too, where a statute in corporating a corporation declared that the charter granted by it should be forfeited by failure. of the company to organize and commence business within une year from the passage of the incorporating act, and subequently, eighteen days before the expiration of the period thus limited, the organization not having been perfected, nor business commenced, an act was passed amending the charter containing the directors in office for a year, and authorizing the stock subscription book to be again opened; it was held that the fair construction of the latter act was that it operated to repeal the limitation contained in the original act and to give the company one year from the time of its passage for perfecting its organization and commencing its business, it being wholly improbable that the Legislature intended that the company should do both within the short space of eighteen days."] § 209. Effect of Later Legislation as Showing Intent to Repeal. -An intention to repeal an Act may be gathered from its repugnancy to the general course of subsequent legislation." Thus the 7 Geo. 1, c. 21, which prohibited bottomry loans by Englishmen to foreigners on foreign ships engaged in the Indian trade, was held to have been silently repealed by the subsequent enactments which put an end to the monopoly of the East India Company, and threw its trade open to foreign as well as to all British ships (a). [As an instance of the operation of this rule may be mentioned the effect which has been given by the courts of various jurisdictions to the statutes enabling married women to sue and be sued, upon the exemptions contained in their favor in the statutes of limitations. Where such powers are conferred upon married women, it is said that "the various provisions that coverture shall be one of the disabilities in case of which time does not run against the plaintiff, can no example of a similar kind, in Manchester (Mayor) v. Lyons, 22 Ch. D. 277. 136 Johnson v. Bush, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 207, 238. 187 As has been seen, ante § 47, an intention that a certain act was not to operate as a repeal of another may be inferred from the fact that the latter was expressly repealed by a still later one. (a) The India, Br. & L. 221. See also R. v. Northleach, 5 B. & Ad. 978. Comp. per Ex. Ch. in Shrewsbury v. Scott, 6 C. B. N. S. 1. See another illustration in 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68; Re Yearwood's Trusts, 5 Ch. D. 545. 239 99138 longer be held to apply.' They have accordingly been held to be silently repealed by the English Married Women's Property Act of 1882. The same effect has been given to the Illinois married woman's act of 1861,10 and approved by the Supreme Court of the United States," declaring that the powers conferred by the act so completely annihilate the existence of every reason for the exemption, that it would be absurd to hold that the two acts could stand together." Similar effect has been held to follow the enactment of the California statute enabling married women; and so in Ohio, and in Maine." This effect has, however, been denied to similar enactments in Mississippi," North Carolina" and Arkansas.' 147 144 148 143 [But the repeal of a statute is not to be implied from the mere fact that some of the evils provided against in it are subsequently removed."" Hence where an act passed in 1847 required the sheriff of a certain county to hold certain municipal elections on a designated day "in each and every year,” and fixed a penalty for his neglect to do so; and an act passed in 1849 provided for the holding of such elections at any other times than those appointed by the act of 1847, if omitted to be held on the proper day, it was decided that the act of 1849 did not repeal the provisions of that of 1847 as to the duty of the sheriff and the penalty incurred by him by neglect thereof.150] 128 Thicknesse, H. & W., at p. 219. 189 Weldon v. Neal, 51 L. T., N. S., 289; 32 W. R. 828; Lowe v. Fox, (C. A.) L. R. 15 Q. B. D. 667. 140 Haywood v. Gunn, 82 Ill. 385; Castner v. Walrod, 83 Id. 171. Enos v. Buckley, 94 Id. 458; Geisen v. Heiderich, 104 Id. 537 (exception in favor of married women in act relating to prosecution of writs of error.) 141 Kibbe v. Ditto, 93 U. S. 674. 303. 144 Ong v. Sumner, 1 Cinc. Super. 145 Brown v. Conseno, 51 Me. 146 McLaughlin v. Spengler, 57 Miss. 818. 147 State v. Smith. 83 N. C. 306; State v. Troutman, 72 Id. 551. 