LEGACIES AND DEVISES-Continued.
the personalty if there is no necessity of converting such in-
vestments into money. Baptist University v. Borden, 477.
Where a testator directs that certain real estate be sold and
the proceeds be divided between two devisees, such sale
constitutes a conversion for the purpose of division only
and does not change the character of the property with re-
spect to its liability for debts and legacies. Baptist Uni-
versity v. Borden, 477.
General legacies must abate or be postponed until payment in
full is made of demonstrative legacies. Baptist University
r. Borden, 477.
The personalty of a testator must be applied to the payment of
debts and exhausted before the realty can be subjected
thereto unless it clearly appears from the will that the tes-
tator meant to charge the same upon his real estate. Bap-
tist University v. Borden, 476.
A will should be so construed that the dissent of the widow
affects the devisees and legatees to as small degree as
possible and that the general scope and plan of distribu-
tion be carried out as far as possible. Baptist University v.
Borden, 476.
The distributive share of a widow consists of one-half of the
personalty after the debts, expenses of administration, her
year's allowance, and specific legacies are deducted from
the total value of the personal estate. Baptist University v.
Borden, 477.
A legatee cannot maintain an action against the executor of
another legatee who has taken possession of the property
of the deceased devisor, but the action must be brought
by the personal representative of the devisor. Mitchell v.
Milchcil, 350.
LEGISLATURE. See "Statutes."
LIBEL AND SLANDER. See "Slander."
In an action for libel, to make a communication privileged, it
must be made bona fide about something in which the writer
has an interest or duty, the person addressed a correspond-
ing interest or duty, and in protection of that interest, or
the performance of that duty. Harrison v. Garrett, 172.
In an action for libel, evidence of a public rumor affecting the
character of plaintiff does not tend to disprove malice or
show good faith in the absence of evidence that the de-
fendant at the time he made the publication had knowledge
of the rumor and acted thereon. Harrison v. Garrett, 172.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-Continued.
When, in an action for libel, the publication is not libelous per
se, and the complainant fails to allege special damage, a
failure to demur waives the defect. Harrison v. Garrett, 172.
LICENSES.
In a prosecution for retailing liquor without a license, a special
verdict which fails to find that the defendant did not have
a license to sell is not sufficient to sustain a judgment of
guilty. State v. Bradley, 1060.
LIENS.
See "Notice."
The commencement of a suit by creditors for themselves and
all other creditors to set aside a fraudulent deed of as-
signment by a bank does not create a lien in their favor,
where it does not increase the assets of the corporation.
Fisher v. Bank, 769.
LIFE INSURANCE. See "Insurance."
LIFE ESTATES. See "Estates."
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS.
The statute of limitations does not begin to run on a breach of
covenant of warranty in a deed for land until after eviction.
Wiggins v. Pender, 628.
An averment that more than three years have elapsed since
the date of the alleged promise before the action was
brought and the services rendered as alleged is a sufficient
plea of the statute of limitations. Pipes v. Lumber Co., 612.
A dismissal of an action for the want of jurisdiction of the
parties is similar to a non-suit and another action may
be commenced within one year thereafter. Harris v. Daven-
port, 697.
The commencement of an action by an administrator for the
sale of the lands for assets with which to pay a debt to
himself is a sufficient filing and admitting of the claim so
as to prevent the running of the statute of limitations.
Harris v. Davenport, 697.
The registration of a grant is constructive notice to a junior
grantee that a senior grantee claims the land included in
the grant and an action to declare the senior grantee a
trustee for the benefit of the junior grantee must be brought
within ten years of said registration. Ritchie v. Fowler, 788.
Where a debt is made payable in two instalments, maturing a
different times, the creditor may elect to wait to sue till
the second instalment is due and the statute of limitations
will not begin to run until that time. Cone v. Hyatt, 803.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS-Continued.
A partial payment of a note in order to stop the running of the
statute of limitation must be made by some one authorized
to make it. Cone v. Hyatt, 803.
It is not sufficient merely to allege that an action is barred by
the statute of limitations without stating the facts from
which it could be deduced. Murray v. Barden, 136.
The defense that a claim is barred by the statute of limitation
may be waived by a failure to set it up. Cone v. Hyatt, 803.
The time within which a sale must be made under a power of
sale in a mortgage is not limited and is not affected by
the fact that the right to sue on the debt is barred. Menzel
v. Hinton, 660.
When a non-suit is granted under Acts 1897, Chap. 109, as
amended, the plaintiff may bring a new action within one
year. Prevatt v. Harrelson, 250.
Where a trustee, holding a legal title to land for the use of
herself and others, executes a mortgage on the same, and
the land is sold under the mortgage the purchaser gets the
legal title coupled with the trust, his possession is not
adverse to the cestui que trustent, and the statute of limita-
tions does not run against them. Deans v. Gay, 227.
