License.

3. A street-railroad franchise was granted on condition of the payment of an "annual license fee for each car now allowed by law." At that time license fees were required by an old ordinance for each accommodation coach" or "stage-coach." Held, that the word "car," in the resolution, and the word "coach," in the ordinance, both referred to a conveyance to accommodate travel, and that the city was entitled to the same license fee on a car as was fixed by the old ordinance on a coach.

City of New York v. Third-Avenue R. Co., (N. Y.)

22 N. E. 755.

issue by her present husband." The husband and wife separated, but he advanced, at different times, children; she entering into a written contract to various sums to her for the support of herself and reimburse him therefor out of her interest in his father's estate. Held that, while at law the contract was void, yet as it was reasonable and just burse him for his advances, it would be enforced that she, under the circumstances, should reimin equity.-Hendricks v. Isaacs, (N. Y.) 22 N. E.

1029.

band to the wife, to be applied at her discretion for 2. A gross sum of money advanced by the husfamily expenses, constitutes a technical considerAction for injuries-Province of jury. ation for her agreement to reimburse him therefor. 4. In an action for injuries caused by being run-Hendricks v. Isaacs, (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 1029. over by a street-car, there was evidence that plaintiff had walked along the track about 80 or 90 feet when struck; that he might have been unable to hear the car approaching, because of a noisy icecart; that the car-driver was careless; and that the car in question was late, and no other was due at the time of the accident. Held, that the question of contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury.-Howland v. Union St. Ry. Co., (Mass.) 22 N. E. 434.

3. In a suit by the husband against his wife's administrator for such advances, it is error to exclude evidence that the wife expended, in the support of herself and children, a sum equaling or exceeding the entire income to which she was entitled under the will, and that the debts owing by her at her decease exceeded the sum collected by her administrator from the estate of the husband's father on account of income accrued but unpaid at her decease, since the husband's advances, under such circumstances, ought to be treated as if made in fulfillment of his general marital obligations.Hendricks v. Isaacs, (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 1029.

5. While plaintiff was crossing a street, he was knocked down by horses drawing defendant's street-car. In an action for the injuries caused thereby, it appeared that the accident occurred on a 4. The administrator, having the right to prove street where many cars were run; that plaintiff was that the husband's claim has no legal or equitable familiar with the locality and the extent of the car foundation, may show what debts were owing by service; and that the car in question had just en- the wife at her death, and this right is not affected tered on the track from a switch near where plain- by the fact that this is not a proper proceeding for tiff was crossing. Plaintiff testified that before ascertaining the wife's debts, and that her creditstarting across he looked both ways, and did not ors will not be bound by any adjudication herein. see the horses which struck him, but saw another-Hendricks v. Isaacs, (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 1029. car halting on the main track a short distance from 5. A husband advanced money to his daughter him. It appeared that the speed of the horses by for the use of his wife. The daughter signed an which plaintiff was struck was increased on their instrument acknowledging the receipt of the moncoming on the main track. Held, that the ques-ey, and promising that it would be repaid by the tion of plaintiff's contributory negligence was for wife out of a specified fund. The wife also signed the jury, and the evidence warranted a finding in the instrument; her signature being preceded by his favor.-McClain v. Brooklyn City R. Co., (N. the words, "I concur and agree to this." Held an Y.) 22 N. E. 1062. original obligation by the wife to repay the advances, and not a guaranty of a promise by the daughter to do so.-Hendricks v. Isaacs, (N. Ÿ.) 23 N. E. 1029.

Evidence.

6. In an action against a street railroad company for injuries sustained by being run over by defendant's car, after plaintiff had fallen on the track, where it is undisputed that the track at that place was icy and slippery, evidence that there had been no storm for two days before the accident is inadmissible for any purpose.-Silberstein v. Houston, W. St. & P. F. R. Co., (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 951.

Instructions.

7. A charge that "defendant had no right to so occupy the street and use the same with its cars as to make it extremely dangerous to cross the street at all times" was proper.-McClain v. Brooklyn City R. Co., (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 1062.

