quite the detached standpoint that to me seemed the only possible standpoint. But he was a fine fellow, and I was in thorough sympathy with him; and his wife was a brilliant and charming woman. Altogether I could not overstate how thoroughly at home I felt in Hungary, and how I enjoyed myself in spite of the rush in which I was kept.

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CHAPTER XVI

FROM KHARTOUM TO LONDON-CONTINUED

THERE was a sequel to my visit to Vienna which was rather amusing. By appointment I called on the Prime Minister. He was a statesman and diplomat of the old school, very polished and cultivated, with real power, and entirely cynical. Down at bottom he had no more sympathy with me than Merry del Val, but unlike Merry del Val he recognized the fact that the world had moved; and went out of his way, as did the Emperor, to thank me for what I had done at Rome, saying that it made their task a little easier; and I think he was instrumental in having the Papal Nuncio call on me when our Ambassador, who is himself a Catholic, gave me a reception at the Embassy-a fact which drove the ultras of the Vatican nearly crazy. He speedily brought the subject round to the question of universal peace and disarmament, and cautiously tried to draw me out as to what my attitude would be on these subjects when I saw the Kaiser in Berlin. Carnegie, personally and through Root, my one-time Secretary of State, had been asking me to try to get the Emperor committed to universal arbitration and disarmament, and had been unwary enough to let something leak into the papers about what he had proposed. Root was under obligations to Carnegie for the way that Carnegie had helped him in connection with the PanAmerican movement, and he had also helped the Smithsonian in fitting out the scientific people who went with me on my African trip; and Carnegie's purposes as regards international peace are good; and so I told him that I would see whether I could speak to the Emperor or not, but that I did not believe any good would come of it. From America, I suppose through some inadvertence

on Mr. Carnegie's part, it got into the newspapers that I was to speak to the Emperor about peace; whereupon all the well-meaning and unspeakably foolish busybodies who, partly from sincere interest and partly from fussiness and vanity, like to identify themselves with large reforms, and whose identification therewith always does damage to the said reforms, began to write to me and to the papers. Evidently this had much alarmed the German foreign office people, and probably the German Kaiser himself. Those responsible for Germany's policies at the present day are most ardent disciples of, and believers in, Frederick the Great and Bismarck, and not unnaturally have an intense contempt for the mock altruism of so many worthy people who will not face facts-a contempt which Bismarck showed for Motley when Motley very foolishly thrust upon him advice about how to deal with conquered France. Having been trained to believe only in loyalty to the national welfare, and in the kind of international morality characteristic of one pirate among his fellow pirates, they are unable to understand or appreciate the standards of international morality which men like Washington and Lincoln genuinely believed in, which have been practised on a very large scale for two or three generations by your people in India, and latterly in Egypt and which are now being applied by our own people on a smaller scale in the Philippines and the West Indies.

Evidently the German foreign office availed themselves of the very close relations between Austria and Germany, and got the Austrian Prime Minister to sound me as to my intentions. He took advantage of a question I put to him anent a remark to me by the Duke of Abruzzi, who had told me that in Europe they firmly believed that two wars were certain, one between Japan and ourselves, one between you and Germany. After repeating this remark, I said that I did not believe war would ever come between Japan and ourselves, certainly not if we kept up a sufficiently efficient navy, and fortified Hawaii and the Canal; and I asked the Prime Minister whether such a calamity as a war between

England and Germany would really be provoked by Germany. He at once answered that he had first-hand information which made him sure that Germany had no intention whatever of provoking a war, but that she did not intend to be at the mercy of any power; and that as her trade was growing, and her overseas interests growing, she believed it necessary to build up a big fleet. I mentioned that while President I had sounded, unofficially and informally, Germany and England as well as other powers to see if we could not limit the size of armaments, at least by limiting the size of ships; but had found that while all the other powers were willing, Germany and England would not consent; Germany taking the ground that the status quo put her at an improper disadvantage, and England sayingas I believe quite properly-that naval superiority was vital to her existence and that if Germany intended to alter the status quo she could not agree under any consideration to refrain from a policy of shipbuilding which would prevent such alteration from coming into effect. I added that while I had no proposition to make myself I did wish that the German authorities would seriously consider whether it was worth while for them to keep on with a building program which was the real cause why other nations were forced into the very great expense attendant upon modern naval preparation.

The minister asked me if I intended to speak about this in Berlin. I answered that I did not know, that I could not tell whether or not the chance would arise. I of course expected him to inform the Berlin foreign office of what I had said, and indeed desired him to do so; but I had not expected what followed. Two days later the Berlin papers came out with semi-official statements to the effect that the Berlin foreign office had been informed that I wished to talk to them on the subject of universal peace and disarmament, but that they did not believe for a moment that I would be so lacking in understanding of the requirements of the situation as to take advantage of my friendly personal visit to broach a subject which would be very dis

tasteful and which the government authorities would have to refuse to discuss.

I was really grateful, not only to the Austrian for what he had done, but to the Berlin Government for taking such public action. Not only Mr. Carnegie, but a multitude of well-meaning and ignorant people had wrought themselves into the belief that if I chose I could do something with the Emperor for peace; and I was glad to be able to point out to them this announcement from the German foreign office in advance of my visit, which saved me the necessity of trying to explain why I could accomplish nothing. On the other hand it did give me exactly the chance that I wished with both the Emperor and the Chancellor in Berlin. To each of them I pointed out these statements in the German papers, and stated that I had had no intention of broaching the subject unless it had become evident that they were willing to have me speak; but after such a publication, obviously inspired by my conversation with the Austrian Prime Minister, it was due to myself that I should tell them at first-hand just what that conversation had been; and I accordingly repeated it to them, ending by saying that I knew perfectly well not only from what had appeared in the press but from other information I had received, that they were reluctant to discuss the matter, that I hoped they understood that I was a practical man and in no sense a peace-at-any-price man, and that all I had felt was that the subject was of such importance as to warrant consideration as to whether or not it was feasible to do something practical toward limiting expense and putting difficulties in the way of war.

The Emperor was very courteous, and said that he really had no control over the matter, that it was something which affected the German people, and that the German people, or at least that section of the German people upon whom he relied and in whom he believed, would never consent to Germany's failing to keep herself able to enforce her rights either on land or at sea. The Chancellor was obviously a good deal taken aback at my remarks, and at first started