and either this object must call forth volition or previous volition must do it; but even this previous volition has a motive for its object. Self-determination implies not merely what is incomprehensible but what is self-contradictory. Volition must have an object from definition. Love to God must have the divine excellence for its object, and it is this, and not a previous volition which the law does not require, which calls it forth, and so of all acts of holy or sinful affection. God has placed all virtue in certain affections towards certain objects; he has not required to call forth these feelings by previous volition, or placed virtue in such volitions; he simply requires us to be thus and thus affected by certain objects, his own blessed character for instance, and all holiness consists in being thus affected by it, and that is the motive or object which is to affect us; he has denounced the curse of his law on the failure of being thus affected by it.

If the actions of any innate affections are directed towards moral objects, and are such as God has forbidden, then to call them mere emotions and teach that they have no moral character, is to unsettle first principles, to sap the foundations of public morals, and to introduce the most fatal infidelity.

If the action of innate affections, however, is not of a moral nature, then they may be considered as mere emotions with all safety, and it is introducing confusion into theology to view them in any other light. We have only to take care of them as we do our limbs, that they do no mischief, but as they are not acts of the will, they are no more of a moral character than the acts of memory or intellect.

We will briefly attempt to show that the acts of these affections which mankind have always considered as passions which belong to the human heart, that these alone are volition. These alone are exercised towards the real ultimate objects of volition. We commonly say that external objects, ends, and actions are the objects of volition; they are, but not its ultimate objects.

First with regard to actions. Two persons perform precisely the same external act of charity, but one from motives of ostentation, the other from benevolence towards the person relieved. But is the action which is the same in both cases the ultimate object of volition? Far from itone individual really wills the honor which comes from men, the other the good of his fellow being. A third perVOL. V.

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son might perform the act from mixed motives and actually will both these objects.

A person may be impelled to perform an action, for instance a literary effort by a variety of separate inducements; he may be excited by ambition of distinction, envy of a rival, and a covetous desire of wealth; now here are several volitions with each a separate object, each by itself a moral act and sinful, and but one external action.

The same person may have certain inducements to perform an action, and others to forbear it; a forgiving spirit for instance, may prompt him to make a sacrifice in favor of an enemy, and the remains of resentment may dissuade him, and the will may balance between these for a time. The will may have opposite inclinations, by means of these, opposite feelings. But here are evidently two volitions, one which the divine law approves, and the other such as it condemns. The same passion may bias the will in opposite directions. A person may see that the effects of a certain action may be adverse to some object of his ambition, and favorable to another, and thus ambition will be an inducement to perform it, and an inducement to forbear it.

The same observations may be applied to what are called moral ends. Two persons may set forward for the ministry, one from pure ambition, the other from love to his Saviour, and, perhaps, various other motives of an opposite character, but all these are separate volitions, distinct moral acts. A person may commence a course of conduct from right af fections, continue it, and quit it from those of an opposite character. But do we ever hear of actions or ends being chosen from any other feelings than those which have always been considered innate, from pure volitions? If there arise in the human mind volitions answering to all the innumerable objects which come before it, it is certain, however, that they have no names.

With regard to external objects which become the motives of volition, nothing is more clear then that they are not its ultimate objects. Several individuals desire a particular book, one from bare covetousness, another from a desire to disappoint a rival, another to acquire distinction by making the contents his own, another in order to bestow it upon a a friend, and perhaps still another from most of these feelings united. The real object of volition in all these cases is different. It is not the book but something quite distinct.

An elegant bonnet excites certain desires in the mind of a young lady, let the fashion change and she views it with new feelings; let the customs of society change, so that it shall be a badge of disgrace, and she views it with feelings still different, but all the while it is the same bonnet. Two beggars solicit each a dollar as charity, they both will the same thing in appearance, but one really wishes nothing more than to gratify his appetite, while the other wishes for the relief of a distressed family. A person may desire a cane at a particular time to support his steps, or to defend himself, or to injure an enemy, or to make a figure, but these motives or volitions all have different ultimate objects, though in common conversation we say the cane is the object of them. The truth is, the acts of the innate moral affections, and those implanted by divine grace alone, are of a voluntary and accountable nature, and there are no other mental operations which have any claim to be considered of this character, or have ever even received a name.

