interest, submit to be controlled by the public, for the court. Otherwise attorneys might be driven from the court, or deterred from coming to it, or be held in bodily fear while in attendance, aud thereby the administration of justice be obstructed. This principle might be pressed beyond reasonable limits, to be sure. but it certainly is not going beyond the true confines of the doctrine to apply it here. It protects parties jurors, witnesses, officers of the court, and all engaged in and about the business of the court, even from the service of civil process, while in attendance, and cer tainly should protect an attorney at the bar from the approach and attack of those who would do him a personal violence. A former ruling of this court on that subject has been especially approved by very high authority. U. S. v. Anonymous, 21 Fed. Rep. 761; Sharon v. Hill, 24 id. 726. U. S. Cir. Ct. W. D. Tenn., Feb. 11, 1886. United States v. Patterson. Opinion by Hammond, J. [26 Fed. Rep. 509.] -REFUSAL TO OBEY SUBPOENA OF LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE.-A standing committee on privileges and elections of either house of the General Assembly, while engaged under the orders of such house in tak ing testimony and making investigations to be reported to it, in a contest for membership thereof, pending therein, with power to send for persons and papers, may by a subpœna duces tecum lawfully command a clerk of the Court of Common Pleas, having custody thereof, to produce before such committee any poll-book affecting the election involved in such contest, although this may require its removal to an other county than that in which his office is situated. Upon the refusal of the clerk to obey the command of such subpoena, it is lawful for such house, upon his arraignment therein and further refusal, to order bis commitment to jail, as for contempt of authority, until he obeys, or signifies his willingness to obey, the command of such subpæna; such imprisonment not to extend however beyond the pending session of the General Assembly. The case of Anderson V. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, decided in the Supreme Court of the United States in 1821, declared the doctrine that representative bodies of America possessed inherently the power to punish for contempt. For sixty years following this decision its authority remained unquestioned in this country. The repeated and unqualified declarations of this principle by courts and text-writers are to be traced to this case. Mariner v. Dyer, 2 Greenl. 165; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395; 1 Burr's Trial, 352; U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; 1 Kent Com. 300; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M. 401; Tenny's case, 23 N. H. 162; State v. Copp, 15 id. 212. The later case of Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, is distinguishable on the ground that the preamble and resolution under which the committee was appointed showed upon their face that the investigation ordered did not have for its object any legislative action, or the impeachment of any officer of the government, but the collection of a debt owing to the government-a power which Congress could not exercise, but which was vested only in courts of justice; that in ordering such an investigation the House of Representatives exceeded the limits of its powers, and consequently the committee had no authority to require the plaintiff to testify before it. On this sole ground the decision of the court was placed. The Constitution of Ohio ordains (art. 2, § 6) that "each house shall be judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its own members." The House of Representatives was exercising, through its committee, the power thus conferred, at the time of the commitment of the petitioner. The power to enforce the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of papers affecting the election of its members is indispensable to CONTEMPT-STRIKING AN ATTORNEY DURING RECESS -During & session of the court, and while a jury case in which N. E., a member of the Memphis bar, was engaged as counsel, an intermission or recess of one hour was taken. Just after the presiding judge had come down from the bench, but before he or all the jurors and witnesses in attendance had left the court-room, and before N. E. had retired from the bar, the respondent, P., entered, and approaching, struck N. E., when further violence was at once prevented by those standing about. Upon proceedings for contempt, the respondent alleged that the assault was to resent a libellous attack made by E. N. upon respondent's father. Held, a contempt, although no disrespect to the court was intended. It is a rude discourtesy to a court, and a grave attack upon the dignity