fees remained unpaid a lien upon the hull, tackle, etc., could manifestly be applicable only to the latter class," it being fairly inferred, where a duty is prescribed by a statute and remedies are provided for the breach of it, and these remedies are such that they cannot be applied to a particular subject, that the subject was not within the view of the Legislature when it exacted the duty." So, where two sec tions of an act defined the degrees of murder, and the third provided that "the degree of murder shall be found by the jury," the latter provision was held inapplicable to cases where the accused pleaded guilty." Conversely a grant of power conferred in general terms in the first section, was limited by a construction which read that section together with the twenty-third." So, an absolute direction, in one section, to set aside a homestead for a decedent's widow and children, free from all debts of the decedent, was restricted by an intention disclosed in succeeding sections to subject such homestead to debts contracted before the passage of the act." And as a survey of the whole act may restrict the generality of certain of its provisions," so it may expand the narrowness of others, if the real intention of the Legislature may be gathered from broader expressions in other parts of the statute. Thus, the object of an act being to restore uniformity of taxation in counties, tc., and repealing, for that purpose, all laws requiring any city to assume certain liabilities imposed by general laws upon counties, it was held that the term "cities" must be held to include incorporated towns."

$38. Context may explain Meaning.-[The effect of a comparison of all the parts of a statute is frequently to explain, rather than to limit or enlarge, an expression somewhere in

42 Ayers v. Knox, 7 Mass. 306. 43 Ibid., p. 310.

44 Green v. Com'th, 12 Allen (Mass) 155; Comp. post, § 215.

45 Maple Lake v. Wright Co., 12 Minn. 403.

47 Simonds v. Powers, 28 Vt. 354. 48 See Stockett v. Bird, 18 Md. 484 Covington v. McNickle, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 262; Electro-M.,

&c. Co. v. Van Auken, 9 Col. 204.

49 Burke v. Monroe Co., 77 Ill. 610. And see Gas Co. v. Wheeling, 8 W. Va. 320, where it is said, that, the context showing a particular intention to effect a certain purpose, some degree of implication may be called in to aid the intent.

the statute, which is open to several interpretations. Thus an act provided for the appointment by the governor of the state, "upon the passage" of the act, of inspectors of mines, upon the recommendation, however, of certain examiners, who were to be appointed by the court of common pleas at the first term of the court in each year, the act being passed after the first term of the court in that year. In another preceding section, certain duties were imposed upon the inspectors and penalties inflicted for disobedience to their orders. It was held that a view of the whole act required that it should be so construed as to direct the appointment of examiners immediately, and in future years at the first term of the court." Again, an act directed that corporations might be dissolved by the court of common pleas of the "proper county." It was held that the "proper" county was the county, in which, by the funda mental articles of agreement between the corporators, upon which the decree of incorporation was based, the principal office of the company should be located; because, by refer ence to other portions of the act, it appeared that the same required the agreement to set forth" the place within which " the corporation was established,-notice of the first meeting in some newspaper printed in the county in which said corporation proposes to conduct its business,"-the depositing of notes of confirmation with the recorder of deeds "in said county," the recording of certificates of the amount of capital fixed and paid in the office of the recorder "for said county," and the like." So, too, where the langnage of one section of an act requiring certain notice of sheriff's sales, etc., was such as to indicate an intention to render sales without the notice prescribed void, such construction was negatived by the next section, which clearly imposed only a penalty on the officer for neglecting to comply with the requirement." Where an act relating to contested elections of senators provided, that, in case there be no law judge of the "district" in which any contest should arise, qualified to act, a certain other judge should be called 50 Com'th v. Conyngham, 66 Pa. St. 99.

71.

51 Com'th v. Slifer, 53 Pa. St.

59 Smith v. Randall, 6 Cal. 47.

in to preside at the trial, it was held, upon comparison of the section in which this provision occurred with the preceding one, which directed that the contest should be determined before the court of the county where the person returned should reside, that the word "district" meant judicial, not senatorial, district." In another case the context was held definitely to fix the meaning of the word "attorneys" occurring in a statute as "attorneys at law."" And again, the phrase "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state," was ascertained by comparison of the context, from which it appears that this phrase "particular state" was uniformly used in contradistinction to "United States," to mean any particular state of the Union."

$39. Context may Correct Errors.-[Again, it is said that a mistake apparent on the face of an act may be corrected by other language in the act itself;" so that, for instance, the evident omission of a word, in one section, which would affect the meaning, may, where the omission is explained in another part of the statute by reference to such section as intended, be supplied according to such explanation."]

§ 40. Context to be Consulted to Avoid Inconsistency. Amendments, etc.—In all these instances, the Legislature supplied in the context the key to the meaning in which it used expressions which seemed free from doubt; and that meaning, it is obvious, was not [in all cases] that which literally or primarily belonged to them. [It has been heretofore" seen that it is a necessity of proper statutory construction, to give effect to every word, clause and provision of the enactment. Possibly the most important purpose of the construction of all the parts of a statute together and with reference to one another, is that of giving, by the means of such comparison,! a sensible and intelligent effect to each, without permitting any one to nullify any other, and to harmonize every detailed provision of the statute with the general purpose or partic

68 Cumberland Co. v. Trickett, 107 Pa. St. 118.

54 Cooper v. Shaver, 101 Pa. St. 647, 549.

55 U. S. v. Furlong, 5 Wheat. 184.

56 Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sumn.