Dr. Taylor, of Norwich, was as decided in his opposition to the doctrines of original righteousness, and original sin, as their present opponents, but more open in teaching selfdetermination. President Edwards, speaking on this subject, says, "The doctrine of original righteousness, or the creation of our first parents, with holy principles and dispositions, has a close connection in several respects with the doctrine of original sin; Dr. Taylor was sensible of this, and, acccordingly, he strenuously opposes this doctrine in his book against original sin." The language of Dr. Taylor was this, "To say that God not only endowed Adam with a capacity of being righteous, but moreover, that righteousness and true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his nature at the same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness." "Adam," he continues, "could not be originally created in righteousness and true holiness, because he must choose to be righteous before he could be righteous; and, therefore, he must exist, he must be created, yea, he must exercise thought and reflection before he was righteous." To this President Edwards replies, "If these things are so, it will certainly follow, that the first choosing to be righteous is no righteous choice; there is no holiness or righteousness in it, because no choosing to be righteous goes before it. For he plainly speaks of choosing to be

righteous as what must go before righteonsness. So that by his scheme, all righteousness and holiness is at once shut out of the world, and no door left open by which it can ever possibly enter into the world."

Mr. Hutchinson observes, "the ultimate end proposed by common moralists, is the happiness of the agent himself, and this certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct. Now, may not another instinct towards the public, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of virtue as the instinct toward private happiness? If it be said that actions from instinct are not the effect of prudence and choice, this objection will hold full as strongly against the actions which flow from self-love."

President Edwards remarks of the same views of the origin of holy and sinful volitions which prevail at present, "It is agreeable to the sense of men in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but the good choice itself from whence that effect proceeds is so; yea, also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection of mind, from WHENCE proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. This is the general notion, not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed. Which supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice, and that, therefore, it is not necessary that their should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a good disposition, what is the character of that choice? There can, according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love or some animal appetites; therefore, a virtuous temper of mind may be before a good act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruit, and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from it."

ART. VIII. ON THE EFFECTS OF REGENERATION.

IT has been with many a matter of no small speculation how that so large a portion of the Congregational and Presbyterian Churches could have been induced, within so short a period, to renounce the doctrines of original sin and regeneration, the two fundamental truths of the Christian system. Doubtless, a number of causes might have conspired to produce the result, but we think that we can name two which has a most decisive influence, and which are alone sufficient to account for the effect.

First, a spirit of bold speculation on theological subjects had infected the church. Dr. Thomas Scott had predicted that this alone would lead to infidelity. The writings of President Edwards had doubtless produced a taste for metaphysical discussions, but ere long those discussions became presumptuous. Subjects were attempted which were evidently beyond the powers of human reason. Divines attempted to tell how sin came into the world, almost as circumstantially as at the present day. But this was not enough; to carry out some favorite positions, the first principles of common sense and theology were assailed, the great principle of Hume's Scepticism was adopted by Christian divines, and the human soul made out to be a mere series of perceptions and exercises. But still these men had a high respect for the great evangelical system, but they were fostering a spirit of bold speculation among their pupils, exalting human reason as a source of truth at the expense of the Bible, and leading Christians to defend the doctrines of revelation with the same weapons, and the same spirit with which heretics opposed them. And it is remarkable that men who had the highest respect for the truths of the Gospel, have furnished the fundamental principle of the new heresy. The New Haven divines acknowledge that their's is what is called the "exercise system." It is at least true, that they borrow most of their reasoning from Dr. Emmons, as they obtained most of their early ad