of the authority to which the court belongs, to use its courtroom as a fighting ground under any circumstances, even though the court be in recess and the judge not upon the bench. The circumstances of this case show that the respondent had no intention or thought of any incivility to the court or the judge, and the cause of the rencounter has no connection, near or remote, to the court or any of its proceedings. The mistake of the respondent was in assuming that when the judge left the bench he might, so far as the court was concerned, proceed to accomplish his purpose of making the assault, supposing that it was only when the judge was upon the bench that any question of contempt could arise. But it must be apparent to every one that it is a misconception, and far too restricted to admit of approval anywhere. A court would deserve the contempt of public opinion if it permitted so narrow a view of its prerogatitves to prevail, and could not complain, if during its recess the court-room should be used for a cock-pit or a convenient place to erect a prize ring. That is the logic of the false assumption that was made in tl;his case. But wholly aside from this consideration there is a principle of protection to all who are engaged in and about the proceedings of a court that requires preservation against misbehavior of this kind. The defendant in court whose attorney was att: ficked is entitled to the protection of the court against any personal violence toward its attorney while he is in attendance on the the efficient exercise of the power so conferred. That the power to commit a recusant witness for contempt in disobeying the command of a subpœna issued in the due course of an investigation affecting the election of any of its members is invested in each house, is now too firmly established to be considered a debatable question. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168; People v. Keeler, 32 Hun, 563; S. C., 99 N. Y. 463, and 52 Am. Rep. 49; Rapalje Contempts, § 2, and cases there cited. Ohio Sup. Ct., March 9, 1886. Ex parte Dalton. Opinion by Owen, C. J. pressly denies that of the prosecutrix she must be corroborated to authorize a conviction. For this purpose the prosecution may show that the prosecutrix made immediate complaint, and any marks upon her person or clothing which would indicate a struggle may be given in evidence for the purpose of showing the attack upon her. Her statement cannot be used as evidence in chief, but may be inquired into on cross-examination. Oleson v. State, 11 Neb. 276; S. C., 38 Am. Rep. 366; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 213. The law presumes that a woman who has suffered the indignity and brutality of a rape will not submit in silence to the wrong, but will at once take the necessary steps to bring the offender to justice. This was one of the tests of the common law. Blackstone says: "The party ravished may give evidence on oath, and is in law a competent witness; but the credibility of her testimony, and how far she is to be believed, must be left to the jury upon the circumstances of fact that concur in that testimony. For instance, if the witness be of good fame; if she presently discovered the offense and made search for the offender; if the party accused fled for it-these and the like are concurring circumstances which give greater probability to her evidence." 4 Bl. Comm. 213. As there was no attempt made to corroborate the testimony of the prosecutrix in this case, her evidence alone could not have been sufficient. Neb. Sup. Ct., March 17, 1886. Matthews v. State. Opinion by Maxwell, C. J. CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-DYING DECLARATIONS. -The dying declaration of the deceased was taken in the form of questions and answers; and he was asked, "What reason, if any, had the man for shooting you?" to which he answered: "Not any that I know of. He said he would shoot my damned heart out." Held admissible. It was held on the former appeal (97 Ind. 122) that this was not the expression of an incompetent opinion, but was the statement of a fact, and we will not depart from that ruling. In the opinion given upon the former appeal the following authorities were cited: Wroe v. State, 20 Ohio St. 160; Rex v. Scaife, 1 Moody, 551; Roberts v. State, 5 Tex. App. 141; Maine v. People, 9 Hun, 113; Whart. Crim. Ev., § 294. The gravity and importance of the case, it is thought, justifies us in referring to authorities that have come to our notice since the delivery of our former opinion, and in briefly discussing the question, although we do not deem it necessary to enter upon a very full discussion of the question. In Payne v. State, 61 Miss. 161, it was held that the statement of the deceased that the defendant shot him without cause was not the