8. A charge that plaintiff "had a right to select any point to go across," and "had a right to go where he chose," was not erroneous, where the court also charged that the duty of exercising due care was on plaintiff.-McClain v. Brooklyn City R. Co., (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 1062.

9. A charge that "a mere error of judgment does not necessarily amount to carelessness, if the plaintiff took reasonable care, and then made a mistake as to the safest course to pursue in crossing the street, he is not guilty of contributory negligence for that reason, "-was proper.-McClain v. Brooklyn City R. Co., (N. Y.) 22 Ñ. E. 1062.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See, also, Divorce; Dower; Homestead.
As witnesses, see Witness, 4, 5.
Parties on appeal, see Appeal, 15.
Rights inter se.

1. A husband was excluded by will from any share in his father's estate, but his wife was entitled to share equally with the other children; the provis ion in her favor concluding with a direction that the moneys received by her were to be "applied to the maintenance and support of herself and her

7. A contract made by a married woman, to indorse all notes given in payment for agricultural implements for the sale of which she was agent, is void, under Rev. St. Ind. § 5119, prohibiting married women from entering into any contract of suretyship, and declaring the same void. Nixon v. Whiteley, Fasler & Kelly Co., (Ind.) 22 N. E. 411.*

8. Under Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § 5119, which provides that a married woman's contract of surety. ship shall be void, a mortgage by husband and wife on land held by them jointly, to secure the husband's note given in payment for the land, is void as to the wife.-Stewart v. Babbs, (Ind.) 22 N. E. 770.*

Wife's separate estate-License by wife.

9. Where a wife gives to her husband the use of her farm, and the personalty thereon, hay severed by him from the land before the license is revoked is subject to attachment for his debts.Plaisted v. Hair, (Mass.) 22 N. E. 921.

Community property.

10. Where husband and wife join in a mortgage on his land to secure his debt, releasing dower and homestead rights, any admissions that estop him from denying the amount of the debt are binding upon her interest in the land, in the absence of any showing of intentional fraud against her.-Casler v. Byers, (Ill.) 22 N. E. 507.

Conveyances between.

11. A conveyance made by a husband to his wife in order to defraud his creditors will be set aside at their suit, though the land was originally bought with the wife's money, where she has allowed the title to stand in her husband's name, for the purpose of giving him credit.-Lowentrout v. Campbell, (Ill.) 22 N. E. 744.

12. In an action against a husband and wife upon their joint note and mortgage, a complaint which alleges that the consideration for the note was money borrowed by the defendants, that they executed the mortgage to secure the note, and that they owned the mortgaged land as tenants by the entirety, states a good cause of action against the wife. Following Security Co. v. Arbuckle, 21 N. E. 469.-Jenne v. Burt, (Ind.) 22 N. E. 256.

22. Under Pub. St. Mass. c. 161, § 52, providing that personalty and realty attached shall be held for 30 days after final judgment for plaintiff, the attachment allowed by Id. c. 147, § 35, in a proceeding by a wife for separate maintenance and the custody of children, being for the purpose of securing such maintenance as may be awarded to the wife, and there being no final judgment in such a proceeding, remains for the further security of the wife after the satisfaction of any execution against the attached property, so far as the property has not been applied thereto, and a sale under subsequent executions confers a good title against any one to whom the property has been conveyed while under the attachment.-Downs v. Flanders, (Mass.) 22 N. E. 585.

Impeachment.

13. In an action against a husband and wife
upon their joint note and mortgage, where the Of witness, see Witness, 14-18.
complaint alleges that the consideration for the
note was money borrowed by the defendants, and
that they owned the mortgaged land as tenants

by the entirety, an amendment to the complaint See Trusts, 1.
showing that the defendants borrowed the money
"for their joint use and benefit" may properly be
allowed, even after the case has been submitted to
the court. Jenne v. Burt, (Ind.) 22 N. E. 256.

Implied Trusts.

Imprisonment.

