175 $504. Private Acts Requiring Judicial Notice.-[Even in the absence of such a general statutory direction, however, a private act may become entitled to judicial notice by a legislative declaration announcing it to be, or requiring it to be, taken as a public law; and where an act is so characterized by the Legislature, a supplement or amendment of it necessarily becomes a public law also, without any special declaration to that effect." Again, an act will become entitled to judicial notice, which otherwise would not be so, where it is expressly recognized" and amended" by a public one; or where the act itself, e. g., an act incorporating a bank, contains provisions for the forfeiture of penalties to the state, or the punishment of public offences in relation to it," as, where it makes the larceny of the notes of a bank incorporated by it felony. Nor is an act amending and extending the provisions of a general law over counties, not before subject to it, a private law. Moreover, a statute, local or private in many of its provisions, may contain a section which is of a public or general character, and to be noticed as such;18 and this, although its title indicates that it is a local act.188 130 181 179 8505. Construction of Private as Compared with Public Acts. [The rule as to the construction of private acts, as compared with that of public acts, has been laid down, in a recent case, as follows: "In the case of a public act, you construe it keeping in view the fact that it must be taken to have been. passed for the public advantage, and you apply certain fixed canons to its construction. In the case of a private act, which is obtained by persons for their own benefit, you construe more strictly provisions which they allege to be in 175 See Butler v. Robinson, 75 Mo. 192. 176 Unity v. Burrage, 103 U. S. 447; State v. Bergen, 34 N. J. L. 438; Stephens Co. v. R. R. Co., 33 Id. 229. 1 Rogers' Case, 2 Greenl. (Me.) 301; Gordon v. Montgomery, 19 Ind. 110. 178 Lavalle v. People, 6 Ill. App. 157. 179 Rogers' Case, supra. 180 U. S. v. Porte, 1 Cranch C. Ct. 369. 181 Third Nat. B'k v. Seneca Falls, 15 Fed. Rep. 783. 182 Bretz v. New York, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 258; 35 How. Pr. 130; McLain v. New York, 3 Daly (N. Y.) 32; Allentown v. Hower, 93 Pa. St. 332, 336. 183 McLain v. New York, supra: of course, in the absence of conflicting constitutional provisions. their favor, because the persons who obtain a private act ought to take care that it is so worded that that which they desire to obtain for themselves is plainly stated in it. But, when the construction is perfectly clear, there is no difference. between the modes of construing a private act and a public act." 184 The statute being plain and unambiguous, whether expressed in general or limited terms, there is no room for construction and no permissible resort to extrinsic facts to arrive at any other meaning, in the case of a private statute, any more than in that of a public one;" and, however difficult the construction of a private act may be, when once the court has arrived at the true construction, after having subjected it to the strictest criticism, the consequences are precisely the same as in the case of a public act. The moment you have arrived at the meaning of the Legislature, the effect is the same in the one case as in the other."186 Even where a statute involves the elements of a compact between the state and an individual, its construction must nevertheless proceed upon the principles regulating the construction of statutes, and not upon those applicable exclusively to the construction of contracts,-the contractual features of such an enactment being something apart by themselves and to be differently construed.187 184 Altrincham Union v. Cheshire Lines Committee, L. R. 15 Q. B. D. 597, 603, per Lord Esher, M. R. And see to same effect as the last clause: Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port. (Ala.) 266. 185 Bartlett v. Morris, supra; and see Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. U. S., 10 Ct. of Cl. 559, aff'd: 91 U. S. 72, holding, p. 91, that the consequences to the appellant were not to be considered. 186 Altrincham Union v. Cheshire Lines Committee, ubi supra. 187 Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. U. S., supra. Comp. Binghamton CHAPTER XVIII. ANALOGIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES AND THAT OF CONSTITUTIONS. § 506. General Analogies and Differences between Statutes and Constitutions. 507. Literal Construction. Technical and Popular Meaning. § 509. External Circumstances. History. Debates. § 511. Preamble. § 512. Titles or Captions of Articles, etc. § 513. Schedule. § 514. Context. Bill of Rights. $517. Superseded and Succeeding Constitutional Provisions. § 518. Expansion and Restriction by Reference to Subject Matter and Object. § 520. Presumption against Unnecessary Change of Law. § 521. Presumption against Evasion. § 522. Presumption against Ousting Jurisdiction. $523. Presumption against Interference with Federal Constitution. 524. Presumption against Injustice, Absurdity, etc. § 525. Presumption against Retrospective Operation. $526. Strict Construction. § 527. Usage, Contemporaneous and Legislative Construction. $529. Stare Decisis. § 530. Effect of Adoption of Adjudicated Provisions of Former or Other Constitutions. 531. Change of Language. 532. Associated Words and Clauses. § 533. Expressio Unius, etc. § 534. Computation of Time. § 535. Implications and Intendments. § 536. Imperative and Directory Provisions. 537. Waiver of Constitutional Provisions. Estoppel. § 538. Enactments and Contracts in Violation of Constitutional Provisions. § 539. Commencement. Self-executing Provisions. 