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The doctrine of "cooling time" does not apply where there is
no legal provocation. State v. Spivey, 989.
The evidence in this case is sufficient to be submitted to the
jury as to the guilt of the defendants of manslaughter.
State v. Goode, 982.
Where two persons are charged with being the cause of the
death of a person, but not with conspiracy, the jury should
acquit if they have a reasonable doubt as to which one
inflicted the injury. State v. Goode, 982.
In an indictment for homicide, the defendant is required only to
"satisfy the jury" of the existence of facts sufficient to re-
duce the killing to manslaughter or to establish a plea
of self defense, not to satisfy them by "stronger proof" or
"greater proof." State v. Barrett, 1055.
Where a person is killed by the accidental discharge of a gun,
in an attempt by another person to execute an unlawful
purpose, the person making the, attempt is guilty of man-
slaughter. State v. Hall, 1094.
In an indictment for murder, evidence tending to show that
the accused had no unlawful purpose in going to the place
of the killing is competent, if their guilt is by the charge
of the court made to depend in some measure upon their
purpose in going. State v. Hall, 1094.
In an indictment for murder, if the trial court instructs correctly
as to the degree or quantity of proof necessary to reduce
the crime of murder to manslaughter and later lays down
a contradictory rule by saying that the mitigating cir-
cumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it
is harmless error, there being no evidence tending to re-
duce the crime to manslaughter. State v. Utley, 1022.
The charge on insanity-that defendant should show to the
satisfaction of the jury that at the time of committing the
deed he was insane, and did not know right from wrong,
or did not know he was doing wrong; that it would not be
sufficient for the jury to be satisfied that he was a man
of weak mind, but they should be satisfied that he was
insane, and did not know right from wrong, before they
could acquit him on the plea of insanity; and that if they
should be satisfied, from the evidence that he was insane,
as the court had explained insanity, they should acquit—
will be held sufficient to make the jury understand their
duty; such charge being prefaced with the statement that
defendant admits the killing, but says that at the time
he killed deceased he was insane, and that his mind was
so diseased that he did not know what he was about, or
was not conscious of doing wrong at the time of committing
the deed, or could not distinguish between good and evil
and did not know what he did. State v. Spivey, 989.
In an indictment for murder, an instruction that there is no evi-
dence of manslaughter is proper, where there had been
no fight between the parties, no battery or assault upon
the prisoner by the deceased, no legal provocation, and
even if the language used by the deceased just before he
was killed could be perverted into legal provocation, then
the cruel and excessive violence used by the prisoner was
out of all proportion to the provocation. State v. Spivey,
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See "Abandonment."
A husband may receive and receipt for money due his deceased
wife, as her administrator, and such receipt is prima facie
evidence that he was such administrator. Murray v. Bar-
A married woman who permits a grantee and subsequent gran-
tees under a void deed from her to take possession of
the land and make improvements thereon is not estopped
thereby from recovering such land. Smith v. Ingram, 956.
Since the Constitution of 1868 a married woman may by will
deprive her husband of curtesy in her separate estate.
Hallyburton v. Slagle, 947.
No part of land purchased by husband and wife can be sold
under execution against the husband. Ray v. Long, 891.
Where a husband and wife, suing in ejectment, claimed that
the land involved had been purchased jointly by them, each
furnishing a portion of the money, evidence to show the
purpose for which a certain sum of money was furnished
by the wife, and her accompanying directions, was properly
admitted, as tending to prove a material fact. Ray r.
A husband is not indictable for trespass on the lands of his
wife after being forbidden by her. State v. Jones, 1043.
Where the husband and wife purchase property, each furnishing
a portion of the purchase money, an estate in entirety is
created, and they hold per tout et non per my. Ray v. Long,
A deed in trust by the husband, in which the wife does not join,
reserving the homestead of the grantor therein conveys the
entire land contained in the deed of trust, subject only to
HUSBAND AND WIFE—Continued.
the determinable exemption in $1,000 worth thereof from
the payment of the debts of the grantor during his life.
Joyner v. Sugg, 580.
IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES.
A witness may be asked on cross-examination whether many
things relative to the case are not slipping from his mem-
ory for the purpose of showing that his memory is weaken-
ing. State v. Hall, 1094.
IMPROPER REMARKS OF COUNSEL. See "Arguments of Coun-
The finding of the jury, in an action for the recovery of land,
that defendant acted with a fraudulent purpose in purchas-
ing the same, could be considered on his application for the
allowance of the value of the improvements made by him,
though for various reasons the issue was immaterial in the
action itself. Hallyburton v. Slagle, 957.
The trial court must be satisfied of the probable truth of the
allegations in a petition for betterments before it is re-
quired that the court empanel a jury to ascertain the
value of the betterments. Hallyburton v. Slagle, 957.