expression of an opinion. The statement of the deceased in People v. Abbott, 4 Pac. Rep. 769, was that "the man cut him with a knife, and that he had no cause for it whatever," and it was held to be the statement of a fact. The statement of the dying person in State v. Nettlebush, 20 Iowa, 257, was in answer to a question whether the shot was accidental or intentional, and the answer was that "it was intentional." The evidence was held competent, but without any discussion. In Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 159, it was held that the statement that "he (the deceased) did not at first recognize the defendant, but when the latter drew his pistol, and commenced his pranks, he knew that it was the prisoner." These authorities fully sustain our former ruling, and neither our own search nor that of counsel has resulted in finding any opposing decisions except that of Collins v. Com., 12 Bush, 271. That case disposes of the whole question in a single sentence, refers to one authority (1 Tayl. Ev. 644), and that authority goes no further than to declare, what is undoubtedly the general rule, that an opinion expressed in a dying declaration is not competent. Ind. Sup. Ct., March 4, 1886. Boyle v. State. Opinion by Elliott, J. Zollars and Mitchell, JJ., dissenting. EVIDENCE-WEIGHT OF NEGATIVE TESTIMONY.-The question was whether and when the plaintiff rang a street car bell. She testified positively; seven others testified that they did not hear it. The jury were instructed as follows: "The rule of law is that the positive testimony of one credible witness to a fact is entitled to more weight than the testimony of several witnesses equally credible who testify negatively, or to collateral circumstances merely persuasive in their character from which a negative may be inferred." This embodies the rule laid down in 3 Greenl. Ev., § 375, and applied by this court in Ralph v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 32 Wis. 177. See also Bohan v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry. Co., 61 id. 391. Counsel do not challenge the accuracy of the rule in a proper case, but maintain that this is not such a case. The cause was tried in the County Court on the theory that if the plaintiff rung the car bell either before the car reached Marshall street, or while it was standing on the west crossing of that street, she was entitled to recover; otherwise not. That was the material issue litigated on the trial. The plaintiff testified that she rang the bell both before the car reached Marshall street and while it was standing at the west crossing of that street just as she started to leave the car. Of course that is positive testimony. On the other hand, the driver and six passengers who were in the car each testified that he or she did not hear the car bell ring until it was rung by a lady passenger just as plaintiff was falling from the car. Some of these witnesses are very positive that the plaintiff did not ring the bell at any time, and as already observed, they state circumstances tending to show that had she rung the bell they would have been likely to see her do so, and to remember the fact. The circumstances thus testified to tend to increase the weight of the testimony of those witnesses; yet after all, their testimony that the plaintiff did not so ring the bell, or that they did not see her do so, and would have seen her ring it had she done so, no matter how positive it may be in form, is negative testimony. It may be reliable testimony-it may be convincing under the circumstances- but it is essentially negative testimony. Such being its character, and it being opposed by positive testimony to the contrary which the jury were at liberty to believe, RAPE-EVIDENCE-NECESSITY OF CORROBORATION OF PROSECUTRIX.-Where one accused of rape testified on his own behalf, and denies the charge, there can be no conviction unless the prosecutrix is corroborated. At common law the accused was not permitted to testify in his own behalf. However false or malicious the charge might be, his lips were sealed, and if the prosecutrix testified positively to the facts constituting the offense, and there was no evidence to the contrary, the courts held the evidence sufficient. Sir Matthew Hale, however, (1 Hale P. C. 633) contended that corroborating proof was necessary. Under our statute the accused is permitted to testify in his own behalf, and in that regard the statute has changed the common-law rule so that where his testimony ex the rule of evidence stated to the jury was applicable, and it was not error to give it. This court has held that where a transaction is established by positive and satisfactory testimony, the mere negative testimony of persons present at the time, to the effect that they did not see or hear or know