For non-payment of alimony, see Divorce, 8, 9.

INDICTMENT AND INFORMA-
TION.

14. Where a married woman, who keeps boarders, purchases a swine with a view to its natural increase, though the animal and its progeny are fed from the waste of the table, which is even greater on that account, the purchase is in the nat ure of a profitable investment of the savings of the business, and not "property employed in the business," within the meaning of St. Mass. 1862, c. 198, and embodied in Pub. St. c. 147, § 11, requiring a married woman doing business on her own account For obstructing highway, see Highways, 4, 5. to file in the clerk's office a certificate of the nat- Form, see Constitutional Law, 9. ure and location of the business before the "prop-Surplusage, see Disturbance of Public Worship, 2. erty employed in the business" will be exempt from attachment as the property of her husband.Lockwood v. Corey, (Mass.) 22 N. E. 440.

15. Nor can the purchase and ownership of a single animal for this purpose, under such circum stances, be deemed to be doing a business within the meaning of the statute.-Lockwood v. Corey, (Mass.) 22 Ñ. E. 440.

16. Where a husband, before marriage, for a valuable consideration, relinquishes his marital rights in his wife's land, and after her death claims no interest therein, except the life-estate given him by her will, no third person can assert that the husband has any other estate in the land.Bowen v. Swander, (Ind.) 22 N. E. 725. Separation and maintenance.

17. Articles of separation, whereby husband and wife agree to live separately from the execution thereof, and whereby the husband agrees to pay money annually to a trustee for the support of his wife and children during the period of her natural life, unless she should remarry, are valid.— Clark v. Fosdick, (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 1111.

18. In a suit for divorce, in which the trustee is not a party, and in which the validity of such contract is not called in question, the court has no power to set the contract aside.-Galusha v. Galusha, (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 1114.

19. The obligation of a husband to make payments to a wife for her support, in accordance with

Description of offense, see Assault and Battery, 5; Embezzlement; Intoxicating Liquors, 20; Shipping; Trespass, 4.

Joinder of counts.

1. A count charging a conspiracy to induce a female to commit fornication may be joined in the same indictment with counts charging defendants with abduction of the same female for the purpose of prostitution, and with unlawfully detaining her in a house of ill fame, though the first count charges a misdemeanor, and the others a felony.Herman v. People, (Ill.) 22 N. E. 471. Description of offense.

*

*

play four games of pool," charges but a single of-
2. An indictment for permitting a minor "to
fense, under Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § 2087, providing
that any person who shall allow any minor "to
play billiards, bagatelle, pool, or any other game"
upon his table, shall, upon conviction "for such
game so allowed *
to be played, be fined,
etc.-Kiley v. State, (Ind.) 22 N. E. 99.
3. Under Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § 1734, which pro-
vides that an indictment for being an accessory be-
fore the fact shall state, "and the said *
was accessory before the fact to the said felony,"
an indictment which charges the defendant with
being an accessory to the crime of murder, without
containing the above statement, is insufficient even
after verdict.-Sage v. State, (Ind.) 22 N. E. 338.

Indorsement.

articles of separation, is not annulled by a subse- Of note, see Negotiable Instruments, 4, 5.
quent decree of divorce.-Galusha v. Galusha, (N.
Y.) 22 N. E. 1114.

20. The obligation of a husband to make payments to a wife, in accordance with articles of separation, is not terminated by a divorce obtained by the wife, where the decree does not provide for alimony, and gives the custody of the children to the mother, as the articles of separation did.— Clark v. Fosdick, (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 1111.

21. A contract between husband and wife, executed after separation, through the medium of a trustee, whereby the husband agrees to pay to the trustee, during the wife's life, a certain amount each month for her support, and the wife and trustee agree to save the husband harmless from any further liability for her support, is valid. Galusha v. Galusha, (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 1114.*

INFANCY.

See, also, Guardian and Ward.

*

Sale of liquor to minors, see Intoxicating Liquors, 16-19.

Actions.

