of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia under § 250
of the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, c. 231, in
cases in which the construction of a law of the United States is
drawn in question, does not extend to cases where the act of Con-
gress construed by that court is a purely local law relating to the
District of Columbia, but only extends to those having a general
application throughout the United States. American S. & T. Co.
v. District of Columbia, 491.
7. To review judgments of Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia;
§ 250 of Judicial Code construed.
All cases in the District of Columbia arise under acts of Congress; and
to so construe § 250 of the Judicial Code as to include the case at
bar, because the construction of a local street extension act was
involved, would largely and irrationally increase the appellate
jurisdiction and the statute will not be construed so as to include
such cases even if within its literal meaning. (Holy Trinity Church
v. United States, 143 U. S. 437.) Ib.
8. Over state courts; scope of review.
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the courts of the sev-
eral States, this court is not absolutely confined to the considera-
tion and decision of the Federal questions, but may inquire
whether, owing to any intervening event, such questions have
ceased to be material, and dispose of the case in the light of that
event. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Dennis, 503.
See APPEAL ANd Error, 7, 8, 9;
STATUES, A 9.
B. OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS.
See BANKRUPTCY, 10-13.
Diversity of citizenship; arrangement of parties in controversy over control
of association.
In a controversy which embraces the rights of an association, the
mastery of which is claimed by both complainants and defend-
ants, the trustees of the association are properly made parties
defendant and are not to be realigned by the court on the side
of the complainant for jurisdictional purposes. (Helm v. Zarecor,
222 U. S. 32.) Sharpe v. Bonham, 241.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 1, 2.
D. OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
See PATENTS, 2, 3, 13, 14.
E. OF UNITED STATES COMMERCE COURT.
To review action of Commerce Commission in refusing to take jurisdic-
The United States Commerce Court has no jurisdiction to review the
action of the Interstate Commerce Commission in refusing to
entertain a complaint because the subject is beyond its jurisdic-
tion. In such a case the remedy is by mandamus to compel the
Commission to proceed and decide the case according to its judg-
ment and discretion. Interstate Com. Comm. v. Humboldt S. S.
Co., 474.
F. OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
Of complaint as to carriers in Alaska.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction to investigate
violations of the Act to Regulate Commerce in Alaska, and to
compel carriers in that Territory to conform to the law; and if the
Commission refuses to act on the ground that it has no jurisdic-
tion, mandamus will issue directing it to take jurisdiction. Inter-
state Com. Comm. v. Humboldt S. S. Co., 474.
G. OF FEDERAL COURTS GENERALLY.
See CORPORATIONS, 1;
FEDERAL QUESTION, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Implication of, by judgment of ouster and fine in quo warranto proceeding.
Where the constitution of a State gives to its highest court the power
to issue writs of quo warranto and to hear and determine the same,
judgment of ouster and fine entered by that court implies that it
had jurisdiction to so decide and enter judgment and is conclusive
upon this court whether the judgment is civil or criminal or both.
(Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U. S. 420.) Standard Oil Co. v.
Missouri, 270.
See JUDGMENTS AND DECREES, 1.
United States may invoke when.
Where there is a violation of the rights of the United States, and a
justiciable question as to the effect thereof, the United States may
invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity, and a pecuniary in-
terest in the controversy is not essential.
American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315.)
States, 413.
(United States v.
Heckman v. United
1. To determine jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, Ex parte Harding, 219 U. S.
363, does not exist in an administrative body which is subject to
having its jurisdiction defined by the courts. Interstate Com.
Comm. v. Humboldt S. S. Co., 474.
2. Of foreign corporations; essentials.
A foreign corporation in order to be subject to the jurisdiction of a
court must be doing business within the State of the court's juris-
diction, and the service must be made there upon some duly au-
thorized officer or agent. Herndon-Carter Co. v. Norris & Co., 496.
In this case, as it appears from the evidence in the record that the de-
fendant corporation was doing business within the State and that
the person served was its agent at the time of service, the Circuit
Court had jurisdiction. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12; LOCAL LAW (PORTO RICO, 1, 2);
COURTS, 2;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 5.
