NOTICE-Continued.
The burden is on the purchaser of property conveyed to de-
fraud creditors to show that he bought for a valuable con-
sideration and without notice. Morgan v. Bostic, 743.
A petition to sell land for assets amounts to notice to a pur-
chaser under a proceeding by heirs for sale for partition.
Harris v. Davenport, 697.
The burden is on the purchaser of property conveyed to defraud
creditors to show that he bought for valuable considera-
tion and without notice. Cox v. Wall, 730.
In an action to recover land alleged to have been fraudulently
sold by an administrator, it is error for the trial court to
instruct that if the administrator was guilty of fraud in
making the sale that subsequent purchasers were guilty of
fraud without adding that such subsequent purchaser must
have had notice of such fraud. Morrow v. Cole, 678.
In an action for land alleged to have been fraudulently sold by
an administrator, a subsequent purchaser is entitled to an
issue as to whether he bought with notice of the fraud.
Morrow v. Cole, 678.
A person who purchases land with notice of an uncancelled
mortgage thereon is charged with notice of all rights of
the mortgagee and those claiming under him. Collins v.
Davis, 106.
A mortgagee, who sells under the mortgage, is not liable to a
subsequent mortgagee or judgment creditor for the surplus,
unless he has actual notice thereof. Norman v. Hallsey, 6.
No notice, however full or formal, will supply the want of regis
tration of a deed. Collins v. Davis, 106.
The proviso in Acts 1885, Chap. 147, Sec. 1, making actual
possession notice to subsequent purchasers, applies only to
deeds executed prior to December 1, 1885. Collins v. Davis,
106.
An acceptance of an overdue assessment by a fire insurance
company, after the property is burned, the company having
notice thereof, is a waiver of the forfeiture of the policy.
Perry v. Ins. Co., 283.
Where a telegram relates to illness or death it is sufficient to
put the telegraph company on notice of its importance.
Bright v. Telegraph Co., 317.
In an action to recover damages for a failure to deliver a tele-
gram, the relationship of the parties need not be disclosed
in the message when the same relates to sickness or death.
Meadows v. Telegraph Co., 40.
NUISANCE.
The discharge of sewage on the premises of a person is only a
nuisance prima facie, and not per se, and whether an in-
junction should issue will depend upon the facts in the
case. Vickers v. Durham, 880.
The evidence in this case to restrain a city from discharging
sewage on the premises of the plaintiff is not sufficient to
show a probability that a nuisance would result therefrom.
Vickers v. Durham, 880.
In an action for an injunction to restrain the defendant from
discharging sewage on the premises of the plaintiff, it is in-
cumbent on the plaintiff to show that such action would
result in a nuisance and in irreparable damage. Vickers v.
Durham, 880.
0
OBJECTIONS. See "Exceptions and Objections."
ONUS PROBANDI. See "Burden of Proof."
OPINION EVIDENCE. See "Expert Evidence."
In an action to recover for personal injuries, it is not compe-
tent for a witness to testify that a plank, alleged to have
been rotten, would have, if sound, held the weight of the
intestate of the plaintiff. Cogdell v. Railroad, 852.
ORDINANCES.
The running of a train at a greater speed than is allowed by an
ordinance is evidence of negligence. Smith v. Railroad, 819.
P
PARENT AND CHILD.
Where it appears from the evidence of the plaintiff that he when
an orphan child had lived with his uncle as a member of
his family and had grown up in this relationship, he is not
entitled to recover compensation for services performed for
his uncle. Hicks v. Barnes, 146.
PAROL TRUSTS. See "Trusts."
PARTIES.
Where trustees, for the purpose of settling their trust, bring
PARTIES-Continued.
suit and make all interested persons parties, a court of
equity will entertain the action. Davison v. Gregory, 389.
When property is burned by the negligence of a railroad com-
pany and the insurance company pays the loss, it may sue
the railroad company and no assignment by the insured is
necessary. Ins. Co. v. Railroad Co., 75.
Acts 1887, Chap. 147, as amended by Acts 1901, Chap. 186, pro-
vides that a personal representative can sell under a mort-
gage, but does not confer any right to maintain an action of
ejectment nor for foreclosure. Hughes v. Gay, 50.
Where the plaintiff in a foreclosure or ejectment action dies,
his heirs at law must be made parties. Hughes v. Gay, 50.
PARTITION.
Since Acts 1903, Chap. 99, the court has the power, when there
is a vested interest in real estate and a contingent remain-
der over to persons who are not in being, or when the con-
tingency has not yet happened which will determine who
the remaindermen are, to order the sale by conforming to
the procedure prescribed by the act. The act is constitu-
tional, and applies to estates created prior to its enactment.
