2. Contract clause; impairment of contract obligations within.
The contract clause of the Federal Constitution is not directed against
all impairment of contract obligations, but only against such as
result from a subsequent exertion of the legislative power of the
State. Cross Lake Club v. Louisiana, 632.
3. Contract clause; effect to reach errors of state court in passing upon
validity and effect of contract under laws existing when made.
The contract clause does not reach mere errors committed by a state
court when passing upon the validity and effect of a contract under
the laws existing when it was made; and, even if such errors
operated to impair the contract obligation, there is no Federal
question, in the absence of a subsequent law, on which to rest the
decision of the state court. Ib.
4. Contract impairment; deprivation of property without due process of
law; effect of compelling corporation to perform prescribed duties.
When prior to the granting of a charter to a public service corporation
it has been clearly settled both by statute law and decisions that
such a corporation must perform certain duties, the compelling of
such performance does not amount to an impairment of the
charter contract, nor does it deprive the corporation of its prop-
erty without due process of law. Consumers' Co. v. Hatch, 148.
5. Contract impairment; deprivation of property without due process;
effect of compelling corporation to perform duties.
A judgment of the state court of Idaho, compelling a water company
to furnish connection at its own expense to one residing on an
ungraded street in which it had voluntarily laid its mains, al-
though not required so to do by its charter, held not to have
impaired the charter contract of the water company or to have
deprived it of its property without due process of law, it appear-
ing that under decisions of the highest court of the State made
prior to the charter, the cost of connection was to be borne by the
water company. Ib.
6. Cruel and unusual punishments; heavier penalty for repeated offense as.
The imposition of a heavier penalty for repeated offenses does not
amount to inflicting a cruel and unusual punishment. Graham
v. West Virginia, 616.
7. Delegation of legislative power; § 20 of Act of June 29, 1906, as.
The provisions of § 20 of the act of June 29, 1906, authorizing the
Interstate Commerce Commission to require accounts to be kept
in a specified manner by interstate carriers, are not an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power. Interstate Com. Comm. v.
Goodrich Transit Co., 194.
8. Double jeopardy; effect of proceeding for identification of old offender.
Where one has been charged with having been previously convicted
of another offense, he is not put in double jeopardy by having the
question of his identity determined by a trial, nor are any of
his immunities and privileges as a citizen of the United States
abridged. Graham v. West Virginia, 616.
9. Due process of law; deprivation of property rights; effect of municipal
ordinance restricting use of streets by public service corporation.
A municipal ordinance will not be held unconstitutional as an unrea-
sonable grant of power because it permits the use of streets by a
public service corporation only in such manner as is satisfactory
to the municipal officers in charge of such streets; and so held that
an ordinance of the City of Richmond, Virginia, in regard to
location and construction of telegraph wires and conduits did not
deprive telegraph companies of their property without due
process of law. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Richmond, 160.
10. Due process of law; validity of Minnesota statute providing for de-
termining liability of stockholders of corporations.
As the statute of Minnesota providing for determining whether stock-
holders of a corporation of that State are subject to statutory
double liability does not preclude a stockholder from showing
that he is not a stockholder or from setting up any defense per-
sonal to himself, it is not unconstitutional as denying due process
of law, but is a reasonable regulation, and the jurisdiction of the
court is sustained by the relation of the stockholder to the corpora-
tion and his contractual obligation in respect to its debts. Con-
verse v. Hamilton, 243.
11. Due process of law; sufficiency of notice and hearing.
Under due process of law one is entitled to notice and opportunity to
be heard, and the notice must correspond to the hearing and the
relief must be appropriate to the notice and the hearing. Standard
Oil Co. v. Missouri, 270.
12. Due process of law; effect to deny, of judgment beyond claim asserted.
Even a court of original general jurisdiction, civil and criminal, cannot
enter a judgment beyond the claim asserted. It would not be due
process of law. Ib.
13. Due process of law; notice; prayer for relief as part of.
The prayer for relief is not a part of the notice guaranteed by the due
process clause of the Constitution. The facts state the limit of
the relief. Ib.
14. Due process of law in quo warranto proceedings.
It is not a denial of due process of law for a court having jurisdiction
to determine quo warranto and to enter judgment for a fine be-
cause there is no statute fixing the maximum penalty. Ib.
15. Due process of law; right of appeal not essential.
Right of appeal is not essential to due process of law, and the legis-
lature may determine where final power shall be lodged and litiga-
tion cease. (Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 111.) Ib.
16. Due process of law; effect to deny of imposition of onerous penalties
for non-payment of extravagant demands.
