CHAPTER III. TITLE, MARGINAL NOTES, PUNCTUATION, PREAMBLE, SCHED § 58. Title. ULE, ETC. § 59. Effect of Constitutional Requirements as to Title. $60. Marginal notes. § 61. Punctuation. § 62. Preamble. § 67. Matters Similar to Preamble. Recital. § 68. Reports of Committees. Petitions. Maps. § 71. Schedule. § 72. Resumé. § 58. Title. It has long been established [in England] by numerous judical decisions or dicta, from Lord Coke's to the present time, that [the title of a statute] is not a part of the statute, and is to be therefore, excluded from consideration in construing the statute. "The title cannot be resorted to," says Lord Cottenham, " in construing the enactment." (a) "The title, though it has occasionally been referred to as aiding in the construction of an act, is certainly no part of the law," it is said by the Court of Exchequer, in a wellknown and considered judgment, "and, in strictness ought not to be taken into consideration at all" (b). And Lord (a) Hunter v. Nockolds, 1 McN. & Gord. 651. (b) Per Cur. in Salkeld v. Johnson, 2 Ex. 283, citing Lord Coke in Powlter's Case, 11 Rep. 336: ["As to the style or title of the act, that is no parcel of the act, and ancient statutes were without any title, and many acts are of greater extent than the titles are."] Lord Holt in Mills v. Wilkins, 6 Mod. 62; Lord Hardwicke in Atty. Genl. v. Weymouth, Ambl. 22: ["The title is no part of the act, and has often been determined not to be so, nor ought it to be taken into consideration in the construction of an act, for origi nally there were no titles to the acts, but only a petition and the King's answer; and the judges thereupon drew up the act into form and then added the title; and the title does not pass the same forms as the rest of the act, only the Speaker, after the act is passed, mentions the title and puts the question upon it; therefore the meaning of the act is not to be inferred from the title."] Lord Mansfield in R. v. Williams, 1 W. Bl. 95. See also Chance v. Adams, Denman remarked that the Court had often laid that down (a). [In this country, whilst the title of a statute is not, in general, regarded as a part of the same,' it is nevertheless regarded as a legitimate aid in ascertaining the intention of the Legislature when the language and provisions in the body of the act are ambiguous and of doubtful meaning and application; as, for example, where a statute purported, in its body, to correct schedule M of section 25 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and section 25 had no schedule M, a reference to the title, an act to "correct an error in section 2504 of the Revised Statutes," etc., was held permissible to explain and rectify an obvious error.' $ 59. Effect of Constitutional Requirements as to Title.—[The propriety of such reference is especially manifest where the title is referred to in the body of the act, and all the more justifiable, in cases of uncertainty, where the constitution 1 Lord Raym. 77; and per Byles, (a) R. v. Wilcock, 7 Q. B. 329. The rule has not, indeed, been invariably observed. See ex. gr. R. v. Wright, 1 A. & E. 446; Alexander v. Newman, 2 C. B. 141; Taylor v. Newman, 4 Best. & S. 93, 32 L. J. 189; Rawley v. Rawley, 1 Q. B. D. 466; Bentley v. Rotheram, 4 Ch. D. 588; for the mind, when laboring to discover the design of the Legislature, natually seizes on everything from which aid can be derived. Per Cur. in U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 386; U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 631. [See People v. Shoonmaker, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 49.] It has even been occasionally asserted that its title was part of a Statute, and was not to be disregarded in construing it. See Brett v. Brett, 3 Addams, Ec. 217; Hinton v. Dibben, 2 Q. B. 663, per Cur.: Wilmot v. Rose, 3 E. & B. 576, 23 L. J. 281, per Lord Campbell: Free v. Burgoyne, 2 Bligh N. S. 78; Blake v. Midland R., 18 Q. B. 109; Johnson v. Upham, 2 E. & E. 263; Allkins v. Jupe, 2 C. P. D. 383 ; and Coomber v. Berks, 9 Q. B. D. 26. But it does not seem that on those occasions, attention was directed to the established rule. See Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, 584; Plummer v. People, 74 Ill. 361; Com'th v. Slifer, 53 Pa. St. 71; McFate's App., 105 Id. 323, 326; Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Cal. 195; Bradford v. Jones, 1 Md. 351; Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 469; Garrigus v. Com'rs, 39 Ind. 66; State v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 334; State v. Welsh, 3 Hawks (N. C.) 404; Eastman v. Mc Alpin, 1 Ga. 157; and see cases in succeeding notes. See U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Hines v. R. R. Co., 95 N. C. 434; and see cases in preceding 9910 gives significance and assigns particular importance to the title by requiring that a statute shall contain but one subject, and that it shall be expressed in the title." It is indeed said, that, under a constitutional prohibition against more than one subject in any statute and a requirement of its clear expression in the title, the latter necessarily becomes a part of the statute," and aids, if need be, in its construction," as "a very important guide to its right construction." But, unless the constitution imperatively prescribes a different relation between the title and the body of the act, the rule remains that the former may be consulted in aid of the interpretation of the latter, only in cases of ambiguity and uncertainty in its provisions, in aid "if need be """ of their construction. It can never control the plain and unambiguous meaning of the language of the statute," nor be used to extend or restrain its positive provisions;" so that, even in the interpretation of a penal law, if the words of the enacting clause are broader than the title, the