148 Hershey v. Latham, 42 Ark. 305. In New York, under the acts enabling married women to sue, it was at first held that the exceptions in their favor in the statutes of limitations were rendered in applicable: Ball v. Bullard, 52 Barb. 141; but this doctrine was subsequently questioned: see Clark v. McCann, 18 Hun 13; Dinham v. Sage, 52 N. Y. 229; and the matter was finally set at rest by the act of 1870, ch. 741, dropping coverture from the enumeration of disabili ties: Acker v. Acker, 81 N. Y. 143, and see Clarke v. Gibbons, 83 Id. 107. 149 Alexandria v. Dearmon, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 104. 150 Ibid. CHAPTER VIII. PRESUMPTION AGAINST REPEAL BY IMPLICATION. GENERAL, SPECIAL AND PENAL ACTS. § 210. Repeal by Implication not Favored. § 211. Conflict between Acts often merely Apparent. § 215. Modification to Escape Repeal. Exceptions. § 217. Negative Statutes Affirmative Inter se. § 218. Statutes without Expressed or Implied Negative. § 222. Acts merely giving Direction and Application to Old Law. § 223. Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant. § 226. Merely Seeming Repugnancy between General and Special Acts. § 227. Personal and Local Acts. § 228. Charters, etc. Municipal Corporations. § 229. Corporations Other than Municipal. § 230. When General Act Repeals Special. § 231. Effect of General Act Intended to Furnish Exclusive Rule. § 232. General Act in Terms Applying to Subject of Special Act. § 233. Special Act Incorporating Provisions of General Act. § 234. Implied Repeal between Special Acts. § 235. No Implied Repeal between Penal Acts where Objects not Iden. tical. § 236. Cumulative Punishments and Procedure. § 237. Change in Locality and other Incidents of Punishment. 238. Change in Quality and Incidents of Offence. 239. Change in Degree of Punishment. $240. Where Degree of Crime is Preserved. § 241. Statute Covering whole Subject Matter. § 243. Revenue Laws. § 244. Secondary Meaning. § 210. Repeal by Implication not Favored.-But repeal by implication is not favoured (a). (a) Foster's Case, 11 Rep. 63a. [McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 495; U. S. v. 67 Packages, 17 How. 85; U. S. v. Walker, 22 Id. 299; U. S. v. 25 Cases, Crabbe, 356; U. S. v. 100 Barrels, 2 Abb. U. S. 305; Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 221; Cattaraugus Co. v. Willey, 2 Lans. (N. It is a reasonable presump Y) 427; People v. Van Nort, 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 205; McCarter v. Orph. Asylum, 9 Cow. (N.Y.) 437; N. Y., etc., Ry. Co. v. Supervisors, 67 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 5; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424; People v. St. Lawrence Co., 103 N. Y. 541; Loker v. Brookline, tion that the Legislature did not intend to keep really contradictory enactments in the statute-book, or to effect so important a measure as the repeal of a law without expressing an intention to do so. Such an interpretation, therefore, is not to be adopted unless it be inevitable. Any reasonable construction which offers an escape from it is more likely to be in consonance with the real intention. [Hence it is, a rule founded in reason as well as in abundant authority, that, in order to give an act not covering the entire ground of an earlier one, nor clearly intended as a substitute for it the effect of repealing it, the implication of an intention to repeal must necessarily flow from the language used, disclosing a repugnancy between its provisions and those of the earlier law, so positive as to be irreconcilable by any fair, strict or liberal, construction of it, which would, without destroying its evident intent and meaning, find for it a reasonable field of operation, preserving, at the same time, the force of the earlier law, and construing both together in harmony with the whole course of legislation upon the subject.' And it may be here stated, that the same rule 13 Pick. (Mass.) 343; Haynes v. Jenks, 2 Id. 172; Goddard v. Boston, 20 Id. 407; Snell v. Bridgewater, etc., Co., 24 Id. 296; McDonough v. Campbell, 42 Ill. 490; Hume v. Gossett, 43 Id. 297; People v. Barr, 44 Id. 198; Hyde Park V. Oakwood Cem'y Ass'n, 119 Id. 141: Casey v. Harned, 5 Iowa 1: State v. Berry, 12 Id. 58; Burke v. Jeffries, 20 Id. 145; Wyman v. Campbell, 6 Port. (Ala.) 219; Horton v. School Comm'rs, 43 Ala. 598; Parker v. Hubbard, 64 Id. 203; Riggs v. Brewer, Id. 282; McAfee V. R. R. Co., 36 Miss. 669; Naylor v. Field, 29 N. J. L. 287; Walter's App., 70 Pa. St. 392; Erie v. Bootz, 72 Id. 196; Rhein Build'g Ass'n v. Lea, 100 Id. 210, 213-4; Osborne v. Everitt, 103 Id. 421; Harrisburg v. Sheck, 104 Id. 