Springs v. Scott, 549.
Where real estate is sold under order of the court, the decree
must provide for investment of the fund in such way as
the court may deem best for the protection of all persons
who have or may have remote or contingent interests.
Springs v. Scott, 549.
•
Where an estate is vested in a trustee to preserve contingent re-
mainders and limitations, the court may, upon petition of
the life tenant and the trustee, with such of the remainder-
men as may be in esse, proceed to order the sale, and bind
all persons either in esse or in posse. Springs v. Scott, 548.
The court has the power to order the sale of real estate limited
to a tenant for life, with remainder to children or issue,
upon failure thereof, over to persons all or some of whom
are not in esse, when one of the class being first in re-
mainder after the expiration of the life estate is in esse, and
a party to the proceeding, to represent the class, and that
upon decree passed, and sale and title made pursuant
thereto, the purchaser acquires a perfect title as against all
persons in esse or in posse. Springs v. Scott, 548.
PARTNERSHIP.
In an action for goods sold to a firm, the testimony of one
in the message when the same relates to sickness or death.
Meadows v. Telegraph Co., 40.
NUISANCE.
The discharge of sewage on the premises of a person is only a
nuisance prima facie, and not per se, and whether an in-
junction should issue will depend upon the facts in the
case. Vickers v. Durham, 880.
The evidence in this case to restrain a city from discharging
sewage on the premises of the plaintiff is not sufficient to
show a probability that a nuisance would result therefrom.
Vickers v. Durham, 880.
In an action for an injunction to restrain the defendant from
discharging sewage on the premises of the plaintiff, it is in-
cumbent on the plaintiff to show that such action would
result in a nuisance and in irreparable damage. Vickers v.
Durham, 880.
O
OBJECTIONS. See "Exceptions and Objections."
ONUS PROBANDI. See "Burden of Proof."
OPINION EVIDENCE. See "Expert Evidence."
In an action to recover for personal injuries, it is not compe
tent for a witness to testify that a plank, alleged to have
been rotten, would have, if sound, held the weight of the
intestate of the plaintiff. Cogdell v. Railroad, 852.
ORDINANCES.
The running of a train at a greater speed than is allowed by an
ordinance is evidence of negligence. Smith v. Railroad, 819.
P
PARENT AND CHILD.
Where it appears from the evidence of the plaintiff that he when
an orphan child had lived with his uncle as a member of
his family and had grown up in this relationship, he is not
entitled to recover compensation for services performed for
his uncle. Hicks v. Barnes, 146.
PAROL TRUSTS. See "Trusts."
PARTIES.
Where trustees, for the purpose of settling their trust, bring
PARTIES-Continued.
suit and make all interested persons parties, a court of
equity will entertain the action. Davison v. Gregory, 389.
When property is burned by the negligence of a railroad com-
pany and the insurance company pays the loss, it may sue
the railroad company and no assignment by the insured is
necessary. Ins. Co. v. Railroad Co., 75.
Acts 1887, Chap. 147, as amended by Acts 1901, Chap. 186, pro-
vides that a personal representative can sell under a mort-
gage, but does not confer any right to maintain an action of
ejectment nor for foreclosure. Hughes v. Gay, 50.
Where the plaintiff in a foreclosure or ejectment action dies,
his heirs at law must be made parties. Hughes v. Gay, 50.
PARTITION.
Since Acts 1903, Chap. 99, the court has the power, when there
is a vested interest in real estate and a contingent remain-
der over to persons who are not in being, or when the con-
tingency has not yet happened which will determine who
the remaindermen are, to order the sale by conforming to
the procedure prescribed by the act. The act is constitu-
tional, and applies to estates created prior to its enactment.
Springs v. Scott, 549.
Where real estate is sold under order of the court, the decree
must provide for investment of the fund in such way as
the court may deem best for the protection of all persons
who have or may have remote or contingent interests.
Springs v. Scott, 549.
Where an estate is vested in a trustee to preserve contingent re-
mainders and limitations, the court may, upon petition of
the life tenant and the trustee, with such of the remainder-
men as may be in esse, proceed to order the sale, and bind
all persons either in esse or in posse. Springs v. Scott, 548.
The court has the power to order the sale of real estate limited
to a tenant for life, with remainder to children or issue,
upon failure thereof, over to persons all or some of whom
are not in esse, when one of the class being first in re-
mainder after the expiration of the life estate is in esse, and
a party to the proceeding, to represent the class, and that
upon decree passed, and sale and title made pursuant
thereto, the purchaser acquires a perfect title as against all
persons in esse or in posse. Springs v. Scott, 548.
PARTNERSHIP.
In an action for goods sold to a firm, the testimony of one
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