506. General Analogies and Differences between Statutes and Constitutions. [The preceding parts of this work have dealt exclusively with the construction of statutes. It has not been, and is not, any part of its design to enter upon questions of constitutional law. Yet rules for the interpretation of constitutional provisions are so often, in judicial decisions, borrowed from cases of statutory construction, and conversely, that a brief indication of the analogies and differences recognized as existing between the principles applicable to the one and those applicable to the other seems indispensable, not only to complete the view taken of the interpretation of written laws, but to point out the limits within which the decisions upon the one class of cases may, and beyond which they may not, be invoked as authority upon questions arising in the other class. In the attempt to do this, the general arrangement of the subject in the foregoing chapters will be followed in the sections of this chapter. [In a general sense, it is undoubtedly true that a constitution is a law, differing from a statute in its paramount force in cases of conflict;' and consequently many of the rules applicable in the construction of statutes are necessarily equally so in the construction of constitutional provisions." But the constitution differs from the statutes of a state not only in being supreme over all of them. "Such instruments deal with larger topics and are couched in broader phrase than legislative acts or private muniments. They do not undertake to define with minute precision in the manner of the latter, and hence their just interpretation is not always reached by the application of similar methods." A constitution, which provides for the future as well as for the present, "is to be interpreted so as to carry out the great principles of government," and in the accomplishment of this end, the application of arbitrary rules of construction, justifiable and necessary in the interpretation of statutes, which serve a more detailed and ephemeral purpose, is to be resorted to "with hesitation, and only with much circumspection." 1 Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367; Bish., Wr. L., §§ 11a, 12, 16, 89, and cases cited; and post, note 12. 2 Bish., Wr. L., § 92, and cases there cited; Potter's Dwarris, 654; Sedgw., 19. 3 Houseman v. Com'th, 100 Pa. St. 222, 232, per Green, J. 4 Leonard v. Com'th, 112 Pa. St. 607, 620; Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 312, 316. 5 Com'th v. Clark, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 127, 133; Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. St. 322. 329. Cooley, Const. Lim., 101. And see Id. 73, 75; Story, Const., § 454. § 507. Literal Construction. Technical and Popular Meaning.— [Like other instruments, a constitution is entitled to a construction, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the intent of its makers, who, in this case, are the people themselves." Whilst, therefore, phrases that have acquired a settled meaning, thoroughly understood, not only in legal parlance, but in common acceptation, are to be given that significance when used in a constitution,'-such, e. g., as " due process of Moers v. Reading, 21 Pa. St. 188, 200; Hills v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 86; Hawkins v. Carroll Co., 50 Miss. 735. See Elton v. Geissert, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 330, infra, note 64, as to language, which, upon the ground of intention, was construed as abolishing an office; and Carpenter v. People, 8 Col. 116, where, to avoid the exclusion from a provision of a whole class expressly mentioned, the word "such was rejected. 8 See Hills v. Chicago, supra; Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 Ill. 34; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135; Cooley, Const. Lim., 68. Comp. Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367, where it is said to be a safe rule to give to terms used in the constitution such meaning and application as they have received from legislative and judicial interpretation, except in cases where it is apparent that a more general or restricted sense Was intended. Thus, in Williamson v. Lane, 52 Tex. 335, it was held that a contested election proceeding was not a" civil case "within the meaning of art. 5, § 6, of the Constitution limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to such cases; (see ante, § 74;) nor, of course, a "suit, complaint or plea,' within art. 5, § 8, where, with those words, is coupled the clause, "when the matter in controversy shall be valued at the amount of $500," etc. Nor does the prohibition of art. 2, § 12, of the Illinois constitution, against imprisonment for "debt," extend to actions for torts, nor to fincs or penalties under penal laws, but only to actions upon contracts, express or implied: Kennedy v People (Ill.), 11 West Rep. 48. (Comp. ante, § 76). In construing prohibitions against, or limitations upon, local or special" legislation, it has been said that a law is said to be local and special . . . not because of the... Constitution, or of any decision under it, but because it falls within the proper definition of a local law both before and since" the adoption of the constitution : Evans v. Phillippi (Pa.), 9 Centr. Rep. 691, 693; and, consequently, in that case, as well as in Bitting v. Com'th (Pa.) Id. 693, it was held that a statute, general in form, was not to be treated as a local or special one, because its application to some portions of the state was prevented by the existence of local laws, enacted before the adoption of the constitution, unrepealed by the statute, or expressly saved by it. [Comp. State v. Camden (N. J.), Id. 497, where a general law, in terms applying to all cities, was held to repeal a special provision formerly in force as to one: see Burke v. Jeffries, 20 Iowa, 145; People v. West Chester, 40 Hun (N. Y.) 353, ante, § 228; because, otherwise, the act would violate the constitutional prohibition of special legislation,-a design not to be imputed to the Legisla ture: ante, § 178; State v. Intox. Liquors, (Me.) 5 New Engl. Rep. 852; Stump v. Hornback, (Mo.) 6 S. West. Rep. 356.] And in Montague v. State, 54 Md. 481, an act adding husbands to the class of persons exempt from the operation of the collateral inheritance tax law, and making the exemption applicable to all such claims not actually paid, was held to be a public and general law, and the fact that the consideration of a particular individual's case proba |