former must govern." This rule, however, under constitutions containing a provision such as above indicated, is subject to an apparent exception. The subject matter being required to be expressed in the title, if the language of the act were broader than the fair meaning of the words of the title, but could be, reasonably and without doing positive violence to the letter, so construed as to bring it within the title, thus avoiding the failure of the entire statute or some of its provisions as unconstitutional, it probably would, upon a principle to be hereafter examined," be so construed. In that way it may in a certain sense, become practically true, that, under such a constitutional provision, the title may control the statute or some portion of it;" i. e., it may narrow it. Where, however, the title is so defective as to render the act void, it would seem to be scarcely accurate to say that the title controls the statute or its construction; and so, where a portion of the statute consisting of a second subject, not expressed in the title, should have to be rejected as unconstitutional. In such cases, in the first the whole statute, in the second that portion not covered by the title, would simply be void, and could never, therefore, become, properly speaking, the subject of judicial construction." But, there being no difficulty as to the sufficiency of the title to comprehend the subject matter of a statute, it is said, that, whilst the title alone is not to be regarded as a safe expositor of the law, it may be presumed, in the absence of plain contradiction by the terms of the body of the act, to express its true intent and meaning." In case of such plain contradiction, it is inferable from the decisions, that the construction of the language of the act would have to remain unaided by the title, even though the result be the avoidance of the statute, or some portion of it, on the ground of unconstitutionality. § 60. Marginal Notes.-[The marginal notes printed by the official printer in connection with the several sections of a statute, have been held to form no part of those sections, or of the statute, so as to throw light upon the question of construction." Nor, when they appear on the rolls of the Legislature itself, as, since 1849, they do in England, are they to be regarded as forming part of the enactment, or as binding as an explanation or as a construction of the same." They are merely abstracts of the clauses, intended 15 See Nazro v. Merchants', etc. Co., 14 Wis. 295; Dodd v. State, 18 Ind. 56. 16 See ante, § 1, note 1. 17 Connecticut, &c., Ins. Co. v. Albert, 39 Mo. 181. 18 Clagdon v. Green, L. R. 2 C. P. 521; Birtwhistle v. Vardill, 7 Cl. & Fin. 895, 929. 19 Atty-Gen. v. G. E. R. R. Co., L. R. 11 Ch. D. 449; Sutton v. Sutton, L. R. 22 Ch. D. 513, overruling In re Venour, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 522, where it was intimated that such marginal notes now formed part of the act and might be used for the purpose of interpreting it, Jessel, M. R., saying, at p. 525, that, within his knowledge, they had been the subject of motion and amendment; a statement at variance with that of Baggallay, L. J., in Atty-Gen. v. G. E. R. R. Co., supra, at p. 461: "I never knew an amendment set down or discussed upon the marginal note to a clause. The House of Commons never has anything to do to catch the eye," and to make the task of reference easier and more expeditions." But it was said, in one case, that, where a marginal note, instead of being a mere abstract of a section, gave express directions as to the form of an order which it accompanied, and was on the margin of the legis lative roll, it was to be held a part of the statute," and the effect of marginal references, in a revision to the original acts has already been noticed." 25 § 61. Punctuation.-[The effect of punctuation in a statute, as an element in its construction, is not determined by the courts with absolute uniformity. It has been repeatedly asserted that punctuation is no part of a statute;" that there is no punctuation in it which ought to control its interpretation; that it is not to be regarded in construction; or, at any rate, may be properly disregarded," and that an erroneous punctuation of a statute, in printing it, onght not to be allowed an effect which would lead to an absurdity." Hence, a comina may be transferred from after a word to before it, to effectuate the obvious intent of the statute;" or carried back several words, in order to prevent the sacrifice of a material and significant word;" or inserted for a similar purpose, as in the phrase "stolen or taken by robbers."" 28 [On the other hand, it has been said, that, whilst not a decisive test of construction, the punctuation in a statute may yet be some indication of its meaning;" and that that meaning may often be determined from the punctuation." with the amendment of the marginal note. I never knew a marginal note considered by the House of Commons." 20 Ibid., at p. 465. 21 Wilb., Stat. Law, p. 294. "R. v. Milverton, 5 A. & E. 841. 23 See ante, § 51; Nicholson v. Mobile, etc., R. R. Co., 49 Ala. 205. 24 Hammock v. Loan Co., 105 U. S. 77. 25 Gyger's Est.. 65 Pa. St. 311, 312; Com'th v. Shopp, 1 Woodw. (Pa.) 123, 129. See also U. S. v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 502. 26 Cushing v. Worrick, 9 Gray (Mass.) 382. 27 Martin v. Gleason, 139 Mass. 183; Albright v. Payne, 43 Ohio St. 8; Shriedley v. State, 23 Id. 130; Hamilton v. The R. B. Hamilton, 16 Id. 428. 28 Randolph v. Bayne, 44 Cal. 366. 29 Albright v. Payne, supra. 30 Com'th v. Shopp, supra. 31 Shriedley v. State, supra; and compare ante, § 33, McPhail v. Gerry, 55 Vt. 174. 32 U. S. v. Three R. R. Cars, 1 Abb. U. S. 196. And See Albright v. Payne, 43 Ohio St. 8. 33 Squires' Case, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 38. |