A Commentary on the Interpretation of Statutes

or insolvent." An act forbidding the carrying of concealed deadly weapons is violated by the carrying of a pistol concealed but for a moment."

§ 17. Exceptions. It is but a corollary to the general rule in question, that nothing is to be added to or to be taken from a statute, unless there are similar adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express (a). [Unless upon such grounds, courts are not at liberty to engraft exceptions or limitations upon words of general scope and comprehensiveness." Where a statute makes no exceptions, the courts can make none." Thus, where an act prohibited absolutely the sale of liquor, the court refused to recognize an exception in the case of liquor shown to have been sold and used as medicine." So, an act making the probate of wills devising real estate conclusive as to such realty unless appealed from within five years, operates against all persons, whether under disabilities or not. And a statutory limitation to five years of the lien of a decedent's debts upon his realty, excepting the cases of mortgages and judgments, and where an action for recovery is brought, is subject to no other exceptions, and to no distinction as to the character of the debt or demand; so that a debt due by a guardian, at his death, to his ward, though, as a trust, beyond the reach of the general limitation laws, can be a lien on his real estate, except in the cases provided for by

16 Hopkins v. Long, 9 Ga. 261. "Brinson v. State, 75 Ga. 882. (a) See per Tindal, C. J., in Everett v. Wells, 2 M. & Gr. 277; per Lord Westbury in Exp. St. Sepulchre, 33 L. J. Ch. 375; Re Cherry's Estate, 31 L. J. Ch. 351. See, however. Re Wainright, Williams v. Evans, and other cases mentioned infra, §§ 295, et seq.

18 U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72; Tyman v. Walker, 35 Cal. 634; Jones v. Jones, 18 Me. 308; Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43; Torrance v. McDougald, 12 Ga. 526.

Kilpatrick v. Byrne, 25 Miss. 57. "It is always unsafe to depart from the plain and literal meaning of the words contained in legisla tive enactments out of deference to

some supposed intent, or absence of intent, which would prevent the application of the words actually used to a given subject:" Pittsburgh v. Kalchthaler, 114 Pa. St. 547, 552.

80 Com'th v. Kimball, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 370. But see Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449, where, by construction, exceptions were made as to liquor sold for medicinal or sacramental purposes.

81 Cochran v. Young, 104 Pa. St. 333; and see Warfield v. Fox, 53 Id. 382; Hunt v. Wall, 75 Id. 413; and see McGaughey v. Brown, 46 Ark. 25, 37, as to coverture, citing Pryor v. Ryburn, 16 Id. 671; Gwynn v. McCauley, 32 Id. 97 Morgan v. Hamlet, 113 U. S. 449.

So,

the act, for only five years after the guardian's death." where an act authorized the courts of common pleas to change the name, style and title of any corporation within their respective jurisdictions, "provided, that no proceeding for such purpose shall be entertained by the courts until notice of such application is given to the Auditor General, and proof of such fact is produced to the courts," it was held that this requisition applied to all corporations whether of the class whose charters were to be filed in the Auditor General's office, or not." And so, again, under a statute declaring that" all property. . from which any income or revenue is derived shall be subject to taxation," it was held that water-works from which a revenue was derived, though the works were owned by a municipality, and irrespectively of the question whether the revenues were paid into the treasury of the municipality or used in maintaning and improving the property, were subject to county-tax." Upon the same principle an act permitting any wife to file a libel in divorce, includes a wife who is under age; and an act authorizing the foreclosure of mortgages by advertisement and sale under power contained in them, admits of no exception in favor of an insane mortgagor."]

§ 18. Additions.-A case which has been omitted is not to be supplied merely because there seems no good reason why it should have been omitted, and the omission appears consequently to have been unintentional. Thus, the Divorce Act, which provided that any order made for the protection of the earnings of a deserted married woman might be discharged by the magistrate who made it, was held not to empower his successor to discharge it, though the magistrate who had made it was dead (a). [So, where an act had conferred upon an officer the right to receive the proof or acknowledgment of all instruments in writing conveying

82 Oliver's App., 101 Pa. 299.

83 Re First Presb. Church, 107 Pa. St. 543.

84 Erie Co. v. Com'rs of Water Works, 113 Pa. St. 368.

85 Jones v. Jones, 18 Me. 308. 86 Encking v. Simmons, 28 Wis. 272.

(a) 21 & 22 Vict. c. 85; Exp.

Sharp, 5 B. & S. 322; 33 L. J. M. C. 152; see now 27 & 28 Vict. c. 45. See also Nettleton v. Burrell, 8 Scott, N. R. 738; Wanklyn v. Woollett, 4 C. B. 86; R. v. Ashburton, 8 Q. B. 871; Higgs v. Schroeder, 3 C. P. D. 252; Newton v. Boodle, 3 C. B. 795; Hind v. Arthur, 7 D. & L. 252.

land within the county in which he had jurisdiction, and a later statute enlarged his authority to take acknowledgments of deeds for lands in any part of the state, it was held that, his power to receive proof of deeds remained restricted to deeds conveying land in his own county." Similarly, an act providing for testing the accuracy of the weights and measures used in selling commodities, and punishing the selling by unmarked weights and measures, was of necessity held inapplicable to buyers' scales and measures." In both of these cases, it was admitted that there was no apparent reason for the discrimination. But the language of the enactments was free from ambiguity and uncertainty, and in such cases, courts cannot supply defects in the enactment in order to carry out more fully the supposed purpose and intent of the Legislature." "It is not for courts of justice, proprio marte, to provide for all the defects or mischiefs of imperfect legislation."] If an Act requires that a writ, on renewal, shall be sealed with a seal denoting the date of renewal, a copy of the writ cannot be substituted for the original for this purpose, when the original is lost (a). [So, where an act requires, in order to entitle plaintiff to judg ment for want of an affidavit of defense, that he file a copy of the instrument or book entries upon which his suit is based, nothing short of an actual copy will suffice, and a reproduction of a lost bond or book entry cannot be filed with the effect of entitling plaintiff to such judgment."] So, also, it was held that the 26 & 27 Vict. c. 29, which enacts that answers made to an election commission shall not be admitted in evidence in any proceeding except in cases of

"Peters v. Condron, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 80.

