1. Introductory.

6. Consequences.

17. Exceptions.

18. Additions.

to the same effect as to settled and uniform practice and usage under a statute, Tayloe v. Thomson, 5 Pet. 358); so that, where a decision of the supreme judicial tribunal of a state announced a certain rule as resulting from the construction of a statute, and a contract was entered into upon the basis of that decision, it was held unaffected by a subsequent overruling of the decision (Geddes v. Brown, 5 Phila. [Pa.] 180). But the object of all judicial exposition of statutes is the ascertaining of the meaning of the language used by the Legislature. It neither adds to, nor changes its true significance, but discovers and declares the same. The statute, therefore, as expounded, is the law, and the aggregate of all statutes in force and the judicial expositions thereof form the body of the Statute Law of the state or nation. It is in this sense that the law is a solemn expression of the will of the supreme power in the state (Cal. Pol. Code, § 4466). Where, however, the supreme law of the land is not the will of the Legislature, or the will of the people expressed by the Legislature, but the Constitution, it is not every statute, however clearly expounded, that is part of the law, but only such as conflict with no constitutional prohibition and conform to constitutional requirements. Whilst it is no part of the purpose of this work to enter upon questions of constitutional law, it is impossible to overlook this restriction in framing a proper definition, of what is, in this country, statute law. "Statute law, by American definitions, is an act which is prescribed by the legisla. ture, or supreme power of the State" (Potter's Dwarris, on Statutes and Constitutions, p. 35). Irrespectively of the obvious criticism. that statute law" cannot be "an act which is prescribed," but must be that which prescribes an act. it is submitted that this definition

It

falls short of accuracy in that it overlooks the element of constitutional limitations and the identification of judicial expositions with the body of the statute law. would seem that an acceptable definition of the latter would be that which describes statute law as being the will of the people conforming with its constitution, expressed, in accordance with constitutional requirements, by the Legislature, and expounded by Courts of justice. This, however, is the body of the statute law, which, by its terms, includes the judicial expositions already made, of the individual statutes. The object of this treatise is to elucidate the principles upon which these expositions that go to form part and parcel of the statute law of a state or nation are to proceed, in the individual cases in which they may be called for. The question, therefore, should not be: What is statute law ?-but, What is a statute? A statute which lacks the formal requisites needful in order to give it the effect of a law, cannot fall under the construction of a court of justice as a law. It is not a statute within the meaning of a work upon the interpretation of statutes. But a statute which is unconstitutional in its objects, although it can form no part of the statute law of the state or nation, is nevertheless a statute for the purposes of construction, until ascertained to be void. A definition of statutes, for this purpose, may consequently discard the ele ment of constitutionality, so far as relates to the substance of the enactment (except, in so far as the presumption against unconstitutional design affects the construction of the language: see post, $$ 178-181), but must take into account the element of constitutionality, so far as relates to the formal requisites of the enactment. It is believed that the definition of a statute as "The written will of the