later statute repealing the exemption. The case here is much stronger. For the tax exemption, which adds value to the property, is not perpetual, but is attached to the land only so long as the Indian retains the title, and in no event to exceed twenty-one years. It is property, and entitled to protection as such, unless the fact that the owner is an Indian subject to restrictions as to alienation made a difference.

7. There have been comparatively few cases which discuss the legislative power over private property held by the Indians. But those few all recognize that he is not excepted from the protection guaranteed by the Constitution. His private rights are secured and enforced to the same extent and in the same way as other residents or citizens of the United States. In re Heff, 197 U. S. 488, 504; Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 294, 307; Smith v. Goodell, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 188; Lowry v. Weaver, 4 McLean, 82; Whirlwind v. Von der Ahe, 67 Mo. App. 628; Taylor v. Drew, 21 Arkansas, 485, 487. His right of private property is not subject to impairment by legislative action, even while he is, as a member of a tribe and subject to the guardianship of the United States as to his political and personal status. This was clearly recognized in the leading case of Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1. There it appeared that an Indian Chief owned in fee land which fronted on a stream. The chief died, and in 1891 his son and heir, during the continuance of the tribal organization, let the land to Meehan for ten years. In 1894 he again let the same property to Jones for twenty years. In that year the Secretary of the Interior was authorized by Congress to approve the lease to Jones if the latter would increase the rental. This he did, and with the assent of the Indian and the Secretary of the Interior a lease was made to Jones. In the litigation which followed Meehan relied on the first contract made in the exercise of the Indian's right of private ownership. Jones relied on that made

Opinion of the Court.

224 U.S.

under congressional authority, and although the Indian was a member of the tribe and much more subject to legislative power than these plaintiffs, the court held that the subsequent act could not relate back so as to interfere with the right of property which the Indian possessed and conveyed as an owner in fee, and while Congress had power to make treaties, it could not affect titles already granted by the treaty itself.

Nothing that was said in Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U. S. 286, is opposed to the same conclusion here. For that case did not involve property rights, but related solely to the power of Congress, to extend the period of the Indian's disability. The statute did not attempt to take his land or any right, member or appurtenance thereunto belonging. It left that as it was. But, having regard to the Indian's inexperience, and desiring to protect him against himself and those who might take advantage of his incapacity, Congress extended the time during which he could not sell. On that subject, after calling attention to the fact that "Tiger was still a ward of the Nation, so far as the alienation of these lands was concerned, and a member of the existing Creek Nation," it was said that “Incompetent persons, though citizens, may not have the full right to control their property," and that there was nothing in citizenship incompatible with guardianship, or with restricting sales by Indians deemed by Congress incapable of managing their estates.

But there was no intimation that the power of wardship conferred authority on Congress to lessen any of the rights of property which had been vested in the individual Indian by prior laws or contracts. Such rights are protected from repeal by the provisions of the Fifth Amendment.

The constitution of the State of Oklahoma itself expressly recognizes that the exemption here granted must be protected until it is lawfully destroyed. We have seen that it was a vested property right which could not be

abrogated by statute. The decree refusing to enjoin the assessment of taxes on the exempt lands of plaintiffs must therefore be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

GLEASON v. WOOD, COUNTY TREASURER OF PITTSBURG COUNTY, OKLAHOMA.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

OKLAHOMA.

No. 575. Argued February 23, 1912.—Decided May 13, 1912.

Decided on authority of Choate v. Trapp, ante, p. 665. 28 Oklahoma, 502, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the taxability of Choctaw allotments in Oklahoma, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Willard L. Sturdevant and Mr. David C. McCurtain, with whom Mr. Edward P. Hill was on the brief, for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. Charles West, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, for defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE LAMAR delivered the opinion of the court.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are Choctaws owning homesteads and surplus granted under the terms of the Atoka Agreement. Their applications to enjoin the officers of the State of Oklahoma from assessing their lands for taxation for the year 1909 was denied. All of the

questions involved are disposed of by the decision in Choate v. Trapp, ante, p. 665. The judgment, therefore, is reversed and the case remanded with directions for further proceedings not inconsistent with that opinion. Reversed.

ENGLISH v. RICHARDSON, TREASURER OF TULSA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

OKLAHOMA.

No. 559. Argued February 23, 1912. Decided May 13, 1912.

Decided on authority of Choate v. Trapp, ante, p. 665. 28 Oklahoma, 408, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the taxability of Creek allotments in Oklahoma, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Willard L. Sturdevant, with whom Mr. Grant Foreman and Mr. M. L. Mott were on the brief, for plaintiff in

error.

Mr. Charles West, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, for defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE LAMAR delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff holds a patent dated December 12, 1902. It was issued to her as a member of the Creek Nation when the tribal lands were divided in pursuance of the same general policy as that discussed in Choate v. Trapp, ante, p. 665. There were, however, a few differences. The tax exemption covered only the homestead of forty acres,

and there was a restriction on alienability for 21 years. The patent, instead of being "framed in conformity with the Agreement," as in the case of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, bore on its face a provision that the land should be non-taxable; the language of the Agreement incorporated in the act of Congress, being that "Each citizen shall select from his allotment forty acres of land

as a homestead, which shall be and remain non-taxable, inalienable and free from any encumbrance whatever for 21 years from the date of the deed therefor, and a separate deed shall be issued to each allottee for his homestead, in which this condition shall appear."

These differences are not material. The right of plaintiff to the exemption granted by Congress is protected by the Constitution on principles stated and applied in Choate v. Trapp. The judgment dismissing her complaint is therefore reversed and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with that opinion.

Reversed.