$ Southw. R. R. Co. v. Cohen, 49 Ga. 627.

89 Swift v. 90 STORY, J., in Smith v. Rues, 2 Sumn. 354, 355.

Luce, 27 Me. 285.

(a) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, and Ord. 8. Judic. Act; Davis v. Garland, 1 Q. B. 250; and see Nazer v. Wade, 1 B. & S. 728, 31 L. J. Q. B. 5; Evans v. Jones, Id. 61; Freeman v. Tranch, 12 C. B. 406, 21 L. J. 214. [But under an act which

made it the duty of the recorder of deeds to "certify the recognizance of certain officers to the prothonotary of the court of common pleas, for the purpose of fixing a lien on the lands of the sureties, etc., a certification of a certified copy, instead of the original, was held a compliance with the act: Borlin v. Highberger, 104 Pa. St. 143.]

9 Com'th v. Laws, 7 W. N. C. (Pa.) 80; Stoops v. Post, 15 Id. 176.

"indictment" for perjury, left them excluded in "informations" for perjury filed by the Attorney-general (a).

19. When the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852 abolished the writ of distringas without providing for the service of a writ on lunatics in confinement and inaccessible, it was found that no actions could be prosecuted against them (b). So, when extra-parochial places were made rateable without either repealing the enactments which required that a copy should be affixed on or near the doors of all the churches in the parish, or making any other provision for publication, it was held, where there was no church in the extra parochial place, that a rate affixed on a church door fifty yards from the boundary was not valid for want of publication (c). The 4 & 5 W. & M. c. 20, which required that judgments should be docketted, enacted that undocketted judgments should not affect lands as regarded purchasers or mortgagees, or have preference against heirs or executors. The 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, abolished docketting, and enacted that no judgment should have effect unless registered; but it made no provision for the protection of heirs and executors. Though this was perhaps an oversight, resulting in hardship on an executor who had paid simple contract debts without keeping sufficient assets to meet an unregistered judgment of which he had no notice, the court refused to supply the omission (d). These were all casus omissi which the court could not reach by any recognized canons of interpretation. [For, whilst, where a case not expressly provided for by a statute is yet so clearly within its reason as to warrant the inference that the Legislature, having the case in contemplation, deemed it unnecessary expressly to enumerate it, the court may extend the words of the statute to such case, although, in their primary sense, they may not include it; yet if there is nothing in the con text to give them a broader meaning,-if the omission was because the contingency was unforeseen, and therefore not

(a) R. v. Slator, 8 Q. B. D. 267. (b) Holmes v. Service. 15 C. B. 293, 28 L. J. 24; Williamson v. Maggs, 28 L. J. Ex. 5. See Judic. Act, 1875, Ord. 9 (5).

(d) Fuller v. Redman, 26 Beav. 600, 29 L. J. 324.

within the contemplation of the Legislature, the court would be assuming legislative powers, if it were to supply the defect."]

§ 20. Where an Act authorized the apportionment of the cost of making a sewer, without limiting any time for the purpose, the court refused to read the Act as limiting the exercise of the power to a reasonable time (a). The 21 Jac. 1, having provided that the Statute of Limitations should not run while the plaintiff was beyond the seas, and the 4 & 5 Anne having made a similar provision where the defendant was abroad, the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, enacted that no part of the United Kingdom should be deemed beyond the seas within the meaning of the former Act, but made no mention of the latter; and it was held that it could not be stretched to include it (b). There may have been no good reason for thus limiting the new enactment to the Act of James; but there was no sufficient ground either in the context or in the nature of the consequences resulting from the omission, for concluding that the Act of Anne was intended to be included. So when the Married Women's Property Act of 1870 empowered a married woman to sue, without making her liable to be sued, it was held that no action lay against her (c). The Habitual Criminals' Act, in enacting that upon a trial for receiving stolen goods, a previous conviction for any offense involving dishonesty should be admissible against the prisoner as evidence of his having received with guilty knowledge, provided that notice were given to him that the conviction would be put in evidence" and that he would be deemed to have known that the goods were stolen until he proved the contrary,"

* See Hull v. Hull, 2 Strobh. Eq. (S. C.) 174. But see Maxwell v. State, 40 Md. 273, 292, 298, as to power of "court to assume and supply an omission in a long and complicated act.

(a) Bradley v. Greenwich Board, 3Q. B. D. 384. [So it is said in Martin v. Robinson, 67 Tex. 368. that, where an act does not fix a time after which administration shall not be opened, the courts cannot legislate by fixing an arbitrary time. Comp. Ricard v. Williams,

7 Wheat. 115; McFarland v. Stone, 17 Vt. 173, and see post, § 327. See Burden v. Stein, 25 Ala. 455. that when a statute requires notice to be given and specifies no particular length of time, it is construed to mean a reasonable time.]

(b) Lane v. Bennett. 2 C. M. & R. 70; Battersby v. Kirk, 2 Bing. N. C. 584.

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