165 156 § 181. Statute and Constitution Construed Together.—[It has already been said that a statute must be construed together with a constitutional provision in pari materia. No departure from the constitution can be assumed to be intended by the Legislature. Hence the meaning of language used in a statute must be understood to conform with, and be construed with reference to, the intention expressed upon the same subject-matter by the constitution; and the provisions of a statute must be understood, on the one hand, as silently embracing those prescribed before or after its passage, by the constitution, or, on the other hand, stopping short of that for which the latter has made other provision. Thus, where the constitution made all the stockholders in corporations chartered under the laws of the state subject to a certain individual liability for all stock "owned" by them, a statute under which a corporation was organized, and which provided for such personal liability of stockholders in respect of stock subscribed by them, was held to impose the burden not only in respect of stock subscribed for, but also of stock distributed as a stock dividend, and not only upon an original subscriber, but also upon a transferee or pledgee of the stock as collateral security. Again, the word "dam" in the charter of a corporation was construed, not in its strict sense as a structure raised to obstruct the flow of water, but in its more conventional meaning as the pond of water itself created by such obstruction, since the former significance, in a provision allowing the company to raise its "dam," but providing no compensation for injury to others, would have violated the constitution. And in in the legal tender case, Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603. For the effect of legislation upon the construction of constitutional provisions, in order to harmonize the two, see post, § 528. It may be here added that every doubt as to constitutionality of an act is to be resolved in its favor: Com'th v. Butler, 99 Pa. St. 535; Crowley v. State, 11 Oreg. 512; Smithie v. Garth, 33 Ark. 17; Alexander v. People, 7 Col. 155; Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612. Similarly, unless what an ordinance says is necessa 167 rily repugnant to the municipal charter, it ought not to be held to be so intended: Shaw v. Macon, 21 Ga. 280. 155 Ante, § 57. 156 Eskridge v. State, 25 Ala. 30; Banger's App., 109 Pa. St. 79; Aultman's App., 98 Id. 505; Johnson's Case, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 230; Billingsley v. State, 14 Md. 369; Bish., Wr. L., §89. 157 Aultman's App., 98 Pa. St. 505. 158 Colwell v. May's Landing, etc., Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 245. 160 view of a constitutional provision that no statnte should take effect until ninety days after its passage, except in case of emergency, the phrase "after the passage of the act, in a statute directing certain matters "within ninety days after the passage of the act," was held to mean within that period after the going into effect of the enactment.100 Further, to conform with a constitutional provision that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right. . to have a speedy.. trial.. by a jury," etc., it was held, that, under an act giving justices of the peace the right to try without the intervention of a jury, and sentence for certain offences, the accused must be held entitled to an appeal to a court where a trial by jury might be had." And where an act passed in 1841 imposed certain duties in the collection of revenue upon the state treasurer and made his account and certificate of amount due evidence against collectors, and subsequently the constitution imposed upon the Comptroller many of the duties formely devolving on the Treasurer, among them that of "superintending and enforcing the collection of all taxes and revenue, adjusting, settling and preserving all public accounts," etc., it was held that his account and certificate were evidence in actions against collectors under the provisions of the act of 1841.101 And finally, the ultimate right to decide upon the claim of any person to sit as a member of either house of the Legislature, being held to rest, under the constitution, with that body, in interpreting an act providing for the trial and determination of contested elections by the court of common pleas of the proper county, the duty being imposed upon it to decide which candidate had received the highest number of votes and was entitled to a certificate of election, it was held that the power of the court ended there, and that it could enter no judgment or decree declaring which claimant was entitled to the office, that right belonging to the Legislature, which remained at liberty, in the ultimate disposition of the matter, to reject every finding of fact or law made by the court.1] 159 Harding v. People (Col.), 15 Pacif. Rep. 727. 160 Johnson's Case, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 230. 161 Billingsley v. State, 14 Md. 369. 169 Re Contested El'n of McNeill, 11 Pa. St. 235. CHAPTER VII. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INCONSISTENCY. REPEAL BY IMPLICA TION. § 182. Legislature Presumed to Know the Law and to be Consistent. § 183. Repugnant Clauses in Same Act. § 184. Exceptions. Saving Clause. Proviso. § 186. Construction of Proviso, etc. § 187. Repugnant Acts passsd at Different Sessions. § 188. Repugnant Acts passed at Same Session. § 189. Acts Passed Same Day. § 191. Constitutional Requisites as to Repeal Inapplicable to Implied Repeal. § 192. Repeal by Unconstitutional Act. § 193. When Later Act does not Repeal Earlier Repugnant Act. § 194. Re-enactments. § 195. Amendments. § 196. Amendments “so as to read," etc. § 197. Repugnancy in Schedule. § 198. Implied Repeal by Negative Statutes. 