Rev. St. Ill. 1889, c. 64, § 18, which allow's an infant to sue by next friend upon the latter giving bond for costs, does not prevent the court from allowing a minor to sue by next friend as a poor person, under Rev. St. Ill. 1889, c. 33, § 5, which permits the court to allow poor plaintiffs to sue without liability for costs.-Chicago & I. R. Co. v. Lane, (Ill.) 22 N. E. 513.

1. Injunction will not lie to restrain the trus-ings, and fails to make any claim therefor of the tees of a village from maintaining an iron grating at the opening of a sewer, used to convey the surface water away from the road-bed of a street, on the ground that the accumulation of sticks and leaves at such grating obstructs the flow of water, and causes it to overflow on plaintiff's land.-Paine v. Trustees, Etc., of Delhi, (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 405.

See, also, Assignment for Benefit of Creditors; basis of insurance, but an authorized agent of the Bankruptcy.

sponsible for such falsity, and it is no defense to
an action on the policy.-O'Brien v. Home Ben.
Soc., (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 954.*

6. Where the insurer alleges that the answers
to questions put to the insured contained in the
application were false, it is a sufficient reply that
the answers were written by the insurer's agent
after he had informed the insured that no answers
were necessary, and without his knowledge.-Phoe-
nix Ins. Co. v. Stark, (Ind.) 22 N. E. 413.
Conditions of policy-Validity.

7. A provision in a paid-up policy that the
amount of notes due the company for premiums on
a policy taken up in exchange for the paid-up policy
shall be deducted when the insurance money is
paid, and that failure to pay the interest on the
notes annually shall forfeit the policy, is not un-
conscionable, and there is no reason for equitable
relief against the forfeiture without some element
of fraud, accident, or mistake.-Fowler v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 576.

Proof of breach.

sure "the estate of R.," the mortgagor, who was
dead, but the insurance was payable to plaintiff as
his interest might appear. One of the conditions
of the policy was that it should be void if the in-
terest of the assured was other than "entire, un-
conditional, and sole ownership," and that fact
was not represented to the company and expressed
in the written part of the policy. R. had conveyed
the property in trust to pay debts to one S., of
which transaction defendant, the insurance com-
pany, had no knowledge. Held, that sole owner-
ship was a condition precedent to the risk assumed
by defendant, and, as "the estate of R." had no
title, the condition was broken on delivery of the
policy.-Weed v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins.
Co.. (N. Y. 22 N. E. 229.

17. Where it is made a condition precedent to
the attaching of any risk under an insurance policy
that the insured has the "entire, unconditional, and
sole ownership" of the property insured, and it ap-
pears that the condition was broken on the deliv-
ery of the policy, the fact that an adjuster, em-
ployed by the insurance company after a loss, ne-
8. Where a policy provides that the company gotiated for proofs of loss after he had knowledge
will not be liable thereunder "for loss or damage of the forfeiture, does not constitute a waiver there-
caused by the working of mechanics, nor for the of, it not appearing that the adjuster was author-
use of kerosene, unless permitted hereon in writ-
ized to make a new contract, or that his knowledge
ing, "a recovery thereon cannot be defeated on the of the forfeiture was communicated to the officers
ground that lamps were filled with kerosene by of the insurance company, or that any of them rec-
the assured in the evening, and by artificial light,ognized the validity of the policy after such knowl-
unless it appears that the loss was caused thereby. edge was acquired.-Weed v. London & Lanca-
-Jones v. Howard Ins. Co., (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 578.
shire Fire Ins. Co., (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 229.

Fire set by owner.

9. Where the company pleads that the plain-
tiff set fire to the building himself, it must prove
such plea beyond a reasonable doubt.-Germania
Fire Ins. Co. v. Klewer, (Ill.) 22 N. E. 489.

10. Where, however, such plea is joined with
others that do not charge a criminal offense, it is
error to instruct the jury that defendant must es-
tablish its other defenses by more than a prepon-
derance of the evidence.-Germania Fire Ins. Co.
v. Klewer, (Ill.) 22 N. E. 489.

