line connecting with another road on the other side of the city, and it may use its own wagons to receive and deliver freight at store doors. This, and no more, the railroad companies of St. Louis have done. They have acquired the terminal facilities of St. Louis for themselves and are operating them as a part of the instrumentalities of their business. That each one might do this if the instrumentalities employed were its own is conceded, but it is denied that they may combine with each other for that purpose. The unitary system is in accord with public policy. Terminal service is a matter of internal economy which the companies may adjust to mutual advantage and no arrangement respecting it operates to restrict competition between them as to the transportation service for the public in which they are engaged. Whatever facility railroad companies may use in common they may own in common. Common arrangements affecting internal economy have never been held to be in violation of public policy and whenever, in the advance, of civilization, they have suggested themselves as feasible, they have been recognized by law, and appropriate regulations have been prescribed for them. In the country every man builds independently. In the crowded section of a great city, however, if all construction were done independently, the waste in space and the increase in cost of construction would be very great. Community of use of terminals in a large city is more than a matter of convenience, or economy; it is an absolute public necessity. Under the Interstate Commerce Law, and indeed under the common law of the land, tolls must be reasonable, and the Government has the power to make them so if they are not. The charges of extortion and that the proprietary railroad companies compel all other railroad companies to Argument for 'Appellees. 224 U. S. use the facilities are not true. There is, indeed, a compulsion, but it is inherent in the situation. The other companies use the terminal property because it is not possible to acquire adequate facilities for themselves. The cost to any one company is prohibitive. Every consideration of a public nature points to a consolidation of the terminals and to a common use of them by all the railroad companies coming into the city. But to avoid the odious phases of a monopoly, this use must be open to all upon equal terms. The charge for service in any case can be stated in one word-cost. No money received for the service rendered goes to any other purpose than paying expenses of operation, taxes, fixed charges, and proper maintenance. No dividends are paid upon terminal shares, and no proprietary railroad company is a beneficiary of fixed charges. Any new railroad built into St. Louis now has but to secure a way to a terminal track and it has at once the advantages of the entire terminal system. The public policy of the country as indicated by statutory enactments has been in favor of combination by railroad companies whenever any common matter of internal economy is involved, and also where the combination is in the nature of connecting lines of railroad for the purposes of continuous transportation. Two bridges across a great river, where one will serve, do not facilitate commerce, but burden it with an unnecessary charge. Common use of the same facilities by different railroad companies has not only been approved, but has been enforced whenever there has been good reason therefor. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 510; §§ 1164, 1165, Rev. Stat. Missouri; Union Depot acts of the State of Illinois; April 7, 1875; of Alabama; of February 15, 1907, of Indiana; Burns' Ann. Stat., Col. 2, §§ 5345, 5374; of Iowa, §§ 2099 to 2102, Annotated Code of 1897; of Maine, 60, 51, Rev. Stat. 1903; and of Michigan, Chap. 224 U.S. Argument for Appellees. 166, Comp. Laws, 1897; of Minnesota, Act of March 5, 1879; of Nebraska, Chap. 20, Laws of 1887, § 1816, Comp. Stat. 1901; of Ohio, Chap. 3, Tit. 2, 2 Bates' Ann. Stats.; of South Carolina, Code of 1902, Vol. 1, 813; of Tennessee, §§ 2429 to 2437, Code of 1896; of Texas, Chap. 16a, Civil Stat. 1897; of Virginia, § 1294, Code 1904. See Acts of Congress relating to Union Station in Washington, D. C. It would be singular indeed, if all of the States severally, and the United States as well, were giving their sanction to arrangements and agreements which are in violation of the Sherman Act, and it is much more probable that a construction of that act leading to such a result is entirely without warrant. Union terminals have been frequently before the courts for consideration, and have always been recognized and approved as legitimate agencies in the work of railroad transportation. State v. Terminal R. R. Assn., 182 Missouri, 284; Bernard v. Cheeseman, 7 Colorado, 376; Central Railroad Company v. Perry, 58 Georgia, 461; Birdwell v. Gate City Terminal Co. (Ga.), 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 909; Indianapolis