cation. Thus, where the courts of Indiana had determined, that, under a certain provision of the constitution of that state, special or local laws could not be enacted by the Legislature where a general law could be made to accomplish the purpose, whilst that interpretation was adopted by the courts of Nevada upon an incorporation of the same provision in the constitution of the latter state, its application by the Indiana courts to the subject of the removal of a county seat, was not accepted by those of Nevada. ---- 195 § 531. Change of Language.-[Slight changes in the phraseology of a later, as compared with that of an earlier, provision would seem, on account of the necessary generality of language, to be of even less significance in a constitution than in a statute.' Thus, in Pennsylvania, the constitution of 1776 provided that "the members of the General Assembly shall receive such wages and mileage for regular and special sessions, as shall be fixed by law;" the constitution of 1790 changed the word "wages" to "compensation:"19" the senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their services to be ascertained by law;" the constitution of 1838 left this clause unaltered; but that of 1874 provided that "the members of the General Assembly shall receive such salary and mileage for regular and special sessions as shall be fixed by law," and added: " and no other compensa tion whatever." It was held that the phraseology, throughout, was substantially synonymous; that the change therein was 194 Hess v. Pegg, supra. 195 See ante, §§ 378, et seq. Where the earlier constitution had made each branch of the Legislature the judge of the "qualifications" of its members, and the later authorized it to judge of "the election and qualifications" of the members, it was said: While the addition of the word 46 election may not give to the house any power which it might not have exercised under authority to judge of the qualifications" of its members, it clearly shows an intention not to restrict the legislative power" Re Cont. Election of McNeill, 111 Pa. St. 235, 241. But see note 179. From the adoption not intended to make any change in the rule; and that consequently an act fixing the salary of members of the Legislature at $1000 for a session of a hundred days, and allowing an additional compensation of $10 per day for the time necessarily spent in service after the expiration of the hundred days, was not, as to the latter provision, a violation of the constitution. Similarly, the difference, between the phraseology of a saving clause in an amended constitution, providing that all laws not inconsistent therewith, all rights, actions, etc., should continue as if the said alterations and amendments had not been made," and that of a subsequent new constitution, "as if this constitution had not been adopted," was treated as insignificant in the determination of the question whether or not the latter was, similarly to the former, to be regarded as, in fact, a mere amendment of the constitution previously in force.' 198 8532. Associated Words and Clauses.-[Principles of common sense, applicable to the construction of statutes, are, of course, equally applicable to that of constitutions. Such is the rule embodied in the phrase noscuntur a sociis." Thus, in a provision that "county officers shall consist of sheriffs, prothonotaries, registers of wills, recorders of deeds, commissioners, treasurers, surveyors, auditors or controllers, clerks of the courts, district attorneys," etc., it was said that "the fair import of the language' anditors or controllers,' admits of one construction only. It assumes that each substantially exercises the same powers and performs the same duties."""" Again, the fact that the words giving the governor the power of filling vacancies in offices were coupled with words indicating the necessity of the senate's acting thereon, would show that only vacancies in such offices as require the senate's confirmation were intended.201 A provision requiring muni 202 cipalities, when incurring indebtedness, to provide for the collection of an annual tax "sufficient to pay the interest and also the principal thereof in thirty years," clearly applies only to an indebtedness which is contracted by the municipality itself, and, for some definite period, is interest-bearing, and not to incidental and ordinary expenses, e. g., for the making and repairing of township roads." And so, where the limitations contained in the first clause of a section clearly related only to the conferring of rights upon individuals, other similar limitations contained in the second clanse were held to be manifestly directed to the same object, and not to apply to municipal corporations. Nor would a provision forbidding the creation, renewal or extension of charters, in a section relating to corporations" with banking or discounting privileges," extend to such as had no such powers, e. g., to municipal corporations, or building associations.205 20 203 [It may be here observed, also, that, in a provision that "all courts of record and all existing courts, which are not specified in this constitution, shall continue," etc., the relative clause was held applicable to both the antecedent terms, not only the one immediately preceding it." 206 207 533. Expressio Unius, etc.