it relates to persons not capable of protecting themselves, or when it has some object of public policy in view which requires the strict construction, the word receives it natural full force and effect (a). [Thus, it would be construed as meaning "voidable" in an act which provides, that, "if an owner of lands sold for taxes establishes fraud in the sale, the sale shall be void.”" In a case above referred to," it was said: "It has been argued, that by judicial construction ..the extent and force of the term void have been limited, so that in truth it means voidable, or to be made void by some plea or act of the party in favor of whose interests such statutes are set up. And there is no doubt that such decisions are founded in good sense and reason, and conform to the intention of the Legislature in their use of the term. An infant's acts, by the common law, are said to be void, and yet they may be confirmed on his coming of age. Usurious debts and gaming contracts are declared to be void, and yet a plea is necessary to avoid them, and a judgment precludes a partner from showing that they were void."" Properly speaking, the term void means of no legal force, null and incapable of confirmation or ratification." That is absolutely void which the law or the nature of things forbids to be enforced at all." What is void can always be assailed, in any proceeding; what is voidable can be assailed only in a direct proceeding instituted for that purpose. The distinction, therefore, is of the greatest importance in its consequences as to third persons; for nothing can be founded upon what is absolutely void, whereas from those things which are voidable only fair titles may flow." Nevertheless, it is a distinction which is often ignored in statutes, the word "void " being used where "voidable" is 18 (a) See per Bayley, J., in R. v. Hipswell, 8 B. & C. 471. See, also, Betham v. Gregg, 10 Bing. 352, and Storie v. Winchester, 17 C. B. 953. 13 Van Shaack v. Robbins, 36 Iowa, 201. 14 Smith v. Saxton, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 483. 15 Ibid., at pp. 486–7. 16 Van Shaack V. Robbins, supra. 17 Seylar v. Carson, 69 Pa. St. 81. Relatively void is that which is a wrong to individuals, and which the law refuses to inforce against them: Ibid. 18 Alexander v. Nelson, 42 Ala. 462; and see Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. St. 436, 441. 19 Crocker v. Bellangee, 6 Wis. 645; Bromley v. Goodrich, 40 Id. 131. really intended." Hence it is said that the term " void," as used in statutes, does not ordinarily import absolute nullity," but does so only in a clear case."] § 271. General Presumption Against Retroactive Operation. — Upon the presumption that the Legislature does not intend what is unjust rests the leaning against giving certain statutes a retrospective operation (a). Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non præteritis. They are construed as operating only on cases or facts which come into existence after the statutes were passed (b), unless a retrospective effect be clearly intended. [Indeed, the rule to be derived from the comparison of a vast number of judicial utterances upon this subject, seems to be, that, even in the absence of constitutional obstacles to retroaction, a construction giving to a statute a prospective operation is always to be preferred, unless a purpose to give it a retrospective force is expressed by clear and positive command, or to be inferred by necessary, unequivocal and unavoidable implication from the words of the statute taken by themselves and in connection with the subject-matter," and the occasion of the enactment," admitting of no reasonable doubt, but precluding all question as to such intention." A few instances only of the 20 Van Shaack v. Robbins, 36 Iowa, 201; Crocker v. Bellangee, supra; Bennett v. Mattingly, 110 Ind. 197, 202; e. g., in a provision declaring void a married woman's contracts of suretyship for her husband: Ibid. 2 Kearney v. Vaughan, 50 Mo. 284. 22 Brown v. Brown, 50 N. H. 538, 552. Comp. ante, § 137. A California statute that no contract shall be binding on a company unless made in writing, is held to apply only to contracts wholly executory: Foulke v. R. R. Co., 51 Cal. 365. (a) 2 Inst. 292: [Bedford v. Shilling, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 401, 403, per Tilghman, C. J. And see Taylor v. Mitchell, 57 Pa. St. 209, 212, per Sharswood, J.; Albee v. May, 2 Paine, 74; Re Billings, 3 Ben. 212.] (b) Per Erle, C. J., in Midland R Co. v. Pye, 10 C. B. N. S. 191; per Cockburn, C. J., 2 Q. B. D. 269; per Pollock, C. B., in Young v. Hughes, 4 II. & N. 76; Vansittart v. Taylor, 4 E. & B. 910. 