the revising statute declares what effect it is intended to have upon the former law; as, where it declares that it shall operate as a repeal of such provisions of earlier acts as are inconsistent with it, which is regarded as a declaration that it shall repeal only such provisions and leave unaffected such as are not inconsistent." The question of implied repeal being, after all, a question of implied intention,where the Legislature expressly declares what effect, in the way of repeal, an act is intended to have, there is no room for any implication." It has even been held, that a specific repeal by one statute of a particular section of another raises a clear implication that no further repeal is intended," unless there is an absolute inconsistency between other provisions of the two statutes." But, where there is such a repugnancy between the provisions of a later act revising the whole subject matter of several former ones and expressly repealing one of them, and the provisions of another not expressly repealed, the latter will nevertheless be abrogated by implication." A revisal repealing all acts repugnant to the provisions thereof, cannot affect statutes which are omitted and which are not repugnant to its provisions.' Moreover, to ascertain the effect of a revision, in this particular, it is necessary to "put together and construe as one act the act which authorized the compilation, and the act which subsequently put the revisal into operation." And where the former gave the compilers no authority to omit

439. And see State v. Co. Ct., 53 Mo. 128. But see Emporia v. Norton, 16 Kan. 236, where, under such a rule of construction, "unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intention of the Legislature," it was held, that a statute enacted in the same terms as a former one, which had accomplished its entire purpose and exhausted its force, should not be construed as a continuation of the same.

115 Patterson v. Tatum, 3 Sawyer, 164; Lewis v. Stout, 22 Wis. 234; Gaston v. Merriam, 33 Minn. 271. But see U. S. v. Cheeseman, 3 Sawyer, 424.

120

116 Thus, where an act expressly repealed so much of a former one as provided, etc., it was held that there could be no implication of an intention to repeal anything beyond: Purcell v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 42 N. Y. Super. Ct. 383.

117 State v. Morrow, 26 Mo. 131. See also Kilgore v. Com'th, 94 Pa. St. 495, post, § 227. And comp. § 398.

118 Crosby v. Patch, 18 Cal. 438. 119 Prince George Co. v. Laurel, 51 Md. 457.

120 State v. Pollard, 6 R. I. 290. 121 State v. Cunningham, 72 N. C. 469, 476.

any, but directed a compilation of all, laws in force, and the latter repealed "all acts and parts of acts the subjects whereof are digested in this revisal or which are repugnant to the provisions thereof," an act, which is neither brought forward in the revisal nor repugnant to its provisions, is, of course, not repealed by it.""

§ 204. Implied Repeal of Common Law.-[The principle under discussion applies not only to statute law, but also to the common law, the latter being deemed superseded by a statutory revision of the entire subject," either when it is couched in negative terms, or when its affirmative provisions are inconsistent with the continued operation of the common law."

124

[Similarly where a statute enacted by the Legislature of a state covers the entire subject matter of a statute theretofore in force in the state, deriving its authority from an enactment of the Legislature of another state or nation of which the state was formerly a part, or to which it was subject, the older law, though not expressly repealed, is deemed abrogated.198

$205. Limits of Extent of Repeal by Implication.-[But, in all matters of repeal resulting by implication, from an affirmative act except where the intent, appearing from a design to substitute the new law for the old, in toto, is clearly to the contrary, it must be remembered that the repeal extends only so far as the provisions of the statutes affecting each

122 Ibid. Such a conclusion is strengthened by a consideration of the obvious impossibility of making any revision so complete as to embrace all general laws,—an impossibility recognized, in spite of the fact that the revision of statutes raises a presumption that it was intended to establish a complete code of laws, by a provision of an adopting clause that statutes of a general nature which are not repugnant to the revision should remain in force: Com'th v. Mason, 82 Ky. 256.