Where, in ejectment, four issues are submitted, one being as
to the statute of limitations, an instruction as to facts
bearing on this issue alone should be limited thereto.
man v. Weeks, 81.
Pitt-
In an action to recover land which had been occupied adversely
by defendant for twenty years, the fact that the plaintiff
did not know the location of his line or that the land was
his until a few days before the suit was commenced, is im-
material. Pittman v. Weeks, 81.
In an action to recover money paid for the purchase price of
land, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time
the payment is made, the vendor having had no title. Bar-
den v. Stickney, 416.
Where the statute of limitations begins to run against a trustee
or an undisclosed agent acting as principal, it is not sus-
pended by the subsequent appearance of a married woman
as cestui que trust or as the undisclosed principal. Barden
v. Stickney, 416.
That the title of land attempted to be conveyed by a mortgagor
is a failure, is not such a mistake as to prevent the running
of the statute of limitation. Barden v. Stickney, 416.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS-Continued.
Under The Code, Sections 756 and 757, a claim against a town
must be presented within two years after maturity or it is
barred. Board of Education v. Greenville, 4.
The power of sale in deed of trust or mortgage is not barred by
the statute of limitations though an action for foreclosuure
thereon is barred. Cone v. Hyatt, 810.
See "Intoxicating Liquors."
LIS PENDENS.
A petition to sell land for assets amounts to notice to a pur-
chaser under a proceeding by heirs for sale for partition.
Harris v. Davenport, 697.
A purchaser of land for value after the filing of a lis pendens,
but before the filing of the complaint in the action, is not
charged with constructive notice of any defects in the title.
Morgan v. Bostic, 743.
LOGS AND LOGGING.
In an action for cutting and removing timber contrary to the
terms of a contract, evidence of the plaintiff that he saw
the hands of the defendant timber company cutting and
removing the timber is some evidence of that fact, the
sufficiency of which is for the jury. Craft v. Timber Co., 151.
M
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. See "False Imprisonment."
In an action against a prosecutor for malicious prosecution, the
plaintiff having been tried and acquitted on two separate
indictments for the same offense, both bills of indictment
are competent evidence. Coble v. Huffines, 399.
Exemplary damages may be awarded in an action for malicious
prosecution. Kelly v. Traction Co., 369.
In an action for malicious prosecution circumstantial evidence
is competent to show that the defendant instigated the
prosecution. Kelly v. Traction Co., 368.
In an action for malicious prosecution, it is not necessary to
show who swore out the warrant if it was done at the in-
stigation of the defendant. Kelly r. Traction Co., 368.
In this action for malicious prosecution there is evidence tend-
ing to show malice. Kelly v. Traction Co., 368.
In an action for malicious prosecution the order and judgment
in the criminal action, finding the prosecution frivolous,
malicious, and not required for the public interests, while
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-Continued.
not conclusive of malice or want of probable cause, is com-
petent as tending to show malice and want of probable
cause. Coble v. Huffines, 399.
In an action for false arrest and malicious prosecution, admis
sions by other persons arrested at the same time are not
competent, there being no allegation of conspiracy. Kelly
v. Traction Co., 368.
In an action for false arrest and malicious prosecution, if the
arrest without a warrant is illegal, it is no defense that
the defendant acted without malice. Kelly v. Traction Co.,
368.
In this action for malicious prosecution there is evidence to
show that the plaintiff was caused to be arrested by the
defendant through its agents acting within the general
scope of their authority. Kelly v. Traction Co, 368.
MANSLAUGHTER.
See "Homicide."
MALICE. See "Libel and Slander."
MARRIED WOMEN. See "Curtesy;" "Husband and Wife;"
"Wills."
Where the statute of limitation begins to run against a trustee
or an undisclosed agent acting as principal, it is not sus-
pended by the subsequent appearance of a married woman
as cestui que trust or as the undisclosed principal. Barden
v. Stickney, 416.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See "Contributory Negligence;" "Dam-
ages;" "Negligence;" "Railroads."
A vice-principal is one who has such a control over those who
act under him that they have a just reason to believe that
a failure or refusal to obey the superior will or may be
followed by a discharge. Lamb v. Littman, 978.
It is the duty of an engineer of a railroad company to use all
proper and reasonable efforts to avoid injuring other ser-
vants of the company engaged in their work and to observe
the rules laid down by the company. Smith v. Railroad, 819.
A timber company building a railroad is liable for damages to
land done by one who built the railroad under a contract
with the company where it is shown that the work was
done under the supervision and contract of the company.
Craft v. Timber Co., 151.
In an action for a servant's injuries, a charge that if a coupler
was out of order, so that it was necessary to go between the
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