of the transaction, is not sufficient to justify a finding that no such transaction took place. Bohan v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry. Co., 61 Wis. 391. See also Muster v. Chicago, M. & St. P., Ry. Co., id. 235. It should be observed that these cases turned upon the weakness of the negative testimony, and furnish no rule for cases in which such testimony is strengthened by the attending circumstances. But we are not aware that it has ever been held in any case that a jury must disregard the positive testimony of a given fact, and find against it merely because there is much negative testimony tending to show the nonexistence of the fact. Wis. Sup. Ct., Fed. 23, 1886. Hinton v. Cream City R. Co. Opinion by Lyon, J. FIXTURES-MACHINERY-AS BETWEEN MORTGAGEE OF LAND AND MORTGAGEE OF MACHINERY.-Boilers and engines not attached to the realty, although in a shed which would have to be removed in order to take away the former, and machines fastened to the floor by cleats, screws, and nails, and connected by belting to the shafting, are personal property, as between a mortgagee of the land and a mortgagee of the machinery. The later decisions of this Commonwealth establish that machines may remain chattels for all purposes, even though physically attached to the freehold by the owner, if the mode of attachment indicates that it is merely to steady them for their more convenient use, and not to make them an adjunct of the building or soil. McConnell v. Blood, 123 Mass. 47; Hubbell v. East Cambridge Sav. Bank, 132 id. 447; Maguire v. Park, 1 N. E. Rep. 750. The master reports that he finds the articles in controversy to be personal property, and we cannot go behind this finding, unless the facts found specially require a different conclusion, as matter of law. Massachusetts Supreme Court, Jan. 8, 1886. Carpenter v. Walker. Opinion by Holmes, J. THE OBITUARY. JUDGE JOHN BAXTER. death of Judge John Baxter of the United States Circuit Court of this circuit leaves a vacancy on the bench which cannot be easily filled. He was perhaps the ablest judge who ever travelled in the circuit, and at the same time the most unpopular with the bar. Judge Baxter possessed many qualities which are often found wanting in a judge. He brought to the bench an unstained character, a sound knowledge of the law, and an acute understanding. He was quick to grasp the points of a case, and rapid in the transaction of the business of the court. He suffered little or no delay in the trial of causes. If counsel on one side of a case were ready for trial, it always occurred to him that counsel on the other side should be ready, and if they were not, the case was ordered to proceed without them. When he made up his mind as to the disposition of a case he did not wait to hear counsel argue it. Counsel were made painfully aware of this when their causes were peremptorily dismissed without hearing, or they were curtly told to desist from further argument in the midst of a trial. This was the cause of Judge Baxter's unpopularity, and it tended to weaken his reputation as a judge. With the public Judge Baxter occupied a different position. He was the impersonation of justice. In his court the righteous cause did not fail of success, and crime never escaped punishment. He was ever the upright judge, the Daniel come to judgment. And who can say that this was not a correct estimate of his judicial character? Those who witnessed the trial of causes in his court could not but be impressed with his sense of jus tice. It was conspicuously shown in the Ambrose case, the Mullen case, and in a number of other important criminal trials over which he presided at Cincinnati. His charges to the jury were models of good sense and fairness. It was seldom that a jury rendered a verdict contrary to his instructions. He was not given to writing opinions for publication. Those he wrote were remarkable for their brevity, their clearness, and their sound views of the law. His opinions on corporation law are particularly valuable. They have been frequently quoted and followed by Federal courts, and have settled the law upon the subjects of which they treat.