an Act required that a recognizance should be entered into in two days after notice of appeal, and the notice was given on a Friday, it was held that recognizances on the following Monday were too late; though Sunday was the last day, and they could not be entered into then (a). Of course, when an Act expressly excludes Sunday, the days given for doing an act are working days only (b). [It is said," however, in this country, that, to some extent, Sundays are excluded even where the time given is measured by days, especially where their number is less than a week;207 as where a city charter required six days' publication of notice of the filing of the assessment roll; or where an act required justices of the peace to render judgment in three days;200 or gave four days for the entry of an appeal, or made a short summons from a justice's court returnable in two days." But where the period is a longer one, intervening Sundays are, in general, to be counted in." Nor does a statutory provision, that, where the last day falls upon Sunday it is to be excluded, change this rule as to intervening Sundays." The rule, that, where the last of a certain number of days allowed for the doing of an act falls on Sunday, the act may be done on the next day," has been by statute, in many states, made count; the person being allowed hours wherein it is lawful to act,"citing Meng v. Winkleman, 43 Wis. 41; Com'th v. Intox. Liquors, 97 Mass. 601, etc.; but referring to Franklin v. Holden, 7 R. I. 215.] (a) Exp. Simpkins, 2 E. & É. 392, 29 L. J., M. C. 23; Peacock v. Reg., 4 C. B. N. S. 264, 27 L. J. 224. (b) Pease v. Norwood, L. R. 4 C. P. 235; Exp. Hicks, 20 Eq. 143. 206 Bish., Wr. L., § 110c. 207 See Chicago v. Iron Works, 93 Ill. 222, and other cases cited in Bish., Wr. L., § 110c, note 4. 208 Chicago V. Iron Works, supra. 209 Hodgson v. Bank'g House, 9 Mo. App. 24. 210 Neal v. Crew, 12 Ga. 93. 211 Simonson V. Durfee, 50 Mich. 80. But see Cressey v. Parks, 75 Me. 387, where, under a 210 statute providing for the sale of property seized for taxes, after being kept four days, it was held that the day of seizure should be excluded, but an intervening Sunday included,, and the property sold on the fourth day unless that fell upon Sunday, when it must be sold on the next day. 212 Conklin v. Marshalltown, 66 Iowa. 122; Goswiler's Est., 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 200; Edmundson v. Wragg, 104 Pa. St. 500; Bish., Wr. L., § 110c, and cases there cited in note 6. Not, however, it seems in Missouri: See Kellogg v. Carrico, 47 Mo. 157; Nat'l B'k v. Williams, 46 Mo. 17; see, also, State v. Judge, 29 La. An. 223. and comp. Pierce v. Cushing, 33 Id. 401. 218 Nat'l B'k v. Williams, supra. 214 Negotiable paper is an excep. tion to this rule: Edmundson v. Wragg, 104 Pa. St. 500, 503. 215 a rule of statutory construction ; but it appears, even without such distinct enactment, to be very generally recognized as such.""] § 394. Periodical Recurrences.—If the statute require some act to be done periodically and recurrently once in a certain space of time, as, for instance, the inspection of the boilers. of steamers once in six months, it would probably be understood to mean that not more than six months should elapse between the two acts. It would not be satisfied by dividing the year into two equal periods, and doing the act once in the beginning of the first, and once at the end of the second period (a). An Act which imposed a penalty for absence for more than a certain time in any one year, means not a calendar year computed from the first of January, but a year computed back from the day when the action for the penalty was brought (b). § 395. Computation of Distances.-Distances were formerly measured by the nearest and most usual road or way (c); and this is undoubtedly the popular manner of measuring them (d). But if the nearest practicable mode of access were adopted, should it be a carriage-way, or a bridle path, or a footpath? If the way were by a tidal river, the distance might vary every hour of the day (e). Where there is nothing in the statute to lead to one construction or to another, convenience alone is the guide in such a question (f). It is to be presumed that the Legislature intends the 215 See, e. g., Brainard v. Norton, 14 Ill. App. 643. 