-[The maxim Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, in the sense in which, as has been seen, it is properly applicable to the construction of statutes, is equally so in the interpretation of constitutional provisions. Thus, where such a provision gave the right to tax "merchants, peddlers and privileges," it was said to be clear that neither of the first two words included that which the third made subject to taxation. It was said, however, by a late 208 of the price for present payment, or the usual lending of money by building associations, but in the sense in which it is commonly understood, its banking sense, confined to dealing in promissory notes, bills of exchange, or other negotiable paper: Schober v. S. F. & L. Ass'n, supra, at pp. 229, 230. 206 Com'th v. Hartranft, 77 Pa St. 154, 155. See ante, § 414. 207 Ante, SS 397, et seq. 208 Jenkins v. Ewin, 8 Heisk. chief justice of Pennsylvania: "The expression of one thing in the constitution, is necessarily the exclusion of things not expressed. This I regard as especially true of constitutional provisions, declaratory in their nature. The remark of Lord Bacon, 'that, as exceptions strengthen the force of a general law, so enumeration weakens, as to things not enumerated,' expresses a principle of common law applicable to the constitution." No doubt, "when the constitution defines the circumstances under which a right may be exercised or a penalty imposed, the specification is an implied prohibition against legislative interference to add to the condition, or to extend the penalty to other cases."" But this proceeds upon the principle, that, where a right is given and the conditions of its exercise are prescribed by a superior power, an inferior one charged with acting under and in accordance with it cannot vary or add to those conditions, a principle obviously alike applicable whether the superior power be the people themselves and the governing rule the constitution, or whether the superior power be the Legislature and the governing rule a statute."" Except in the sense above indicated," the maxim referred to can certainly not be deemed to be a principle of universal application in the construction of constitutions, any more than of statutes."" (Tenn.) 456. So, in the case of the Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, the definition of the word "foreign," as excluding Indian, nations was arrived at (p. 19), at least in part, by reference to the provision conferring on Congress power to regulate commerce "with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes," in which the particular mention of the latter was held clearly to exclude them from the more general phrase "foreign nations," under which it was claimed they were, and admitted they might be, comprehended. See § 514, n. 71. 209 Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338, 346, per Thompson, C. J. See, also, State v. Taylor, 15 Ohio St. 137, ante, § 513. 210 Cooley, C. L., 78, citing, among other cases, Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189, where it was held incompetent for the Legisla 94. 212 See Jenkins v. Ewin, supra. 213 People v. Wright, 6 Col. 92, Whilst its application in the other sense may, to a limited extent, comport with the general theory of the federal constitution, as a delegation of express powers in which all that is not granted is to be deemed withheld, it is utterly at variance with the theory of state constitutions, which are limitations upon the powers of government, and under which whatever power is not denied is deemed to exist." To give but a single illustration where instances might be multiplied indefinitely: where a constitution authorized and directed the Legislature to provide by law for "the establishment of schools throughout the state, in such manner that the poor may be taught gratis," it was held that the provision did not (as, upon the principle expressio unius, etc., in its misconceived sense, it undoubtedly would) imply a limitation upon the power of the Legislature to establish a common school system, free to the rich as well as the poor." 534. Computation of Time.-[The rules for the computation of time under constitutional provisions do not differ, in the various states, from those there recognized as applicable to the same purpose under statutes. Thus, under provisions requiring the governor to return bills presented to him for approval within a certain number of days, it is in general held that the first is to be excluded, and the last to be included in the computation." A "day" in common acceptation, and ordinarily in a constitution, means a civil day of twenty-four 215 Com'th v. Hartman, 17 Pa. St. 118. 216 Price v. Whitman, 8 Cal. 412; Iron Man. Co. v. Haight, 39 ld. 540; People v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9; Corwin v. Comptr.-Gen., 6 Rich. (S. C.) 390. The constitutions of Illinois and South Carolina except Sundays from the computation. See, under a limitation to five days, Sundays excepted, Op. of Just., 45 N. II. 607, where it was held that a bill sent to the gov ernor on Wednesday, Aug. 17, and returned with his veto on Wednesday, Aug. 24, was a valid law, although the bill did not actually come into the governor's hands until Aug. 18, and on Monday, Aug. 22, neither house was in session. (It is intimated in that case, also, that, where at the time of the adoption of a constitution a certain method of computing time is recognized, it applies to computations under constitutional provis ions; but whether a statutory change in the rule would also apply to the constitution is doubted: p. 607.) A three days' limitation upon the right of either branch of the Legislature to adjourn seems to be exclusive of Sundays: Buckelew, Const. of Pa., p. 52. And see Id., pp. 195-196, as to computation of time generally under the Pa. Constitution. |