-Ohio Weekly Law Bulletin. LETTER FROM DR. OLIVECRONA, OF SWEDEN, HE following letter to David Dudley Field from Dr. Olivecrona, one of the judges of the Supreme Court of Sweden, will be of present interest: STOCKHOLM, March 22, 1886. DEAR SIR: I am really and truly sorry for having so long postponed to acknowledge receipt of your letter of September 21, last year, as well as of the copies of "The Civil Code of the State of New York" and a "Code of Evidence," which you had the kindness to send me. The fact is that I have been the whole time so assiduously engaged in the Supreme Court of the Kingdom that I have very little leisure for any thing else, and thus I have just lately finished the perusal of the above-mentioned works, which I was anxious to do before writing to you. On account of this, I trust that you will kindly excuse my long silence in expressing to you my sincere gratitude for your valuable gift. You have asked me to examine critically the Civil Code prepared for the State of New York, and to give you freely my opinion of it. Owing to the vast difference between English or Anglo-American and Swedish legislation, it is however very difficult for me to take a correct view of a work of such great importance as yours. American and English lawyers can no doubt better than I appreciate the great merits of this eminent specimen of legislation, as they are conversant with the historical origin of a great many general rules relating to persons and to property, which are quite peculiar to the Anglo-American jurisprudence. But as they are obliged to look for the true principles of jurisprudence in the great bulk of common law, it is wonderful that they still can hesitate to accept a codification, which could give to existing law a fixed and correct form. In Sweden we have our civil law codified since 1734, and we can scarcely understand how we should act without a written Code. The fact that the "Civil Code of the State of New York" has for many years been working in the most satisfactory manner in California, though not originally written for that State, is the best proof of the practical value of a codification, which has given so favorable results. When studying the various subjects treated in your Civil Code, I could not avoid observing the great difference existing between the American and the Swedish principles of jurisprudence in what relates to persons and property. Historical facts and historical development of some general rules may account for this difference. To you it seems quite natural for husband and wife to make contract with each other, but the laws of Sweden do not permit any engagement or transaction whatever between married persons. The transfer of landed property is also based on different principles. By us, for instance, succession is the rule, will, the exception. It is therefore impossible to compare legislations where the fundamental principles differ so essentially. The third division of Civil Code, viz., on "Obligations," is according to my opinion a most remarkable specimen of an excellent legislative work. The legal propositions are there stated with a precision and a clearness which do the capacity and the judgment of the author the greatest honor. We have in Sweden certainly much to learn from your Civil Code in subjects relating to partnerships, insurance, bills of exchange, cheques, etc. I cannot but congratulate you on such an important piece of legislation, which will no doubt finish by overcoming all opposition to the codification of the rules of the existing common law in such a clear, fixed and firm form. * * * I remain, dear sir, Yours very sincerely, DR. K. OLIVECRONA. CORRESPONDENCE. MARRIAGE LICENSES. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: other wives, and without having ever seen either of the parties before. Again, is not the common-law marriage a disgrace to a community that turns up its nose at French morality? I am neither French nor a Catholic, but from such sources of information as have come to me, 1 believe the marriage system and the marriage law of Catholic France to be far superior to ours. Clandestine marriages and unhappy unions are there much rarer than with us. We do not find the highest courts of France or Germany compelled to make the question of the legitimacy of children, and the rights of property dependent upon what were called by a man, on some particular occasion when he wished to have illicit connection with a woman whose scruples he could not otherwise overcome, the mummeries of priests! 66 We need a carefully drawn (and in matter of penalty severe) marriage license law. That it is well nigh hopeless to expect the subjects of marriage and divorce to be placed where for the good of the community they undoubtedly belong, within the constitutional limits of uational legislation, is no reason why each State should not try to do something toward the desired end. A marriage license law has been in force in Pennsylvania for six months past. Similar enactments have been introduced into the Legislatures of New Jersey and Connecticut. Let New York not be behindhand. J. C. LEVI. In reference to the subject of marriage licenses I observe that a few weeks since you stated that a bill had been introduced in the Legislature. In this I think you were mistaken. The advisability of such an enactment has been before the Bar Association of this city, and the standing committee having cognizance