123 Com'th v. Cooley, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 37; Com'th v. Marshall, 11 Id. 350; State v. Boogher, 71 Mo. 631 (where it is held that a statute

making an act, which was an offence at common law, an offence by statute, repeals the common law). But see Washington, etc., Road v. State, 19 Md. 239 (where it is held that an act fixing a penalty for an offence, but neither expressly nor by necessary impli cation destroying the common law remedy, is cumulative merely). Compare post, $$ 463, et seq.

124 State v. Norton, 23 N. J. L. 33; State v. Wilson, 43 N. H. 415.

125 Mason v. Waite, 1 Fick. (Mass.) 452 (the case of an English statute); Towle v. Marrett, 3 Greenl. (Me.) 22 (of a Massachu setts act).

other are inconsistent; the old law being, in all other respects, left in full force and effect.1" Whatever portions of the old law may be incorporated with the new, as being consistent with the latter, must be deemed to remain in force. 127 Thus, an act amending the charter of a town and giving to the mayor and aldermen the exclusive right to grant licenses for the sale of spirituous liquors, would not supersede the general law requiring the application for a license to retail to be recommended by a majority of the legal voters. And] if one act imposed a toll, payable to turnpike trustees, for passing along a road, and another transferred the duty of repairing the road to another body, prohibiting also the trustees from repairing it, the toll would not be thereby impliedly repealed (a).

128

[This is so, indeed, even where the later act contains an express repeal of "all inconsistent " acts, etc. 129]

206. Expressed Intention to Repeal.-Yet, where a statute contemplates in express terms that its enactments will repeal earlier acts, by their inconsistency with them, the chief argument or objection against repeal by implication is removed, and the earlier acts may be more readily treated as repealed. Thus, after a local act had directed the trustees of a turnpike to keep their accounts and proceedings in books to which "all persons" should have access, the General Turnpike Act, which recited the great importance that one uniform system should be adhered to in the laws regulating turnpikes, and enacted that former laws should continue in force, except as they were thereby varied or repealed,

126 Wood v. U. S., 16 Pet. 342; McCool v. Smith, 1 Black 459; Mongeon v. People, 55 N. Y. 613; Sullivan v. People, 15 Ill. 233; Watson v. Kent, 78 Ala. 602; Pub. School Trustees v. Trenton, 30 N. J. Eq. 667; Re Contested Election of Barber, 86 Pa. St. 392; Connors V. Iron Co., 54 Mich. 168; Elrod V. Gilliland, 27 Ga. 467; Coats v. Hill, 41 Ark. 149 (where an act to quiet land titles was held not repealed by the general revenue laws, which contained nothing inconsistent with the former, except as to the time in which a tax title

must be assailed, and the amount to be paid by the purchaser).

127 Daviess v. Fairbairn, 3 How. 636.

128 House v. State, 41 Miss. 737. (a) Phipson v. Harvett, 1 C. M. & R. 473. Comp. Brown v. G. W. R. Co., 51 L. J. Q. B. 529.

129 People v. Durick, 20 Cal. 94; and see also Hickory Tree Road, 43 Pa. St. 139. And a statute repealing all former acts within its purview does not, as to matters not provided for by itself, repeal the provisions of former laws: Payne v. Connor, 3 Bibb (Ky.) 180.

directed that the trustees should keep their accounts in a book to be open to the inspection of the trustees and creditors of the tolls, and that the book of their proceedings should be open to the inspection of the trustees; it was held that the power of inspection of proceedings given by the first act to "all persons all persons" was repealed (a). [Thus a declaration in a general law that all acts or parts of acts, whether local or special, or otherwise, inconsistent with its provisions, are to be deemed repealed, will repeal inconsistent provisions even in special acts.130 And where an act expressly repealed certain designated sections of the Revised Statutes of the state, and in general terms all previous acts in conflict with it, it was held that it repealed every previous act⚫identical with any of those expressly repealed."]