Other insurance.

11. Where two concurrent policies on the same
property, issued at different dates, both contain a
clause making them void in case other insurance
is taken out on the property, the first policy makes
the second void, but is not affected by it.-Ger-
mania Fire Ins. Co. v. Klewer (Ill.) 22 N. E. 489.
12. When a policy is avoided by the existence
of prior insurance, unknown to the insuring com-
pany, the fact that the agent issuing the policy
might have learned of the prior insurance by the
exercise of diligence will not relieve the assured
from the forfeiture.-Landers v. Cooper, (N. Y.)
22 N. E. 212.

13. Where a policy of fire insurance contains a
clause making it void in case of other insurance
on the same property, and there is a prior policy
on the property which expires before the second
policy, such second policy attaches and becomes
operative upon the expiration of the prior policy.
Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Klewer, (Ill.) 22 N. Ë.
489.

Suicide.

14. The fact that assured committed suicide in
New York is not a defense to an action on the pol-
icy, under the provision of the policy that it should
be void if he should "die
* in violation of,
or attempt to violate, any criminal law" of the state
in which he should be, as in New York suicide is
not a crime, though an attempt to commit suicide
is a crime.-Darrow v. Family Fund Soc., (N. Y.)
22 N. E. 1093.*

18. In an action on a policy, it appeared that the
assured, a few days after the loss, assigned all his
property for the benefit of his creditors. The pol-
icy provided that the assured, making claim for
loss or damage by fire, shall render an account of
said loss, "stating the interest and title of the as-
sured, and of all others, therein." Held, that a
proof of loss stating that at the time of the fire the
assured was the sole owner is a sufficient compli-
ance with the requirement of the policy.-Jones v.
Howard Ins. Co., (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 578.

Waiver.

19. The facts that the insured attempted to col-
lect the policy, and that he stated that he did so at
the request of the insurer, are sufficient evidence
of waiver of the violation of a condition of the pol-
icy against leaving the insured premises vacant, to
justify submitting the question of waiver to the
jury.-Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Klewer, (Ill.) 22
N. E. 489.

20. A policy of insurance, taken by a mortgagee
of one R., payable to the mortgagee as his interest
might appear, purported to insure the "estate of
R.," who was dead. Held, that the use of the
words quoted did not amount to a waiver of a con-
dition of the policy requiring the assured to have
the entire, unconditional, and sole ownership of
the property insured; it appearing that the inten-
tion of the parties was by the use of such words
to describe only those who on the death of R. suc-
ceeded to his title.-Weed v. London & Lancashire
Fire Ins. Co. (N. Y.) 22 N. E. 229.

21. An assured owed defendant certain notes for
premiums on a policy, which he surrendered, and
took a paid-up policy, which provided that failure
to pay interest on the premium notes on a given
day of each year should avoid the policy. About
the time the first policy was issued, and about
three years before the surrender and exchange were
made, defendant published a pamphlet recommend-
ing its policies as preferable to those of other com-
panies, saying that its policies were non-forfeita-
ble and incontestable, and that it allowed 30 days'
grace for payment of premiums after the first one,
which was for the benefit of persons so situated
that they could not pay when their premiums were
15. Where a policy is issued on a vacant build- due. The original policy was substantially accord-
ing, the receipt of the premium by the insurance ing to these representations. A copy of the pam-
agent with knowledge of the vacancy, and with-phlet was sent to assured, and was found in his
out objection on that ground, is a waiver of a clause
making the policy void in case of vacancy.-Ger-
mania Fire Ins. Co. v. Klewer, (Ill.) 22 N. E. 489.

Vacant premises.

Title of insured.

16. Plaintiff procured insurance on property
mortgaged to him, and the policy purported to in-

possession, with the policy, at his death. Assured
paid the interest promptly the next year after the
second policy was issued, and was only prevented
from paying the next installment by the fault of
his agent. Held that, as there was no evidence
that the assured was induced by the pamphlet to
believe that he had 30 days within which to pay the

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