A claim for improvements will not be allowed a person holding
land under an invalid decree. Finch v. Strickland, 103.
A married woman who permits a grantee and subsequent grant-
ees under a void deed from her to take possession of the
land and made improvements thereon is not estopped there-
by from recovering such land. Smith v. Ingram, 959.
One purchasing land at a sale by his own assignee in bank-
ruptcy, with the fraudulent purpose of defeating the rights
of his wife and children under a prior deed which he had
made to them with intent to defraud his creditors, is not
a bona fide holder of the premises under a color of title
believed by him to be good, and is therefore not entitled to
the value of improvements placed thereon by him. Hally-
burton v. Slagle, 957.
Where a circus company indemnifies a carrier for any amount
which the carrier may be compelled to pay for any injuries
to the employees of the circus during transportation, and
the carrier pays without suit an employee for injuries
sustained, and in an action on the indemnity bond alleges
that the amount thus paid was less than the actual dam-
ages the employee sustained and less than he would have
received by a jury, a demurrer to the complaint on the
ground that there should have been an adjudication of
the amount of damages by a court of competent jurisdiction
will not be sustained. Railroad Co. v. Main, 445.
A timber company building a railroad is liable for damages to
land done by one who built the railroad under a contract
with the company where it is shown that the work was
done under the supervision and contract of the company.
Craft v. Lumber Co., 151.
An indictment against a husband for abandoning his wife must
aver his failure to support her. State v. May, 1020.
A motion in arrest of judgment for defects in the indictment
may be made in the Supreme Court though no objection was
made thereto in the trial court. State v. Marsh, 1000.
A defective count in an indictment cannot be aided by reference
to another count. State v. May, 1020.
An indictment for slander of an innocent woman must contain
the averment that the defendant attempted to destroy the
reputation of an innocent woman. State v. Mitchell, 1033.
An indictment for rape must allege that the act was done
forcibly and against the will of the prosecutrix, or words
equivalent thereto. State v. Marsh, 1000.
An indictment for murder need not contain the words "premedi-
tation" and "deliberation." State v. Cole, 1069.
A complaint describing a road, naming the county wherein it
lies, alleging the person summoning to have been the over-
seer of that particular road; that the defendant was a citi-
zen of the county liable to work on said road and duly as-
signed thereto, and that he had been duly summoned, giv-
ing time and place; that he wilfully and unlawfully failed
to work, and also negatived the payment of one dollar, is
sufficient to support a warrant for failure to work a public
road. State v. Yoder, 1111.
Where a minor, after attaining his majority, accepts the pro-
ceeds of a sale under a deed of trust, he is estopped from
disputing the validity of the sale on the ground that the
trustee sold without a previous request from the creditor
as required by the trust deed. Norwood v. Lassiter, 52.
Where a minor, after attaining his majority, accepts the pro-
ceeds of a sale of land under a deed of trust, he is estopped
from denying the validity of the sale, though he was ad-
vised by counsel that he would not be estopped thereby.
Norwood v. Lassiter, 52.
Where the record clearly shows that all matters in dispute be-
tween the parties can be settled in the pending action and
that the plaintiff will not be injured, an injunction to pre-
vent a multiplicity of actions should be granted.
stone v. Carr, 800.
A motion for an injunction to prevent a multiplicity of suits is
properly made in the action pending and a new action for
that purpose would not be proper. Featherstone v. Carr, 800.
The fact that the method prescribed for assessing the damage
caused by taking land for the construction of a sewage plant
was illegal is not ground for restraining the construction of
the plant. Vickers v. Durham, 880.
In an action for an injunction to restrain the defendant from
discharging sewage on the premises of the plaintiff, it is
incumbent on the plaintiff to show that such action would
result in a nuisance and in irreparable damage. Vickers v.
Where a resident creditor of an insolvent bank brings suit in
another State, which hinders the collection of the assets
of the bank by the receiver, the receiver is entitled to en-
join the creditor for the prosecution of such suit. Davis v.
Lumber Co., 233.
In a suit by a receiver for an injunction to restrain a resident
creditor from maintaining a suit in another State against
the corporation for which the receiver had been appointed,
it is no defense that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at
law. Davis v. Lumber Cc., 233.
The discharge of sewage on the premises of a person is only a
nuisance prima facie, and not per se, and whether an in-
junction should issue will depend upon the facts in the
case. Vickers v. Durham, 880.
An injunction will not lie to restrain the threatened blocking
up of a depression into which the water from the land of
the plaintiff naturally drains, there being adequate remedies
at law. Porter v. Armstrong, 66.
A complaint for an injunction must allege that the defendant is