has been directed to prepare a bill during the present year. The subject is one of greater importance than may prima facie appear. In its consideration we are apt to fall into the common error of regarding it from a sentimental rather than a practical point of view. Men and women have no inalienable or absolute right to marry when and how and whom they please. They have no more this right than they have the right of absolute personal liberty to go where and when, and do what they please. The liberty of the individual is always subordinate to the welfare of the community. The State has always regulated marriage. I maintain that (especially in thickly settled communities, such as ours) judicious restraints upon marriage tend greatly to promote both public and private morals. There is no act in life fraught with more important consequences, nor one which our theory and system and law leaves so entirely without proper safe-guards, as marriage! It may not be practicable to prevent the union of the sexes (legitimately or otherwise) in cases where crime and disease predominate on both sides. If it were, can any one deny the right of the State and community to protect itself against the procreation in its midst of drunkards and criminals, and of hereditary chronic or contagious disease? How much of misery and sin can be traced to the rash marriage of mere children, and of the poverty stricken, and the incurably diseased! I agree that the validity of the marriage should not be dependent upon the license, but I would make the penalties for violation of the requirements of the law very severe against all parties (except perhaps the wife), and especially so against the officiating clergyman. The average minister will sermonize in the morning from his pulpit on hasty and ill-assorted marriage, and in the afternoon beneath the roof that shelters his own daughter will indissolubly bind the trapped and misguided, and perhaps idolized sixteen year old child of honest and deceived parents to some scalawag, or to one who perhaps has two or three MERRILL'S COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE. Comparative Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws, by George Merrill, A. B. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1886. The title of this work shows the modern tendency to decentralize jurisprudence. Comparative jurisprudence is more thau a tabulated comparison of the local laws of particular States. It is an effort to arrange scientifically some of the legal principles which are common to all States. We know of very few works which show an adequate execution of this effort, for comparative jurisprudence, as thus defined, rises into the realm of philosophy. Mr. Merrill's work is not written from this point of view; it deals finitely with the local laws of the great European states and with the laws of the United States upon such intricate subjects as Nationality, Domicile, Aliens, Maritime Liens, Bankruptcy, and always from the point of view of the leading cases. Such a treatment is of course eminently practical in character, and lawyers will no doubt have frequent occasion to use Mr. Merrill's hand book in connection with their professional labors. is clearly printed, and bids fair to be a useful addition to a law library. It COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. THE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, April 13, 1886: especially on Admission to the Bar, Appellate Courte, and the Jury System. We are indebted to the courtesy of Mr. Edward Otis Hinckley, secretary of the American Bar Association, for the Report of the Eighth Annual meeting. This is an exceedingly important volume, much of which, by the same courtesy, has appeared in our columns, but which is now given in a consecutive and official form. In a very favorable notice of Mr. Barber's "pony" volume on Insurance, the Law Magazine and Review says: "The California Code is substantially a reproduction of Mr. Dudley Field's famous draft Code for the State of New York, and it is one of that eminent jurist's best rewards for his labors." Among the friends of Grover Cleveland when he was practicing law in this city was another attorney, but one of rather different stamp than the man of destiny The friend was a bright fellow, but with the bump of laziness abnormally developed. He was not a well use a decision bearing on any point it was his habit to lounge into Cleveland's office and casually worm the desired information out of his friend's mental storehouse. "Grover" was not so dull as not to appreciate the fact and to resent the sponging—not so much because the process was worthy of that name as because he wished to spur his friend on to more energetic work. One day the friend came in on his usual errand, and when Cleveland had heard the preliminaries usual to the pumping process, the latter told his questioner that he had given him all the imformation on law matters that he was going to. "There are my books," said Cleveland, "and you're quite welcor e to use them. You can read up your own cases." here, Grover Cleveland," said the friend, "I want you to understand that I don't read law. I practice entirely by ear, and you and your books can go to thun der."