23 See Bay v. Gage, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 447. 24 People v. Supervisors of Essex, 70 N. Y. 228. 25 See U. S. v. Heth, 3 Cranch, 399; Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. 421; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 329; Chew Heong v. U. S., 112 U. S. 536; U. S. v. Starr, Hempst. 469; Costin v. Washington, 2 Cranch C. Ct. 254; Prince v. U. S., 2 Gall. 204; Warren Manuf'g Co. v. Ins. Co., 2 Paine, 501; Ellis v. Ins. Co., 19 Blatchf. 383; Re Billings, 2 Ben. 212; Tinker v. Van Dyke, 14 Bankr. Reg. 112; People v. Columbia Co., 43 N. Y. ́ 130; McMaster v. State, 103 Id. 547; Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 128; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns (N. Y.) 477; Shepherd v. People, 24 How. Pr. (N. Ý.) 388; operation of this rule can be here given." An act declaring forfeiture of dower or curtesy, "whenever a married man shall be deserted by his wife, or a married woman by her husband," for the space of one year, was held to apply only to cases of desertion beginning after the statute went into operation." A provision that married women shall be bound, like other persons, by estoppel in pais, was held inapplicable to the case of a mortgage made by such a person before the enactment." An act amending a city charter and fixing the salaries of certain officials in the city was deemed prospective only," and so was an act making it the duty of the auditor of a state to pay into the state treasury 75 per cent. of all fees collected by him, under the provisions of a certain earlier Wade v. Strack, 1 Hun (N. Y.) 96; 3 Thomp. & C. 165; Whitney v. Hapgood, 10 Mass. 437; Somerset v. Dighton, 12 Id. 383; Medford v. Learned, 16 Id. 215; Gerry v. Stoneham, 1 Allen (Mass) 319; Garrett v. Wiggins, 2 Ill. 335; Mason v. Finch, 3 Id. 223; Guard V. Rowan, Id. 499; Bruce v. Schuyler, 9 Id. 221; Belleville R. R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 Id. 20; La Salle v. Blanchard, 1 Ill. App. 635; Bartruff v. Remey, 15 Iowa, 257; McIntosh v. Kilbourne, 37 Id. 420; Barnes v. Mobile, 19 Ala. 707; Hooker v. Hooker, 18 Id. 599; Brown v. Wilcox, 22 Miss. 127; Garrett v. Beaumont, 24 Id. 377; Williamson v. R. R. Co., 29 N. J. L. 311; State v. Scudder, 32 Id. 203; Vreeland v. Bramhall, 39 Id. 1; Elizabeth v. Hill, Id. 555; State v. Newark, 40 Id. 92; Warshung v. Hunt, 47 Id. 256; Neff's App., 21 Pa. St. 243; Fisher v. Farley, 23 Id. 501; Becker's App., 27 Id. 52; Dewart v. Purdy, 29 Id. 113; Ihmsen v. Nav. Co., 32 Id. 153, 156; Taylor v. Mitchell, 57 Id. 209; White v. Crawford, 84 Id. 433; People's Fire Ins. Co. v. Hartshorne, Id. 453; Stockwell v. McHenry, 107 Id. 237; Von Schmidt v. Huntington, 1 Cal. 55; Smith v. Aud. Gen., 20 Mich. 398; Saunders v. Carroll, 12 La. An. 793; McGeehan v. Burke, 37 Id. 156; Plumb v. Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Hastings v. Lane, 15 Me. 134; Torrey v. Corliss, 33 Id. 333; Sturgiss V. Hull, 48 Vt. 302; Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Id. 86; Richardson v. Cook, 37 Id. 599 Morgan v. Perry, 51 N. H. 559 State v. Atwood, 11 Wis. 422 Seaman v. Carter, 15 Id. 548; Finney v. Ackerman, 21 Id. 268; Gaston v. Merriam, 33 Miun. 271; State v. Waholz, 28 Id. 114; Kerlinger v. Barnes, 14 Id. 398; Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471; State v. Auditor, 41 Mo. 25; State v Blakeman, 52 Id. 578; State v. Ferguson, 62 Id. 77; Ryan v. Hoffman, 26 Ohio St. 109; Pritchard v. Spencer, 2 Ind. 486; Aurora, etc, Co. v. Holthouse, 7 Id. 59; Hopkins v. Jones, 22 Id. 310; Merwin v. Ballard, 66 N. C. 398; Forsyth v. Marbury, R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 324; Bond v. Munro, 28 Ga. 597; White v. Blum, 4 Neb. 555; State v. Stein, 13 Id. 529 Stewart v. State, 13 Ark. 720; Parsons v. Payne, 26 Id. 124; Martin v. State, 22 Tex. 214; and cases infra. 26 It is a rule of construction established by law, in Georgia and Louisiana, that an act can prescribe only for the future, and in Kentucky, California, Georgia, Louisiana, Dakota, and Utah, that it can have no retrospective operation: Stimson, Amer. Stat. L., p. 143. § 1044 27 Giles v. Giles, 22 Minn. 348. 28 Levering v. Shockey, 100 Ind. 558. 