279.

57 Brinsfield v. Carter, 2 Ga. 143. See upon this subject, also post, 298-302, 317, 319.

58 Ante, § 23

ular design which the whole is intended to subserve." With this end in view, the rule extends to acts and their amendments, which, for this purpose, are regarded as constituting but one enactment, so that no portion of either is to be left without effect, if it can be made operative without wresting the words used by the Legislature from their appropriate meaning," and of two constructions equally warranted by the language of an amendment, that is to be preferred which best harmonizes the same with the general tenor and spirit of the act amended." The same rule applies as to acts and their supplements," and still more obviously to codes and revisions. A code, or body of revised laws, should, it is said, be regarded as a system of contemporaneous acts," as established uno flatu." Its various sections relating to the same subject should, if practicable, be construed together," as one," as one act or chapter," or as continuous sections of the same act ;" and one chapter is to be read with another, relating to the same subject, as one body of law," though collected from independent laws of previous enactment," originally passed at different times and re-enacted by a revisory act." If possible, the various portions of such a code or revision must be so construed as to harmonize with one another." Its general system of legislation upon the subject matter should be taken into view, and any particular article construed in conformnity therewith, unless an intention to depart from it be clearly shown;" and definitions contained in it are to be

59 See cases in note (b) to § 35. 60 Harrell v. Harrell, 8 Fla. 46. 61 Griffin's Case, Chase Dec. 364. 62 Van Riper v. Essex R. R. B'd. 38 N. J. L. 23. And as to a repealing act and an act suspending its operation, both passed at the same session of the legislature, being construed as one act, so that both may have effect, see Brown v. Berry, 3 Dal. 365.

63 Ashley v. Harrington, 1 D. Chip. (Vt.) 348.

Gibbons v. Brittenum, 56 Miss. 232. And see Com'th v. Goding, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 130.

65

5 Exp. Ray, 45 Ala. 15; O'Neal v. Robinson, Id. 526; Mobile, &c. R. R. Co. v. Malone, 46 Id. 391 :

66

Bryant v. Livermore, 20 Minn. 313; Smith v. Smith, 19 Wis. 522 ; Gallegos v. Pino, 1 New Mex. 410. 66 Mobile, &c. R. R. Co. v. Malone, supra.

67 Smith v. Smith, supra. 68 Gallegos v. Pino, supra. 69 Bryant v. Livermore, supra. 70 Mobile, &c. R. R. Co. v. Malone, supra.

71 Gallegos v. Pino, supra. 72 Gibbons v. Brittenum, 56 Miss. 232.

13 Childers v. Johnson, 6 La. An. 684. Compare Bank of La. v. Farrar, 1 Id. 54, where it is said that the civil code of the State is not to be considered as technically

a statute.

construed with reference to its positive enactments in pari materia."

841. Limits of Rule Requiring Context to be Consulted. [The rule commending a consideration of the whole statute, in order to discover the sense in which words are used in a particular portion of it, is subject, however, to this qualifi cation, that, if the meaning of a word can be found in the section itself in which it is used, it ought to be there sought for, without recourse to anything beyond." It is only where the meaning of the word or phrase cannot be satisfactorily ascertained from reading the particular section; or where the meaning which such a limited view gives to it, would raise a conflict or incongruity as compared with other portions of the statute, that a reference to the latter is proper. And where there are general sweeping words which it would be difficult to apply in their full literal sense, it is one of the safest guides to construction, to examine other words of like import in the same statute, and if it is found that a number of such expressions have to be subjected to limitatations or qualifications, and that such limitations and qualifications are of the same nature, that forms a strong argument for subjecting the expression in dispute to a like limitation or qualification :" the reason for this concession being, that it is presumed, that the Legislature used a word throughout the entire act in the same sense."]

842. Statute Embodying Several Distinct Acts.-It has been observed, that when an Act embodies several distinct Acts, one part throws no further light on the other parts than would be cast upon them by separate and distinct enactments to the same effect (a). [But where an act incorporates another and provides that the two shall be construed as one, supra; Pitte v. Shipley, 46 Cal.

14 Egerton v. Third Municipality, 1 La. An. 435; Depas v. Riez, 2 Id. 30; and they have no mean ing beyond: Ibid. See also Ala. Warehouse Co. v. Lewis, 56 Ala. 514.

75 Spencer v. Metropol. B'd., L' R. 22 Ch. Div. 162, per Jessel, M. R.

76 Blackwood v. Reg., L. R. 8 App. Cas. 94.

Spencer v. Metrop. Board,

154.

(a) Per Turner, L. J., in Cope v. Doherty, 4 K. & J. 367, 27 L. J. 600. [And it has been said that cach chapter of a body of Revised Statutes is a statute or act on the subject to which it relates; and may, in penal suits, be referred to as a statute of the State: Cleaves v. Jordan, 35 Me. 429. Compare ante, § 40.]