53; People v. R. R. Co., 28 Cal. 258: Kerlinger v. Barnes, 14 Minn. 526; Goodrich v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422; State v. Morrow, 26 Mo. 131; State v. Bishop, 41 Id. 16; State v. Draper, 47 Id. 29; St. Louis v. Ins. Co., Id. 146; State v. Jaeger, 63 Id. 403; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 311; Buckingham v. Steubenville, 10 Id. 25; Lichtenstein v. State, 5 Ind. 162; Blain v. Bailey, 25 Id. 165; Com'th v. Mason, 82 Ky. 256; State v. Woodside, 9 Ired. L. (N. C.) 496; Erwin v. Moore, 15 Ga. 361; Connor v. Exp. Co., 37 Id. 397; Gillette v. Shark, 7 Nev. 245; Hockaday v. Wilson, 1 Head (Tenn.) 113; Furman v. Nichols, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 432; Smith v. Hickman, Cooke (Tenn.) 330; Rogers v. Watrous, 8 Tex. 62; Stirman v. State, 21 Id. 734; Gill v. State, 30 Id. 514; Schwenke v. R. R. Co., 7 Col. 512; and see cases cited infra.] 1 See Wood v. U. S., 16 Pet. 342; McCool v. Smith, 1 Black. 459; Beals v. Hale, 4 How. 37; Furman v. Nickol, 8 Wall. 44; Exp. Yerger, Id. 85; U. S. v. Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Id. 652; Clay Co. v. Soc'y, 104 U. S. 579; Louisiana v. Taylor, 105 Id. 454; Red Rock v. Henry, 106 Id. 596; Exp. Crow Dog, 109 Id. 556; Chew Heong v. U. S., 112 Id. 536; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 applies equally to questions arising between different parts and sections of the same enactment."] 8211. Conflict between Acts often merely Apparent.—It is sometimes found that the conflict of two statutes is appar ent, only, as their objects are different, and the language of each is therefore restricted, as already pointed out, to its own object or subject. When their language is so confined, they run in parrallel lines, without meeting. Thus the real property statute of limitations, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, which limits the time for suing for the recovery of land (which is defined to include tithes) to twenty years after the right accrued, was found not to affect the provision of the Act of the preceding session, 2 and 4 Will. 4, c. 100, which enacts that claims to exemption from tithes shall be valid after non-payment for thirty years; for the former Act dealt with conflicting claims to the right of receiving tithes which are admittedly payable; while the latter related to the liability to pay them (a). So, the 1 N. Y. 424; Re The Evergreens, 47 Id. 216; Kingsland v. Palmer, 52 Id. 83; People v. St Lawrence Co., 103 N. Y. 541; N. Y., etc., Ry. Co. v. Superv's, 67 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 5; Roberts v. Fahs, 36 Ill. 268; People v. Barr, 44 Id. 198; Fowler v. Pirkins, 77 Id. 271; Iverson v. State, 52 Ala. 170; Riggs v. Brewer, 64 Id. 282; Comm'l B'k v. Chambers, 16 Miss. 9; Richards v. Patterson, 30 Id. 583; State v. Blake, 35 N. J. L. 208; Morris v. Del., etc., Canal, 4 Watts. & S. (Pa.) 461; Street v. Com'th, 6 Id. 209; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 61 Pa. St. 401; Erie v. Bootz, 72 Id. 196; Williamsport v. Brown, 84 Id. 438; Re Cont. Elect'n of Barber, 86 Id. 392; Com'th v. Ry. Co., 98 Id. 127; Wayne Co.'s App., 4 W. N. C. (Pa.) 411; Merrill v. Gorham, 6 Cal. 41; Pratt v. R. R. Co., 42 Me. 579; Atty.-Gen. v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513; State v. Mister, 5 Md. 11; Billingslea v. Baldwin, 23 Id. 85; State v. Bishop, 41 Mo. 16; Ludlow v. Johnston, 3 Ohio, 553; Blain v. Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; Water Works Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Id. 364; Carver v. Smith, 90 Id. 222; Connor v. Expr. Co., 37 Ga. 397; Lawson v. Gibson, 18 Neb. 137; State v. Babcock, 21 Id. 599; Kollenberger v. People, 9 Col. 233; Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 245; Forqueron v. Donnally, 7 W. Va. 114; Lybbe v. Hart, L. R. 28 Ch. D. 15; and see cases in preceding note. It is said that the exposition of statutes passed at the same session, though apparently conflicting, but not directly repugnant, should be such as to give effect to what appears to be the main intent of the law maker: La Grange Co. v. Cutler, 6 Ind. 354. 9 Wilcox v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 110; and see Brown v. Co. Comm'rs, 21 Pa. St. 37. Compare also on this subject, generally, ante, SS 182, 183, 187-189, 192, 195-196. (a) Ely (Dean of) v. Cash, 15 M. & W. 617. In the one case, tithe was real property, in the other, a chattel: Ely (Dean of) v. Bliss. 2 De G., M. & G. 459. See also R. v. Everett, 1 E. & B. 273; Adey v. Trinity House, 22 L. J. |