Arkansas. Railroads; act No. 61 of 1907 (see Constitutional Law,
17). St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 354.
California. Telephone companies; right to use streets. In this case
held that under the statutes of California a telephone corporation
operating interstate and local lines in Pomona, a city of the fifth
class, obtained rights to maintain its main line in the streets but
not its local posts and wires except subject to regulations of the
city. Pomona v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 330.
Mortgages; § 1582, Code of Civil Procedure (see Constitutional
Law, 25). McCaughy v. Lyall, 558.
Municipal control of public utility plants (see Municipal Corpora-
tions, 1). Pomona v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 330.
Idaho. 1. Riparian rights; appropriation of water; limitation upon.
Under the laws of Idaho relating to appropriation of water, the
extent of beneficial use is an inherent and necessary limitation
upon the right to appropriate; and one who appropriates does not
have further right to the current of the stream for the purpose
of obtaining power to distribute the water required for the bene-
ficial use which is the basis of his appropriation. Schodde v. Twin
Falls Water Co., 107.
2. Riparian rights; appropriation of water; extent of. There is no
rule of riparian rights in Idaho by which one whose land borders
on a stream can appropriate the whole current thereof for the
purpose of making fruitful the limited appropriation of water to
which he is entitled for beneficial use. Ib.
3. Riparian rights; common-law doctrine abrogated. The Federal
courts below rightly followed the decisions of the state courts of
Idaho, in holding that the common law doctrine of riparian rights
had been abrogated to the extent that the provisions of the con-
stitution and statutes of Idaho in regard to the rights of appro-
priators for beneficial use are in conflict therewith. Ib.
4. Riparian rights; right of upper owner to restrain interference by
lower owner with current of stream. In this case held that one who
had lawfully appropriated the amount of water from a stream in
Idaho to which he was lawfully entitled for beneficial use could
not restrain those below him from raising the river so as to inter-
fere with the power necessary to raise the water appropriated by
him to a height necessary for distribution over his land; neither
his appropriation nor his riparian rights gave him any control
over the current of the stream. Ib.
Kentucky. 1. Corporations; right to create; control by municipalities.
Under the then constitution of Kentucky, in 1886, the legislature
had the sole right to create corporations and grant franchises to
use the streets of municipalities; a charter granted by the State,
subject to conditions to be imposed by the municipality, became,
after the acceptance of the conditions, a grant, not of the mu-
nicipality but of the State, and one which cannot be impaired
by an ordinance made by the municipality. Louisville v. Cum-
berland Tel. Co., 649.
2. Municipalities; street franchises; constitution of 1891. The new
constitution of 1891, conferring upon municipalities the right to
grant street franchises, and the later statute repealing special
corporate privileges, did not and could not, repeal rights vested
in corporations nor relieve them of the burdens imposed by prior
charter contract.
3. Franchises; sale of; effect of constitution of 1891. The constitu-
tion of Kentucky of 1891, while limiting the power to sell franchises
in the future, distinctly protected previously granted charter
rights under which work had in good faith been begun. Ib.
4. Mortgages; rights of creditors; creditors embraced within § 496,
Stats. 1903. As construed by the highest court of the State, the
term "creditors" as used in § 496, Kentucky Statutes, 1903,
which declares that no mortgage shall be valid against purchasers
without notice or creditors until recorded does not include ante-
cedent creditors, or subsequent creditors whose claims are ac-
quired with notice, but does include subsequent creditors without
notice, who by diligence secure a specific lien before the mortgage
is recorded; but that court has not specifically decided whether
the term includes subsequent creditors without notice who have
not so secured such lien. Holt v. Crucible Steel Co., 262.
See BANKRUPTCY, 6.
Minnesota. 1. Corporations; liability of stockholders. The provisions
of the Minnesota constitution imposing double liability on stock-
holders of corporations other than those carrying on manu-
facturing or mechanical business is self-executing, and under it
each stockholder becomes liable for the debts of the corporation
in amount measured by the par value of his stock. Converse v.
Hamilton, 243.
2. Same. The liability of stockholders under the Minnesota
constitution is not to the corporation but to the creditors col-
lectively; is not penal but contractual; not joint, but several; and
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