29 State v. Hill, 32 Minn 275. statute, and of all other fees received by him on account of services rendered in a certain department of his office." So, an act declaring that municipal lands used for agricultural purposes should be taxed higher for municipal purposes, than township lands for township purposes; " and another declaring county treasurers ineligible for more than two consecutive terms," were each held devoid of retrospective force, so that the former act did not interfere with assessments made before its passage," and the latter did not forbid a treasurer in office for a second term to hold it again." A statute giving exclusive, in the place of former concurrent, jurisdiction would not be construed as operating retrospectively if another construction could be fairly given to it; " nor one doing the converse, where the effect would be to subject a party to damages." And an act respecting written acknowledgments of rights of action will be given a prospective operation only;" as also an act establishing a rule for the computation of time," and an act relating to appeals;" and one for the prevention of the spread of infectious and contagious diseases, and imposing upon the state liability for expenses incurred for that purpose;" and so, too, a by-law of a municipality passed under its charter authorizing it to prescribe terms upon which certain persons might reside therein." § 272. Prospective Effect Apparently Contrary to Words.[Even where there is that in the statute which would seem upon other principles of interpretation, to require a retroactive construction, the presumption against the same, in the absence of an intention otherwise demonstrable to give the statute such an effect, will overcome the influence of such 30 Henderson v. State, 96 Ind. 437. 31 Stilz v. Indianapolis, 81 Ind. 582. 32 State v. Stein, 13 Neb. 529. 33 Stilz v. Indianapolis, supra. 31 State v. Stein, 13 Neb. 529. 35 State v. Littlefield, 93 N. C. 614. See post, § 288. 36 McMichael v. Skilton, 13 Pa. St. 215. 37 Van Rensselaer v. Livingston, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 490. 38 Edmundson v. Wragg, 104 Pa. St. 500. 39 White v. Blum, 4 Neb. 555; so as not to apply to cases determined before its passage: Ibid. See Cockran v. Douglass, 25 Pitts. L. J. (Pa.) 120, post, § 272. But see post, 285 et seq. 40 State V. Bradford, 36 Ga. 422; so that the state would not be liable thereunder for such expenses incurred before the passage of the act: Ibid. 41 Costin V. Washington, 2 Cranch C. Ct. 254. rules. Thus, where an act amended and re-enacted a former one, which provided that every conveyance not recorded should be void as against attachment and judgment creditors, but omitted the words "hereafter made," contained in the earlier act, it was, nevertheless, held that the act could not apply to conveyances executed prior to the statute re-enacted by it." And so, as it has been seen" that the strict grammatical sense of the language used by the Legislature may give way to a construction required by other rules of interpretation, words apparently importing a retroactive effect will yet, in the absence of other reasons supporting such literal construction, be so construed as to produce a prospective operation. Thus, an act which makes certain provisions "when any judgment is obtained" is construed as referring to such cases only "when any judgment is hereafter obtained;"" and so the provisions of an act regulating, with additional requirements, appeals "in all cases in which judgment shall have been rendered."" Where, indeed, the act is not of immediate operation, but limited to take effect at a future date, that form of grammatical construction requires a prospective operation. Thus, in a statute passed in April, to go into operation in October of the same year, it was provided "that in all cases of partition of real estate in any court, wherein a valuation shall have been made of the whole or parts thereof, the same shall be allotted to such one or more of the parties in interest, who shall, at the return of the rule to accept or refuse to take at the valuation offer in writing the highest price therefor above the valuation returned," etc. It was said by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in denying to this provision any retrospective force: "This new rule of allottment [the Legislature] enacted should not go into effect before the 1st of October, 1856. As if they had said, whenever a valuation in parti |