Union Railway Co. v. Cooper, 6 Ind. App. 202; Reisner v. Strong, 24 Kansas, 410; State v. Martin, 51 Kansas, 462; Mayor v. Norwich R. R. Co., 109 Massachusetts, 103; Mayor v. Railroad Commissioners, 113 Massachusetts, 161; Union Depot Co. v. Morton, 83 Michigan, 265; Detroit Station v. Detroit, 88 Michigan, 347; State v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 42 Minnesota, 142; St. Paul Union Depot Co. v. M. & N. R. Co., 47 Minnesota, 154; Chicago, St. Paul & Kansas C. Ry. Co. v. Union Depot Ry. Co., 54 Minnesota, 411; Dewey v. Railroad, 142 N. Car. 392; Riley v. Union Station Co., 71 S. Car. 457; Ryan v. Terminal Co., 102 Tennessee, 124; Collier v. Union Railway Co., 113 Tennessee, 96; Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1; C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. U. P. Ry. Co., 47 Fed. Rep. 15; S. C., 51 Fed. Rep. 309, and 163 U. S. 564. Opinion of the Court. 224 U.S. The arrangement in question is not in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or a monopoly of any part of the trade or commerce among the several States. Counsel for the Government confuse the operation of the railroad and the cost of it, with the service rendered to the public and the charge for it. The Sherman Act has nothing to do with the former; its restrictions fall altogether upon the latter. No matter how many subordinate agencies of transportation different railroad companies employ in common, no matter how many combinations they may make to secure economy in operation, so long as they do not pool their business or their earnings, so long as they are left free in their relations to the shipping and traveling public, every motive of self-interest remains to incite to competition. And when economy of operation, however accomplished, reduces costs, the end hoped for, through competition, commerce is aided, and charges are reduced to a still lower level. Mr. John C. Higdon, by leave of the court, filed a brief as amicus curiæ. MR. JUSTICE LURTON delivered the opinion of the court. The United States filed this bill to enforce the provisions of the Sherman Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, against thirty-eight corporate and individual defendants named in the margin,' as a combination in re 1 The Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis; The St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Railway Company; The Wiggins Ferry Company; The St. Louis Bridge Company; The St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Company; The Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company; The St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Company; The Chicago & Alton Railway Company; The Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Company; The Illinois Central Railroad Company; The St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company; The Chicago, Burling 224 U.S. Opinion of the Court. straint of interstate commerce and as a monopoly forbidden by that law. The cause was heard by the four Circuit Judges, who, being equally divided in judgment, dismissed the bill, without filing an opinion. From this decree the United States has appealed. The principal defendant is the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, hereinafter designated as the Terminal Company. It is a corporation of the State of Missouri, and was organized under an agreement made in 1889 between Mr. Jay Gould and a number of the defendant railroad companies for the express purpose of acquiring the properties of several independent terminal companies at St. Louis with a view to combining and operating them as a unitary system. The terminal properties first acquired and combined into one system by the Terminal Company comprised the following: The Union Railway & Transit Company of St. Louis and East St. Louis; The Terminal Railroad of St. Louis and East St. Louis; The Union Depot Company of St. Louis; The St. Louis Bridge Company, and the Tunnel Railroad of St. Louis. These properties included the great union station, the only existing railroad bridge— the Eads or St. Louis Bridge-and every connecting or terminal company by means of which that bridge could be used by railroads terminating on either side of the river. For a time this combination was operated in com ton & Quincy Railway Company; The St. Louis, Vandala & Terre Haute Railroad Company; The Wabash Railroad Company; The Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company; The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company; The Southern Railway Company; The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company; The Missouri Pacific Railway Company; The Central Trust Company of New York; A. A. Allen, S. M. Felton, A. J. Davidson, W. M. Green, J. T. Harahan, C. S. Clarke, H. Miller, Benjamin McKean, Joseph Ramsey, George E. Evans, C. E. Schaff, T. C. Powell, J. F. Stevens, A. G. Cochran, W. S. McChesney, Julius Walsh, V. W. Fisher and S. D. Webster. |