-Buffalo Express. How many lawyers there are who "practice law entirely by ear!" We hope this story is true. It is good enough to be. "See Judgment affirmed-John S. Perry, respondent, v. Board of missions of the Protestant Episcopal Church of Albany, appellant: Joseph Emrich, appellant, v. Lucy E. White, respondent; Peter D. Conklin, appellant, v. New York, Ontario and Western Railroad Co., respondent: Moses Kessel, respondent, v. Andrew Zeiser, appellant; Samuel Colgate et al., survivor, respondents, v. Pennsylvania Company, appellant; Stephen V. White, respondent, v. Old Dominion Steamship Co., appellant; Nicholas Quackenbos, ex'r of Leonard, appellant, v. Sophie Kingsland, respondent; Rudolph G. Salomon, respondent, v. Adolph Sternfeld et al., appellants; Edith E. Kerr,appellant, v. James Bryar, respondent; Mary Augusta King, ex'rx, respondent, v. Mayor, etc., appellant; John J. Hallahan, respondent, v. New York, Lake Erie and Western R. Co., appellant; Charles E. DeKay, respondent, v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., appellant; John W. Gil-read lawyer, and whenever it was necessary for him to lies et al., appellants, v. Augusta Kreuder, impleaded, respondent; In re Judicial Settlement of Theodore J. Denton, ex'r, etc.; Walter H. Mead, substituted trustee of will of Thorn v. John Riley, appellant; Amelia Smither, respondent, v. Elias L. Bissell et al., appel- | lants; Henry J. Goodwin et al., respondents, v. Julius Bunzl et al., appellants; Peter Schuster et al., respondents, v, Dutchess County Mutual Insurance Co., appellants; Sarah A. Vingut, appellant, v. Setauket Presbyterian Church, etc., respondents; Carl F. W. Busch et al., respondents, v. Mary Busch, appellant; Maretta L. Stebbins, respondent, v. William Breese, appellant. Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-George I. Newhall, appellant, v. Wm. H. Appleton et al., respondents; William L. Ford et al., respondents, v. Chas. J. Knapp, et al., appellants; Morris H. Smith, appellant, v. Long Island R. Co., respondent; Luther E. Mansfield, appellant, v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., respondent; Elizabeth Twogood, appellant, v. Mayor, etc., respondents; James V. Du Bois, respondent, v. City of Kingston, appellant; Henry Rosenberg et al., respondents, v. Hugo Block et al., appellants.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event, unless plaintiffs stipulate to deduct the amount of policy A, in which case it is affirmed, without costs to either party in this court-Mary E. Whitehead et al., respondents, v. New York Life Insurance Co., appellant.-Judgment of General Term reversed; decree of surrogate affirmed with costs-In re Application of Wm. E. Haxtun, etc., to mortgage estate of Akin, deceased.Order affirmed, with one bill of costs in this court to be paid to the respondent's attorney-Eugenia A. Rice, respondent, v. Hetty J. Barrett et al., appellants.Order affirmed with costs-Caleb S. Woodhull, respondent, v. Robert Little et al., defendants, Wm. J. Northridge, appellant; In re Application of Matilda T. McMahon, receiver, etc., v. F. A. Palmer, appellant. -Orders of Special and General Terms reversed aud injunction dissolved, with costs in all the courts-Hat Sweat Manufacturing company, respondent, v. Wm. H. Reinoehl et al., appellants.-Order of General Term reversed and judgment of Special Term affirmed, with costs-New York and Brooklyn Ferry Co., appellant, v. John H. Moore et al., respondents; New York Ferry Co. v. Moore et al.; John Fallan, appellant, v. Rosanna Lawler, respondent. NOTES. The Report of the Second Annual Meeting of the Georgia Bar Association contains interesting reading, We always knew there was poetry in marriage, but we have not been wont to regard divorce as a poetical subject. The writer of the following, from the Cin cinnati Law Bulletin, deserves to be heard: CAUSES OF DIVORCE IN OHIO. The law that keeps you out of trouble, my sister and my Says that while you have a wife or husband you cannot have That you must not leave the dear one to loneliness and fears, To preserve you in your manhood. You must not be impo- You must treat your family nicely, and furnish grub and Nor tear the dear one's eyes out, nor be extremely cruel; So, too, when you are married, the law declares it sooty And if your partner does a crime, and gets into the "Pen." SANDUSKY, O. |