known when it was made, as dukes, marquises, and viscounts (a). The 17 Geo. 2 (a. d. 1744), which gave parishioners the right of inspecting the accounts of churchwardens and overseers under the poor law of Elizabeth, was held to extend to those of guardians, officers who were created by Gilbert's Act (22 Geo. 3), passed in 1783 (b). The 13 Eliz. c. 5, which made void, as against creditors, transfers of lands, goods and chattels, did not originally apply to copyholds or choses in action, as these were not seizable in execution (c); but when they were made subject to be so taken (1 & 2 Vict. c. 110), they fell within the operation of the Act (d). The Act of Geo. 2, which protects copyright in engravings by a penalty for piratically engraving, etching, or otherwise, or "in any other manner" copying them, extends to copies taken by the recent invention of photography (e). [A statute authorizing counties to take stock in railroads is applicable to stock of railroads organized under a subsequent statute;"" and the operation of a law for regu lating "all existing railroad corporations," extends to railroads incorporated after, as well to those incorporated before its passage, unless excepted from its provisions by their charters. So a provision in a statute in favor of an alien "who shall have resided within the state two years," applies to future and past residence alike. And under an act providing that the expenses of the borough and township elections, in a certain county, "held in March annually," should be paid by the borough and townships respectively, they remained liable for the expenses of such elections, notwithstanding a subsequent change, by statute, in the date of the

(a) 2 Inst. 35.

(b) 17 Geo. 2, c. 38; 22 Geo. 3, c. 83; R. v. Great Farringdon, 9 B. & C. 541; Bennett v. Edwards, 7 B. & C. 580 6 Bing. 230.

(c) Sims v. Thomas, 12 A. & E. 536.

(d) Norcutt v. Dodd, Cr. & Ph. 100; Barrack v. McCulloch, 26 L. J. Ch. 105, 3 K. & J. 110; R. v. Smith, L. R. 1 C. C. 270, per Bovill, C. J.

(e) Gambart v. Ball, 14 C. B. N. S. 306; 32 L. J. C. P. 166; Graves

248

v. Ashford, L. R. 2 C. P. 410; Atty. Genl. v. Lockwood, 9 M. & W. 378; Barber v. Tilson, 3 M. & G. 429. See other instances, Re Taylor, 10 Sim. 291; Exp. Arrowsmith, 8 Ch. D. 96; and cases cited infra, chap. xii,

246 Stebbins v. Pueblo Co., 2 McCrary, 196.

24 Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Blackman, 63 Ill. 117.

948 Beard v. Rowan, 1 McLean.

135.

.249

250

same; nor did the conversion of a borough into a city affect its liability under the act ;"" just as the Massachusetts act of 1817, ch. 50, providing that prosecutions under the byelaws of Boston might be in the name of the commonwealth, remained unchanged, in that particular, by the act which incorporated the town of Boston as a city. Thus again, a provision of an act giving justices of the peace civil jurisdiction in cases involving not more than $100, made the judgment of the court of common upon certiorari to the judgment of such justices final, and forbade the issuing of a writ of error to the same by the Supreme Court; and it was held that this provision applied to certioraris in suits under a later act increasing the civil jurisdiction of justices to $300. Similarly, where a corporation originally incorporated as a road and bridge company, was by a subsequent statute permitted to form itself into two companies, one a turnpike, the other a bridge company, it was held that the penalties imposed by the original act upon the officers of the corporation created by it extended to the officers of the new turnpike company." So, an act dividing a county, and creating, out of a portion of the old county, a new one, with a new name, was held not to repeal, as to the latter the special laws in force in the whole territory covered by the original county, but the same were held to extend to and remain in force in the new county."

251

252

263

249 Crawford Co. v. Meadville, Y.) 203. The act allowing the 101 Pa. St. 573.

250 Com'th v. Worcester, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 462. Comp. Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330, supra, § 43, note (a), p. 54.

251 Pa., etc., Co. v. Stoughton, 106 Pa. St. 458. In New York, an act passed in 1876 gave to cleaning women at the State Hall the same per diem compensation as was paid to cleaning women at the Capitol, then $2. After the Capitol then used had been abandoned for the new Capitol, it was held they were still entitled to that pay, no change in the pay of cleaning women employed in the new Capitol having been shown: Pool v. State (N. Y.) 10 East. Rep. 365.

25 Kane v. People, 8 Wend. (N.

division extended the penalties of the old act to the officers of the bridge company, a circumstance which was referred to by the court as aiding it in arriving at the construction stated. It is to be observed, that, in both in this decision and that of Crawford Co. v. Meadville, supra, it was declared by the courts, as a ground for their decision, that the later acts were not intended to change the exist ing law beyond the immediate purposes of the enactment: see next chapter.