199. Implied Negative in Affirmative Statutes. § 200. Statutes Intended to Furnish Exclusive Rule. § 201. Revisions and Codifications. § 203. Qualifications of Foregoing Rules. § 204. Implied Repeal of Common Law. 205. Limits of Extent of Repeal by Implication. 206. Expressed Intention to Repeal. § 207. Acts conferring Conflicting Rights, etc. § 208. Effect of Inconvenience and Incongruity between Acts. § 209. Effect of Later Legislation as Showing Intent to Repeal. § 182. Legislature Presumed to Know the Law and to be Consistent.—An author must be supposed to be consistent with himself; and, therefore, if in one place he has expressed his mind clearly, it ought to be presumed that he is still of the same mind in another place, unless it clearly appears that he has changed it (a). In this respect, the work of the (a) Puff. L. N. b. 5, c. 12, s. 9. Legislature is treated in the same manner as that of any other author. [As it is the function of the Legislature to express the national will by means of statutes, it is essential that the Legislature should know what is the existing state of the law whenever any statute is passed, and it is always presumed that the Legislature possesses such knowledge.'] The language of every enactment must be so construed, as far as possible, as to be consistent with every other which it does not in express terms modify or repeal. The law, therefore, will not allow the revocation or alteration of a statute by construction when the words may have their proper operation without it (a), [but requires the courts "to uphold the prior law, if the two acts may well subsist together.' Yet, "it is not in accordance with settled rules of construction to ascribe to the law-making power an intention to establish conflicting and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force provisions of law by which the later will of the Legislature may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility."] It is impossible to will contradictions; and if two passages are irreconcilable, the earlier stands impliedly repealed by the latter (b). Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. Ubi duæ contrariæ leges sunt, semper antiquæ obrogat nova (c). [“Of course, subsequent legislation repeals previons inconsistent legislation, whether it expressly says so or not. In the nature of things it would be so, for contradictions cannot stand together." Wilb., Stat. L., at pp. 12, 13, citing R. v. Walford, 9 Q. B., at p. 635; Jones v. Brown, 2 Exch., at p. 332. "Laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject:", Sedgw., at p. 106; and to same effect: Howard Association's App., 70 Pa. St. 344, 346; and of the common law: Jones v. Dexter, 8 Fla. 276, 286. (a) Per Bridgman, C. J., in Wyn V. Lyn, Bridg. Rep. by Bannister, 117. Sedgw., at p. 106, citing: Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 221; Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218. (b) Co. Litt. 112; Shep. Touchst. 88; Grot. b. 2, c. 16, s. 4; Sims v. Dough y, 5 Ves. 243; Constantine v. Constantine, 6 Ves. 100; Morral v. Sutton, 1 Phil. 533; Brown v. G. W. R. Co., 9 Q. B. D. 753, per Field, J. (c) Livy, b. 9, c. 34. Re Hickory Tree Road, 43 Pa. St. 139, 142. § 183. Repugnant Clauses in Same Act.-[Where, in a statute, there are several clauses which present, as compared with each other, an irreconcilable conflict, the one last in order of date or local position must, in accordance with this rule, prevail, and the others be deemed abrogated to the extent of such repugnancy; whether the conflicting clauses be sections of the same act, or merely portions of the same section. But this rule is subject to some modifications. Thus it has been said, that a later clause which is obscure and incoherent will not prevail over an earlier one which is clear and explicit. Nor, as a statute is to be construed with reference to other statutes in pari materia, as well as by a general survey of the whole context, and as the various provisions are to be made to stand together if possible, will such be the result, where, upon a comparison of the entire act with others upon the same subject, there appearing no intention to change the general scheme or system of legislation upon the same, the earlier provision harmonizes and the latter conflicts with such statutes.' And it has been seen that a reading of the provisions of the whole statute together may give to earlier sections the effect of restricting the meaning of later ones, as well as to the latter the effect of restricting the operation of the former." As to repugnant portions of a code it has been held that the sections last adopted, or portions transcribed from later statutes," must be deemed to repeal sections adopted earlier or transcribed from earlier statutes, or so to modify them as to produce an agreement between them. 184. Exceptions. Saving Clause. Proviso. [It seems proper, in this connection to examine the effect of exceptions, See Harington v. Rochester, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 547; Comm'l B'k v. Chambers, 16 Miss. 9; Packer v. R. R. Co., 19 Pa. St. 211; Brown v. Comm'rs, 21 Id. 37, 42; Quick v. White Water Tp., 7 Ind. 570; Ryan v. State, 5 Neb. 276; Albertson v. State, 9 Id. 429; Sams v. King, 18 Fla. 557; Branagan v. Dulaney, 8 Col. 408. And compare, Gee v. Thompson, 11 La. An. 657; Peet v. Nalle, 30 Id. P. II. 949; Hamilton v. Buxton, 6 Ark. 24. State v. Williams, 8 Ind. 191. Kans. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Wyandotte, 16 Kan. 587; ante, § 44, note 84. 8 Ante, § 38; Bish., Wr. L., § 64. Gibbons v. Brittenum, 56 Miss. 232. 10 Exp. Ray, 45 Ala. 15; O'Neal v. Robinson, Id. 526; State v. Heidorn, 74 Mo. 410. |