§ 207. Acts Conferring Conflicting Rights, etc.-A later Act which conferred a new right, would repeal an earlier one, if the co-existence of the right which it gave would be productive of inconvenience; for the just inference from such a result would be that the Legislature intended to take the earlier right away (b). [A statute fixing a salary different from one prescribed by a former act, by necessary implication repeals the latter.""] The Point Stock Banking Act of 7 Geo. 4, c. 46, which besides limiting and varying the common law liabilities of members of banking companies, provided that suits against such companies should and lawfully might be instituted against the public officer, was held to take away by implication the common law right of suing the individual members (c), for from the nature of the case, this must have been what the Legislature intended (d). [But not only does the grant of a power by the Legislature inconsistent with a former one repeal the latter," but in

(a) R. v. Northleach, 5 B. & Ad. 978.

130 State v. Williamson, 44 N. J. L. 165. See post, § 223, et seq.

131 State v. Barrow, 30 La. An., P. I. 657.

(b) See inf. §§ 245, 251, seq. 132 Pierpont v. Crouch, 10 Cal. 315.

(c) Steward v. Greaves, 10 M. & W. 711; Chapman v. Milvain, 5

Ex. 61, 1 L. M. & P. 209; Davison v. Farmer, 6 Ex. 252; O'Flaherty v. McDowell, 6 H. L. 142. See also Green v. R., 1 App. (H. L.) 513. Roles v. Rosewell, and Hardy v. Bern, 5 T. R. 538.

(d) Per Lord Cranworth in O'Flaherty v. McDowell, 6 H. L. 157. See Cowley v. Byas, 5 Ch.

D. 944.

133 Korah v. Ottawa, 32 Ill. 121

general, the grant of a power conditioned on different things,—e. g., where an act providing for appeals from the assessment of railroad damages gave thirty days after confirmation of the report of viewers from the entry of an appeal, and a subsequent one upon the same subject gave thirty days from the filing of the report for the same purpose,—the latter was held to repeal the former."

134

[But, as a question of legislative intent, it has been held, that, where a statute, the manifest object of which was to extend a benefit, or create a right, was passed under a misapprehension, or in ignorance of the existence or effect of a former law, which gave a greater benefit, or created a greater right than the new law, the latter should not be held to affect the former, so as to repeal the right or benefit, unless an intention appeared upon it that the limits fixed by it, and nothing beyond, should regulate the matter, and that the rights and benefit conferred by it and no greater, should be enjoyed.1"]

§ 208. Effect of Inconvenience and Incongruity between Acts.In other circumstances, also, the inconvenience or incongruity of keeping two enactments in force has justified the conclusion that one impliedly repealed the other, for the Legislature is presumed not to intend such consequences. Thus, the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, which prohibited keeping open public-houses during the hours of afternoon divine service, was held repealed by implication pro tanto by the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 118, which prohibited the sale between three and five o'clock P. M., the usual hours of afternoon divine service. If both Acts had co-existed, it would have been in the power of the clergyman of every parish to close the public-houses for four hours instead of two, by beginning the afternoon service at one or at five P. M., an intention too singular to be lightly attributed to the Legislature (a). [So,

134 Gwinner v. R. R. Co., 65 Pa. St. 126. See also New Haven v. Whitney, 36 Conn. 373; District Township, etc. v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 272.

135 Tyson v. Postlethwaite, 13 Ill. 727. That, however, mere presumptive ignorance of the existance of an act by the Legislature will not prevent its repeal by

implication from a later act, see Johnston's Est., 33 Pa. St. 511.

(a) R. v. Whiteley, 3 H. & N. 143; Whiteley v. Heaton, 27 L. J. M. C. 217, S. C. See Harris v. Jenns, 9 C. B. N. S. 152; 30 L. J. 183; R. v. Senior, 1 L. & C. 401, 33 L. J. M. C. 125; R. v. Bucks, 1 E. & B. 447; R. v. Knapp, 22 L. J. M. C. 139, S. C. See another