A state statute which attaches onerous penalties to the non-payment
of extravagant demands denies the due process of law guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v.
Wynne, 354.
17. Due process of law; invalidity of Arkansas statute of 1907 relative to
railroad liability for loss or injury to live stock.
The statute of Arkansas of 1907, Act 61, providing that railroad
companies must pay claims for live stock killed or injured by
their trains within thirty days after notice and that failure to do
so shall entitle the owner to double damages and an attorney's
fee, even if the amount sued for is less than the amount originally
demanded, as construed by the Supreme Court of that State, is
unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Ib.
18. Due process of law; quære as to.
Quære: and not decided whether the statute is unconstitutional as
denying due process of law even where the original demand is
sustained.
19. Due process of law; taking of property; sufficiency of hearing to con-
stitute.
The hearing which must precede an order taking property must not
be a mere form, but one which gives the owner the right to secure
and present material evidence; but a state statute which gives
the privilege of introducing such evidence, affords compulsory
process, and gives the right of cross-examination, does not deny
due process by not affording sufficient opportunity to be heard.
Oregon R. R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 510.
20. Due process of law; taking of property; sufficiency of hearing.
The hearing is sufficient if the person whose property is to be taken
is put on notice as to the order to be made, and given opportunity
to show that it is unjust or unreasonable. Ib.
21. Due process of law; effect to deny, of restricting evidence, on review by
courts, to that adduced by commission whose order is under review.
An opportunity given to test, by review in the courts, the lawfulness
of an order made by a commission does not deny due process
because on such review new evidence (other than newly dis-
covered or necessary on account of surprise or mistake) is not
allowed, and because the court must act on the evidence already
taken, if the court is not bound by the findings, and the party
affected having had the right on the original hearing to introduce
evidence as to all material points. Ib.
22. Due process of law; taking of property; when question one of justifica-
tion.
Where the party whose property has been taken has not been deprived
of a right to be heard, the question is whether as a matter of law
the facts proved a public necessity justifying the taking. Ib.
23. Due process of law; necessity of order of railroad commission as test
of validity.
While the statute of the State of Washington authorizing the State
Railroad Commission to order additional trackage is not uncon-
stitutional as denying due process of law, the orders in this case
were not justified by public necessity, and thereby deprived the
railroad company of its property without due process of law. Ib.
24. Due process of law; equal protection; commerce clause; validity of
Nebraska railway liability act of 1907.
The railway liability act of Nebraska of 1907 is not unconstitutional as
depriving a railway company of its property without due process
of law, or denying it equal protection of the law, or as interfering
with interstate commerce. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Castle, 541.
25. Due process of law; validity of § 1582 of Code of Civil Procedure of
California.
Section 1582 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, as construed
by the Supreme Court of that State, is not unconstitutional as
denying due process of law to an heir of a mortgagor because it
permits foreclosure against the administrator without making
the heir a party to the suit. McCaughy v. Lyall, 558.
26. Due process of law; equal protection; double jeopardy; validity of
West Virginia statute imposing additional penalties on old offenders.
The statute of West Virginia, providing that where a prisoner has
been convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary, the question
of his identity with one previously convicted one or more times
can be tried on information, and if proved, imposing additional
imprisonment in case of one prior conviction for five years, and
in case of two convictions, for life, is not unconstitutional, as to
one twice previously convicted and on whom life imprisonment
has been imposed, either as depriving him of his liberty without
due process of law, denying him the equal protection of the law,
placing him in second jeopardy for the same offense, abridging
his privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States, or
inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. Graham v. West Vir-
ginia, 616.
27. Due process of law; effect to deny, of separate proceeding to establish
identity of old offender.
One who has been convicted before is not denied due process of law by
having the question of identity passed upon separately from the
question of guilt of the second offense. Ib.
28. Due process of law; equal protection; effect of proceeding by informa-
tion instead of indictment for purpose of identification.
Proceeding by information instead of indictment to ascertain the
identity of a convicted criminal with one previously convicted
does not deny due process of law or equal protection of the law;
and this even if other persons accused of crime are proceeded
against by indictment. Ib.
See Supra, 4, 5;
INDIANS, 10;
RAILROADS, 2.
29. Eminent domain; compensation; when to be made.
Compensation for property taken under eminent domain need not
necessarily be made in advance of the taking if adequate means be
provided for a reasonably just and prompt ascertainment and
payment thereof. Crozier v. Krupp, 290.
30. Eminent domain; compensation; sufficiency of fulfillment of duty as to.
The duty to provide for payment of compensation for property taken
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