216 See Gibbon v. Freel, 65 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 273; Goswiler's Est., supra; Edmundson V. Wragg. supra; Cressey v. Parks, 75 Me. 387; English v. Williamson, 34 Kan. 212. But see contra, Adams v. Dohrmann, 63 Cal. 417. (a) Virginia & Maryland St. Nav. Co. v. U. S., Taney & Campbell's Maryland Rep. 418. (b) Cathcart v. Hardy, 2 M. & S. 533. (c) 1 Hawk. s. 15. Comp. 23 L. J. C. P. 144n. (d) Per Coleridge, J., in Lake v. Butler, 5 E. & B. 92, 24 L. J. 273. [The Pennsylvania Act 19 May, 1887. P. L. 134, provides for computation of mileage for jurors, witnesses, etc., to the county seat by the route usually traveled in going from the places where they reside, whether by public highways, railroads, or otherwise, restricting, however, the mileage to the number of miles actually traveled.] (e) Per Lord Campbell, Ibid. (f) Per Erle, J., Ibid. most convenient and certain mode of measurement, and that is unquestionably as the crow flies; a straight line on a horizontal plane, between the nearest points of the two places or objects (a). (a) Lake v. Butler, ubi sup.; Stokes v. Grissell, 14 C. B. 678, 23 L. J. 141; Jewell v. Stead, 6 E. & B. 350, 25 L. J. 294; R. v. Saffron Walden, 9 Q. B. 76; Duignan v Walker, 1 Johns. 446, 28 L. J. Ch. 867; Mouflet v. Cole, L. R. 8 Ex. 32. See Coulbert v. Troke, 1 Q. B. D. 1. CHAPTER XIV. A880CIATED WORDS. § 396. Restrictive effect of Association of General and Specific Words. § 397. Expressio Unius est exclusio alterius. § 400. Noscuntur a Sociis. 404. Extending Effect of Association of Words. § 405. Rule as to Generic Words added to Specific. $396. Restrictive Effect of Association of General and Specific Words. When two words or expressions are coupled together, one of which generically includes the other, it is obvious that the more general term is used in a meaning excluding the specific one. Though the words "cows," "sheep," and "horses," for example, standing alone, comprehend heifers, lambs, and ponies respectively, they would be understood as excluding them if the latter words were coupled with them (a). The word "land," which in its ordinary legal acceptation includes buildings standing upon it, is evidently used as excluding them, when it is coupled with the word "buildings" (b). If after imposing a rate on houses, buildings, works, tenements and hereditaments, an Act exempted "land," this word would be restricted to land unburthened with houses, buildings, or works; which would otherwise have been unnecessarily enumerated (c). In the 43 Eliz. c. 43, which imposed a poor rate on the occupiers of "lands," houses, tithes and "coal-mines," the same word was similarly limited in meaning as not including mines (d). (a) R. v. Cooke, 2 East, P. C. 617; R. v. Loom, 1 Moo. C. C. 160. (b) See ex. gr. Dewhurst v. Fielding, 7 M. & Gr. 182; Peto v. West Ham, 2 E. & E. 144, 28 L. (c) R. v. Midland R. Co., 4 E. & B. 953. (d) Lead Smelting Co. v. Richard The mention of one kind of mine shows that the Legislature understood the word "land," which in law comprehends all mines, as not including any. [So, where an act imposed certain taxation upon "every company or association whatever . except foreign insurances companies, banks and savings institutions," it was held, in denying the benefit of this exemption to building associations, as a species of savings institutions, that the legislative sense of the latter phrase as excluding building associations was clearly established by reference to other acts in pari materia, which, when intending to exempt building associations as well as the other institutions named, expressly mentioned the former, in addition to savings institutions; as, e. g., " and excepting also banks and savings institutions, building associations and foreign insurance companies," the court observing: "If the two classes were the same, of course they would not receive separate designations." And this construction was insisted upon, although, by it, the act referred to was made to repeal by implication an act passed at the same session of the Legislature, not two months previously, specifically exempting building associations from taxation.] In the same way, although the word "person," in the abstract, includes artificial persons, that is, corporations (a), the Statute of Uses which enacts that when a 66 person "stands seized of tenements to the use of another" person or body corporate," the latter" person or body" shall be deemed to be seized of them, is understood as using the word "person" in the former part of the sentence as not including a body corporate. Consequently, the statute does not apply where the legal seizin is in a corporation (b). The same construction was |