253 Lackawanna Co. v. Stevens, 105 Pa. St. 465; and see Parsons v. Winslow, 1 Grant (Pa.) 160. In Lumpkin v. Muncey, 66 Tex. 311, it is said that an act creating

[A statute limiting the time or place within which or where a designated class of offences may be prosecuted or tried, applies to offences of the same class created and punished by subsequent enactments."]

new counties does no more than provide for their organization, and until the new county is actually. organized or attached to some other county or district, its territory remains subject to the old juris diction. But the New Jersey act of 21 March, 1881, dividing the 8th Assembly district, and, with other territory, making two districts, one of which, however, was called the 8th, was, for obvious reasons, held to repeal by implication the

special provision of the act of 23 March, 1875, requiring one of the two freeholders from the 8th district to be from the western, and the other from the eastern part thereof: Mulligan v. Cavanagh, 46 N. J. L. 45.

254 Bish., Wr. L., § 126, citing the following American cases: Johnson v. U. S. 8 McLean, 89; U. S. v. Ballard, Id. 469; Ottawa v. La Salle, 12 Ill. 839.

CHAPTER V.

PRESUMPTIONS ARISING FROM SCOPE AND SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF ACT, AND AS TO EVASION AND ABUSE OF POWER.

§ 113. Presumption against Needless Change of Law.

§ 114. Application of the Rule.

127. Change of Common Law.

§ 129. Intent as an Element of Crime.

$130. Incapacity, etc.

§ 131. Acts done in Assertion of Right.

132. Ignorance as a Defense.

$155. Liability of Master for Servant's Act.

§ 136. Mens Rea and Guilty Mind.

§ 137. Restriction of General Terms to Particular Parties.

§ 138. Presumption Against Permitting Evasion.

§ 144. Limits of the Rule.

§ 146. Presumption Against Permitting Abuse of Power. $147. Judicial Discretion.

$148. Limits of Discretion Conferred on Officers.

§ 149. Discretion to be Exercised in Individual Cases.

113. Presumption against Needless Change of Law.-Before adopting any proposed construction of a passage susceptible of more than one meaning, it is important to consider the effects or consequences which would result from it (a), for they often point out the genuine meaning of the words (b). There are certain objects which the Legislature is presumed not to intend; and a construction which would lead to any of them is therefore to be avoided. It is found sometimes necessary to depart, not only from the primary and literal meaning of the words, but also from the rules of grammatical construction, when it is improbable that they express the real intention of the Legislature; it being more reasonable to hold that the Legislature expressed its intention in a

(a) Grot. de B. & P. b. 2, c. 16, S. 4; U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 390, per Cur. [Hines v. R. R. Co.,

95 N. C. 434.] See ante, § 4, as to when consequences may be considered.

(b) Puff. L. N. b. 5, c. 12, s. 8.

slovenly manner, than that it intended something which it is presumed not to intend.

One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any alteration in the law beyond what it explicity declares (a), either in express terms or by unmistakable implication; or, in other words, beyond the immediate scope and object of the statute (a). In all general matters beyond, the law remains undisturbed. It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness (b); and to give any such effect to general words, simply because, in their widest and perhaps natural sense, they have that meaning, would be to give them a meaning in which they were not really used. is, therefore, an established rule of construction that general words and phrases, however wide and comprehensive in their literal sense, must be construed as strictly limited to the immediate objects of the Act, and as not altering the general principles of the law (c); [i. e., they are to be construed as near the use and reason of the prior law as may be, without violation of their obvious meaning.']

It

§ 114. Application of the Rule. Thus, a Statute which authorized "any" or "the nearest" justice of the peace to try certain cases, would not authorize a justice to try any such cases out of the territorial limits of his own jurisdiction (d); or in which he had a disqualifying interest (e); or which he was incapacitated by any other general principle of law from hearing (f); or to hear them by

(a) Per Trevor, J., in Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. 150; see also Harbert's Case, 3 Rep. 13b. [Lee v. Forman, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 114; McAfee v. R. R. Co., 36 Miss. 669; Paramore v. Taylor, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 220; Schepp v. City of Reading, 2 Woodw. (Pa.) 460; Kerlin v. Bull, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 175.]

(b) 2 Cranch, 390.

(c) Per Sir J. Romilly in Minet v. Leman, 20 Beav. 278, 24 L. J. Ch. 547; Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, 1 Q. B. D. 546, per Mellish, L. J., 2 App. 783.

Cadbury v. Duval, 10 Pa. St. 265, 270; Ihmsen v. Navigation Co., 32 Id. 153, 157; Com'th v. Shopp, 1 Woodw. (Pa.) 123, 129. And see 1 Kent, Comm. 464.

(d) 1 Hawk. P. C., c. 65, s. 45; Re Peerless, 1 Q. B. 153; R. v. Fylingdales, 7 B. & C. 438. (e) R. v. Cheltenham, 1 Q. B. 467.

(f) Bonham's Case, 8 Rep. 118a; Great Charte v. Kennington, 2 Stra. 1173; R. v. Sainsbury, 4 T. R. 456.